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Abstract 
 
Over the years, truth commissions have become an appealing mechanism for dealing with 
large scale human rights violations. One of the reasons for this is that they avail varied 
opportunities for approaching the many shades of grey that characterise most conflicts. 
The mandates have also evolved beyond establishing the truth. It is now common for truth 
commissions to propose reparations programmes for victims as part of its 
recommendations. However, considering that truth commissions are temporary 
establishments with limited time frames and restrictive mandates, what is the future of 
the recommendations they propose in their reports? To further compound this situation, 
there is often a considerably diminished interest in the issues truth commissions raise in 
the post- truth commission phase. 
 
The objective of this research is to study the recommendations relating to reparations 
that truth commissions have issued. It examines how different stakeholders respond to 
the recommendations and the frameworks that have been set up (or not) to follow-up and 
implement specific recommendations. 
 
Two case studies, Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Ghana National 
Reconciliation Commission are selected. Whereas these two cases both recommended 
reparations for victims, different approaches for the follow-up were instituted, both in the 
reports and during the post- truth-commission phase. How is this related to the actual 
realities on the ground with regard to victims’ reparations? This research takes on four 
major issues in relation to truth commissions and reparations: the inclusion or omission 
of reparations in the mandate of truth commissions; the content of the recommendations 
(what reparation, and for who); the follow-up of the recommendations (agencies and 
frameworks) and, the relevance of truth commissions in making recommendations for 
victims’ reparations. 
 
The research describes the different contexts for the inclusion of reparations within truth 
commissions and strategies for their implementation, and to this end, it proposes a model 
for studying the follow-up of recommendations on reparations made by truth 
commissions. 
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Abstract 
 
In de loop der jaren zijn waarheidscommissies een aantrekkelijk instrument geworden 
om schendingen van de mensenrechten op grote schaal, aan te pakken. Eén van de 
redenen hiervoor is dat ze meer kansen creëeren om om te gaan met de vele tinten grijs 
die de meeste conflicten karakteriseren. Het mandaat is ook geëvolueerd tot ver buiten 
de vaststelling van de waarheid. Het is nu een normaliteit geworden voor 
waarheidscommissies om aan de slachtoffers maatregelen of herstelprogramma's voor te 
stellen als een onderdeel van hun aanbevelingen. Maar toch, als we in gedachten houden 
dat waarheidscommissies slechts tijdelijke instellingen met een beperkt tijdskader en 
mandaat zijn, moeten we ons de vraag stellen wat de toekomst is van de aanbevelingen 
in de rapporten. Om deze situatie nog verder samen te vatten: niet zelden heerst er een 
sterk verminderde interesse in het onderwerp dat wordt aangesneden in de post-
waarheidscommissie fase.  
 
Het doel van dit onderzoek is de aanbevelingen te bestuderen die verband houden met de 
herstelmaatregelen die de waarheidscommissies hebben voorgesteld. Het is een 
onderzoek naar de reacties van de verschillende belanghebbenden op de aanbevelingen 
en de kaders die al dan niet geïmplementeerd werden om specifieke aanbevelingen op te 
volgen en uit te voeren. 
 
Twee gevalstudies werden geslecteerd: Sierra Leone's Waarheids- en 
Verzoeningscommissie en Ghana's Nationale Verzoeningscommissie. Hoewel deze twee 
commissies allebei herstelmaatregelen voor de slachoffers aanbevolen, werden 
verschillende benaderingen voor de opvolging ingesteld, zowel in de rapporten als tijdens 
de post-waarheidscommissie fase. Hoe houdt dit verband met de werkelijkheid ter plaatse 
als het op herstellingen voor de slachoffers aankomt? Dit onderzoek richt zich op vier 
grote onderwerpen binnen de waarheidscommissies en de herstellingen: de inclusie of 
omissie van herstelmaatregelen binnen het mandaat van de waarheidscommissies; de 
inhoud van de aanbevelingen (welk herstel, voor wie en naar wie?); de opvolging van de 
aanbevelingen (instellingen en kader); en de relevantie van waarheidscommissies in de 
vaststelling van aanbevelingen voor het herstel van slachtoffers.  
 
Het onderzoek beschrijft de verschillende contexten voor de inclusie van 
herstelmaatregelen binnen waarheidscommissies en de strategieën voor hun 
implementatie. Hiertoe stelt het een model voor om de opvolging van de aanbevelingen 
voor herstelmaatregelen door waarheidscommissies te bestuderen.  
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“If I receive it [reparation], I will thank God. 
If I don’t, I will put my complain to God. 
Because I suffered, why should I not get the benefit?” 
(Other war wounded victim, Free Town) 
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 3 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Societies emerging from genocide, civil war or authoritarian regimes are often faced 
with complex relationships and compromised institutions. One of the priorities of the 
new regimes is how to deal with the history of violations and transition into more 
stable and democratic states. Transitions can be delicate and fragile processes and 
whether societies are emerging from a war or repressive regime, one of the 
fundamental concerns is how the needs of the different actors are adequately 
accommodated (Posner & Vermeule, 2003). This is a process involving bargains, 
compromises and concessions. The outcomes of these processes are not only 
significant in the immediate aftermath of the transition but continue to remain relevant 
long after the actual process.   
 
The concept of Transitional Justice (TJ) emerged from the 1980s as a body of theory 
and practice to explain and understand how societies deal with the past atrocities. 
According to the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) both judicial and 
non-judicial mechanisms have typically been implemented. These include; truth 
seeking, reparation, criminal prosecution and institutional reforms (International 
Centre for Transitional Justice, n.d.). This study focuses on two of these mechanisms, 
truth seeking through the practice of truth commissions and reparations through the 
recommendations made by the truth commissions.  
 
The study explores the linkages between the two mechanisms by analysing what 
happens to the recommendations on reparations made by the truth commissions 
following the end of the truth commission process. It explores the issues of compliance 
and/or noncompliance and the interactions of the different stakeholders involved in 
the design and implementation of the reparation programmes.  
 
The recommendations on reparation originating from truth commissions are 
presumed to reflect the perceptions of the victims. Truth commissions further maintain 
a strong claim to tailoring the recommendations as closely as possible to the needs of 
the victims. Additionally, many of the recommendations are a result of extensive 
consultation and are therefore framed with the expectation that they will be easily and 
quickly implemented. However, the implementation record of various truth 
commissions’ recommendations on reparations presents a different story. 
4 
 
One subject that remains largely uncharted in TJ in general and more specific to truth 
commissions is the implementation of the recommendations, notably, what happens to 
the grand designs orchestrated through these processes? It is an all too common 
scenario in virtually all post conflict countries. There is significant interest in the 
periods during and after a transition. There is often an outpouring of expatriates, 
academicians, researchers, NGO workers, among others and a mushrooming of local 
and international NGOs. TJ as a practice however is not an indefinite process and its 
mechanisms and practitioners have time lines. They may set the ball rolling for further 
development and reconstruction processes but as individual mechanisms, time comes 
and they end. There are certain exceptions which have evolved into permanent 
structures such as the Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission which 
became a permanent body, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone which is now the 
Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone following the closure of the Special Court in 
2013. Despite their continuity, the role and interest of the newer institutions also 
evolved from the frameworks for which they were initially established.  
 
Newer conflicts are continually emerging causing the interest to shift to the newer 
challenges. In the rush to catch the next big thing in conflict, there is a relegation of the 
processes that were started in the former conflict areas, an aspect that has resulted 
into less systematic follow up studies.  
 
This study therefore contributes to the TJ field by building on the debates on the 
interconnectedness of TJ processes. It focuses on the post-truth commission phase by 
following up on the processes and status of the recommendations on reparations made 
by truth commissions. The central question of the study is “what happens to the 
recommendations on reparations made by truth commissions after the completion of the 
commission?”  This is broken down into six sub-questions: 
a. To what extent did the question of reparation feature in the discussions on 
Transitional Justice measures?  
b. What do truth commissions mean when they refer to reparations? 
c. What are the determinants for the inclusion or non-inclusion of follow up 
frameworks? 
d. To what degree have the proposals on reparation been implemented? 
e. To what extent can the understanding of truth and reparations within 
criminology be applied to truth commissions and reparation programmes? 
 5 
f. To what extent can implementation studies contribute to the study of 
implementation in TJ? 
 
Using the cases of Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Ghana 
National Reconciliation Commission, it examines the issues of compliance and/or 
noncompliance and the responses of the different stakeholders to the 
recommendations on reparation.  
 
A qualitative approach that involved in-depth interviews with purposely selected 
respondents was undertaken. Through this analysis, the study develops a framework 
that could be used to study how the recommendations on reparations made by truth 
commissions are implemented.  
 
This dissertation is divided into five parts and twelve chapters. Part I presents the 
general setting of the study. Chapter 1 explains the background to the research and 
addresses the methodological choices of the study. 
 
Part II explores the theoretical constructions. In Chapter 2, a general TJ framework is 
presented which is eventually narrowed down to the two mechanisms of truth 
commissions and reparations and how these have been linked through truth 
commissions including reparations as part of their recommendations.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with how the implementation of truth commission recommendations 
on reparation has been addressed in existing TJ literature. The study in general 
identifies two angles which have been discussed. The first angle identifies a set of 
criteria that needs to be considered when designing reparation programmes (de Greiff, 
2006b; Magarrell, 2007; Roht-Arriaza, 2004). The assumption is that such criteria will 
result in a more comprehensive programme. The second angle identifies elements that 
impact the implementation of reparation programmes. The focus of these studies has 
mainly been on identifying and proposing strategies to maximise the possibility of the 
implementation process happening. In response to these approaches, the study 
proposes a third approach to studying implementation. It calls for an integrated 
approach that views implementation not as an isolated activity but as a process that 
takes into account the totality of experiences from design to output. It therefore 
discusses elements in the pre-truth commission, during truth commission and post-
truth commission that contribute to compliance and/or non-compliance to the 
recommendations on reparation. 
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In Chapter 4, the study examines the linkage between TJ and criminology. Despite the 
cross cutting theme of ‘crime’, criminology has not made significant strides in 
addressing international crimes while a number of TJ scholarship does not recognise 
the criminological orientation. This chapter therefore explores issues such as the 
position of international crimes in the field of criminology and how it is conceptualised 
and explained. It draws on the argument that criminology has specialised on 
understanding crime and is therefore relevant in offering this specialised knowledge 
in the field of TJ and international crimes (Parmentier, 2011). It however limits the 
exploration to the concepts of truth and reparation and how these have been 
understood and utilised within criminology and the significance it presents to TJ. 
 
Part III presents the case studies. It offers a historical background of TJ in each case and 
shows that despite making use of a similar mechanism, the context and processes that 
led to the adoption of the TJ and reparation programme vary significantly. The 
trajectory of each case also had an impact on the post-truth commission phase. Chapter 
5 considers the case of Ghana whereas the Sierra Leone case is discussed in chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 synthesises the two cases by applying the proposed integrated approach to 
studying implementation of the TRC recommendations on reparation. It however 
argues that focusing on the secondary literature results in a number of limitations 
particularly on the diverse interpretations from different stakeholders. Both cases 
have also had a limited examination of the post-truth commission implementation of 
the recommendations on reparations and as such detailed literature on the process and 
status of reparation is lacking. 
 
In Part IV, the results of the empirical study is presented. It analyses the responses of 
the different actors around the issue of the truth commission, reparations and the 
implementation of the reparations. Chapter 8 focuses on Ghana and the Ghana National 
Reconciliation Commission whereas chapter 9 discusses Sierra Leone and the Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Chapter 10 compares the cases by 
presenting the salient issues observed from the field while linking them to the 
proposed integrated approach for studying implementation.  
 
Part V focuses on implementation studies. In Chapter 11, a general discussion on 
implementation is conducted through which the context in which to place the study of 
the implementation of truth commission recommendations on reparation is identified. 
Chapter 12 elaborates the proposed framework for studying the implementation of 
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truth commission recommendation on reparations. It identifies and discusses the 
variables pertinent to studying implementation using the integrated framework by 
referencing to the truth commission cases of Ghana and Sierra Leone.  
The last part consists of the conclusions and general recommendations. In the 
conclusions, the general significance of the study is reiterated. It also presents a 
summary of the key issues identified in each chapter.   
 
The recommendations contains five proposals;  
First, more scholarly and practitioner focus on post-truth commission programmes 
concerning reparation. This could be facilitated by directing funds and grants for 
research to institutions to specialise on following up the processes set up by the 
commissions.  
 
Second, longitudinal studies of truth commissions that take into account the before, 
during and after processes would provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
dynamics of the mechanism and therefore the implementation of the 
recommendations. 
 
Third, a long term approach to the mechanism of truth commissions. This could be 
achieved by recognising and encouraging local capacity, ownership and direction of the 
process. Truth commissions need to be locally driven in a bottom-up process with the 
local actors actively defining the process.  
 
Fourth, an empirical application of the proposed framework for studying truth 
commissions. The framework in the study was developed after identifying the gaps in 
TJ and implementation studies literature following both the literature review and field 
work. It also focuses on only two cases. It would be beneficial to test its applicability to 
other cases as well. 
 
Fifth, integrate a victim-centred implementation process that addresses the nuances of 
victims groups and needs. Such a process should involve victims as active participants. 
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“Da mi sista wae na trenja” 
(Female, Freetown) 
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CHAPTER 1.  BACKGROUND AND METHODS  
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the general setting of the study. It first introduces the research 
topic by discussing the background to the research and thereafter discusses the 
methodological deliberations undertaken. It aims to explain how specific decisions in 
the study were reached at. The strategic choices in selecting an appropriate research 
design are not only critical for establishing focus but also for ensuring quality of the 
research. Silverman (2005), Punch (1998) and Palys & Atchison (2008) argue that the 
choices of which method to employ largely depends on what the researcher is trying to 
investigate. It is therefore essential to adequately prepare prior to immersing oneself 
in the data that could potentially emerge.  
 
1.1 Background to the research 
 
Since the first truth commissions in the 1970s and 1980s, they have grown in 
popularity as a TJ mechanism and subject of scholarly research. One area to which 
limited attention has however been paid is the post-truth commission phase, 
specifically empirical research into the follow up and implementation of their 
recommendations. Nevertheless, reference has over time been made to the issue of 
implementations. As discussed below, this is usually in the context of emphasising the 
need to carry out implementation of the recommendations of truth commissions. 
 
In 1996, Hayner raised the issue of the continuity of the work of truth commissions 
once they have completed their mandate in two publications. In the first one, she 
argues that truth commissions should include “the power to make recommendations” 
in their mandates which “can be expected to be given serious consideration.” She 
further briefly raises the issue of “follow-up activities or policies [that can] put a truth 
commission report to best use and contribute to reconciliation”(Hayner, 1996a, p. 25). 
She argues that the implementation of the recommendations could contribute to a 
reconciliation process but often the recommendations are viewed as “optional” and not 
carried out (p. 28).  
 
In the second publication, Hayner (1996b) proposes a set of guidelines for the 
establishment of truth commissions in which she details a set of minimal requirements 
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for their operation. On the issue of the implementation of the recommendations, she 
argues that “While there might be no prior commitment to implement the 
recommendation of a commission, there should be good faith that the government, and 
the opposition, where relevant, will give serious consideration to its recommendations 
and give credence to its findings” (p. 180). Granted that this is a preliminary guideline, 
the mention of implementation is very brief and the future of the implementation is 
painted as uncertain where a commitment to implement is dependent on the “good 
faith” of the relevant stakeholders.   
 
The UN in 2006 released a report on rule of law tools for post conflict states focusing 
on truth commissions. They accurately point out that once a truth commission has been 
formally dissolved, the relevant bodies face an uphill task of implementing the 
recommendations. Implementation success however is reliant on a number of political, 
social and economic factors and requires a carefully thought through follow up and 
implementation structure including effectively lobbying the government to ensure that 
such a structure is set up (United Nations, 2006c).  The emphasis for this report 
however lies in how to guarantee that the next step of implementation is taken up by 
relevant bodies. Likewise, in 2013, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of 
truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence reiterated the challenges 
faced in the implementation of truth commission recommendations and highlighted 
how to strengthen the truth commission mechanism to address human rights 
violations (United Nations, 2013). 
 
The Amnesty report on establishing an effective truth commission contains a chapter 
on building the future of truth commissions. In it, they  argue for the publication and 
dissemination of the report, making recommendations on prosecutions and 
reparations and designating a successor body to “monitor the implementations … 
continue investigations [and] preserve the archives” (Amnesty International, 2007b, p. 
40). However, as with the previous publications, there is an emphasis on the 
importance of implementation of the recommendations but no detailed analysis of how 
this has been done. 
 
In later publications, although the monitoring of implementation aspect is addressed, 
this is limited to pointing out that a rigorous approach to monitoring the performance 
of relevant stakeholders in implementing the report needs to be adopted (Hayner, 
2011; González & Varney, 2013; González, 2013). However, there is no framework or 
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empirical research for studying how these stakeholders are observing their 
responsibilities 
 
Despite many of these publications emphasising that states and other stakeholders 
“disseminate, implement, and monitor implementation of the recommendations of 
non-judicial mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation commission” (UN 
Commission on Human Rights, 2005: Para 3), there is limited systematic study 
following up the compliance to the recommendations.  
 
This study draws on this limitation to focus on the post-truth commission period, 
specifically in investigating the dynamics of the implementation of its 
recommendations on reparation. It does so by analysing the reports of specific truth 
commissions and the ways in which the objectives outlined in the reports are either 
realised or not. Through this analysis, a framework for studying the implementation of 
truth commission recommendations and the responses of the different stakeholders is 
developed. 
 
1.2 Research questions  
 
The central question this study aims to explore is “what happens to the 
recommendations on reparations made by truth commissions after the completion 
of the commission?” When proposing recommendations, it is expected that the 
recommendations will be implemented within a reasonable time-frame. This is even 
more critical when the well-being of a section of the population is looking to benefit 
from the said recommendations. 
 
Truth commissions, particularly after the South African experience in which public 
testimonies were carried out have tended to be more public, attracting international 
and local attention. The centralisation of victims in the discussion heightens the 
perception that the whole process is geared towards attempting to redress the wrongs 
victims have suffered. It is therefore expected that after the process, victims and 
victims needs articulated in the report will be addressed in a timely and appropriate 
way.  
 
In reality, often the fanfare that accompanies the truth commissions drastically reduces 
following the end of the truth commission process.  In general, truth commissions 
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operate for a specific time period and do not have the mandate to implement their 
recommendations. They are limited to sometimes only making recommendations on 
the frameworks and institutional arrangements for the implementation of their 
recommendations. A recent development however is the on-going Tunisia Truth and 
Dignity Commission which has been mandated with implementing its 
recommendations on reparations (Amnesty International, 2016).   
 
There have been a number of studies that have focused on the various variables that 
could impact on the implementation however a detailed study into the frameworks, 
whether recommended by the truth commissions themselves or instituted following 
their completion has so far been missing. An in-depth analysis of the interaction of the 
various agencies in setting up these frameworks and how they attempt to transform 
the recommendations into action could be significant within the Transitional Justice 
field. This is particularly significant because implementation is overwhelmingly 
complex and Transitional Justice has so far not readily engaged with it.  
 
This study approaches the central question from two angles. The first angle focuses on 
truth commissions and how they have addressed the question of reparation and its 
implementation. The second approach extends the scope beyond Transitional Justice 
to explore how other fields have addressed the key concepts in this study, truth 
(commissions), reparations and implementation.  
 
In the first approach of exploring how truth commissions have dealt with issues of 
reparation and its implementations, four main areas are highlighted. 
 
(1) First, the circumstances under which the truth commission mechanism was 
preferred as a Transitional Justice tool and the rationale for including reparation for 
victims in the final report. There are various factors that determine the selection of an 
appropriate Transitional Justice mechanism for a particular country (United States 
Institute of Peace, 2008) and these have repercussions on the outcome of the selected 
mechanism (Posner & Vermeule, 2003). Colvin (2006) for instance,  in analysing the 
reparation programme in South Africa argues that whereas reparations was an 
important component of the transition, the discussion and negotiations around it 
remained minimal and it was never dealt with intensively or extensively. This, he 
argues partly explains the tepid responses to its implementation. I therefore explore 
the discussions around reparation and how these were framed during the 
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establishment and operationalisation of the commissions. These concerns are guided 
by the following sub-question: 
a. To what extent did the question of reparation feature in the discussions on TJ 
measures?  
 
(2) Second, the study addresses the meaning of reparation from the perspective of 
the truth commissions. What do truth commissions mean by reparations and how do 
they frame these recommendations. Reparations can be defined either broadly or 
narrowly and these have consequences in the design and implementation of the 
programmes (Cammack, 2006). This study therefore explores whether truth 
commissions differentiate between the broad or narrow approaches and how they 
frame the discussion on reparation for instance in terms of the specific benefits and to 
whom.  The following sub-question contributes to this discussion. 
b. What do truth commissions mean when they refer to reparations? 
 
(3) Third, the study explores the frameworks for following up the 
recommendations on reparations when the truth commissions have ended. In some 
cases, truth commissions propose specific frameworks that could be used in the 
implementation process specifying the details such as responsible parties, institutions 
and resource options. In other cases however, no frameworks or follow up procedures 
are proposed and it is up to the body at which the recommendations are directed, 
usually the government to institute a follow up and implementation process. This study 
therefore examines the processes following the submission of the report. Below is the 
guiding sub-question.   
c. What are the determinants for the inclusion or non-inclusion of follow up 
frameworks? 
  
(4) Forth, the study compares the actual implementation that has taken place 
against the objectives set out in the recommendations. By documenting what has been 
done and what has not been done, it further explores the reasons behind the status of 
the implementation. This discussion is also broadened to include the impact of 
(non)implementation on victims as well as general perceptions of how a reparation 
programme would be considered to have been successfully implemented. Below is the 
sub questions.  
d. To what degree have the proposals on reparation been implemented? 
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In the second angle, the study broadens its scope to explore how the concepts of truth, 
reparation and implementation have been addressed in other fields. Two main fields 
are considered.  
 
(1) First, the study links criminology and transitional justice by exploring how the 
concepts of truth, reparations and truth commissions are addressed within 
criminology. Taking into consideration how little either field has interacted with the 
other, it seeks to contribute to the existing knowledge by exploring how the theories of 
truth and reparation within criminology can be applied within a transitional justice 
framework. Below is the sub question. 
e. To what extent can the understanding of truth and reparations within 
criminology be applied to truth commissions and reparation programmes? 
 
(2) Secondly, the study explores the field of implementation studies. It first 
examines how TJ has approached post-truth commissions with a focus on the 
implementation of its recommendations on reparations. Drawing on the limited 
attention that has been given to this area in TJ it explores the understanding of 
implementation from the perspective of implementation studies seeking out the 
variables developed to study implementation.  Below is the sub question. 
f. To what extent can implementation studies contribute to the study of 
implementation in TJ? 
 
By exploring these questions, the research aims to contribute towards the study of 
truth commissions’ recommendations with a specific focus on reparations policies for 
victims hence contributing to both theory and practice. In so doing, I examine the 
current functioning of truth commissions, the frameworks for following up the 
recommendations on reparations and propose a model for studying the follow-up 
frameworks. 
 
1.3 Research Design 
 
The method selected for carrying out this study was a qualitative approach. At the heart 
of this study is exploring the state of the field. This is done through; seeking out what 
the practice is in transitional justice for studying post-truth commission 
recommendations, empirically explore how the recommendations are translated into 
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action and from these develop a framework for studying post-truth commission 
recommendations.  
 
According to Bryman (2008), qualitative investigations yield more informative, richer 
and enhanced interpretations because of the way data is collected and analysed. This 
is especially so when complex issues are being studied that require an in-depth analysis 
of experiences. In this case, this study takes place at least five years after the 
commissions were ended. There is diminished interest in the issue, a limited number 
of respondents and a possibility that the topic may still be a sensitive issue particularly 
to victims. The choice for a qualitative approach was mainly based on four 
justifications.  
 
In the first instance, as argued by Noaks & Wincup (2004) data generated from 
qualitative research can inform the policy development process. It may be used to 
evaluate existing policy, as an instrument to generate ideas for policy development or 
take the form of action research. Such an approach seeks to “enhance contextualized 
understanding for stakeholders closest to the programme” (p. 16).” Palys & Atchison 
(2008, p. 7) argue that “humans are cognitive beings who actively process and make 
sense of the world around them, have the capacity to abstract from their experience, 
ascribe meaning to their behaviour and the world around them, and are affected by 
those meanings. Drawing on this observation, I sought to gain a deeper understanding 
of how the different agencies interact in the process of implementing the 
recommendations on reparations. The study focused not only on the individual but also 
the social structures and institutional interactions. It aimed at embracing an approach 
that would allow me to probe deeper into perceptions of why and how the 
phenomenon is the way it is. I therefore inquired into the opinion of different actors 
regarding what is happening in the implementation process, why it is happening the 
way it is and how it could be improved. The policy implication of this study is its 
potential to contribute to the theory and practice of how implementation programmes 
can be carried out and studied. 
 
Secondly, qualitative approaches place primary value on comprehensive 
understanding of people and experiences and can afford to accommodate the dynamics 
of social structures. This human-centred approach (Palys & Atchison, 2008) allows the 
researcher to view human beings and agencies as “thinking and motivated actors” (p. 
7) and capture what they perceive as important and significant (Bryman, 2008). This 
research was therefore structured in such as a way as to let respondents explain from 
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their own perspective about their experiences. I posed questions that sought to let the 
respondent locate their position in whole framework of truth commissions and 
reparation and thus explain their behaviour and motivations among others.  
 
Third, one of the qualities emphasized by Tewksbury (2009), that drew me to this 
approach is that qualitative research mimics everyday life. He further argues that  the 
approaches to qualitative research “look and sound a great deal like what we do in 
regular daily life” (p. 43). For respondents such as the ones I intended to interact with, 
who have experienced research as participants from a number of sources, research can 
tend towards a tedious and non-beneficial endeavour for them. I anticipated they might 
be weary of yet another researcher. I therefore preferred a method which could seek 
them out and accommodate them in their ‘natural’ setting as much as possible. I wanted 
the interviews to follow as much a conversational pattern as possible by using open 
ended questions and letting them tell their story. I also assumed that there might be a 
possibility that some of the respondents might be either unwilling or unable to read 
and write hence responding unenthusiastically to paperwork involving surveys. I 
therefore sought to minimise the paperwork which might be intimidating for some of 
the respondents, especially the less literate or put off some who might not think they 
have the time to fill out a form.  
  
Fourth, qualitative research emphasises processes (Palys & Atchison, 2008) and 
particularly, the processes by which perceptions are constructed and evolve (Bryman, 
2008). Following an initial literature review, what was already established was that the 
outcome of reparation programmes following truth commissions was little to no 
implementation. In addition to this, there is an acute shortage of detailed empirical 
studies on the processes. This study focused on attempting to understand the 
processes and the interaction between the different actors in the implementation 
process.  
 
1.4 Data collection 
 
The data collection process was carried out in two parts. The first part involved a 
literature review and analysis of specific reports and documents while the second part 
involved an empirical study in the selected cases, Sierra Leone and Ghana (See 1.4.2.1 
for the case study selection). 
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1.4.1 Literature review and analysis of documents  
 
In the literature review, a general overview of transitional justice literature was carried 
out which clarified the definitional contexts and set the background from which this 
study was carried out. It also explored literature in criminology and implementation 
studies.  
 
A number of sources was used to access the literature, mainly through the KU Leuven 
Library data base. While in the field, I also visited and had access to the local university 
libraries, that is, Fourah Bay College (University of Sierra Leone) library and University 
of Ghana, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy library. I also had 
access to the libraries of two NGOs, Centre for Democratic Development (Ghana) and 
Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law (Sierra Leone). Both were key players during 
the truth commission process in the respective countries. Online search engines were 
particularly useful in giving a broad overview of publications, institutions and 
organisations covering the issues I was searching on.  
 
An equally important task was accessing the reports of the respective truth 
commissions. Initially, these were downloaded from online sources. While in the field, 
I made an effort to acquire a hard copy of the reports. In Sierra Leone, through the 
United Nations Integrated Peace building Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), I obtained 
the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation report, a CD version of the report and a music 
CD of the recommendations. In Ghana, the hard copies were not readily available and 
a copy could only be consulted at the University of Ghana Library and the Auditor 
General’s office. 
 
1.4.2 Empirical study 
 
The empirical study was carried out in Sierra Leone and Ghana where interviews were 
carried out with key respondents.  In the literature review, I was not able to find 
detailed information, particularly on the implementation of the post-truth commission 
recommendations on reparation. It was also difficult to know exactly what had been 
implemented or not implemented, or the decisions that had informed specific actions 
by relying only on the literature because the information was not available. I therefore 
focused on exploring what had been done, how it had been done, whether that was 
what was expected and explain why it had happened the way it had (Werner, 2004). 
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The insights from the study were foreseen to be useful in proposing a framework for 
studying implementation by drawing on pertinent variables identified from the cases 
(Palys & Atchison, 2008) and linking them to the approaches identified in the literature. 
 
In the following sections, I elaborate on the methods I used for the selection of the case 
studies and participants in the interviews. 
 
1.4.2.1 Case study selection 
 
Since 1974 when the first truth commission was created, over forty commissions have 
been set up in different parts of the globe. There however is still an ongoing debate 
among  some scholars on the specific criteria for characterising truth commissions 
which has led to the variation in the number of truth commissions that have so far been 
established (Dancy, Kim, & Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010; Freeman, 2006; Hayner, 2002, 
2011; Olsen, Payne, & Reiter, 2010b; United States Institute of Peace, n.d.-b; 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2009). Whereas it would be interesting to have a detailed 
empirical analysis of all of them, it would be difficult to carry out within the scope of 
this study. For a detailed exploration, I therefore identified two cases (Silverman 2005; 
Bryman, 2008; Davies, Francis, & Jupp, 2011). These were purposefully selected 
(Bryman, 2008). A key consideration that informed the selection was the practical 
aspects of getting to the field and accessing information. This included among others 
the available funds and relevant documentation such as the report, logistical 
considerations in terms of transportation and the working language in the country as 
described below. 
 
First, in the selection of the specific cases to focus on, I surveyed the United States 
Institute of Peace (USIP) database accessed in 2009 which had a more extensive data 
on the cases ( United States Institute of Peace, n.d.-b). I identified six types of transition 
preceding the establishment of a truth commission: 1) Transition from a repressive 
regime; 2) Electoral or post-electoral violence; 3) Civil war; 4) Political violence; 5) 
Genocide; 6) Apartheid. Two types of transitions, transitions from repressive regimes 
and civil war and two continents, Africa and South America stood out. Whereas both 
continents would serve as interesting cases, I selected to focus on the African continent 
mainly due to consideration regarding language. A number of the truth commission 
reports in the South American countries are in Spanish as is the local language of 
communication which I do not comprehend.  
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Secondly, I considered the content of the recommendations. From the USIP database I 
observed that whereas a number of truth commissions explicitly proposed 
recommendations for victims’ reparation, some did not. For this study, it was essential 
that the selected cases suggested recommendations relating to victim reparations. 
Those that did not recommend reparation were eliminated.  
 
Third, the truth commissions would need to meet the basic characteristics of truth 
commissions and a consensus from the different scholars on whether they qualify as 
truth commissions. In the first instance, I used Hayner’s (2002, 2011) criteria of truth 
commission characteristics.  Despite the on-going debate on truth commissions, she is 
still considered the most authoritative source. She identifies five definitive 
characteristics for truth seeking bodies to be identified as truth commissions (1) 
focusing on the past; (2) investigating a pattern of abuse over a period of time; (3) 
temporary body at the end of which a report is submitted, (4) officially sanctioned or 
empowered by the state and (5) engages directly with the affected population. In the 
second instance, by referring to other databases such as Wiebelhaus-Brahm's (2009),  
United States Institute of Peace (n.d.-b) and Dancy et al. (2010), I opted for truth 
commissions in which there was consensus as to whether they met the parameters of 
a truth commission. 
 
Forth, I considered the time period that had elapsed after the closure of the truth 
commission. Ideally, there should be adequate time to allow the governments to set up 
mechanisms for the implementation of recommendations and short enough that the 
issues are still pertinent. Mazmanian & Sabatier (1989) for instance argue that the time 
span for implementation analysis is at least seven to ten years. This period gives, 
“adequate time to correct any deficiencies in the legal framework, tests the ability to 
develop and maintain political support over a sufficient period of time to actually be 
able to bring about important behavioural or systematic changes, gives time to the 
political system to decide if its goals are worth pursuing” (p. 42). Although their 
assessment is made from a framework of statutory policies where there is an impetus 
on government to follow up and implement the policies the same logic can be applied 
to truth commissions. I therefore opted for truth commissions that had ended at least 
six years before the study.  
 
Fifth, in some cases, truth commissions may or may not propose an implementation 
framework in their recommendations. By selecting both experiences, it could provide 
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an interesting study of the economic, social and political factors that explain the 
compliance or non-compliance with the recommendations on reparations.  
 
It was also important that the selected cases are easily accessible. This included factors 
such as language (English speaking), geographical location and accessibility of data. It 
was pragmatic to consider countries nearer to each other to minimise costs of travel. 
Additionally, the data relating to the truth commission such as the report, Acts and 
Agreements had to be publicly available. I also verified that the report, in addition to 
being released was published and publicly disseminated. 
 
Based on the above considerations, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (2002-2004) was selected as a case that detailed follow-up strategies and 
in contrast, the Ghana National Reconciliation Commission (2003-2004) as a case 
where recommendations were made but no strategies discussed by the commission for 
the follow-up.  A key consideration to selecting Ghana was also of the fact that it has 
had considerably little focus by researchers. 
 
1.4.2.2 Participant Selection 
 
As with the cases, respondents were also purposefully selected (Bryman, 2008) so as 
to get nuanced perspectives. A key aspect in their selection was their knowledgeability 
and experience in being involved with the truth commission and the follow up process.  
 
A number of individuals and institutions were closely involved before and during the 
commissions but were however not involved in what was happening after the 
submission of the report. In a number of cases, respondents expressed that they were 
not aware of the status of the implementation or had not kept up to date with what was 
happening after the end of the truth commission. In these cases, the discussion focused 
basically on the commission itself and the interviews were terminated. This therefore 
presented a relatively small pool of respondents to draw from.  
 
In order to appreciate the different aspects to the implementation process from the 
initial setting of the goals to the actual translation into benefits, I identified a number 
of categories of respondents who I considered would give diverse opinions on the 
subject. They included, the former staff of the truth commissions, government officials, 
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individuals from the reparation programmes, victims, offenders and civil society and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).  
 
In both Sierra Leone and Ghana, the study was limited to Freetown and Accra 
respectively. This is because the main offices of the reparation programmes are located 
in these cities. In Sierra Leone, whereas NaCSA has district offices, the decisions and 
policies originate from the main office. In Ghana, subsidiary offices were never 
established but rather the staff from the reparation committee travelled around the 
country to implement the programme. Additionally, considering the difficulty in the 
logistics of travelling to another location, it was considered more pragmatic to remain 
in the centre given that I was able to access the relevant respondents. 
 
1.4.3 Data Collection methods 
 
According to Werner (2004, p. 6), researching implementation requires “first-hand 
accounts of program processes, experiences, opinions and results by the key 
stakeholders.” Stakeholders may include all the actors and individuals involved during 
the life of a programme such as “programme planners and developers, state agency 
managers, local office management and staff, service provider management and staff, 
state and local advocacy, public interest groups and clients.” He recommends collecting 
data at the source or on the ground “where programme activities happen and client 
outcomes are realised.” The information gathering strategies proposed in 
implementation research include: open ended interviews that “focus on the parts of the 
programme experiences most relevant to the informant being interviewed,” focus 
groups and participant observation.  
 
Open ended face-to-face interviews were conducted with the selected respondents. 
Two categories of respondents were identified; the elite and non-elite. By elite 
respondents, I refer to respondents either in positions of power or influence. This 
included government officials, staff of the reparation programmes, members of NGOs 
and Academia. The interviews with elite respondents were carried out in their 
respective offices and a formal process of approaching was taken such as drafting and 
sending introduction letters, following up with phone calls and office visits in order to 
schedule an appointment.  
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The non-elite Interviews which comprised of the victims took place at a convenient 
location such as a restaurant, office of the AWWA (in the 2012 field visit to Sierra Leone 
when the amputees and other war wounded association had their office facilities) and 
in their homes in the Amputee camps. The interviews normally took between twenty 
minutes to one and a half hours depending on how much information they had or their 
willingness to share the information. A number of times though, some respondents 
were not knowledgeable about my area of focus concerning the implementation but 
out of politeness and respect, I continued with the interview and let them focus on 
areas they were keen on. 
 
1.4.3.1 Gaining access 
 
As a researcher in a culturally and geographically different location, a key challenge for 
me was gaining access which according to Noaks & Wincup (2004) may be to 
documents or possible respondents. According to them, gaining access is a key 
research phase “because the initial presentation will influence the ways in which 
potential research participants define the research” (p. 57). An approach to circumvent 
this is through negotiating access, a process that is of concern not only at the beginning 
but continued throughout the data collection (2004, pp. 55–72). 
 
The initial step to negotiating access involves identifying gatekeepers (Broadhead & 
Rist, 1976; Noaks & Wincup, 2004; Silverman, 2010; Silverman & Marvasti, 2008). 
Gatekeepers may be drawn from existing social networks or identified from studying 
an organisational or institutional structure. 
 
Pertaining to the research, accessibility was a central concern particularly because the 
selected cases were located in countries that I had never been to. I pursued two 
approaches.  
 
In the first approach, I used existing acquaintanceship with individuals in the specific 
countries. I presented my research and intentions and requested their assistance in 
travel arrangements, identifying potential respondents and contacting respondents I 
had already identified.  This informal approach was used because of the notion that 
potential respondents would respond to the researcher more positively if someone of 
the same nationality or social group introduced them. As argued by Noaks & Wincup 
(2004, p. 59), informal gatekeepers “vouch for the researcher” and “can use their status 
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and relationship with potential respondents to facilitate contact and trust between 
them and researcher.” 
 
The second involved emailing potential respondent expressing my interest to 
interview them. I included an introduction letter and summary of the research. The 
approach of using acquaintances to facilitate the initial introduction yielded more 
positive results in comparison to sending emails to specific institutions and individuals.  
 
However, as pointed out by Noaks & Wincup (2004), negotiation is a continuous 
process. Consequently, on arrival, the same requests for interviews were hand 
delivered to the various institutions. In some cases, particularly with NGOs, I was able 
to get the contact information of the individual who could process my request and 
direct me to the relevant respondent from the front desk. In other cases such as with 
the government institutions, I was required to wait at least one week before reporting 
back for more information.  Between the delivery of the introduction and research 
summary letters, it took on average two weeks before securing an interview. With the 
academia, except in one case in Ghana, and most NGOs I contacted, I was usually 
granted an immediate audience if the relevant individual was present or at the very 
least within the week. In two cases, one in Ghana and one in Sierra Leone, despite 
continuous follow up both physically and through phone calls, I was not able to meet 
the relevant respondent.  
 
Overall, I experienced a more positive response when I physically arrived in the field 
and was able to introduce myself, even after the informal introductions through 
acquaintances rather than trying to establish contact as an abstract researcher from 
far off. Physically showing up demonstrated the researcher’s commitment towards the 
research and motivated the respondents to respond positively.  
 
It is worth pointing out that the above experience mainly pertained to the category I 
refer to as the elite respondents. It was a much simpler process with the non-elite such 
as the victim groups. In Sierra Leone, once I was able to access the contact of the victims 
group Chairperson, he acted as the gate-keeper and his acceptance of me as a 
researcher was interpreted as approval to participate in the research by the 
respondents. Participation by individual respondents however was still considered on 
a voluntary basis. The chairperson gave me the contact numbers of the camp 
chairpersons whom I informed about the research and the permission from the overall 
Chairperson. On arrival at the camp, I would first meet with the camp chairperson who 
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would then take me from home to home or assign another person to move around the 
camp with me. In Ghana, which had no victims’ organisation groups, I inquired from 
respondents I had interviewed if they had acquaintances who had been a victim and if 
they could put me in touch with them. I also randomly posed the question to individuals 
I would interact with out of the research context. I would then request the individual 
to put me in touch with another person. 
 
1.4.3.2 Interviews 
 
The aim of the research was to explore how the different stakeholders had responded 
to the truth commission recommendations on reparation. I used semi-structured 
individual face-to-face interviews for two reasons; first, I was particularly interested in 
the respondents’ point of view. As such, I focused on the respondents’ perception and 
was able to get an explanation of the overall context of their opinion.  Second, the 
interviews were arranged on an individual basis and for the elite respondents, these 
took place at their convenience, usually in their respective offices.  
 
For the victims, in Sierra Leone, I was advised by one of my contacts who was taking 
me around in the camp to visit every home of the amputees. Even if they were not at 
home, I made sure to inform the occupants or neighbours that I had been there. The 
approach was to let each individual speak for themselves rather than as a group as 
some would feel left out. This would avoid creating tension and conflict among the 
group if they perceived any hint of supposed favouritism. I also sensed that a number 
of the victims preferred to communicate one on one, to talk about their experience 
because I found some of them waiting for me to reach their homes and they informed 
me that they had heard I was around and had been waiting for me. In Ghana, individual 
interviews were also conducted. The same procedure for elite interviews was followed 
as in Sierra Leone. For the victims however, accessibility was challenge due to their 
scarcity. I therefore relied on formal introduction and referrals.  
 
1.4.4 Field visit 
 
Two sets of field visits were conducted. I carried out joint visits where I went to one 
country and immediately flew out to the next one.  
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1.4.4.1 First field visit 
 
The first joint field visit was carried out in Sierra Leone (Free Town) from 4 January – 
29 January 2011 and Ghana (Accra) from 30 January – 25 February 2011. This initial 
visit was to seek out contacts with the key actors in the field. This was particularly 
relevant following insufficient feedback I got from the emails. During this trip, initial 
contact was established and a general sense of the context of the implementation 
process was observed. This was an exploratory visit to get acquainted with the facts on 
the ground.  
 
Prior to the field visit, a tentative set of question themes was developed which was to 
be directed at the different stakeholders in relation to their role in the truth 
commission process. Through this visit, the pool of respondents was narrowed down 
significantly through sieving out individuals, institutions or organisations that were 
either not knowledgeable about the implementation of the reparation or were not 
involved at all although a number of them were selected precisely because they had 
been involved in the operation of the TCs. For the NGOs, I for instance inquired if their 
work with the victims is linked to the recommendations that the truth commission 
made regarding reparation or if they were in any way involved in following up of the 
recommendations. If their answer was in the negative, I generally asked them about 
their current programmes and views on the commission and the government response 
to the recommendations.  
 
For the government ministries, in Sierra Leone, although the TRC made specific 
recommendations directed at particular line ministries, I established that none of the 
ministries had made any significant effort towards interpreting and integrating the 
specific recommendation in their programmes. In Ghana, after moving between 
Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Women & Children's Affairs, 
Ministry of Justice and Attorney General's Department, National Peace Council and 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), I established that 
the Reparation programme was under the Reparations Committee in the Attorney 
General’s office. 
 
In the first joint visit, twenty interviews were conducted. In Sierra Leone, twelve 
interviews were carried out. The respondents included individuals from: academia, 
NaCSA, Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone, Civil society organisations, Victims 
the truth commission, Ministry of Finance and Development, and Relics Monuments 
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Commission. In Ghana, eight interviews were carried out. These included individuals 
from the academia, the truth commission, Reparations Committee and Civil society. 
 
1.4.4.2 Second field visit 
 
The second joint field visit was carried out in September – December 2012. This was 
divided into approximately two months in each country; Ghana, 1 September – 21 
October 2012 and Sierra Leone, 22 October – 18 December 2012. 
 
This visit aimed at building upon and consolidating the findings from the first field 
work. It sought broadly to inquire into ‘what has happened’, ‘why is it happening the 
way it is’ and ‘how should it have happened?’ Through this, the study would assess the 
implementation status and the response of the different stakeholders in the 
implementation process. 
 
In order to ease access, it was considered prudent to identify an organisation that 
works closely on issues of reparations for victims in each of these countries and request 
to be hosted by them. 
 
In Ghana (Accra), no such organisation was identified. All issues of reparations for 
victims following the NRC are handled by the Reparations Committee, under the 
Attorney General’s Office. I was not able to attach myself to the office. As an alternative, 
I contacted the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), 
University of Ghana whose facilities I was able to use. 
 
In Sierra Leone, the Centre for Accountability and Rule of Law (CARL-SL) was identified 
as an organisation that has been keen on following up the issue of reparations for 
victims, although this is not one of its core activities. I was able to contact the Director 
who agreed to host me during the time I was in Sierra Leone. 
 
I developed a standard interview guide which I could modify depending on the 
respondents. To ease the discussion, I had three modified questionnaires; for former 
commissioners, civil society and other stakeholders. The interview guide was divided 
into four categories: 
1. Operations of the commission 
2. Commission’s recommendations on reparations 
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3. Follow-up of recommendations on reparations 
4. Implementation of recommendations on reparations 
 
In this second joint field visit, I contacted the specific institutions I had identified as 
being involved with the reparation programme to request for interviews, first for a 
follow up discussion with the individuals I had already met but also requested to be 
referred to other members of the programme. I also followed up with the different 
respondents I had already met in the first visit to inquire about any updates on the 
programme and references to other key people I could meet. 
 
In total, twenty five interviews were conducted. In Sierra Leone, seventeen interviews 
were carried out among; NaCSA, victims, civil society organisation and victims. In 
Ghana, eight interviews were recorded. These came from; a former NRC commissioner, 
government officials, Reparations Committee, victims and civil society organisations. 
 
Two observations stand out from the field work experience. First, the post-truth 
commission processes in both countries with regard to reparations recommendations 
has been low key. Seven to eight years down the road, discussions an actions regarding 
reparation for victims has significantly reduced in public discourse.  Second, because 
we sought to involve key respondents knowledgeable and who are actually actively 
involved in reparations, there was not a wide basket to draw from.  
 
In both cases, data saturation was reached when I started being referred back to the 
same individuals and organisations by the different respondents. When it came to the 
technical information about what is actually happening regarding the reparation 
programme and why it is happening the way it is, there was a limited selection of 
potential respondents.  
In Ghana, when I inquired if there was someone that they could recommend I speak to 
about the implementation of the reparation programme, I was constantly referred to 
Justice Crabbe in the Attorney Generals’ Office and when I pointed out that I had 
already been to his office, then they would generally say along the lines of, ‘then you 
have everything you need, he is the right person to talk to.’  
 
Similarly, in Sierra Leone, I was referred back to NaCSA. When I insisted on an 
alternative name or organisation, although in some instances an alternative was given, 
I was still informed that NaCSA would be the best source of information.  
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In Sierra Leone, for the victims, I visited two amputee camps, Waterloo and Grafton and 
all of them repeated the same benefits that they had received. There was also a 
repetition of the impact of the delay in implementation of the full reparation 
programme on their lives. Despite the saturation, I could not simply terminate the 
interviews but I continued to interview all the amputees and war wounded who were 
present at the camp during the time of my visit and write down the names of those who 
were not present. This was to minimise conflict after my visit. However, in letting each 
individual tell their story, I was able to draw their perceptions regarding the 
programme beyond the generic responses as most of them were keen on expressing 
how the situation had affected their specific needs in terms of the future of their 
children, immediate livelihood needs or their potential capabilities.  
 
For the other camps not visited, I called the camp chairpersons on phone and asked 
them general questions about the reparation programme and benefits members in 
their camp had received and their answers were similar to the individuals I had already 
interviewed and in this case, I did not physically go to the camp. 
 
1.4.3 Research Dilemmas  
 
This study sought to understand the different aspects of how to study truth 
commission recommendations with a specific focus on reparations policies for victims 
thereby contributing to both theory and practice. This would be achieved by exploring 
the theories in TJ and other fields, the current functioning of the truth commissions, 
and the frameworks for following up the recommendations on reparations. 
I was however faced with two outstanding dilemmas which would invariably pose a 
challenge in our selection of an appropriate research strategy. The first dilemma 
relates to the desk research. The limited inclusion of the research topic in relevant 
fields implied that I had a minimal pool of publications to draw from. For instance, 
international crime and TJ has only minimally interacted with criminology. Most 
criminological research has dealt with more conventional crime and criminal justice 
hence when reading about research in criminology, references are made to such 
crimes.  
 
Similarly, in linking TJ and implementation studies, whereas there is a lot of interest 
and scholarly publications prior to and during a TJ process in a specific case, this 
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interest somehow diminishes once the mechanism has been established. This is 
certainly the case for truth commissions and their recommendations.  
 
A limited number of studies have been carried out in the selected cases. In Sierra Leone, 
an empirical study was carried out by the ICTJ in 2009 to review a one year project of 
building the institutional capacity to implement the TRC recommendations on 
reparations (Suma & Correa, 2009). Another study was published in 2014 and this 
however focused on the impact of non-implementation of the recommendations on 
reparation on amputees (Conteh & Berghs, 2014). Both are organisational reports. 
Other post TRC studies have mainly focused on perceptions towards the TRC and the 
significance of the TRC on goals such as healing, forgiveness reconciliation and 
reintegration (Kelsall, 2005; Shaw, 2005, 2007; Stovel, 2010;  Millar, 2010,  2011, 2012, 
2015). In Ghana, there has not been any study specifically related to the reparation 
programmes following the NRC although a number of studies have assessed the truth 
commission and its work (Alidu, Webb, & Fairbairn, 2009; Robert Kwame Ameh, 
2006a, 2006b; Valji, 2006).  
 
The second dilemma relates to the experiences in the field. As indicated by the 
quotation at the beginning of the chapter, I was often referred to as a ‘trenja’, loosely 
translated as a stranger or guest. One of the implications for this was that it took longer 
to negotiate access. At least the first two weeks in each country were spent in trying to 
establish contact. Local introductions and references certainly helped thus my reliance 
on snowballing to establish contact.  
 
In a number of cases, particularly in Ghana, I needed to prove my authenticity as a 
researcher and student before I was allowed access to some institutions. In addition to 
losing out on research time while getting acclimatised to the surroundings, I also 
questioned the depth of the data I collected and wondered if they had given me as much 
information as they would to a local researcher. I could also have overlooked key 
individuals by not being aware of the dynamic relationships in the field. On the other 
hand though, being a foreign researcher framed me as impartial which granted a 
degree of access and information. 
 
Although English is widely spoken in both Freetown and Accra and the majority of my 
respondents were fluent in it, I also encountered cases where the respondents were 
unable to speak it with ease. This was particularly so with the interviews held with the 
victims. In this case, I relied on a translator. 
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Additionally, while interacting with the victims, I was conscious about asking sensitive 
questions which could potentially harm them emotionally. In the beginning, I tried not 
to ask about their disfigurements and focused on the reparation programme but during 
the course of the interview, they still explained how their injury occurred. I therefore 
adapted to asking them about their injury and give them the floor to talk about their 
injury and its impact on their lives. 
 
A more pragmatic choice I had to make while in the field was on which categories of 
victims to focus on and whether to include the perpetrators in the research. For the 
latter case, the perpetrators are an invisible group, not necessarily willing to be 
identified as one. In Sierra Leone, a number of the perpetrators went through the 
reintegration programmes and for the case of the child combatants, have grown up. It 
was also not possible to access the top tier perpetrators. In Freetown, I only interacted 
with one male in his twenties who acknowledged that he was a former child combatant 
but he was emphatic on how it was a brief period and focused more on his stay as a 
refugee and his return to join the military. In Ghana, it was a different dynamic with the 
perpetrators acting within state authority and many of them either retaining positions 
of power or protected under the law. In both cases, I opted out of seeking out the former 
perpetrators due to the difficulty in accessing them. 
 
For the case of the victims, in Ghana, I did not encounter any victims groups and the 
organisations that worked with them during the NRC did not keep up with that 
relationship. The victims were therefore scattered and difficult to come across except 
through being directly referred or being put in touch.  
 
Sierra Leone’s case however was a more systematic approach at selection of 
respondents given the wide range of reparation benefits and victims. The initial 
approach was to examine the implementation of all of the benefits against all of the 
categories of victims. However, given that the benefits had been sporadically awarded 
coupled with the fact that some victim groups such as children, war widows and victims 
of sexual violence were often difficult to identify and access, I considered two options. 
Either to select one benefit and examine how it has been implemented across the range 
of victims or select one group of victims and examine their interactions with the 
reparation programme and the benefits. Because of the difficulty in accessing the other 
categories of victims coupled with the limited reparation programme, I opted for the 
second approach of one victim group across the range of reparation benefits. The one 
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group that stood out was the amputees and war wounded who had an association, 
AWWA, and an organised structure countrywide. This of course limits the views of the 
other victims’ categories but allows for the wider examination of the whole range of 
programmes given the time scope of the research.  
 
According to Ballamingie & Johnson (2011, p. 726), “difficult research relationships 
that force a researcher to confront his/her own vulnerability while still engaging 
ethically with participants will undoubtedly render rich insights, complementing 
traditional textual analysis and literature reviews.” These dilemmas, frustrating as they 
may be, served to strategise on both my role as a researcher and delineate the research. 
I was more confident going to the field the second time although issues of accessibility 
were still cumbersome. However, by the second visit, I was more comfortable with 
issues of protocol, directions, contacts and how to manoeuvre my way. 
 
1.5 Data processing and analysis 
 
Processing and analysing qualitative interviews can be a daunting process while trying 
to make sense of the voluminous data generated. As a researcher, how does one ensure 
that they are able to “understand [the respondents’] meaning and draw legitimate 
conclusions [and] how to grasp the essence of these data while protecting the integrity 
of each story when responding to the research question” (Dierckx de Casterlé, 
Gastmans, Bryon, & Denier, 2012, p. 361). Authors such as Tewksbury (2009) and Palys 
& Atchison (2008) propose an approach that includes identifying patterns, themes and 
clusters. Categorising similar people, events or processes can enable one to see 
connections (Palys & Atchison, 2008). Dierckx de Casterlé et al. (2012) have also 
discussed a more detailed step by step procedure in which they detail how to 
familiarise oneself with their data and deduce meaning that will enable them to answer 
their research questions. Drawing on these suggestions, I will describe below how I 
interacted with my data. 
 
1.5.1 Transcription of interviews 
 
I started by transcribing each interview. The interviews had been recorded using an 
audio recording device, except in two cases where the respondents preferred not to 
have the interview recorded. In this case, I wrote down the highlights of the interview 
and later filled in as much detail as possible regarding the interviews.  
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Although not verbatim, the transcriptions were meticulously done to include all that 
was spoken. In a number of cases, the interview environment was not conducive, for 
instance with a noisy background. Sometimes it was possible to control the noise, for 
instance, in a restaurant, I and the interviewee requested that the management turn 
down the volume of the music which they did. Other times though, it was impossible 
such as traffic noise that could be heard into the office. In this case, in addition to the 
recording, I wrote down the highlights and then endeavoured to transcribe as quickly 
as possible. For the interviews in which a translator was used, I only transcribed the 
English translations from the translator.  
 
The transcribing also involved re-reading the interviews with the recorder playing and 
correcting errors. This was important because I found that I sometimes either missed 
or misunderstood certain phrases and words because of the different accents. This 
process also helped to familiarise myself with the data and reflect on it while picturing 
the general storyline. Through this process of reading and re-reading, I could link one 
interview to the other interviews and draw up preliminary general themes. 
 
1.5.2 Grouping the data 
 
Once the transcription was completed, I grouped my data into different categories. 
These were the different groups earlier identified as potential respondents. These 
included academia, reparation staff, government, civil society organisation, former TRC 
commissioner, victim and other stakeholders. Other stakeholders were members of the 
public whom I interviewed or informally discussed my research. In this case, I also 
sought for their permission on whether I could include relevant aspects of the 
discussion in my write-up. 
 
The data was also broken down into themes relevant to the research questions. At the 
first level was the four categories of the interview guide, comprising of: (1) Operations 
of the commission (2) Commission’s recommendations on reparations (3) Follow-up 
of recommendations on reparations (4) Implementation of recommendations on 
reparations. 
 
At the second level, I identified the key issues that came up from each discussion 
regarding the different categories. For instance, in ‘operations of the commission’, I 
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inquired about what their perceptions were about the establishment of the 
commission, a number of the respondents in their answers justified or condemned the 
establishment of the commission which created the issue of ‘necessity of the 
commission’. Similarly, several of the respondents included information in their 
discussion which I perceived to be relevant to the general topic of truth commissions 
and reparations and how they work and these were included in the theme of ‘salient 
issues arising from the interviews’ while others respondents were quite expressive on 
how they thought a reparation programme should be implemented, an issue which also 
got a category of its own. 
 
At the third level was identifying the relevant phrases in each interview that could 
serve as supportive quotations regarding the themes and concepts. With the main 
themes and key issues identified, I re-read each interview and identified the quotes and 
grouped them accordingly. Important to this part was in endeavouring to understand 
the context in which the respondent made a certain statement and ascertain that what 
they meant in their statement is captured in a legitimate way in the overall story. This 
process of breaking down the interviews into themes and relevant concepts allows for 
the data to be filtered and clustered around the research questions (Dierckx de Casterlé 
et al., 2012).  
 
The data processing and analysis involved a constant forward and backward 
movement through the data in order to familiarise with the data. This process included 
transcribing, reading and re-reading and re-listening to the interviews.  It is through 
this that relevant concepts and themes are extracted which can then be tested and 
commonalities identified. 
 
1.6 Research ethics and Quality Criteria  
 
In the following section, I discuss the principles to ensure that the research was carried 
out in an ethically appropriate manner and to guarantee the quality of the research.  
 
1.6.1 Research Ethics 
 
A number of characteristics have been identified to regulate the ethical concerns of 
social research. Key principles include informed consent, confidentiality and 
anonymity, and risk and safety (Flick, 2006; Trochim, 2008; Wiles, 2013). This is due 
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to the awareness that social research is not risk free and there is need to deliberate 
about the impact of the research on both the participants and the researchers (Flick, 
2006; Wiles, 2013). Below, I discuss concerns I was confronted with in the context of 
my research. 
 
Informed consent 
Before the interviews started, I explained what the research was about and that I was 
an academic researcher. This affiliation to academic research was particularly useful 
as it conveyed my impartiality. For some of the victims who expected to be 
remunerated after the research, they were made aware that they would not be paid for 
their participation. In fact, some of them even accepted to participate for this reason 
because they said they were tired of NGOs coming in to interview them and take their 
pictures while they do not receive any returns from it. Because of my different accent, 
I also made them aware that I was not from their country and this also painted me as a 
neutral party not affiliated to any political or ideological groups.  
 
I also informed them that their participation was voluntary and they could opt out at 
any time during the interview. Consent was also sought before recording. In the 
instances where a guide/interpreter was involved, I explained to them the role of the 
guide or interpreter and inquired about which language they felt most comfortable 
communicating in. If it was in English, then I also asked the guide/interpreter to wait 
aside but if they needed an interpreter then they still had to consent to them being 
there.  Participants did not receive any financial or material compensation for their 
participation. There were certain exceptions for instance if the respondent had to 
travel to where I was, then I refunded their transportation costs or if the interview took 
place in a restaurant, then I paid the bill. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
The respondents were made aware that the information they had given would not be 
traced specifically to them and they would remain anonymous. Some of the 
respondents however mentioned that they did not mind having their names attributed 
to what they said. However, for uniformity in reporting, I used the general group 
reference unless the quote was very specific to the individual. I was also keen to 
emphasise that all information would be confidential and used for academic purposes 
only. This was critical for organisations and individuals giving unpublished reports or 
private information. Such information has also been anonymised where the participant 
gave their permission for its use. 
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Risk and safety 
This involved submitting an application for a study period abroad to the university that 
would assess the security risk in the destination countries. Both Ghana and Sierra 
Leone were not considered high risk. The research topic was also not considered a 
sensitive issue in both countries and I did not anticipate any security concerns 
regarding me asking questions about them. However, common-sense precaution was 
taken to guarantee personal safety while in the field.  
 
According to (Wiles, 2013) research can also pose a risk to the research participants. 
This could be emotionally or physically and adequate steps should be taken to ensure 
that the participant suffers minimal to no harm as a result of their participation. The 
study did not pose any danger to the participants and were all willing to participate in 
it. More so, since it was open ended where participants could tell their story, I reminded 
them that if they were not comfortable with certain aspects of their story they were not 
obliged to talk about it. I had some reservations about asking participants about their 
scars (for the amputees), however, they were comfortable about explaining how their 
amputation or scars occurred and also how it has impacted their lives. In only one case 
in Sierra Leone, one of the victims burst out crying. On calming down, he gave his 
consent to continue with the interview. The experience was disconcerting for me 
although his wife and a family member who joined in chided him for being drunk and 
dramatic in order to elicit sympathy from me. This breakdown however occurred when 
he was talking about being mocked by children along the road because of his 
amputation. 
 
Wiles (2013) also include ethical dilemmas experienced by qualitative researchers in 
terms of treatment of participants in terms of “consent, anonymity, confidentiality, risk 
and role conflict” (p. 72). As explained above, the study did not involve any particular 
“ethical ‘horror stories’” (p. 80) although I was aware of the possibility considering the 
history of both countries where they have experienced a horrendous past.  
 
1.6.2 Quality Criteria for Qualitative Research  
 
The need to guarantee rigour and quality of a research is as relevant in qualitative 
research as it is in quantitative research (Bryman, 2008; Mays & Pope, 2000; Northcote, 
2012; Silverman, 2010). The traditional criteria for ensuring quality in research have 
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included the concepts of validity and reliability. These concepts however cannot be 
used in a similar manner in qualitative research as they are used in quantitative 
research because of the different approaches to generating information as this could 
potentially limit the scope and flexibility of the collection and use of data, among others 
(Mays & Pope, 2000; Northcote, 2012; Trochim, 2008). As such, an “alternative criteria” 
for assessing the quality of qualitative research has been developed (Bryman, 2008; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Nevertheless, according to Mays & Pope (2000) a basic strategy 
to ensure quality is applying a “systematic, self conscious research design, data 
collection, interpretation, and communication” (p. 52). In the following section, I 
discuss how I applied the alternative criteria as discussed by Bryman (2008, pp. 365–
395) to guarantee the quality of my research. 
 
1.6.2.1 Alternative criteria 
 
Bryman (2008) identifies two criteria for evaluating qualitative research. These are 
trustworthiness and authenticity. Trustworthiness is aimed at establishing the four 
variables of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability whereas 
authenticity identifies the wider political impact of social research. These concepts and 
the strategies I used to satisfy the quality criteria are discussed below: 
 
1.6.2.1.1 Credibility 
 
Credibility is concerned with the plausibility of the research and in ensuring that the 
findings are true and accurate. During the interviews, I endeavoured to ensure that I 
understood exactly what the participant was conveying in the way they meant it. This 
included reaffirming certain points as well as carrying out repeat interviews. 
Additionally, periodic scientific discussion on the research was carried out. This 
included doctoral seminars, debriefing and discussion following each field study as 
well as presentation in conferences. This opened up the research to reflection by peers 
and experts.  
 
1.6.2.1.2 Transferability 
 
In transferability, the researcher demonstrates how the findings can be applicable to 
other contexts. These could mean similar situations, populations or phenomena. 
According to Bryman (2008) whether or not a research is transferable ultimately 
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depends on a reader. However this can be facilitated by providing a thick description 
to demonstrate applicability of the findings. In this case, I have made an effort to 
provide a detailed description of the contexts and steps undertaken in carrying out the 
research, both in the analysis of the relevant literature and my interactions in the field.  
 
1.6.2..1.3 Dependability 
 
In dependability, researcher demonstrates that the research can be replicable and 
therefore whether the findings are likely to be consistent and apply at other times. In 
order to satisfy this criterion, I made sure to keep a clear record of the research process 
and procedure. This included having a research journal, complete details of the 
interviews, data collection and analysis decisions. In the results of the empirical study 
section, I present verbatim accounts where relevant. Similarly, in order to ensure that 
the reporting was as comprehensive as possible, I used the consolidated criteria for 
reporting qualitative research (COREQ) checklist proposed by Tong, Sainsbury, & Craig 
(2007). This proved useful in guaranteeing that a detailed explanation of the methods, 
context, findings, analysis and interpretation of the data is provided. 
 
1.6.2.1.4 Confirmability 
 
This criterion is concerned with the objectivity of the researcher and reaffirms their 
neutrality. In order to reduce the risk of bias to a minimum, I regularly discussed the 
research with my promotor and colleagues. This included regular updates through 
presentations. Additionally, I discuss in detail the research choices and data analysis to 
highlight how I arrived at certain decisions in the research process. Furthermore, by 
selecting case studies that are geographically and culturally different from mine, I have 
confidence that the issue under study was looked at from a new and nuanced 
perspective rather than from preconceived theories and background information.  
 
1.6.2.1.5 Authenticity 
 
Authenticity is concerned with the wider political impact of social research. It 
elaborates for instance how different viewpoints are included, whether it helps 
members of a community to better understand their community and different views, 
whether it induces change and whether the necessary steps for the change have been 
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taken. In authenticity, the emphasis is on the contribution and relevance of the 
research to its field (Bryman, 2008). 
 
In order to address the criteria of authenticity I sought to incorporate different 
viewpoints. Through a diverse selection of respondents I strove for adequate 
representativeness within the social setting and in terms of experiences of the different 
categories of participants in the process. In terms of effecting change in the community, 
I view this research as capable of influencing the policy and practice of truth 
commissions recommending reparations. The contribution of this research to the field 
is in seeking to highlight the relevance of studying post-truth commission processes, 
namely the follow up and implementation frameworks of their recommendations. 
Additionally, theoretically, it links together three fields of TJ, Criminology and 
implementation studies showing how these fields could be beneficial to the others’ 
growth.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on the methodological decisions concerning the research. In it, I 
elaborate on the scope, research question, data collection approaches, data processing 
and analysis as well as reflect on the research ethics and quality guidelines.  
 
The main argument in this study is that despite the popularity of truth commissions as 
a TJ mechanism, there has been limited attention to the processes following its closure, 
specifically in following up and implementation of their recommendations. The central 
question asked is “what happens to the recommendations on reparations made by truth 
commissions after the completion of the commission?” The approach is to first analyse 
how truth commissions have framed reparations and to assess the status of the 
implementation and its impact on the victims. Secondly, it broadens the scope to 
understand how other fields, notably criminology and implementation studies have 
addressed issues of truth, reparation and implementation respectively. The overall aim 
of the study is to understand how different stakeholders respond to truth commission 
recommendations and to develop a framework for studying how the implementation 
is carried out. The methodological approach expounded on in this chapter is a 
qualitative methodology consisting of a desk research and field work in Sierra Leone 
and Ghana.  
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Despite the challenges in terms of access, limited respondent sample and the issue of 
implementation of reparation not being a priority, I was able to engage with a diverse 
range of respondents. This approach reinforces the argument that for an in-depth 
understanding of the dynamics of implementation, a first-hand encounter with the 
relevant stakeholders is critical. 
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PART II. THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
 
“De perpetrator dem dae drive fine jeep” 
(Amputee, Freetown) 
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CHAPTER 2.  TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Transitional Justice (TJ) approaches have become a standard response to situations 
following gross and systematic human rights violations. Over the decades, it has 
established its place in both the academic and practitioner field. TJ has expanded in 
scope from focusing on transitions from authoritarianism to include periods after a 
civil conflict, electoral violence and colonial legacies, among others. It has also evolved 
from largely punishments and perpetrator focus as in the Nuremberg trials to victim-
oriented processes. This interdisciplinary field has drawn on both theory and practice 
from various other fields to construct a relatively stable field of study and practice. 
Several mechanisms have been employed which have typically been grouped into the 
four pillars of: criminal prosecutions; truth seeking; victim reparation programmes 
and institutional reforms. This chapter explores the transitional justice discourse. First, 
it discusses the definition of TJ and how it has evolved to its present state. Second, it 
reviews the four pillars and third, it discusses the linkages between truth commissions 
and reparation.  
 
2.1 The growth of Transitional Justice 
 
The usage of the term transitional justice gained prominence in the late 1980s and 
1990s in the human rights and post conflict discourse. This was in response to the 
complex status quo created by the fall of the authoritarian and military regimes in 
central and south America and central and eastern Europe and the emergence of 
democratic ones (Arthur, 2009; Bell, 2009). Central in these deliberations was the 
triple dilemma of how to frame a smooth transition leading to stability, what to do with 
the perpetrators to promote accountability and how to assuage the demands of the 
victims.  
 
It is thus from that background of transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy or 
civilian rule that TJ has been described from a narrow framework with a focus on this 
political shift in power. Teitel (2000, 2003, p. 69) for instance defines TJ as “the 
conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterised by legal 
responses to confront the wrong doings of repressive predecessor regimes.” This 
definition falls into the narrow category based on four arguments. (1) It is limited to 
only political change thereby eliminating other forms of transitions. (2) It 
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conceptualises all that can occur in the post transition phase through the lens of justice. 
In reality however, there is a myriad of concerns in these periods beyond justice. (3) It 
focuses on the legal responses which down-plays other mechanisms and processes that 
may be used in TJ. (4) The implied assumption is that there is a definite period in which 
transitional justice sets in (Roht-Arriaza, 2006). Following up on the forth observation, 
Roht-Arriaza (2006) further argues that it presupposes  that TJ sets in right after the 
old regime ends,  yet in reality TJ can be instigated years after the transitions.  
 
The narrow description of TJ was influenced by the kind of transitions at that time, 
which were mainly observed as shifts from authoritarianism to democratic regimes. 
The field of TJ was also not yet well known although gaining prominence following the 
three volume publication by Niel Kritz (Kritz, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). The earlier 
definitions however fall short of capturing the changing landscape of TJ. Some of the 
definitions, such as offered by Elster (2004) mention specific features that TJ should 
comprise of. He refers to TJ as “the process of trials, purges and reparations that take 
place after the transition from one political regime to another” (p. 1). According to him, 
transitions involve interactions between the old and new governments as well as 
internal and external influences which impact upon the nature and outcome of the 
transition. 
 
The notion of TJ comprising of interactions is further promoted by Bell (2009). She 
refers to it as consisting of bargains and trade-offs which emerge as societies seek for 
the most suitable mechanism for dealing with the atrocities and various actors in both 
the old and new regimes as well as in the period before, during and post conflict. This 
definition is reflective of the broadening focus and range of TJ as well as the inclusion 
of other fields within it.  
 
The United Nations in streamlining its activities to incorporate TJ define it as 
“comprising of the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (United Nations, 2004, para. 
8). This extended definition is reiterated in the 2010 and 2011 reports where the UN 
elaborates on how it has approached conflict and post-conflict societies with an 
awareness of TJ issues right from brokering peace deals to implementation of 
recommendations arising out of TJ mechanisms such as truth commissions (United 
Nations, 2010, 2011).  
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This broad definition of TJ is shared by other scholars and institutions alike. Roht-
Arriaza (2006) for instance states that TJ can be defined broadly to include just about 
any processes and mechanism that societies undertake to deal with a legacy of 
widespread human rights violations. She describes it as “that set of practices, 
mechanisms and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or 
repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations 
of human rights and humanitarian law” (p. 2). This may include efforts including 
structural and institutional reforms to projects such as building memorials or enacting 
commemoration days. This perception tends to be all-inclusive and does not limit to a 
particular approach or strategy. It also is not time bound as it does not specify how far 
back violations committed can go.  
 
Similarly, Van Zyl (2005, p. 209) defines TJ as “an attempt to build sustainable peace 
after conflict, mass violence or systematic human rights abuse.” While The 
International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009) refers to it as “the set of judicial 
and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order 
to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses.”  
 
In analysing the growth of TJ, Teitel (2003) has linked its evolution with the 
developments in the responses to international crimes. She identifies three phases; 
1945 post-war phase associated with the Nuremberg trials and international 
responses to international crimes. The post-cold war phase associated with democratic 
transitions and modernisation. This period is linked with the transitions occurring in 
Latin America and Eastern and Central Europe. The third phase, also known as the 
steady-state phase is characterised by the “normalisation of transitional justice” (pp. 
89–92) where the international responses to international crimes which were 
considered to be established under extraordinary circumstances become the norm. She 
highlights the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), International 
Criminal Tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda as examples of this normalisation of 
responses to international crimes.   
 
Teitel’s genealogy is invaluable in highlighting the evolution of TJ and how the 
transforming political conditions, expanding scope of political actors and expanding 
human rights dilemmas played a crucial role in the development of TJ discourse. It 
however limits this discussion to the judicial responses whereas TJ has comprised of 
multifaceted approaches which have evolved with the different transitions. Thus there 
is a shift in the focus of TJ from largely political changes as in the 1980s to include a 
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wide spectrum of issues like civil wars, genocides, development, democracy and rule 
of law, among others.  Another angle that is not captured in the genealogy is the 
phenomenon of already stable and democratic societies establishing TJ mechanisms to 
address historical injustices. Krueger (2016) and Parmentier & Aciru (2016) for 
instance have addressed this issue in reference to truth commissions however it serves 
to show how TJ has become a standardised response to international crimes and 
historical injustices. 
 
In unpacking the definition of TJ, it is important to understand the various contexts in 
which it is understood and practiced. The complexity in defining TJ has been broken 
down by Vandeginste (2009) who argues that TJ is interpreted and used in different 
ways and identifies five dimensions; as a (1) practice, (2) policy issue, (3) specific 
approach, (4) normative concept, and (5) field of research (p. 7). This broad 
conceptualisation of TJ covers the definition and usage of the term TJ which often is 
dynamic as well as takes into account the local realities such as the social structures, 
local knowledge, histories and the underlying assumptions that would result in 
‘frictions’ (Hinton, 2010). More so, such an understanding closely reflects the 
perception of TJ I encountered while in Ghana and Sierra Leone. 
 
A broad definition of TJ closely describes the approach to TJ that was taken in the case 
studies, Ghana and Sierra Leone. As is further elaborated in chapter 5, Ghana 
experienced periods of unconstitutional rule and authoritarianism in which human 
rights were violated. Successive regimes from 1957 – 1992 employed repressive and 
violent means to entrench themselves in power. During the transition to democracy in 
the 1990’s, national reconciliation featured prominently on the agenda. The irony in 
using the national reconciliation discourse however, was that during the transition 
from unconstitutional to constitutional rule, indemnity clauses were added into the 
1992 constitution which in effect shielded the perpetrators from possible 
accountability. It therefore was not possible to pursue justice through legal means at 
the same time bearing in mind the cumbersome and lengthy process this would entail 
if one attempted using the national courts.  Ten years after the return to 
constitutionalism, the search was still on for how to deal with the perpetrators, victims 
and the human rights abuses of the past.  
 
Ghana generally approached its violent past cautiously and quietly. A low key on-going 
restitution process had already been underway although this was not framed under TJ 
and neither was there any real effort at confronting the violations, mostly because 
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despite the regime change, the power still remained in the same hands. The NRC 
process however brought to the forefront the discussion on issues of TJ. In this case, TJ 
was closely identified as an alternative approach to achieving accountability. Thus 
specific approaches, namely the NRC and the follow up recommendations were 
identified and utilised to deal with the human rights violations and indemnities of the 
perpetrators.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
The Sierra Leone case (chapter 6) is more widely known due to the conflict that 
attracted widespread media and international attention. Following the war, a number 
of mechanisms were instituted for dealing with the war atrocities and the different 
parties to the conflict. As such a broader conceptualisation of TJ is evident. Multiple 
means both at local, national and international level were employed to confront the 
violent past including the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the TRC. 
 
Based on the different paths that the two countries follow, I lean towards the view 
shared by scholars such as Fletcher & Weinstein (2002) and Roht-Arriaza (2006) that 
there is not a single and conventional or linear pattern transition. I therefore concur 
with the broad definition of TJ encompassing a range of approaches employed by 
societies to deal with their atrocious past. In the end, TJ comprises of a move from a 
“period of violent conflict or oppression towards peace, democracy, rule of law and 
respect for individual and collective rights” (International Centre for Transitional 
Justice, 2009, p. 1). The evolution aside, TJ mechanisms have been popularly embraced 
by countries in different contexts ranging from those emerging from authoritarian rule, 
regime change or conflict to those grappling with violent incidences such as election 
violence to established democracies confronting historical wrongs. TJ therefore seeks 
to employ approaches which can enable society and individuals to effectively confront 
and deal with a violent past in order to establish or renew civic trust, enhance 
reconciliation and prevent the recurrence of the atrocities.  
 
In recent years, TJ as a concept and as a practice has become normalised in that it has 
become the automatic response and catch phrase in periods of transition or with 
anything to do with repression whether in the past or present. While in a museum in 
Freetown (Sierra Leone National Museum), I struck up a conversation with a 
gentleman who on learning I was a researcher with interest in the truth commission, 
kept liberally using the term TJ. I inquired what he meant by TJ and his response 
signified how sometimes at the local level, TJ is literally taken as a complex mix of 
processes, mechanisms and institutions. According to him, the entire experience of war 
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and negotiating the end of the war is TJ. Similarly, the various mechanisms of the truth 
commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone signified TJ. Interestingly though, 
mechanisms geared towards the perpetrator such as the Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration (DDR) as well as the Amnesty process did not qualify as TJ. In this 
way, TJ was associated with a victim centred process. This perception was further 
consolidated by the presence of various victim focused NGOs working under the 
umbrella of TJ. 
 
Despite the advancement in theorising TJ, it still has room to expand, mainly in the 
post-TJ phase, a period where the TJ programmes have come to an end. Collins (2010) 
has framed post-TJ as a resurgence of accountability demands for earlier human rights 
violations, usually in contexts where amnesties were the norm following the transition. 
This perception also becomes relevant in contexts of implementation of 
recommendations following the end of a TJ mechanism.  
 
 TJ may be a catchphrase that has been popularised mainly by international and local 
NGOs however, there is still a gap in how it is translated at the local level, particularly 
for the victim waiting for their reparation benefit up to ten years after the decision to 
award the said benefits. 
 
2.2 Exploration of the mechanisms 
 
In general, four main mechanisms are associated with TJ; criminal prosecutions, truth 
seeking, reparations and institutional reforms. As pointed out in the previous section, 
following periods of mass violations, societies are confronted with among others, how 
to deal with these experiences and what to do with especially the perpetrators, victims 
and other actors. In scenarios where the society has also been confronted with large 
scale destruction of institutions, property, livelihoods and mass displacement, 
rebuilding is not only centred on how to deal with the victims and perpetrators but also 
infrastructural and institutional rebuilding.  These are all competing demands in a 
resource strained economy.  
 
Parmentier (2003) in the Truth-Accountability-Reparation-Reconciliation (TARR) 
model suggests four interrelated key issues facing post conflict regimes and which any 
TJ mechanism(s) should consider; searching for the truth, ensuring accountability, 
providing reparations and promoting reconciliation. To these four components, 
Parmentier & Weitekamp (2007) further add the components of trauma and trust. In 
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theory, these issues raised rightly reflect the multiple layers transitioning societies are 
confronted with. However, what it fails to look at is the ability and willingness of the 
different actors to successfully follow through on such issues. It is one thing to identify 
needs but it is quite another to satisfactorily meet those needs and any TJ mechanism 
has to consider these two aspects of design and implementation. Although with specific 
reference to reparations, Cammack (2006, p. 216) asserts that “a well designed and 
implemented programme can accomplish two goals: It can bring closure to past rights 
abuses and the divisions and antipathy they engendered and it can set the stage for 
new democratic dispensation where rights are emphasized and protected.” However, 
the impact of any other TJ programmes can just as well bring about the intended 
consequences when designed and implemented appropriately.  
 
A number of mechanisms have been established to address the atrocities and their 
impact among affected populations. These include prosecutions, both international 
and national, reparations, truth seeking, institutional reforms, and vetting and 
dismissals (United Nations, 2004).  To these, the ICTJ (2009) includes gender justice 
and memorialisation efforts. These mechanisms offer a variation ranging from 
international interventions such as international prosecutions to domestic 
mechanisms as well as both judicial and non-judicial interventions.  
 
However, the decision on which mechanism(s) is most appropriate for a particular 
context should be determined by the TJ goals of the society as each trajectory has a 
different impact on society (Aukerman, 2002). Whether it is punishment, reconciliation 
or restoration or any other number of goals, each of the mechanisms possesses varying 
degrees of strengths and weaknesses in achieving the TJ goal. In some cases two or 
more mechanisms are instituted either simultaneously or consecutively to achieve 
multiple goals.  
 
The following section discusses the four mechanisms of criminal prosecutions, truth 
seeking, reparation and institutional reforms. Thereafter it examines the linkages 
between truth commissions and reparations. 
 
2.2.1 Criminal prosecutions 
 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials following World War II were significant 
in setting the trend for the prosecution of individuals for committing international 
crimes. This trajectory focused on holding perpetrators accountable for the atrocities.  
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Drumbl (2007) argues that this method attempts to transplant ordinary criminal 
processes to deal with extraordinary crimes which can be challenging considering the 
characteristics of international crimes. This development according to Hinton (2010) 
individualises guilt while undermining group blame. This is because despite the mass 
perpetration of crimes, individuals are held accountable for their specific roles in 
perpetuating specific crimes. Moreover, the main motivations for international 
prosecutions are geared towards retribution, deterrence and expressivism (Drumbl, 
2007, pp. 149–180), which might not necessarily be consonant with local needs.  
 
Subsequent international criminal justice mechanisms such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have maintained this 
approach thereby dealing with disproportionately few perpetrators in comparison to 
the actual number. The overriding argument being that they deal with individuals who 
bear the greatest responsibility. The ICTY however also included those considered as 
low level offenders such as Dražen Erdemović and Duško Tadić (Clark, 2008; Drumbl, 
2007). 
 
International trials are significant in some areas such as portraying the commitment of 
international community to address these atrocities, demonstrate that international 
crimes will not be tolerated at the international level and contribute to raising 
awareness about the atrocities wherever they are committed (Drumbl, 2007), a case in 
point being the self-referral by Uganda to the ICC regarding the LRA that 
internationalised the conflict in northern Uganda. Furthermore, they create the 
impression that something is being done to redress the harm particularly for the 
victims who are able to see some of the ringleaders of the atrocities being prosecuted.  
 
However, these tribunals tend to fall short on the ideals of procuring a broad based 
sense of justice or even contentment. They are far removed from the victims 
themselves, certainly in the case of the ICTR, ICTY and ICC and therefore there is less 
chance of direct observance of justice being done. There is further a huge disparity 
between the numbers of perpetrators tried in comparison to the number of 
perpetrators who actually participated in the atrocities which raises the question of 
what happens to the low level perpetrators who in most cases were of closer proximity 
to the victims. Smith (2009) in his discussion on the prosecution of genocide crimes 
posits that international justice falls short of appeasing the victims and may turn out to 
actually be “unfair and unhelpful.” He however attributes this to the top-down 
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approach that international justice seems to embrace. The processes are in most 
instances hatched and implemented by the elites, an argument reiterated by Drumbl 
(2007). This “[externalisation] of justice from the communities most traumatised by 
the atrocity (p. 124) and being taken up by the “technocratic savvy of international 
lawyers” (p. 135) may lead to the justice being offered questioned and reluctantly 
accepted by survivors, perpetrators and residents of post conflict regions (Smith, 
2009) thereby falling short of their aim of deterring perpetrators, bridging 
reconciliation and rendering justice. 
 
An approach to bring the trials to the local level while still retaining the international 
aspect was the creation of hybrid tribunals. These were established in the location in 
which the atrocities took place, the most notable cases being the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL), East Timor Special Panels, and the Extra Ordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). However, these are still motivated by the aims of 
retribution and deterrence with a focus on punishing through incarceration of the 
perpetrator. Even with the close proximity to the victims and crime scene, they still 
remain largely inaccessible to the victims. Additionally, the astronomical costs 
incurred by these courts in the face of scarce resources have been called out for 
instance by Gberie (2014) for the case of Sierra Leone and prompted debates on how 
to maintain the ideal human rights standards and the local realities in precarious 
contexts such as post conflict societies (Parmentier, Aciru, Saeed, & Rauschenbach, 
2016).  
 
At a more local level, pursuit for redress for international crimes has been incorporated 
in the domestic courts. In Uganda, the International Crimes Division was established to 
try serious crimes before national courts (Human Rights Watch, 2012; The Judiciary of 
the Republic of Uganda, n.d.). Rwanda also utilised the domestic courts to try genocide 
perpetrators but it was increasingly overwhelmed by the large numbers of 
perpetrators, criticisms of not following due process and inadequate institutions, 
among others (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The advantages of using domestic courts 
over international courts mainly lie in their close proximity to where the atrocities 
have been committed and strengthening the domestic legal system and overall rule of 
law (Ryngaert, 2010).  
 
Whether international, hybrid or domestic, judicial proceedings still follow a similar 
trajectory that focuses on sentencing the perpetrators. They remain distant for many 
victims with a few participating as witnesses. More critical however is the limitations 
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encountered in attempting to apply the stringent requirements of the legal system, 
primarily designed for ordinary crimes in a domestic context to extraordinary crimes 
(Aukerman, 2002).  
 
In the realm of domestic judicial proceedings, a further hybridisation has occurred 
where indigenous justice practices are incorporated with the mainstream procedures 
(Huyse & Salter, 2008). Rwanda’s system of gacaca has dominated this approach. In it, 
the ‘traditional’ practices were combined with the criminal justice system to pursue 
cases related to the genocide. This initiative, heavily reliant on local participation has 
received mixed reviews ranging from acclaims in its promotion of reconciliation and 
fostering accountability to criticisms regarding its treatment of perpetrators, 
collectivising guilt and travesty  to the criminal justice system (Ingelaere, 2012).  The 
multiple representations (Ingelaere, 2012, 2016) aside, gacaca has increased the 
appeal for more localised and community oriented mechanisms of justice in other post 
conflict societies (Longman, 2009).  
 
The appeal for prosecutions as a TJ mechanism is linked to assumptions about its 
contributions towards establishing the truth through for instance exposure of the 
wrongdoing and acknowledgement of harm, strengthening the rule of law,  reinforcing 
moral norms through a collectivised understanding of wrong behaviours rest and 
furthering restorative goals including repairing harm and restoring relationships 
(Aukerman, 2002).  
 
2.2.2 Truth seeking 
 
The right and significance of knowing the circumstances under which crimes were 
perpetrated has become a banner for truth seeking mechanisms (Parmentier & Aciru, 
2016). The right to truth involves knowing to the fullest extent possible the details of 
the violation. Clarifying the facts of a painful past is therefore a prominent feature in 
the period following repression or violence. It is supported through various 
instruments at international and regional levels (Landel, 2009) which are still evolving 
(Groome, 2015). There are a number of initiatives that can be utilised to seek the truth 
about past violations. Freeman (2006) for instance examines at least eleven 
mechanisms for investigating human rights violations (Freeman, 2006, pp. 40–69) 
while Bickford (2007) and Hayner (2011) refer to official, semi and unofficial inquiries. 
This significance is to emphasise that whereas truth commissions have dominated the 
field, other forms of inquiries are also in existence and can play crucial roles in 
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establishing the truth. In this study however, I focus on the mechanism of truth 
commissions. 
 
The number of truth seeking mechanisms since the 1970s when this phenomenon 
caught on varies from scholar to scholar. USIP, in their database list 33 truth 
commissions and 12 commissions of inquiry from the period 1974-2011 (USIP, n.d.-b). 
Dancy et al., (2010) however list 37 truth commissions from 1974 to 2005. (Olsen et 
al., (2010b)  on the other hand cite 53 cases of truth commissions through 1970-2007 
while in Wiebelhaus-Brahm (2009), there is a compilation of about 80 cases cited by 
different authors between 1970 and 2006. 
 
Despite the debate on the characteristics of truth commissions resulting in a 
discrepancy in the totals, there is a proliferation of truth seeking mechanisms, a need 
to establish the truth about particular events and official acknowledgement of this 
truth. This resonates with the notion of the right to the truth and the obligation of the 
state to provide information to victims and the society about the circumstances 
surrounding serious violations of human rights (UN Commission on Human Rights, 
2006). 
 
Societies have therefore readily worked towards seeking the truth as a way of  
addressing issues of past human rights violations and abuses (Freeman & Hayner, 
2003). Teitel (2003) places the emergence of truth commissions in the second stage of 
transition in her genealogy. According to her, the expanding scope and complexity of 
crimes, perpetrators and victims placed limitations on the trial system which made the 
model of truth commissions and commissions of inquiry more attractive as these were 
able to “offer a broader historical perspective, rather than mere judgements in isolated 
cases” (p. 79).  
 
Additionally, the operations of truth commissions are more fluid and avail more 
opportunities for the interaction between victims and perpetrators. Roht-Arriaza 
(2006) points out that the non-judicial methods, like truth commissions seem more 
adaptable to dealing with the many shades of grey that characterise most conflicts. 
More so, truth commissions tend to be more victim oriented and provide a less 
confrontational option while still not ignoring the violations and doing something for 
the victims, setting it within a larger social context focusing on the overall pattern of 
violations rather than zeroing in on the relatively few cases that happen to make it to 
trials. The process can therefore among others, offer significant benefits for the victim 
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and society in terms of obtaining the information about them or their loved ones which 
may provide a sense of closure as well as a sense of satisfaction from the official 
acknowledgment (de Greiff, 2006a).  
 
In terms of definition, Hayner (2002, 2011) has  broadly defined truth commissions as 
a temporary official body authorised by the state to investigate a pattern of past human 
rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law. A truth commission is 
often mandated to offer an acknowledgement of the truth regarding past abuses and 
human rights violations; reduce the likelihood of future human rights abuses and make 
specific recommendations for reform.  
 
In the 2011 edition, after consideration of the various debates regarding the defining 
parameters of truth commissions discussed in her previous publications, particularly 
the contribution from Freeman (2006), Hayner proposes five parameters for defining 
a truth commission (pp. 11–12): 
i. Focused on the past, rather than ongoing events; 
ii. Investigates a pattern of events that took place over a period of time; 
iii. Engages directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information 
on their experiences; 
iv. Temporary body with the aim of concluding with a final report; 
v. Officially authorised or empowered by the state under review. 
 
The operations of truth commissions have however increasingly attracted controversy 
on among others, the mandates and ability to provide healing and closure. Critiques 
have highlighted the time period of the commissions, the non-judicial nature and the 
notion of a ‘single’ truth. According to Wilson (2001) with particular reference to the 
South African case, truth commissions may provide short-term healing for others but 
not all and do not work on the power relations which sometimes remain the same. They 
also run the possibility of re-traumatizing victims when their expectations are not 
fulfilled. This observation could easily be extrapolated to several other cases following 
the work of the truth commissions who are often faced with the question of ‘what next?’ 
following the conclusion of the work of these bodies.  
 
The ‘what next’ question is especially relevant considering that truth commissions are 
temporary mechanisms (Aciru, 2017a; Hayner, 2011; Parmentier & Aciru, 2016; 
United Nations, 2013). Truth commissions are additionally challenged in their inability 
to offer substantive assistance during their operations. Often, victims approach the 
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commission with the expectation that their demands, particularly for reparations will 
be immediately fulfilled or at the very least within the short-term but many truth 
commissions do not have the power nor the resources to do this but rather defer these 
demands to their proposals for recommendations. Exceptions such as the truth 
commissions in South African and Timor-Leste were able to provide urgent interim 
reparations to some victims who gave statements (Hayner, 2011). A number of them 
have also provided therapeutic services such as locating the remains of the missing and 
commemoration and memorialisation activities as well as counselling services prior, 
during and after the hearings (Guthrey, 2015). 
 
However, the legacy of a truth commission is inextricably linked to the implementation 
of its recommendations and implementation has so far remained weak. Hirsch, 
MacKenzie, & Sesay (2012) among others have argued that the post-truth commission 
phase is an area that has received significantly little attention. It is critical that with the 
end of a truth commission, substantial attention should be directed to evaluating 
whether it has achieved what it set out to achieve in its mandate as well as what is 
expected of it as a truth commission. 
 
With their limited time frame of operation, truth commissions set the momentum 
towards redressing past harms however, they do require a certain level of 
sustainability through adequate follow up, implementation and research. 
Unfortunately however, what happens following a truth commission has remained 
largely unattractive to governments, academicians and other local and international 
stakeholders.  
 
2.2.3 Victims reparations 
 
Where a victim has suffered gross violation of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, they are entitled to, under international law adequate, 
effective and prompt reparation for the harm suffered. The UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and serious violations of international humanitarian 
law (UNBPG)   specifies that “where appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the 
violation and the circumstances of each case [victims should be] provided with full and 
effective reparations” (UN General Assembly, 2006, principle 18).  
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However, it still remains challenging to determine what amount of money or symbols 
can truly repair and make whole all the harm that has been done (Rombouts, Sardaro, 
& Vandeginste, 2005). There is no amount of actions that can undo what has been done 
since “life has no undo button” (Elster, 2004, p. 167). Despite this, there are still a range 
of possibilities and measures that can be implemented to ease the suffering whilst 
acknowledging the losses.  
 
According to Redress, the principle of reparation has existed in international law and 
other systems and  concerns an obligation to redress damage to an injured party by the 
wrongdoing party (Redress, 2003). It may be looked at from a broad or narrow 
perspective (de Greiff, 2006). The former applies to “all measures that may be 
employed to redress the various types of harms that victims may have suffered as a 
consequence of certain crimes.” This may include both direct benefits as well as 
mechanisms which will provide reparative benefits such as truth telling, criminal 
justice and institutional reforms (p. 452).  Roht-Arriaza (2004) also provides a broad 
understanding of reparation in which she describes it as “the embodiment of society’s 
recognition, remorse and atonement for harms ‘inflicted’.” These may be both material 
constituting of restitution, rehabilitation, monetary and service packages or moral 
means including truth, justice, assurances of non-repetition, acknowledgement, 
apology and measures to bring “satisfaction” to the victims such as reburials, 
ceremonies and commemorations. According to her, reparations fulfil four purposes, 
“reparations for the body to enable survival, reparations for the spirit and sense of 
justice, [reparations] for some sense of a decorous and [reparations for a] secure future 
for future generations” (pp. 158–159).  
 
A broad conceptualisation of reparation however runs the danger of remaining remote 
to the victims, particularly from efforts that are aimed at providing reparative benefits. 
This is because these efforts may not directly respond to the specific harms and 
damages that victims might have suffered (Hayner, 2011), particularly if it involves 
direct losses to the body and property. 
 
Consequently, reparations is sometimes framed more narrowly as specific measures to 
directly benefit the victims (de Greiff, 2006). This could be financially through 
compensations, access to social services or symbolically, among others.  
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In TJ framework, reparations are typically considered a cornerstone for facilitating 
healing and reconciliation through acknowledgment of the physical, psychological and 
social damage (Garcia-Godos, 2008). Reparations can play a significant role in the 
healing process and according to de Greiff (2006a, p. 2), “for some victims, reparations 
are the most tangible manifestation of the efforts of the state to remedy the harms they 
have suffered.” This is particularly so when it moves beyond the direct benefits to 
victims to addressing the structures that enabled the atrocities to take place.  
 
On a hypothetical level, six main questions are asked when considering reparation. 
These include; why provide reparations? What forms of reparations are to be awarded? 
Who provides the reparations? To whom are reparations awarded? What objectives 
does it seek to fulfil? And, how should the programmes be implemented?  
 
Why provide reparations? 
Various scholars have attempted to discuss why it is important to provide reparations. 
Rombouts (2004) proposes two grounds for reparations, the legal and moral grounds. 
On the legal grounds, reparation is framed as a right and it is therefore an individual 
right to receive reparations for harm suffered. This is also the view framed by for 
instance the UNBPG (Principle VII(b)) and international law.  The moral ground is 
motivated by general feelings of sympathy and/or solidarity for harm inflicted and 
suffered by victims. Through reparation, the victim is recognised, the harms are 
addressed and avenues are opened to facilitate the interaction between the 
perpetrators, victims and society. 
 
Similar to the moral justification for reparation, Appiagyei-Atua (n.d.) in an 
unpublished paper suggests a normative justification for reparation consisting of 
interactions between the victims, perpetrators and community. Using a community 
emancipation framework Appiagyei-Atua (2000) argues for a needs-capacities-duties-
rights-development framework which claims that victims of rights abuse have special 
needs which have been generated by the past abuses they suffered. The victims 
therefore need to be given the opportunity to express how the violations took place, 
communicate their special needs and survival story, among others. The perpetrators 
on the other hand need to admit the wrong, seek forgiveness and offer redress while 
the community plays the role of rehabilitating both the victim and offender. 
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Rombouts & Parmentier (2009) on the other hand identify three objectives of 
reparations; restoration of the victim to the situation in which they were before the 
violation occurred; bringing the victim to the state that would have existed if violations 
had not occurred; deterrence to wrongdoers from causing harm in the future. From the 
limitations of the above, they suggest a fourth objective of seeking a new balance aimed 
at avoiding renewed cycles of violence. The authors further suggest a process-oriented 
approach as an appropriate framework for managing reparation which emphasizes the 
central role of the victims (Rombouts, 2004).  The implication is that reparations 
programmes need to take account of the different stakeholders as well as the resources 
necessary for such a programme. 
 
Who are the beneficiaries? 
The UNBPG (article V) provides that the beneficiaries of reparations are victims of 
gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. It further clarifies that victims can be individuals or 
groups who have suffered harm. The harm could be physical, mental, emotional, 
economic or an impairment to their fundamental rights. The victims can be direct or 
indirect such as family, dependants or persons intervening to assist a victim (UN 
General Assembly, 2006).  This may appear a straightforward categorisation however 
in practice it is much more complicated.  
 
The context of International crimes presents a lot of grey areas in profiling victims and 
perpetrators (Huyse, 2003) therefore the interpretation of the beneficiaries of 
reparation has sometimes been challenging. Other factors such as the available 
resources or political implications have also curtailed efforts on determining who a 
victim entitled to benefits is.  
 
Forms of reparation 
The UNBPG provides a comprehensive breakdown of possible reparation packages 
which it has grouped into five elements: Restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.  
 
In restitution, the idea is to “restore the victim to the original situation” before the harm 
and may include measures such as restoration of liberty and rights, return to one’s 
place of residence, restoration or employment and return of property (Principe 19). 
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The dilemma however is that it simply is impossible to restore to the original situation 
(Rombouts & Parmentier, 2009). Even if the rights and property are eventually 
restored to the state in which the victim originally was, this approach does not account 
for the period that the individual was deprived of their rights or property. If an 
individual is deprived of their home or employment for instance for ten years, having 
it restored may not rectify other harms and indignities they might have endured during 
the time of their deprivation. This approach therefore assumes that the situation would 
have remained the same before and after the violations by seeking to restore the victim 
to the situation before the violation, which is a fallacy. Sometimes, the situation before 
the violations may not have been ideal, for instance in cases of marginalisation, 
inequality or poverty. This gives credence to the approach of combining different forms 
of reparations and endeavouring to make them more context specific. 
 
Compensation mainly relates to financial benefits and are costs provided for “any 
economically assessable damage” (Principle 20). The damages may range from 
physical, mental, material and moral.  It can also include loss of opportunities like 
employment, education, social benefits, earning and earning potential. The costs may 
also be incurred in search of legal or expert assistance, medical, psychological and 
social services (Principle 20). In principle, this approach of compensation 
complements what has been offered in restitution as it takes into account the period in 
which the individual suffered deprivation as well as the total sum of the struggles 
endured (Rombouts et al., 2005). However, owing to the huge financial obligations 
expected in this approach, it might not be a sustainable option for many transitioning 
societies. 
 
Rehabilitation includes medical and psychological care as well as legal and social 
services (Principle 21). The UNBPG does not go into detail to expound on this form of 
reparation. It is however a major issue that comes out in post conflict debates 
especially where the violations cause serious physical and mental injuries.  According 
to Redress (2009), rehabilitation as a form of reparation is still complex in terms of its 
definition and the details of what it should involve and how it should be done.  
“’Rehabilitation’ continues to be an elusive form of reparation. It is unclear what exactly 
it means, to whom it applies and for what duration (many human rights violations have 
life-long and multigenerational impacts), who has the obligation to afford it and how 
practically it can be afforded” (pp. 5–6). Redress further distinguishes between a 
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narrow approach to rehabilitation that only focuses on the physical and psychological 
care and a holistic approach that encompasses all that is necessary for an individual to 
reconstruct their lives and reduce the consequences of the harm endured. This would 
involve all aspects of the physical, psychological, social, legal, and financial services as 
hinted at by the UNBPG. Shelton (2006) further elaborates that rehabilitation should 
where necessary be broadened beyond the individual to include the family, local 
community and society and aims at restoring physical and psychological wellbeing of 
the beneficiaries. The challenge with rehabilitation is that despite it being included 
among the forms of reparation, it is often associated with humanitarian assistance, 
mainly by international organisations and NGOs as well as developmental programmes 
(Rombouts, 2004). It therefore becomes difficult to draw the line between what aspects 
of it are reparation as a right and which are included in the general reconstruction and 
development efforts. 
 
Under satisfaction, the UNBPG provides eight components of which might contribute 
to satisfaction. These include; cessation of hostilities, full and public disclosure of the 
truth, search for the disappeared and killed and assistance in recovery, identification 
and reburials, restoration of the dignity, reputation and rights, public apology, 
sanctions against perpetrators, commemorations, tributes and remembrance 
strategies (Principle 22). Satisfaction however is a vague concept (Rombouts, 2004) 
and sometimes very individual and it is not quite clear what criteria are to be used to 
measure levels of satisfaction. She for instance points out that cessation of hostilities 
can hardly be referred to as reparation. Reparations can only be done when violations 
have ceased and “stopping any further violations is not a  form of redress, it is a basic 
respect of a right” (p. 51). However, leaving the debates aside, the value that the 
measures that lead to satisfaction can bring to individuals and groups should not be 
underestimated.  
 
Guarantees of non-repetition, as the name suggests, are measures intended to 
contribute to the prevention of the recurrence of the factors that brought on the harm. 
This basically involves reorganising the socio-political structures (Rombouts, 2004).  It 
includes acts such as military and security reforms, ensuring international standards 
of due process, fairness and impartiality in civilian and military proceedings, 
strengthening the independence of the judiciary, protection of persons in the legal, 
medical, media, human rights defenders and other professionals, providing human 
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rights and humanitarian law education, promoting observance of codes of conduct and 
ethical norms, promoting mechanisms or preventing and monitoring social conflicts 
and their resolution and reviewing and reforming laws (principle 23).  
 
Who provides the reparations? 
According to the UNBPG in article IX (15-17), the primary duty to provide reparations 
lies with the state. This can be done directly through the provision of the benefits, 
establishing national programmes and other assistance and enforcing judgements 
against liable individuals or entities (UN General Assembly, 2006).  The basis for state 
responsibility however is that the state is liable for the acts that require the reparation. 
The ICTJ further concurs with this role of the state in their definition of reparations as  
“state-sponsored initiatives that help repair the material and moral damages of past 
abuse” (International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2009, p. 1). 
 
The question of who provides the reparations however is contentious. Where the state 
is strongly implicated in violations or where the perpetrators retain strong positions 
in the new regime and their guilt is undisputable, it might provide the grounds to 
demand that the state pays the reparations. However, when it is a new successor 
regime or when perpetrators are at pains to cover their tracks, the payment becomes 
problematic particularly because reparation is often associated with acceptance of 
guilt, a burden the new regime or even the perpetrators may not be ready to undertake. 
Furthermore, where the guilty persons or other entities such as international 
corporations and states are found liable and required to pay the reparation, there 
simply may not be a mechanism or a willingness by the state to enforcing such a 
decision.  
 
Although it is clear on who is responsible for paying reparations, the context in which 
the reparation decisions are implemented is heavily influenced by the socio-economic 
and political situation in each context which has resulted in mixed record of 
compliance, semi-compliance and non-compliance in providing the specified 
reparations.  
 
The above elements have generally been taken as a comprehensive approach to 
reparations, ensuring redress to not only the direct victim but to the local community 
and society as a whole. It also captures aspects of direct benefits as well as elements 
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that provide reparative benefits. It is however virtually impossible to establish a 
reparation programme that contains all of the above elements, particularly in a 
resource strapped post conflict country with competing demands and priorities. As 
such, a number of considerations need to be made in determining the best reparations 
fit for a particular context as discussed below. 
 
Individual and Collective Measures 
Reparations can be paid individually, collectively or a mixture of both. In cases of mass 
atrocity, it is not only about the masses. Violations can be targeted at individuals but 
also at groups as a whole therefore the experiences and consequences of violence can 
be individualised or sometimes shared by a larger population despite having been 
directed at an individual.  
 
Individual reparations can come in handy because they target individual victims. 
Individual reparations recognise the specific harm to a specific individual and has a 
bearing on their worth as a citizen (Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, 2009). One of the set-
backs to individual reparations however, is that they often require a relatively large 
resource base (Rombouts et al., 2005), there is also an additional challenge of 
determining what each individual should get because often the harm varies. In a 
situation where there are large numbers of victims, it may not be possible to award 
reparation on an individual basis but rather a flat sum per individual. For instance in 
Chile’s case it was assumed that everybody who had been held in custody was 
subjected to torture and therefore all were awarded the same compensation. 
 
Where individual reparations are not “feasible, desirable or sufficient” (Rombouts et 
al., 2005, p. 460), collective reparations can be made. Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky (2009) 
further assert that collective reparations may be instituted as a response to collective 
harms and harms to social cohesion particularly in instances where there is a strong 
sense of collective identity. According to them, the awarding of collective reparations 
not only has the possibility of re-establishing social solidarity but also “maximises the 
effectiveness of existing resources” (p. 3). Where there was a deliberate structural 
discrimination and oppression of a group, individual reparations tend to be inadequate 
and difficult to manage. In practice however, reparations tend to comprise a mixture of 
both individual and collective. 
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Most of the debates on the appropriateness of individual or collective reparations are 
framed from the assumption that they constitute monetary benefits. For non-monetary 
benefits such as apologies, sometimes individual responses might be more beneficial 
considering that in group harm, individuals experience the harm differently. Such a 
gesture could be as simple as providing individual apologies or mentioning individual 
names rather than as a group. 
 
Symbolic and material measures 
The decision on whether to award symbolic or material measures may arise out of a 
number of considerations. In a resource strapped economy, symbolic gestures such as 
apologies, monuments or reconverting and renaming structures which might be linked 
to the violations might make economic sense. Such symbols can act as a reminder of 
the acknowledgement and recognition of the victimhood. On the face of it, it could be 
argued that all reparations are symbolic gestures or tokens of acknowledgement 
because it would be difficult to restore the victims into a position in which they were 
before the violations in its entirety.  
 
On the other hand, material measures such as monetary compensation have the 
potential to meet the tangible needs of the victims. Where the money is available, the 
payment of funds can also be a quick endeavour and if it is one-time payments finalise 
the process. The danger of monetary compensation is that they may be interpreted as 
a payment for the violation. As such the expectation may be a payment equivalent to 
the harm, which might either amount to unrealistic figures or be impossible to 
compute. 
 
Reparation as social service benefits 
In some cases, reparations are framed as access to social services such as health, 
education, and housing and are even considered as an alternative to individual 
monetary compensations (Rombouts, 2004). However, as she further argues at which 
point does the differentiation between social services as a reparation benefit and an 
obligation by the state start? Nevertheless, development programmes remain an 
attractive option for reparation particularly since the assumption is that they can easily 
be incorporated into the overall development and reconstruction agenda (Cristian 
Correa, 2014; Roht-Arriaza, 2006; Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, 2009).  
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Despite the clear distinction between the different categories of reparation, it still 
remains challenging to carry out reparations. This is mostly because of the 
complexities associated with loss and victimisation. Reparations need to comprise of 
on the one hand, individual-focused reparations targeting individual needs, and on the 
other community-focused or institutionalised reparations that target the community 
with the aim of improving community cohesion, reconciliation and satisfaction. As 
such, whereas reparation programmes should have a real impact on a victim’s life, they 
also need to be acceptable to the larger society (Correa, Magarrell, & Guillerot, 2009). 
 
Nonetheless, even with the available reparation options, the actual process of provision 
and implementation is overwhelmed with challenges hence underscoring the 
importance of undertaking a comprehensive approach to victims’ needs and 
perceptions in post-conflict situations.  
 
2.2.4 Institutional reforms 
 
In a number of cases, state institutions may be responsible for violations. In conflict or 
authoritarian regimes, the security sector such as military, intelligence services, police 
and prisons as well as the judiciary and other branches of government become 
intertwined and complicit in the execution of crimes. In other cases, such as in Peru, 
the omission of state responsibility leading to the marginalisation and impoverishment 
of some sections or society contributed to their vulnerability and victimisation 
(Amnesty International, 2004; Laplante, 2008). In this case, these institutions need to 
be transformed to prevent the recurrence of violations, re-establish civic trust and 
restore the legitimacy of public institutions. Purging and vetting are common practices 
during institutional reforms (Mayer-Rieckh, 2006). Without reforming structures that 
perpetrated or remained indifferent during the violations or even were non-existent, 
the best intentioned TJ processes are bound to stall as explored in the case of 
Cambodia, East Timor and Sri Lanka (Fernando, 2014).  
 
Whereas institutional reforms are sometimes framed in the context of reparations 
under the element of ‘guarantees of non-repetition, in other cases they can be 
independent processes established during general reconstruction and development 
efforts. Truth commissions are also taking an active role in including elements of 
institutional reform in their recommendations.  
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Institutional reforms as an element of TJ appears to be understudied in comparison to 
the other three mechanisms. At best, it is treated either as a subset of the other 
mechanisms or the focus is limited to specific aspects such as the security or judiciary. 
However, as pointed out by Fernando (2014) institutional reforms need to be as 
comprehensive as possible in order to ensure that the aims of TJ are achieved (p. 193). 
 
At this point, it is pertinent to emphasise that despite the above breakdown of the 
different mechanisms, in practice and in an ideal situation, a meaningful TJ process 
would necessitate the establishment of different mechanisms concurrently or 
successively. The critiques involving individual mechanisms have in a positive sense 
given credence to the incorporation of more than one tool in post-conflict 
reconstruction or an “ecological model” of social reconstruction (Fletcher & Weinstein, 
2002) which looks at the interplay of the different tools. ICTJ (2009) refers to this as a 
holistic approach in which different complementary mechanisms are combined. The 
range of challenges encountered by societies encountering a transition are more 
suitably responded to using different and complementary approaches as often “no 
single measure is as effective on its own as when combined with others (p. 2). Other 
scholars such as Olsen, Payne, & Reiter (2010a) and Freeman & Hayner (2003) have 
also reiterated this idea. de Greiff (2006a) on linking truth telling and reparations for 
instance asserts that whereas truth telling can provide victims with significant benefits, 
“in the absence of other positive and tangible manifestations, truth by itself can easily 
be considered an empty gesture, as cheap and inconsequential talk” (de Greiff, 2006a, 
p. 2) while on the other hand reparations alone, particularly monetary compensation 
could be considered  a payoff.  
 
In light of this interconnectedness of the mechanisms Roht-Arriaza (2006) suggests a 
process of “interweaving, sequencing and accommodating multiple pathways to justice 
[in order] for some kind of larger justice [to] emerge” (p. 8). It is with this in mind that 
in the following section. I consider the linkages between truth commissions and 
reparations on the basis that truth commissions have increasingly incorporated 
reparations stressing the significance of reparations and taking measures to include 
proposals for reparations in their recommendations.  
 
2.3  Linking truth commissions and reparations 
 
A strong argument in favour of truth commissions and reparation processes is the 
central role they give to victims in the TJ process. The main focus of TCs is in victims 
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being availed the opportunity to narrate their experiences and be heard (Hayner, 
2011). Similarly, in reparations, the focus is explicitly on victims and their situation 
(Magarrell, 2007; Rombouts et al., 2005). With both mechanisms, the rights of the 
victims to truth and redress is cemented as well as paving the way towards the process 
of attempting to repair the harms. 
 
From the practice of truth commissions, it can be noted that in terms of sequencing, the 
trend has mostly been truth telling preceding reparations programmes. Sometimes, the 
decision on whether or not to include the issue of reparation in the recommendations 
of a truth commission is closely linked to its mandate while in other cases, the 
commissions take on this initiative despite not being in its mandate. Argentina’s 
National Commission on the Disappeared was mandated to establish the facts on the 
disappearances. It however went ahead and produced strong recommendations on 
reparations as did Chile, Germany, El Salvador and Haiti among others. In a number of 
cases however, the mandate specifically calls on it to make recommendations for the 
reparation of victims such as Ecuador although for some, they have creatively 
interpreted the mandates and translated phrases such as ‘addressing needs of victims’, 
‘preventing future violations’ or ‘facilitation of reconciliation’ to mean proposing 
measures of reparation.  
 
The argument that truth telling and reparations are complementary processes has for 
instance been discussed by (Hayner, 2011). She identifies three ways in which truth 
commissions can be relevant to the reparation process; first by providing a detailed 
proposal on the structure of the reparation programme. Truth commissions typically 
interact widely with victims, listening to their stories and soliciting their views on 
various issues pertaining to their welfare and such information particularly on the 
needs of the victims can prove useful for a potential reparation programme that seeks 
to directly address victims’ needs. Secondly, it provides a basis for the work of the 
reparation programme such as available lists of victims, who in most cases already 
have their stories and experiences verified by the commission. Third, hearing the 
stories creates an environment that facilitates political and public support for the 
establishment of a reparation programme. Through focusing the spotlight on the 
victims, the public is made aware of the harms they suffered and their continued plight 
as a result of the harm. The shifting of the public mind-set can also further minimise 
future resentment towards the victims for being beneficiaries. 
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Furthermore, Hamber (2000) also argues that linking reparations to truth recovery 
eases the process of making reparations by framing the reparations as an 
acknowledgement process rather than as a payoff. This is because reparations alone is 
often not possible to satisfy the victims’ need to come to terms with the events of what 
happened and can be viewed as a government conspiracy to keep the past hidden or 
even blood money (Roht-Arriaza, 2004). In Morocco, for instance, a reparations 
programme was set up under the Independent Arbitration Panel in 1999 to 
compensate the victims and despite paying the beneficiaries, the programme was 
heavily criticised for among others failure to investigate and reveal the truth about the 
past which precipitated the creation of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission in 
2004 with a more truth seeking mandate. A truth telling process alone on the other 
hand can also be considered an incomplete process, particularly if the victims are 
expecting some form of material or symbolic gestures in recognition of their suffering 
and participation in the truth telling exercise.  
 
Consequently, truth commissions have increasingly included components of 
reparations for victims in their recommendations. A more challenging setback for 
linking truth commissions and reparation however is the often inadequate 
implementation record of truth commission recommendations (Hayner, 2011). In a 
number of cases, there is a weak follow-up framework or strategy for ensuring that 
recommendations are implemented. Truth commissions are temporary, usually with a 
lifespan of between six months to two years and with no powers to enforce the 
recommendations they propose, thus giving rise to the dilemma of what happens to the 
recommendations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Elster (2004), Hinton (2010) and Teitel (2003) among others present an analytic 
evolution of TJ. A common theme is developing creative and collective responses to 
unimaginable atrocities and thereby establishing the place of TJ as a theory and 
practice. The four main pillars that have been considered instrumental in addressing 
the legacies of serious and massive human rights abuses include; criminal 
prosecutions, truth seeking, reparations and institutional reforms. These include a 
range of international to local as well as judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. From 
the 1990s when the term was popularised (Ohlin, 2007), TJ has grown exponentially 
with a large and committed base. However, as argued by Hinton, (2010) TJ still needs 
to become more meaningful at the local level to grapple with the complexities existing 
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at such localities. More research and practice would be vital in exploring how TJ is 
experienced, perceived and conceptualised at the local level as these responses have 
significant impact on the overall outcome of specific mechanisms.  
 
Despite the various arguments in favour of individual mechanisms, there is a strong 
dominance on criminal prosecutions considering the amount of resources injected into 
running the trials. However, trials can only accommodate a limited number of 
perpetrators. They also focus on individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for 
the atrocities and these may not necessarily be the local level perpetrators whom 
victims have witnessed wrecking the havoc. The Gacaca experience has so far stood out 
as a community based court that managed to try a large number of perpetrators but its 
legacy has remained clouded as a result of the criticisms levelled against, particularly 
in its treatment of the accused, the interaction between the victims and perpetrators 
and the truth that has emerged out of the process (Funkeson, Schröder, Nzabonimpa, 
& Holmqvist, 2011; Ingelaere, 2009). Furthermore, the issue of reparation in Gacaca 
was not comprehensively addressed and while positive reparative effects, particularly 
in symbolic measures such as acknowledging the truth and finding the remains of their 
loved ones have been registered, a holistic reparation measure was not included and 
the implementation of the property related cases has remained complex (Bornkamm, 
2012; Brouwer & Ruvebana, 2013). In both the gacaca and criminal prosecutions, 
reparations have not been a prominent issue although with the establishment of the 
ICC, the issue of reparations is being addressed through the Victims Trust Fund. 
 
Institutional reforms as a TJ mechanism have on the other hand received less attention. 
It is commonly addressed within the framework of the general post conflict 
reconstruction and development agenda. 
 
In the discussions on TJ mechanism, truth commissions create the impression of being 
one of the most comprehensive mechanisms, the middle ground between prosecutions 
and impunity, victim oriented with significant interaction with the perpetrators in 
establishing the truth and forward looking goals through proposals that seek to 
address the causes and consequences of the atrocities. The positive attributes 
elaborated by various scholars, practitioners and institutions have further popularised 
it into a widely recognized mechanism for dealing with the past. The strength of truth 
commissions has also been explained in terms of its interaction with other 
mechanisms, particularly reparation programmes to make it more meaningful for the 
victims and society. A key area within the truth commissions discourse that has 
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received significantly less attention is the post-truth commissions phase, precisely 
studies into the follow up and implementation of their recommendations. Whereas a 
number of them specifically concerning institutional reforms are incorporated within 
general post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes, some of them have 
scarcely been translated into action. The following section tackles this dilemma and 
discusses the truth commission recommendations with a specific focus on reparations 
for victims. 
  
72 
  
  
 73 
CHAPTER 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS:  
   POST-TRUTH COMMISSION 
  
3.0 Introduction 
 
According to Hayner (2011) one of the key outputs of a truth commission is the 
publication of the report containing the findings and recommendations. A key concern 
following their conclusion is the outcome of the various recommendations that they 
have proposed in the report. This chapter discusses the issue of implementation of 
truth commission recommendations with specific reference to reparation for victims. 
The main argument is that there has not been a concerted interest in studying how 
recommendations are followed up and implemented. As a result there is lack of a 
comprehensive framework for studying implementation. This chapter therefore 
presents an overview of how the implementation of reparations for victims have been 
approached in different cases and argues for a synthesised approach in which the 
implementation is not viewed as an isolated component but rather through a broader 
framework that takes into account the entire cycle of the truth commission and 
reparation programme. The first part discusses the status of the implementation of 
reparations in selected cases. The second part discusses the criteria that have been 
proposed in the TJ literature for analysing recommendations on reparations and in the 
third part, the proposed framework for studying the implementation of truth 
commission recommendations is introduced. 
 
3.1 An overview of the Implementation of recommendations on reparation 
 
When truth commissions make recommendations, the target government will likely 
respond in one of three ways;  implementing all of the recommendations, 
implementing some of the recommendations or implementing none of the 
recommendations (www.truthcommissions.org, 2012). According to Roht-Arriaza 
(2004), despite the emphasis on availing reparations following mass atrocities, few 
have actually been paid. Reparations have either been partially paid, delayed or plain 
ignored. In a number of cases, the government has shown willingness and commitment 
to work towards the implementation of the recommendations, particularly where it 
involves reforming institutions and laws that were party to and facilitated the 
violations. The option of implementing some of the recommendations leaves the 
governments with the dilemma of selecting which ones to prioritise. This is not an 
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enviable position considering that in many transitioning societies, the incumbent 
government is faced with various competing demands.  
 
In general, implementation of recommendations has remained weak, garnering little 
government and public attention.  Nevertheless, in cases where the recommendations 
have been proposed within the context of government reconstruction efforts, such as 
institutional reforms, there is a tendency to absorb them within the general 
reconstruction efforts. Reparation however is much more complex as it targets a 
specific category of citizens over an entire population but it also requires extra effort 
and resources from the governments to realise its implementation. 
 
Some of the more successful cases of implementation have included the programmes 
in Morocco, Chile and Argentina (Hayner, 2011). As seen in the ensuing discussion, 
despite the successful implementation, the programmes continued to face a number of 
criticism. A recurring feature in these cases however is the political commitment and 
sustained advocacy locally and internationally to ensure that the recommendations are 
implemented.  
 
In Morocco, following the frustrations voiced after the stand-alone reparations 
programme of the Arbitration Panel, an advocacy for a truth telling body was launched 
which resulted in the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER). It was mandated to 
investigate the forced disappearances and arbitrary detentions, decide on the pending 
reparation requests and determine responsibility for the atrocities. It proposed a 
comprehensive reparation programme including individual, collective, material, 
symbolic and social service benefits. In 2006, a year after the release of the report, the 
individual compensations started to be paid which was concluded in 2007. The 
facilitation of the medical needs highlighted and recommended by the commission was 
also carried out such as free long term medical care and vocational training. Communal 
reparations were also carried out for regions that were identified as targets for 
systematic violations, those that were excluded and marginalised and where secret 
detention centres were located (Hayner, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2005; 
International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009; National Commission for Truth 
Justice and Reconciliation, n.d.; Opgenhaffen & Freeman, 2005). The IER has however 
received harsh criticism particularly on its limited mandate and its hesitation to 
identify the perpetrators.  The Advisory Council on Human Rights (CCDH) tasked with 
following up and implementing the reparation programme has also faced claims about 
the lack of transparency and equity of the reparation programme as well as the inability 
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of beneficiaries to appeal the decisions regarding their cases (Amnesty International, 
2010). Amnesty International in fact considers it an incomplete process where “the full 
truth in all cases of enforced disappearance has not been established, that justice has not 
been addressed and that adequate reparation for all victims of human rights violations 
has not been awarded” (p. 6). As such the victims are likely to remain frustrated and 
there are no guarantees against further human rights violations. 
 
In Chile, a truth commission was established in 1990 to investigate human rights 
violations under the Pinochet regime (Bram, 2005; Ensalaco, 1994; Ferrara, 2014; 
Vasallo, 2002). Later in 2003, it established a commission of inquiry to supplement the 
work of the 1990 commission, specifically to document abuses during the military 
dictatorship that had been excluded by the first commission. Both the National 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (1990) and the National Commission on 
Political Imprisonment and Torture (2003) both recommended reparation. The 1990 
commission recommended restoration of good names, symbolic measures, legal and 
administrative procedures and access to specific social welfare services for victims 
(Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation).  A National 
Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation was established to follow up and 
implement the recommendations. A pensions plan was instituted as well as 
programmes to implement the educational and health benefits (Hayner, 2011; Lira, 
2006). Despite the accomplishment of this programme, the process was criticized 
among others for its exclusion of survivors of torture or illegal imprisonment. This led 
to the establishment of a second commission which also recommended reparation 
comprising of educational and health benefits, pensions, symbolic measures and 
individual material reparations ( United States Institute of Peace, n.d.-a).  Following 
this new development, a reparations law was also passed and the government put in 
place measures to carry out the reparations provisions (Hayner, 2011).   
 
The National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) in Argentina 
was established in 1983 to investigate the disappearances and human rights violations 
during the military dictatorship (Crenzel, 2008). It proposed general 
recommendations on reparation in relation to economic assistance, scholarships, 
social security and employment assistance (Guembe, 2006; Hayner, 2011). Prompted 
by the cases in the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in which substantial 
sums were awarded for the petitioners, similar benefits were extended to all political 
prisoners and exiles. Through the 1994 reparations law these benefits were also 
passed on to the families of those who had disappeared or been killed. The Argentina 
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case, although controversial following claims by groups such as the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo, committed considerably large amounts to pay the beneficiaries 
(Hayner, 2011).  
 
A common feature in the above cases is the enactment of legislation to facilitate the 
process. A follow up body was also established in each of these cases to continue the 
work of the commission in investigations as well as to follow through on the reparation 
programmes. A more critical factor however is the political will to institute the said 
reparations programmes. The respective governments took a strong stance towards 
enacting the various legislations or availing the necessary funds to get the programme 
running. 
 
The above are cases which could be considered ‘successful’. Hayner (2011) for instance 
refers to their reparation programmes as being “robust”. Despite the methodological 
and outcome oriented criticisms against these commissions, they strove to implement 
the reparations in a timely manner (with the exception Argentina where it took at least 
seven years before the reparations was implemented) and as close to what was 
recommended as possible. 
 
In some cases however, the report is either ignored or resisted. The Liberian 
government for instance showed extreme resistance to the report of the truth 
commission and largely ignored the recommendations. One of the antagonising 
recommendations was proposing sanctions and prosecutions for certain individuals 
and firms. Among those listed is the president, Sirleaf Johnson with 47 others. It was 
recommended that they be banned from holding elective or appointive public office for 
30 years and those already in such positions to complete their tenure but remain 
ineligible in the future (Aning & Jaye, 2011). A Supreme Court ruling on the 
recommendation to bar individuals listed by the commission from holding public office 
as unconstitutional and violation of the individuals’ right to procedural due process 
further ostracised the report recommendations (Williams vs Tah, 2011). The fact that 
the president, Sirleaf Johnson and other powerful actors were on the list of 
perpetrators proved to be a hindrance towards implementation (Aning & Jaye, 2011).  
 
For some countries, either a few aspects of the recommendation or modified versions 
are implemented.  In Peru, despite the extensive recommendations on individual and 
collective recommendations, the government instituted a programme that focused 
only on community reparations (Laplante, 2007; Laplante & Theidon, 2007).  As will 
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be discussed further on, in Ghana there was a strong focus on monetary payments over 
non-financial measures such as symbolic reparations (see 8.4.4). Meanwhile in Sierra 
Leone, the financial requirements and the lack thereof made it impossible to institute 
a programme as described by the commission. Monetary payments were made to the 
victims under urgent interim measures in place of providing accessibility to critical 
social services as recommended by the commission (see 9.4.5). Similarly, in South 
Africa, the final programme fell far short of the expectations when only one-off 
payments were made to the beneficiaries in place of the six years payment scheme with 
amounts much lower than was recommended (Bray, 2014; Hayner, 2011).   
 
In general, the follow up processes have been less sensational than the actual 
commission proceedings which attract substantial media, civil society and in cases 
with considerable international presence, international coverage and following. 
However, there has been limited examination, both scholarly and non-scholarly on the 
implementation of the recommendations, particularly on reparations (Laplante & 
Theidon, 2007). An exception to this limited examination is The Handbook of 
Reparations, a classic in reparation research. It includes at least five cases of 
reparations following truth commission recommendations. It also covers reparations 
in other contexts such as for historical crimes, terrorism, world war crimes and the 
international compensation scheme under the UN Compensation Commission (de 
Greiff, 2006c). A number of other authors have also addressed issues around the 
implementation of reparations however mainly focusing on factors which have either 
hindered or facilitated the process. De Feyter, Parmentier, Bossuyt and Lemmens’ 
(2005) Out of the Ashes: Reparation for Victims of Gross Human Rights Violations is also 
an exceptional compilation focusing on the general reparation theory with some 
specific cases on truth commissions and reparation. 
 
Specific to the implementation of recommendations of truth commissions, a team of 
scholars are currently engaged in an ongoing project on processes around the 
formulation and implementation of truth commission recommendations. The project 
is however limited to Latin America and is focused on processes that shape the truth 
commission recommendations and the conditions that impact the implementation.  
(Skaar, Garcia-Godos, Wiebelhaus-Brahm, & Martinez, 2014).  
 
Research on implementation of reparations following truth commissions have in 
general been discussed from two main angles. The first discusses strategies adopted 
during the designing of the reparation programmes that could maximise the possibility 
78 
of their implementation. The second angle analyses the features that impact on the 
implementation of reparation programmes. Both approaches are elaborated in the 
following section. Drawing on these two approaches, I propose a third angle for 
studying the implementation of truth commission recommendations on reparation 
that synthesizes both the design strategies and the features that impact 
implementation. This approach frames the implementation process not in isolation but 
rather as a component of the whole process from conception to the actual or intended 
realisation of the goals.  
 
3.2 Design criteria for enhancing the implementation of reparation following truth 
commission 
 
In the analysis of reparation arising out of truth commissions, some authors such as 
Roht-Arriaza (2004), de Greiff (2006) and Magarrell (2007), among others have 
focused on identifying features that can be incorporated when designing a reparation 
programme to maximise its success. The focus of these discussions is on the 
frameworks within which to design the reparations recommendations to maximise 
accessibility and availability.  
 
de Greiff's (2006) framework for key issues to take into account when designing a 
reparation programme is one such case. The “taxonomy” answers several fundamental 
questions to be considered in the design phase which should ideally lead to a 
comprehensive programme as indicated below (de Greiff, 2006a, pp. 5–13): 
 
i. Who are the beneficiaries? (Scope). 
ii. How does one ensure the programmes reach the intended beneficiaries? 
(Completeness). 
iii. Does a programme include the complete range of violations or victims? 
(Comprehensiveness). 
iv. What is the range of benefits that a reparation programme provides? 
(Complexity). A complex programme avails a broad category of benefits thus 
responding more closely to victims’ needs while a ‘simple’ programme may 
focus on limited benefits. 
v. How do the different benefits support each other to maximise their value to the 
victims? (Internal coherence) e.g. apologies to be offered together with 
monetary awards. What is the relationship between the reparation programme 
and other TJ mechanisms? (External coherence). 
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vi. Is there a possibility of pursuing other means for civil redress after receiving 
the reparation benefits? (Finality). 
vii. What are the amounts provided for in the reparation and the significance of 
such an amount and what does it mean to the victims? (Munificence). 
 
The classification provides a systematic methodology for not only the design of 
reparation programmes but which could also be significant for studying the 
implementation of such processes in cases where actual implementation occurred.  
 
Similarly, other authors as discussed below have also raised arguments concerning the 
design of reparation programmes and have identified characteristics that could 
strengthen the reparation programmes. In the following paragraphs, I group these 
characteristics into four main themes; context, content, policy strategy and 
institutional backing. In their discussions, they also address some of the key issues de 
Greiff (2006) suggests in his taxonomy. In this case, I highlight these similarities and 
whenever appropriate I will refer to de Greiff’s taxonomy in italics and/or brackets. 
 
3.2.1 Context 
 
Understanding the context refers to being perceptive of the general setting of the 
location where the reparation programme is to be carried out. Roht-Arriaza (2004) has 
for instance argued for understanding the characteristics of the victims, an issue raised 
by de Greiff (2006) under scope of the programme. She has pointed out that in general, 
reparations have fared better in instances where there is an easily identifiable set of 
victims, relatively smaller number of victims and where violations have been 
committed by state security forces against unarmed opposition, than in post-civil 
conflicts involving fluid perpetrators and victims Roht-Arriaza (2004).   
 
Circumstances which might facilitate implementation may be as diverse and abstract 
as political will or it could be concrete as the availability of resources to implement the 
said programmes. It therefore is important that the programme designers possess an 
insight into what may or may not work.  
 
Hamber (2000) and Schotsmans (2005) similarly emphasise the processes that lead up 
to the reparations. Hamber (2000) posits that reparations are shaped by processes 
which feed into each other and are instrumental in the overall outcome of the 
reparations agenda. Between the granting of the reparations and the actual delivery, 
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quite a considerable effort goes into processes such as ensuring a reparations 
discourse and creating alliances and relationships. The emphasis has particularly been 
on local ownership with the predominant principle being that it is the beneficiaries 
who know best their own needs. As such, reparations programmes should preferably 
be managed by victims and consist of bottom-up processes with large consultation of 
victims’ organisations (Schotsmans, 2005). 
 
Basing on this criterion, a conducive atmosphere for reparations should be cultivated 
to ensure that there is acceptance both at the local and top levels. At the local level to 
guarantee that there is no friction when a specific group is entitled to certain benefits 
and at the top so there is both the will and the necessary resources made available 
(completeness). 
 
3.2.2 Content of the recommendations 
 
The content of the reparations is focused on what needs to be contained in reparations 
(complexity). As earlier discussed (see 2.2.3), reparations can comprise of a number of 
benefits ranging from material to symbolic, from individual to collective. It could also 
come in the form of service packages or development projects. The way it is framed 
may have certain advantages but also set backs (de Greiff, 2006a). 
 
Roht-Arriaza (2004) has for instance argued for the framing of reparations as 
development. The rationale for reparations as development arises from the 
observation that even before the conflict, the situation in most communities was 
deplorable, with poverty and inadequate services and infrastructure. Conflict further 
compounds this state of affairs. Economic and social development in post conflict 
societies thus becomes one of the top priorities and inevitably competes with other 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts, reparations inclusive. A further argument is that 
post conflict governments often approach these two elements of reconstruction and 
transitional justice efforts as two separate entities and yet in reality they could be 
integrated and built into the other (Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, 2009). More significant 
however is that by framing reparation within development, it allows the state to 
provide adequate reparations to a large number of victims (completeness) (Correa et 
al., 2009). 
 
By integrating reparations into the reconstruction and development agenda, societies 
and governments are able to address one of the shortfalls of reparation programmes, 
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that is, failing to achieve priority status in government discourse and, at the same time 
achieve the forward looking aim of development. Commissions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Ghana, South Africa and Kenya among others all included components of service 
delivery as part of recommendations.  
 
However, the argument against framing reparations as development is that 
reparations and development are two separate responsibilities of the government. The 
objectives serve distinct purposes to the different targets and beneficiaries. Whereas it 
is possible to frame reparations around development, caution has to be taken to ensure 
that they do not overlap and as aptly put by Roht-Arriaza (2004, p. 8), the government 
ends up doing “what it is already obligated to do in its capacity as tax receiver and 
public works provider [and] slap a ‘reparations’ label on it, and get off cheaply.” 
 
One way to ensure there is no overlap and at the same time integrate development and 
reparation is in exercising preferential access in atonement and reparations Roht-
Arriaza (2004). She considers this one of the approaches to ensuring implementation 
is carried out and it basically focuses on prioritizing victims. With large numbers of 
victims afflicted with differing levels of victimisation and vulnerability, providing 
preferential access of services and public goods to victims contributes to the 
recognition of their extraordinary suffering. This approach compliments the 
reparations as development in that for instance, if free access to education is part of 
reparations, the development component would cover the construction of a school, 
making it accessible to all. Reparations would involve giving preferential access to 
victims by provision of scholarships or scholastic materials or low-cost education and 
training to victims by virtue of their victimhood. A similar logic can also be extended to 
other services such as health, housing, transportation and the like. 
 
Roht-Arriaza (2004) points out that the underlying rationale is in repairing individual 
harms. It focuses on benefits of significant value to survivors like health and education 
while avoiding the controversial monetary compensation and, it does not conflate the 
state’s responsibility to provide infrastructure and public services with its 
responsibility to repair harm. Magarrell (2007) however cautions on framing 
reparations as a hand-out. It should be on the basis of the victim as a right holder and 
it is on this basis that they are awarded the said reparation. 
 
de Greiff (2006) however points out that whereas providing reparations as 
development and social investment has potential benefits, it does come with 
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disadvantages. It has a low reparative capacity, focuses on basic needs, targets 
community as opposed to individuals, is a long term programme and can easily become 
influenced by partisan politics. And even when they are framed as service packages, 
there is likelihood that they will be interpreted as a right accorded to them as citizens 
rather than as victims. This line of argument perhaps stems from the conception of 
reparations as a “tangible manifestation” of acknowledgment of the harm and a 
recognition of the status of victimhood. For many victims however, the packaging itself 
is non-consequential and what matters is what they are getting, and all the better if it 
happens to improve their current position, whether it is financial or access to a 
particular service. The onus therefore falls on the designers and implementers of the 
programme to frame it in such a manner that it meets the values of reparation 
(munificence). 
 
Another approach, also proposed by Roht-Arriaza (2004) is in framing reparations as 
community-level acknowledgement programmes. These are measures that could 
contribute to truth, justice and acknowledgement and have a strong symbolic impact 
such as apologies (internal coherence).  Atonement and acknowledgement from 
perpetrators at community-level can be powerful and especially valuable where 
victims and perpetrators have to live together following the conflict. Practical cases she 
highlights are Rwanda’s Gacaca and reconciliation exercises in East Timor which strive 
to give satisfaction to the victims by providing a semblance of justice, truth, 
acknowledgment, apology and repayment. A basic assumption here would be that 
victims and perpetrators are willing to participate in such ‘reconciliatory’ processes 
which may not necessarily be the case. Moreover, the examples she highlights are 
inclined towards programmes that provide reparative benefits. As such, it would be 
useful to explore what these programmes mean to the victims and whether they 
perceive them as meaningful and beneficial in a similar context as programmes that 
would avail more material benefits. 
3.2.3 Policy strategy of reparations 
 
Magarrell (2007) suggests four critical aspects that need to be considered when 
designing a reparation programme: First, the designers need to determine what kind 
of reparations are to be provided (complexity). As previously discussed, there is a wide 
range of processes and benefits and this diversity calls for clarity on what exactly will 
be provided. This decision can be resolved by first, classifying the type of harm and 
secondly, a characterisation of victimisation (comprehensiveness) (Rombouts et al., 
2005). 
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Secondly, the beneficiaries of specific reparation measures need to be clearly identified 
and defined (scope). Often, it is not possible to award the said benefits to all the 
individuals that may consider themselves victimised. For instance, in the case of a post 
conflict society, the reality is that all individuals might have suffered harm in one form 
or another. Designing a reparation programme with the entire population may turn out 
to be overwhelming for a fragile post-conflict state. In these contexts, some individuals 
however suffer more harm than others and continue to face negative consequences as 
a result of the harm. The most logical way to meander through this would first be to 
describe the entire spectrum of victims and then narrow that down by identifying 
various classes that are eligible for specific measures of reparations, usually basing on 
the type of violation suffered (comprehensiveness). These criteria should be enshrined 
in fairness and feasibility (Magarrell, 2007). The benefit of narrowing down victims is 
that by creating different categories of victims, this process can inform the type of 
reparations most beneficial to a particular category of victims. 
 
Third is the need to define priorities. This is crucial in determining which particular 
victims and benefits to start with. Whereas every individual may have been victimised, 
some are more disadvantaged as a result of their harm. In the case of amputees in Sierra 
Leone, the victims were even further narrowed down to single amputees versus double 
amputees, upper limb versus lower limb and so forth. Each category of these amputees 
faces specific challenges in addition to the collective challenge they face as amputees. 
Although it is not the official policy of the government and reparations agency to 
distinguish between the different levels of amputation, while in conversation with the 
amputees, they were acutely aware of these distinctions and how the level of 
amputation has impacted on their productivity. Magarrell (2007) also cites the case of 
the East Timorese women who were raped by the Indonesian occupying forces and 
bore children of mixed decent as being a category that deserves special consideration. 
Both the women and children were shunned and discriminated against by the 
community 
 
Fourth, reparation programmes need to pay attention to the overall process. These 
processes include participation, inclusion and clarity of reparations. Victim 
engagement should be ensured in the entire process. Participation entails engagement 
in all aspects of design, implementation and monitoring (UN Women & United Nations 
Development Programme,  2010). This includes not only taking part in the proceedings 
but also involves having a level of control over the proceedings (Rombouts et al., 2005). 
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Participation not only achieves the highest impact but ensures that the programmes 
are meaningful and timely. The reparation programme should be viewed by the rest of 
the population, notably the non-beneficiaries as fair and legitimate. This is especially 
critical where an entire country may have been devastated by civil war and entire 
sections are facing the same poverty and other disadvantages as specific victims. A 
reparation programme is capable of spurring criticism when it targets a specific group 
among an entire population facing similar disadvantages.  
 
3.2.4 Institutional backing 
 
Often, victims do not have significant power to influence decisions. There are certain 
exceptions such as the Argentinean Initiative Group for the Convention against Forced 
disappearances consisting of at least sixteen diverse organisations popularising the 
redress for forced disappearances using national and international legal  instruments 
(Guembe, 2006). Similarly, the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo (The Mothers of the plaza 
de Mayo) became influential in the political discourse through their sustained activism. 
In Brazil, the Commissão de Familiares de Mortos e Desaparecidas Políticos (Commission 
for the Family members of the persons killed or disappeared for political reasons) were 
instrumental in collecting information about the dead and disappeared during the 
military rule (Hamber, 2009).  
 
In most cases however, victims have no military, economic or political power and are 
therefore not a formidable threat to the sitting government.  An option is a strong and 
well organised victims’ organisation that can unify the victims, increase their 
negotiation power and articulate their needs (Schotsmans, 2005). An alternative as 
discussed by (de Greiff, 2006a) in external coherence is in structuring reparation 
programmes around other TJ mechanisms so they can complement one another and 
raise the overall output and value for the beneficiaries. 
 
Hamber (2000, 2005, p. 142) talks about providing “ongoing space” for survivors to 
express their feelings of sadness and rage as they try to come to terms with their losses 
and harms. Civil society activism by and for the victims is one aspect of this ‘space’. 
Other aspects to the concept of ‘space’ might include private and public mediums such 
as counselling, traditional ceremonies, media exposure, exhibitions, theatre and the 
like. 
The above discussion identifies issues critical to reparation programmes. The 
limitation however is that it is restrictive in that it limits the study to the design aspects 
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of reparation. As I illustrate further on, implementation and implementation research 
consists of series of processes that range from policy conception to policy realisation. 
The design criteria would therefore be unable to present a complete framework to 
study implementation.  
 
In the next section, I highlight key features that have been identified by a number of 
authors as relevant to the failure or success of reparation programmes following truth 
commissions.  
 
3.3 Features that impact the implementation of reparation programmes 
 
 As elaborated further in the ensuing discussion, some authors have focused on 
analysing variables that are relevant to and impact the implementation of reparation 
programmes after the design phase. A number of these analyses originate from an 
assessment of the different programmes in specific cases. I have identified a number of 
recurring themes and discussed them below. 
 
3.3.1 Resources 
 
Reparation programmes require money and lots of it. Inadequate resources is often 
cited as a reason for which programmes have either stagnated or not achieved their 
full potential. The question of how reparation programmes are to be financed has 
however received little attention. Segovia (2006a) argues that there is an 
oversimplification of the process of mobilising resources for reparations. Whereas 
truth commissions may sometimes be able to suggest ‘where’ resources should be 
sourced from, they rarely talk about the ‘how’. Colvin (2006) for instance points out 
that the South African TRC remained superficial on the financial requirements of the 
reparation programme with no suggestions on tangible guidelines or costs of specific 
programmes. There is an assumption that government will comply with the proposals 
but in reality this is determined by a complex socio- economic and political 
environment influenced by factors like political will, dynamics of mobilising resources 
and various demands on the government. Moreover, reparations occupy a precarious 
position in the political and economic agendas of transitioning societies, being that they 
are directed at a specific category of individuals and a reminder about an unpleasant 
past. Reparations may be side-lined or promoted depending on the socio-political and 
economic interests of different actors (Colvin, 2006; Segovia, 2006a). 
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Segovia (2006) identifies two models proposed by truth commissions regarding 
financing reparations: (1) the creation of a special fund to which resources are 
channelled, and (2) direct funding from public budget. According to him, the second 
model has registered more success. The special fund model has been constrained by 
inability to attract funds into it as he illustrates with cases such as El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Malawi and South Africa. The expectations that a reparation fund will 
automatically be financed are simply wishful thinking as seen in El Salvador and a 
number of other cases. 
 
A number of truth commissions have directed their proposals for the funding of 
reparation programmes to the international community, particularly for those who 
benefitted or were active in the settlement of the conflict to contribute to the 
reparations fund. The contribution could also be in terms of apportioning a percentage 
of international assistance towards reparation progammes. El Salvador recommended 
that one percent be set aside for this purpose (Segovia, 2006b) or as Liberia did, 
requested the diaspora to donate one US dollar a month to the Reparation Trust Fund 
(Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, 2009, p. 396). The international 
community has however been reluctant to bankroll a reparation programme despite 
verbally encouraging reparation endeavours. This reluctance stems from the 
acknowledgement of responsibility component and sensitive political decisions 
involved in reparations which the international community argues should be locally 
handled (United Nations, 2008). The UN however argue that the international 
community should rethink their stance and contribute to the reparation programme, 
particularly if they were involved in the conflict in the first place. Their role could be in 
terms of direct material support, technical assistance, local group support, pressure to 
multilateral institutions and governments, among others.  
 
Irrespective of the funding sources, the respective governments play a significant role 
in the direction of resources for reparation programmes. More successful cases such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Morocco had the governments and various coalitions 
working in favour of the reparations (Segovia, 2006a) which has not been the case 
where the reparations have either not been implemented or not far reaching as 
envisioned by the commission.  
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3.3.2 The socio-political dynamics 
 
Whereas funding for reparation programmes is critical, it is influenced by the 
prevailing socio-political dynamics. Reparation programme may or may not get 
funding based on whether the sitting government, political coalitions and pressure 
groups favour reparations. Chile, Argentina and Brazil had strong social and political 
coalitions favouring reparation. Notably, in Argentina, the government of President 
Menem, a former political prisoner set in motion reforms aimed at remedying the 
harms (Guembe, 2006). In contrast, such social and political support has been limited 
in El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti (Segovia, 2006b). South Africa and Peru, although 
not experiencing a favourable government and coalitions in favour of reparations 
according to (Segovia, 2006b) have had far reaching reparation programmes. These 
two cases have however had a vibrant local activism and advocacy groups.  According 
to Segovia (2006a), “effective implementation requires an interdependence of political 
forces and the formation of political alliances and coalitions among different sectors 
(domestic and international) with sufficient political strength and capacity to defend 
and move forward the programme” (p.162). In Haiti, the sitting government was 
generally weak, politically and economically and relied heavily on external support for 
whom reparations was unfortunately not a priority. The implementation of reparation 
therefore requires “a balance of political forces that favour such programmes” 
(Segovia, 2006b, p. 168). 
 
Additionally, the profile of the victims can also influence the approach to reparation 
implementation. Argentina and Chile have had a more urban, middleclass with social 
and political influence victims as opposed to Guatemala and Peru where the majority 
are the rural and marginalised indigenous society with low social and political capital 
and located on the periphery (Segovia, 2006a). The way victims organise themselves 
and articulate their concerns as well as the pressure they are able to exert can be 
instrumental in bringing the issue of reparation on the agenda and is vital to the way 
that government responds towards the reparations. In El Salvador, which is notable for 
the non-compliance of the government, the reparation measures for handicapped ex-
combatants happens to be the only one adhered to. According to Segovia (2006b), they 
organised marches, demonstrations and occupied public buildings to make their issue 
visible and they were perceived as a threat. Contrastingly, victim activism in South 
Africa does not seem to register the desired impact. Colvin (2006) however argues that 
despite their presence, reparation entered late in their discourse. Moreover, they have 
also not created a clear strategy and structure for how reparation needs to be done and 
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what it should entail. Victims and victims groups therefore need to hold considerable 
power to push their issues but also possess a clear structure of what the reparation 
entails. 
 
3.3.3 Legislation  
 
Following the CONADEP proceedings in Argentina, a series of reparation laws were 
passed reinforcing the earlier laws on reparation. Although the earlier laws were not 
directly linked to the CONADEP and as such did not “comprise an official reparations 
policy” (Guembe, 2006, p. 22), they were instrumental to providing the momentum for 
the reparations laws and their compliance. These laws were paramount in defining the 
amounts to be paid, the victim or beneficiaries, the procedures for accessing the 
payments as well as the responsibility for their payment. Brazil, equally has 
experienced a legislation driven reparation plan to redress human rights violations 
which have largely been complied with (Cano & Ferreira, 2006). Chile also enacted a 
reparations law that was key in the payment of pensions to the victims and their 
families as well as defining the functions of the National Corporation for Reparations 
and Reconciliation. The law proved to be useful, particularly to the victims groups in 
articulating their demands. In one instance, following the end of the National 
Cooperation for Reparation and Reconciliation, the Group of Families of Disappeared 
Detainees cited the law that recognised their right to know the final whereabouts of 
missing family members. This led to the enactment of a follow up programme to 
continue with the activities of Law 19.123. This law also guided the work of the Human 
Rights programme tasked with the symbolic reparations. Additional laws were also 
passed to modify the existing reparations law which adjusted certain benefits and 
beneficiaries. Additional laws have clarified the issues of groups such as returning 
exiles, political prisoners and those who were dismissed for political reasons (Lira, 
2006). 
 
As such, enacting supportive legislation can be instrumental in facilitating the 
implementation process. It communicates the support of the government as well as 
giving advocates a tool to make demands and hold the government and other parties 
accountable for non-compliance.  
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3.3.4 The context through which reparation emerges 
 
The stage at which the issue of reparations emerges in the transition can also play a 
significant role in the responses towards it. Segovia (2006b) for instance explains that 
one of the reasons for the non-compliance of reparations recommendations in El 
Salvador was that reparations was not an issue during the peace negotiations but only 
emerged with the truth commission report. Both parties, the government and the rebel 
movement were therefore more concerned about the aspects of the agreement they 
had been most vocal about and that boosted their image, of which reparations was not 
one of them.  
 
The tone adopted during the establishment of the commission therefore carries 
significant repercussions. Where reconciliation or truth have been the rallying theme, 
as is in South Africa, Sierra Leone or Ghana, among others, then coalitions following the 
establishment will evaluate their work based on whether these aims have been met. In 
the Latin American contexts, despite reparations being largely paid, there is still 
dissatisfaction because the emphasis was on truth seeking. As in Haiti (Segovia, 
2006b), reparations did not feature in the South African negotiations but rather focus 
was on amnesty and reconciliation. And even when it did come up, there was an 
emphasis on the rehabilitative prospects of narratives in affording recognition and 
healing for the victims (Colvin, 2006). Colvin further argues that when reparations 
permeated the discussions, there were no details on the content or structure or 
eventual outcome until later in the process, during the drafting of the TRC Act. 
 
3.3.5 The output of the report versus the regime in power 
 
Where the report implicates a number of high ranking officials in the regime, it is 
unlikely that any action will be taken to comply as this in a way validates the 
accusations made by the commission. Liberia has seen no significant action regarding 
the report where the president and a number of officials have been named for further 
action. El Salvador also suffered the same fate where the report implicated the state 
functionaries for 95% of human rights violations against civilians. The 
recommendations also targeted the former guerrilla groups recommending actions 
such as a ban of ten years on political activities. This automatically alienated the groups 
who were attempting to reorganise into the democratic processes (Segovia, 2006b). A 
report that proposes recommendations that antagonises the status quo is therefore 
most likely not to be followed through. 
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Some of the proposals suggested to facilitate the implementation of reparation 
programmes have been more specific to one measure and theoretical such as 
integrating reparations into microfinance institutions (Seibil & Armstrong, 2006) or 
reframing psychosocial work to better reflect the social, historical and cultural 
dynamics (Lykes & Mersky, 2006). One key issue that is not strongly addressed by 
these authors though is the issue of resources, that is, where and how the money for 
implementing such programmes will come from. Even the best intentioned 
programmes have to grapple with this issue. 
 
Implementation and availing resources for the implementation does require a 
concerted effort from different angles and sections of society. Segovia (2006a) for 
instance proposes for measures such as engaging various social and political groups 
committed to reparation to ensure sustainability. Perhaps a more radical approach to 
the question of resources for reparation would be for truth commissions to demand a 
binding commitment and an estimate of how much the government intends to dedicate 
to the programmes in order to frame their proposals around the already known funds. 
 
From the above discussion, attempts to study the implementation of reparation have 
been limited. The first approach focuses on criteria that could increase the success of 
reparation programmes and emphasises the design aspects of reparation programmes. 
A focus on only the design aspects would however not avail a detailed structure of the 
implementation complexities because of its emphasis on only the design. Similarly, the 
second approach to studying reparation has focused on identifying features that have 
facilitated or hindered the implementation process. In cases where implementation 
has been looked at, there has not been an attempt to develop a systematic and 
generalisable methodology and criteria for studying the implementation process 
because the analysis has been done on a case by case basis as discussed in 3.3.  
Moreover, there is no clear definition of implementation or a criteria that would 
describe when or how implementation is taking place or not to guide such 
implementation studies in the context of truth commission recommendations on 
reparation. In the following section, I explore the idea of a systematic methodology for 
studying implementation of reparation by proposing a third-way that integrates 
focusing on both the design and the context in which a reparation programme is 
planned.  
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3.4 The third-way: An integrated approach to studying implementation of 
reparation following truth commission 
 
Truth commissions after the completion of the hearings and investigations are 
mandated to produce a report in which they detail their findings and propose 
recommendations on a number of issues. The report normally signifies the end of the 
work of the commission. Following this, a key concern is what happens to the 
recommendations made by the commissions. It is usually left up to the incumbent 
regime to respond to these recommendations and experience has so far shown a mixed 
reaction to the recommendations with some regimes completely ignoring the 
recommendations to more positive responses. Similarly, interest from different 
stakeholders also tends to wane after the publication of the report. One area that has 
suffered from this diminished interest is research into the follow up and 
implementation of the recommendations that truth commissions make, which this 
study seeks to address with a focus on reparation for victims. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, two approaches have been identified for studying 
the truth commission recommendations on reparation. The first approach has focused 
on identifying criteria that is relevant during the design of the recommendations. These 
seek to ensure that in the end a meaningful programme is designed. These include for 
instance de Greiff's (2006a) taxonomy of reparation programmes as well as scholars 
who have proposed different means to package the reparation programmes such as 
Roht-Arriaza (2004) and Magarrell (2007). The emphasis is in understanding the 
socio-economic and political setting of the society while designing the programmes. 
The second approach focuses on examining the factors that explain why the reparation 
programmes have either been implemented or not in different cases. These authors 
have therefore identified features that influence the implementation of the 
programmes.  
 
The limitation with both these approaches is that they are limited to addressing 
specific aspects of the implementation process, either the design or execution of the 
decisions, thereby treating these as two separate components rather than 
complementary processes that feed into each other. Moreover, a clear definition for 
implementation in these contexts has not been explored. As such there is not a 
systematic framework for studying the implementation process.  
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Therefore, a third approach to studying the implementation of the recommendations 
for victims’ reparation following truth commissions is proposed. The basic assumption 
to an integrated approach is that implementation is not an isolated activity but rather 
a process that takes into account the totality of experiences from the design to the 
expected output. Such methodology to studying the implementation would look at 
three aspects; the pre-design, the packaging of the reparation programme and the 
prevailing circumstances under which the implementation is being carried out.  
 
The first aspect explores the circumstances that facilitated the setting up of a truth 
commission and their inclusion of reparation in their recommendation. The choices 
that determined first the selection of a truth commission mechanism and secondly the 
inclusion of reparation as a focus can have a significant impact on the implementation 
process. Was the truth commission a concession in a peace negotiation and how much 
did it feature in the deliberations? Or did it arise out of either domestic or international 
pressure? Was it an elitist decision or locally driven? Similarly, how were the initial 
questions of reparation handled in the framing of the truth commission? Did they even 
feature at all or were they a late introduction? What were the views of the different 
stakeholders towards reparation? 
 
The second aspect analyses the content of the reparation proposal. As discussed in 3.2, 
several variables have been proposed which are considered vital to the design of a 
reparation programme. How however do the proposed reparation programme 
measure up to these variables and does this have any significant impact on the output 
in terms of implementation? 
 
The third aspect explores the social, political and economic structure of the 
implementation. It compares what is happening vis-à-vis what should have happened. 
It analyses the responses of the various stakeholders and seeks to answer why the 
implementation is happening the way it is, thereby discussing the features that have 
impacted the follow up and implementation process.  
 
Such an integrated approach portrays reparation and its implementation as a complex 
programme. By limiting the study to only one or two aspects, it gives an incomplete 
picture. A number of truth commissions in defining what features of reparations to 
propose are quite sensitive to the issues discussed in the design criteria but this 
attention to detail is not necessarily translated into implementation. Similarly, it would 
be futile to analyse the decisions that go into how and why a reparation programme is 
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either implemented or not without linking them to the pre-design and design 
dynamics.  
 
An integrated approach would therefore offer a clearer picture of the complexities that 
go into implementation as well as an understanding of where and how loopholes in the 
implementation occurred, and to even stretch it further, opportunities to rectify 
setbacks. This approach is further analysed in chapter 7, following a discussion of the 
background of the case studies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Scholarly approach to analysing what happens after the truth commission proceedings 
has remained low key. Many of these studies have been limited to issues such as 
victims’ perceptions of the whole process or whether truth commissions have been 
able to meet the goals of variables such as reconciliation, truth, healing, 
democratisation and rule of law among others. One of the main legacies of a truth 
commission is the recommendations that they make on various issues in their reports. 
However, rarely are there follow ups into the outcome of these recommendations and 
neither is there a systematic framework for studying the follow up and 
implementations. On the one part, there are scholars who propose criteria that truth 
commissions could incorporate in proposing comprehensive reparation programmes. 
These have focused on the design aspects. These criteria have however hardly been 
empirically tested against the reparation recommendations. On the other hand, some 
scholars have assessed how the implementations have been carried out and identified 
features that have either facilitated or hindered the implementation in specific cases. A 
focus on the design aspect alone would be inadequate. Similarly, focusing only on the 
implementation structure excludes the dynamics that went into designing the 
programme as well as the reasons for why things are the way they are. 
  
In this dissertation, I propose a synthesised approach which considers the entire 
lifecycle of reparation. It analyses first, how reparations were included in the TJ 
framework of the country, second, how the commissions were able to arrive at a 
specific set of recommendations for reparation and third, how various stakeholders 
have responded to the recommendations and what the consequences of their actions 
have been to the implementation process.  
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In the following chapters, I focus on developing this approach. Consequently, the next 
chapter will explore the linkages between criminology, a field specialised to 
understanding crime and its consequences and TJ, a newer field with a focus on the 
responses to international crimes. The assumption is that criminology which has been 
in existence much longer than TJ has encountered similar mechanisms of truth telling 
and reparation and it is worthwhile to explore how these mechanisms have been dealt 
with in criminology, specifically in the implementation aspect in order to identify 
features to include in the framework for studying the implementation of truth 
commission recommendations on reparation. 
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CHAPTER 4. CRIMINOLOGY, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND 
REPARATION 
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
The intersection between TJ and criminology is limited despite both being occupied 
with understanding crimes. It is only recently that criminology is breaking out to cover 
such atrocities despite international crimes being a fixture in much of the previous and 
present century. Similarly, TJ scholars are branching out to explore how to understand 
international crimes from criminological perspectives (Drumbl, 2003; Haveman & 
Smeulers, 2008; McEvoy, 2007). The chapter contributes towards advancing the 
linkages between TJ and criminology and concurs with the idea of broadening the 
understanding of TJ mechanisms and international crimes from a criminological 
perspective and vice versa. In that regard, I focus on three aspects; first, the contentious 
relationship between the two fields and the move towards synergising them; second, 
the definition of international crimes from a criminological perspective; and third, the 
notion of truth seeking and reparation in criminology and what it can offer to the field 
of transitional justice. 
 
4.1  A fragmented intersection 
 
“War crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide have for long been 
almost totally neglected by the science that studies crimes, the situation in 
which these crimes take place, possible interventions to stop these crimes 
from being committed and the efficacy of the interventions: criminology. 
Criminology lives in a state of denial when it comes to these large scale, 
widespread and systematic committed atrocities” (Haveman & Smeulers, 
2008:26). 
 
The above quote succinctly summarises the intersection between international crimes 
which is at the core of transitional justice and criminology. This divide between 
criminology and TJ is puzzling considering that criminology is principally concerned 
with studying crimes and international crimes present some of the most shocking 
criminal acts.  
 
As pointed out earlier, the concept of TJ emerged during the transitions in Latin 
America, principally as a response to deal with large scale and systematic violence and 
human rights abuse.  The magnitude of the violence also attracted an international 
response to these atrocities, an approach referred to Teitel (2003) as the displacement 
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of national justice by international justice.  However, as pointed out by Mullins & Rothe 
(2008) and a number of other scholars, criminology has for the most part focused on 
national or conventional crime and on the nation-state. Referring to it as ‘retail street 
crimes,’ Mullins & Rothe (2008, p. 138) assert that “most organizational criminology 
has ignored the social forces and incipient social structures occurring within the 
international realm in favour of focusing on the state itself.” Consequently, there has 
been little attention paid to violations of international criminal law (Rothe & Mullins, 
2009).  
 
In Haveman & Smeulers (2008), one of the reasons for this deficit of criminology in 
international crimes lies in the rigid definition, contextualization and criminalization 
of crime.  They stress that in a restrictive interpretation where the state determines 
what is punishable and what is considered a crime, it becomes problematic 
extrapolating this to a broader arena more so when crimes also implicate states as 
perpetrators and the criminals are no longer the deviant, ‘problematic’ individual(s) 
but sometimes the ordinary and conformist members of society. Ironically, some of the 
worst atrocities are meted out by the state and dwarf the magnitude of ordinary crimes 
to the extent that new terms have had to be invented to refer to such crimes such as 
‘murders’ becoming ‘genocide’ (Watts, Bessant, & Hil, 2008). 
 
The dynamics of international crimes are also more complex and challenging which 
may limit the application of traditional research methods (Bijleveld, 2008; Haveman & 
Smeulers, 2008). Other reasons cited for the limited inclusion of international crimes 
include the fact that the field of criminology has been dominated by mainly western 
criminologists while the havoc wrecked by international crimes have been too far away 
from their realm to attract significant attention (Haveman & Smeulers, 2008). A 
significant amount of violations of international criminal law leading to the 
perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity occur in Africa (Mullins & 
Rothe, 2008) while most of the scholars are based in western institutions. In contrast, 
the number of African criminologists is dismal, and many of them are based in Western 
institutions. A quick review of criminology focused journals in Africa only further 
highlights this deficiency. In the nine volumes of The African Journal of Criminology and 
Justice Studies, only two articles are linked to international crimes, Muwereza's (2011) 
piece on the conflict in Northern Uganda and Tamfuh's (2008) on the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). while the African Journal of Law and Criminology has one article 
related to international crimes. The more vibrant and perhaps oldest Southern African 
Journal of Criminology hardly refers to such crimes as well.  
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On an academic level, there is a limited interaction between criminology scholars and 
scholars and practitioners of TJ despite being able to draw specialists from similar 
fields like law, political science, sociology, psychology, and others.  However, this is a 
challenge being confronted by a section of criminologists and TJ scholars who are 
bridging the gap and exploring the dynamics of international crimes and the 
frameworks for their resolution from a criminological perspective. 
 
In fact, one of the significant aspects of McEvoy's (2007) paper discusses the limitations 
encountered by defining and rationalising TJ from a legalistic perspective and suggests 
approaching TJ from a criminology viewpoint because of the ‘Interdisciplinarity’ of 
criminology. He further argues that criminology is equipped with a number of 
attributes for developing a broader understanding of TJ and provides a helpful 
framework in asking both practical and philosophical questions about TJ and the 
notion of crime. 
 
This criminological approach has been defined by Haveman & Smeulers in their 2008 
publication as “supranational criminology” or “the criminology of international crimes” 
comprising of the study of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide as well 
as the mechanisms for addressing such atrocities. The study also includes analysing the 
behaviour of actors, causes and possible interventions and their effectiveness 
(Haveman & Smeulers, 2008, p. 26). In this publication, several authors contribute 
towards popularising the concept of supranational criminology. They address the 
diverse features, dilemma, methodology and direction it could take as a specialised unit 
of criminology focusing on international crimes.  
 
Despite the limited intersection between criminology and TJ, a number of scholars 
(Friedrichs, 2008; Karstedt & Parmentier, 2012; Parmentier, 2003, 2011; Parmentier 
& Weitekamp, 2007) have argued that criminology offers specialised knowledge of 
crime, criminality and criminals and this knowledge can come in handy when studying 
the origin, progression, manifestation, implication and resolution of international 
crimes. Haveman & Smeulers (2008) also point out that criminology can actually 
benefit from this involvement by applying and testing the traditional theories on crime 
and criminological research methods to international crime. In the editorial to the 
European Journal of Criminology Special issue on Atrocity Crimes and Transitional 
Justice, Karstedt & Parmentier (2012) further argue that despite the limited 
involvement of the field of criminology in understanding mass atrocities, 
criminological research can contribute to understanding of international crimes and 
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serious violations of human rights. Its “multiple theoretical frameworks and extensive 
methodological tool boxes” can particularly be insightful in understanding the 
changing landscape of mass atrocity crimes and the various strategies and mechanisms 
of TJ ( p. 465).  
4.2 A general understanding of criminology and international criminology 
 
To a non-criminologist, reference to criminology elicits the depiction of an expert in 
crime, someone well-versed in understanding and solving crime. Criminology also 
appears to be entrenched in fields related to police, prisons or law. Such bewilderment 
about criminology is not only limited to non-experts. As a field of study, criminology is 
a multidisciplinary discipline that is still delineating its boundaries. Loader & Sparks 
(2012, p. 10)  for instance argue that it has “a subject matter but no unique 
methodological commitment or paradigmatic theoretical frameworks”. However, one 
starting point for understanding criminology is in the definition of what constitutes a 
crime since crime happens to be its focal subject matter. But even then, defining crime 
itself is also problematic.  
 
Watts et al., (2008) for instance have argued that the definition of crime is debateable 
and as such, there is no universal definition. “Crime is not always obvious, objective or 
simple” and what may be considered criminal may at a point in time be sanctioned 
behaviour and looked upon as “desirable for the functioning of that form of society” (p. 
15). Female genital mutilation for instance is regarded as criminal in the legal context 
in many societies but still condoned and practiced locally and those who practice it do 
not necessarily view it as criminal. In this way, crime can not only be looked at as 
something that has been labelled as such but rather requires a more unrestricted 
interpretation.  
 
Similarly, the definition that crime is what is prohibited by the criminal justice systems 
is problematic. There is no universal uniformity in the criminal justice systems to 
properly sanction criminal activity and the criminal justice systems vary across 
jurisdictions, states, continents and regions. Furthermore, a universal definition of 
crime misses out on the societal perception of crime and what is considered as anti-
social behaviour.  
A more objective approach to crime has been to view it as “whatever society said it 
was” (Watts et al., 2008.  p.16). The authors, however, counter argue that such a liberal 
definition has the danger of being abused if crime is to be determined by a social group 
and may lead to stringent restrictions and lack of consensus on behaviour which might 
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be considered anti-social such as euthanasia, abortion and homosexuality, among 
others. Following their analysis, they do not offer a definition of crime or criminology 
but rather stress on the need for thoughtfulness and thinking outside the box while 
researching on crime and criminology.  
 
Similarly, the understanding of international criminology, either from mainstream 
criminology or TJ is still developing. The first striking aspect to international crimes in 
criminology is the absence of the theme in numerous criminological writings. 
Yacoubian's (2000) analysis of the content of the American Society of Criminology and 
other journals for reference to the crime of genocide is often cited to back the limited 
attention to international crimes. Likewise, the yearly European Society of Criminology 
conference is dominated by topics related to other crimes besides international crimes 
although there has been a rise in presentations on international crimes through the 
efforts of the European Criminology Group on Atrocity Crimes and Transitional Justice  
(Karstedt & knust, 2014). 
 
On the other hand though, criminologists have recognised that crime and criminal 
activities is not something that only impacts at the micro level and as such, attempts 
have been made to relate the everyday criminal activities to the overall stability of a 
country. Karn (2011, p.69) for instance points out that there is a growing recognition 
of the “impact of everyday violence on a countries’ prospects for economic growth and 
development” leading to a focus on violence and crime prevention for development. 
This observation is also relevant for transitional justice where there is a growing 
emphasis on linking transitional justice and development (de Greiff & Duthie, 2009) as 
a more holistic approach that addresses structural antecedents of a conflict and as a 
forward looking framework for creating conditions that would limit the recurrence of 
the conflict. Karn (2011) however questions the appropriateness of using the same 
frameworks in both the south and north which have more established institutions for 
crime studies. These debates are however limited to the more conventional crimes 
rather than international crimes. The context in which crime occurs and its impact at 
both the micro and macro level tend to be unique to the dynamics in a particular case. 
 
Maguire, Morgan & Reiner’s (2012) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology is one of the 
more progressive publications that avails a comprehensive discussion of both theory 
and practice in response to crimes both within a state and the broader implications of 
crimes. It incorporates crimes such as drug trafficking, white collar and corporate 
crime and terrorism. However, it is significantly silent on discussion of international 
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crimes in the context of atrocity crimes. The exception in the compilation is Green & 
Ward (2012) who deliberate on international crimes though within the context of state 
crimes. Similarly, books such as the International Handbook of Criminology, (Shoham, 
Knepper, & Kett, 2010), Introduction to Criminology: Why Do They Do It? (Schram & 
Tibbetts, 2013), Criminology, (Newburn, 2007), Understanding Criminology: Current 
Theoretical Debates, (Walklate, 2007), Criminology: Theory and Context, (Tierney, 
2009) and Key Readings in Criminology, (Newburn, 2009), among others have none to 
a couple of chapters addressing international crimes. 
 
Reiterating scholars such as Mullins & Rothe (2008), Rothe & Mullins (2009) and 
Haveman & Smeulers (2008), some scholars have maintained that the issues covered 
in international crimes appear not to be a priority at the international scene. A case in 
point is Zhang (2011) who in The Routledge Handbook of International Criminology 
identifies the most pressing matters in international criminology as being generating 
focus on the international criminal system, particularly the UN agencies on crime and 
crime prevention of international crimes and transnational crimes, and, the advantages 
of cross national studies into crime and criminal behaviour. His discussion however 
limits these crimes to trafficking, cybercrime, identity theft and organised crime and 
criminals.  Joutsen (2011) similarly discusses the impact of UN crime conventions on 
international cooperation but the focus remains on drug trafficking, organised crime 
and corruption. Redo (2011) further argues that the criminological research in UN is 
largely directed by the interests of the member states. As such, the direction of the 
research is determined by among others, the interests of the member states, funding 
and NGO agendas and international crimes do not seem to be a priority. An exception 
in the publication is Rhea (2011) who focuses on international crimes in the context of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and discusses the response to such 
crimes with focus on criminal prosecutions notably through the national, hybrid, 
multinational and international criminal courts. He traces an overview international 
crimes and points out that they have evolved from largely national prosecutions to 
concerted international and multinational responses to such crimes. 
 
The general idea about international criminology is that it by and large involves 
integrating an international perspective in approaching crimes. It could either be by 
comparison of a number of case studies or crimes whose implications spill beyond the 
borders of a state (Smith, Zhang, & Barberet, 2011a). They further argue that 
international criminology can be approached from two angles; in terms of subject 
matter or the type of crime and in terms of the context. In the former case, it involves 
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studying international crimes categorised as universally recognised criminal activities 
that are considered a serious matter of international concern. These include genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. It could also mean studying transnational 
crimes which can be defined as crimes involving more than one state in terms of its 
planning, control or execution as well as organised criminal groups in more than one 
state when criminal effects spill into another state. Examples of such crimes include 
trafficking and money laundering. 
 
In the latter case, the context in which a crime is approached gives it the international 
label. A global approach takes into account the wider political and cultural complexities 
beyond the location of the crimes. A similar reference would be “global criminology” 
which studies issues that transcend the nation state such as terrorism, trafficking, 
immigration and asylum issues and drugs. The field claims to focus on international 
and transnational crimes but has however been silent on mass atrocities. A 2013 
publication, Global Criminology: Crime and Victimization in a Globalized Era (Jaishankar 
& Ronel, 2013), addresses four themes; terrorism, cybercrimes and victimisation, 
marginality and exclusion, and theoretical and practical models of criminal 
victimisation and none of the chapters centres on mass atrocities as an international 
crime. A more recent, 2015 publication Global Criminology (Palmer & Warren, 2015) 
although more nuanced in its exploration of international crimes, is still silent on mass 
atrocities  
 
A more established discussion on international crimes within criminology has been 
confined in the realm of state crime (Haveman & Smeulers, 2008). State crimes have 
been described as  
“harmful or illegal acts carried out by officials on behalf of the state which infringe 
fundamental rights … government crime encompasses harmful acts carried out on 
behalf of the state as well as harmful or illegal acts carried out by state officials 
for their own benefit or benefit of their party” (Watts et al., 2008:214).  
 
Such a definition rightly criminalises such acts by state or their machineries. It however 
is critical to understand who defines them as illegal? If what is criminalised is to be 
determined by the criminal justice system, the government is therefore at the fore in 
dispensing what is determined to constitute criminality. The government is less likely 
to implicate itself by declaring its activities criminal. More so, such crimes sometimes 
remain hidden and become institutionalised and viewed as legitimate forms of state 
policy and practice (Stanley, 2005; Welch, 2010). Such a scenario may very well explain 
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highly orchestrated state criminal activities such as the Nazi killings, genocides and 
forceful removal of indigenous populations. State complicity however does not explain 
the absence of discussion on crimes committed for instance during a civil war in which 
some of the perpetrators are ordinary citizens not affiliated with the government. The 
non-culpability of states as perpetrators is further backed by studies that find that 
many ordinary people do not consider state violence as criminal or are ready to 
legitimise it or even accept it as lawful (Watts et al., 2008). Moreover, there is often 
limited funding into research on state crime (Friedrichs, 1998) particularly due to the 
nature of such research which would unearth state culpability and criminality.  
 
Rothe & Mullins (2009) similarly express their reservations on the limitations imposed 
on the categorisation of violations of international criminal law under the ambit of state 
crimes. They point out that the definition of state crimes as being “any action violating 
public international law or international criminal law, when these actions are 
committed by individuals acting in official or covert capacity as agents off the state 
pursuant to expressed or implied orders of the state” (p.98) potentially excludes 
groups that might not be considered as agents of a state such as paramilitaries, militias, 
transnational and international organisations and civilian individuals. They therefore 
call for a broadening of the definition and understanding of the violators of 
international criminal law. 
 
Rothe & Mullins (2009) further propose a model to analyse international crimes. The 
strongest attribute of this model is in its attempt to cover the multiplicity of the actors, 
forms and means that characterise international crimes. In their model, they propose 
four levels of analysis of international crimes; international, state or structural, 
organisational and interactional. International crimes occur in a space of interactions 
between various levels of social forces and institutions. At the international level, such 
a model would analyse the role, motivation and interests of international institutions. 
This is vital given the participation of international institutions in many of the world’s 
conflicts and yet surprisingly there is a glossing over of their role. The structural 
conditions, whether political, economic or social that characterise a state play a 
significant role in the perpetuation of international crimes and at this level, the analysis 
would explore these interactions. At the organisational or meso level, the authors 
propose for an analysis of the organisational structures and culture of actors violating 
international criminal law in order to understand such crimes while at the interactional 
level, the authors suggest that the integrated model should be able to explain the 
motivations and opportunities of all actors.  
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Whereas this model is inherently useful in pushing for a nuanced understanding of 
international crimes, it does not address the role of these entities in the post-conflict 
setting. Conversely however, such an understanding can be instrumental in pushing 
the boundaries of how societies are able to deal with the past. Contemporary post-war 
discourse for instance has taken a strong stance on addressing the role of both 
international and local actors in fuelling and maintaining a conflict. An example is 
Pruitt (2014) who attempts to draw upon criminological theories to understand the 
crime of genocide. He argues that one of the limitations of criminological theories 
transplanted to the realm of international crimes is that many of the theories are 
“individual-decision based theories at a micro level of analysis” (p. 3) whereas state 
crime occurs at a macro level with multiple rather than single causes and levels.  
 
One of the more focal studies that attempts to link criminology and transitional justice 
is Parmentier (2011). He identifies three theoretical frameworks under which crimes 
of concern to TJ have been studied in the context of criminology; through the angle of 
(1) political crimes; (2) state crimes; and (3) violent crimes. The study emphasises that 
the interconnectedness of the two fields is not an entirely new thing and additionally 
proposes three ways in which criminology can contribute to the study of international 
crimes and transitional justice. It could enhance (1) understanding the nature of crimes 
and criminal behaviour; (2) understanding the nature of victimisation and needs of 
victims and, (3) understanding various strategies for dealing with the legacies of large 
scale abuse. 
 
The first two dimensions are already picking up in criminology publications, notably 
the second aspect which has a whole field of victimology with victims of mass crimes 
gaining attention considerably particularly through the World Society of Victimology 
and the International Victimology Institute, Tilburg, among others. The third aspect has 
largely remained unexplored although Parmentier (2011) argues that research on the 
strategies for dealing with crime have had “a long tradition in criminology and 
criminology justice studies, and to tap into the insights of ‘what works’, what does not 
work and ‘what is promising’ cannot be overrated” (p.388). As such, these insights 
would be relevant in the analysis and evaluation of the mechanisms for dealing with 
international crimes.  
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Following up on that observation, the subsequent sections explore the elements of 
truth seeking and reparations in criminology with a view to extrapolating this to a TJ 
framework. 
 
4.3 Truth seeking in Criminology 
 
From the literature, I identified two ways in which truth is conceptualised; truth that 
emerges from strict evidentiary procedures such as in the courts and court processes, 
or ‘judicial truth’ (Ewald, 2008; Viola, 1995) and fluid truth from experiences such as 
through Restorative Justice processes. Although both serve to establish the facts 
following a harm, the means and purpose of attaining the truth vary as discussed 
below. 
 
Judicial truth 
The mainstream approach to truth-seeking in criminology has mostly been framed 
through the criminal justice system, specifically through judicial proceedings. Criminal 
courts and the court system are presented as having the main purpose of searching for 
the truth (Bradley & Hoffman, 1996). The truth is presented as a set of objective facts 
which are considered to be “’fair’, ‘just’ and ‘authoritative’”(Ewald, 2008, p. 409). This 
is generated through the collection of evidence and mainly to facilitate the prosecution. 
The basic framework through which the truth is generated involves identifying 
information that is relevant for a case under investigation. The information is then 
narrowed down to produce facts to establish individual criminal responsibility and it 
is these that are presented as “judicial truth” (p. 422). 
 
The main mechanism of establishing judicial truth is through trials. Rock (2009) in his 
analysis of the criminal courts and court cases however presents trials as an 
adversarial system in which the focus is on winning a case rather than on the truth. The 
prosecutors and defendants aim at proving a case to the satisfaction of the jurors 
thereby leaving a lot of the experiences “unquestioned, unsaid and unresolved” (p. 
613). He argues that during trials, competing accounts of the past are reconstructed 
and presented as choices between “innocence and guilt, truth and falsehoods” (p. 615). 
This does not leave a place for multiple truths co-existing nor for the lived experiences 
of the parties as the focus is on the specific crime and culpability for it. More so, the 
tools through which the truth is established such as the police, prosecutors and cross 
examinations structure their accounts to fit into the above legal categories thereby 
limiting the truth that emerges.  
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The processes of establishing a comprehensive truth through this mechanism can be 
challenging because of strict procedures (Bradley & Hoffman, 1996; Ewald, 2008; 
Friedland, 2013). Likewise, the method through which truth is attained can also have 
negative consequences for the parties involved, particularly the witnesses. Rock 
(2009) for instance states that witnesses may perceive a case that they lost as 
signifying that they had been disbelieved or were liars.  
 
Sanders & Jones (2012) however distinguish between adversarial and inquisitional 
trial systems and argue that the methods applied in each case can influence the type of 
truth that is produced. The above discussion relates to the adversarial system. In the 
inquisitional system, there is more victim recognition and a more diverse truth-finding 
process. The evidence is not as restricted and witnesses are allowed to narrate their 
account of events. The authors however caution that victim recognition in this system 
does not necessarily translate to giving them control of their cases.  
 
In establishing judicial truth, factual findings are relevant and these are presented as 
“knowledge’ on crimes and individual responsibility”  (Ewald, 2008, p. 402). It is these 
same principles that are extrapolated in dealing with international crimes through the 
court systems, whether at national, hybrid or international levels. 
 
According to Chalmers (2015), these process of truth seeking have mainly focused on 
the offender. The truth is usually used to build a case where it is sometimes viewed as 
an alternative or a means to minimising retributive punishment such as prison 
sentences. The conceptualisation of the truth-teller and the wrong-doer being the same 
individual however does not give adequate space to the truth-telling of victims.  
 
Truth seeking and restorative justice 
The second aspect to the understanding truth views truth seeking as an object through 
which the crimes, motivations and impact of crimes can be understood and explored. 
The main approach in this framework is Restorative justice. Walgrave (2008) defines 
Restorative Justice as “an option on doing justice after the occurrence of an offense that 
is primarily oriented towards repairing the individual, relational and social harm that 
is caused by that offense” (p. 621). This approach views crime as a disruption to the 
social harmony.  Crime is considered an offence that does not only affect those directly 
involved in it but extends to indirect parties including family and community. 
Therefore, it is not enough that the crime should be punished but more importantly 
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restoring the balance in society by repairing the relationship between the offender, 
victim and community (Braithwaite, 2004, 2005). 
 
A lot of the comprehensive discussion focusing on truth seeking has therefore emerged 
in the context of restorative justice. The process of establishing the truth within 
retributive systems, particularly the criminal justice system has been strongly 
criticised as being offender biased and procured to serve the interest of the system and 
the offender. However, Restorative Justice processes such as family circles have been 
viewed as instrumental in facilitating the establishment of the truth. The programmes 
are based on the notion that parties to a conflict ought to be actively involved in 
resolving the conflict and mitigating its negative consequences. The offenders are also 
able to return to local decision making. Restorative Justice is therefore a means to 
encourage the peaceful expression of conflict to promote tolerance and inclusiveness, 
build respect for diversity and promote responsible community practices (United 
Nations, 2006b).  
 
One of the assumption of RJ processes is that the offender owns up to their crimes 
through self-confrontation (Braithwaite, 2005) or that the community is able to 
confront them and therefore elicit remorse. In the pursuit of truth, it is assumed that 
offenders experience remorse from their conduct and take charge or responsibility for 
their actions. This experience is therefore expected to change the offender from doing 
wrong. Additionally, in Restorative Justice, truth seeking is discussed in the framework 
of known victims and known offenders. These assumption may in a number of cases 
not hold in the case of Transitional justice, particularly in contexts in which offenders 
are either not known or are unwilling to participate. 
 
A more concrete discussion in which truth seeking and restorative justice has been 
linked in the context of international crimes is in the practice of truth commissions. 
Stanley (2005) for instance discusses truth commissions in the context of state crimes 
and how the mechanism can be useful in recognizing or denying state crimes. Her 
discussion is however limited to the role of truth commissions in documenting and 
acknowledging state crimes. Drawing on Nancy Fraser’s critical theory of recognition, 
she argues that misrepresentations of culpability, victimhood and offenders in state 
crime are challenged through the process of truth commissions. Truth Commissions 
therefore need to “establish a recognition based on identity (detailing who victims are 
and what they have suffered, who perpetrators are) as well as status (specifying what 
victims need to deal with injustice)” (p.588). She however argues that truth 
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commissions on the other hand can inhibit recognition due to a number of operational 
and structural limitations such as their limited mandates, operating time frames and 
when they fail to include marginalised groups. Her arguments however are vital to 
approaching state crime as comprising of multiple levels and features in the way crimes 
occur and are perpetuated.  
 
Similarly, Ameh & Alidu (2010) connect  peacemaking criminology with truth 
commissions and argue that truth commissions deal with similar issues and utilise the 
same values and principles at the national level as do restorative justice programmes 
and practices at the community level. Their discussion highlights the benefits of 
restorative justice and peacemaking criminology over a criminal prosecution approach 
in the pursuit of justice and reconciliation. They use the terms restorative justice and 
peacemaking criminology interchangeable, in fact, even arguing that they are 
“grounded in similar values and practices” (p.257). This argument is however not 
further elaborated thereby curtailing its ability to make a theoretical and 
methodological contribution to the understanding of restorative justice and truth 
seeking.  
 
Chalmers (2015) however argues that truth commissions do not produce a balanced 
truth between offenders and victims. In a number of cases, they are limited in their 
inclusion of the offender’s truth. Truth commissions being victim centred place 
emphasis on the victims’ truth and there is no mechanism for formally accusing the 
wrong-doers of any wrong doing, except through a victim’s story. Chalmers (2015) 
however limits his analysis to the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
which explicitly prohibited it from naming the perpetrators. Not many truth 
commissions have however publically named perpetrators nor enjoyed a balanced 
participation of both victims and perpetrators which therefore has consequences on 
the final truth that emerges. 
 
From the above exploration of truth seeking in criminology, three aspects stand out; 
the offender focus of truth seeking in the criminal justice system, the potential of truth 
seeking in facilitating reconciliation through RJ processes and the limitations of truth 
commissions in establishing the truth due to victim focus over offenders. Moreover, the 
context in which truth seeking is carried out is individualised, often between a known 
offender and victim. In this regard, I find that the way truth seeking has been framed in 
the TJ to be more progressive in terms of the multiple ways that truth can emerge as 
well as the alternative truths that that the process produces.  
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4.4 Reparations in Criminology  
 
Different terminologies have been used in reference to reparation in criminology, each 
with specific implications in terms of the benefit or implications of the benefit. These 
include compensation, restitution and reparation.  
 
Jacob (1970) for instance distinguishes between ‘compensation’ which he refers to as 
payment made from state funds to a victim and ‘reparation’ which is used 
interchangeably with ‘restitution’ as payment from the offender to the victim for the 
harm. Walklate (1986) offers a broader definition of reparation which comprises of 
activities performed to repay the damage from a crime such as apology, community 
work and direct payment. She differentiates reparation from restitution which is 
referred to as the return of stolen property or payment for damages or injuries. 
Similarly, McLaughlin & Muncie (2001) in The Sage Dictionary of Criminology have 
described reparation as “actions that aim to repair the damage caused by crime” 
(p.376). They also distinguish between the concept of restitution and reparation. 
Restitution is very specific comprising of tangible benefits awarded to the victim for 
the loss of injury suffered, specifically, goods and monetary compensation. Reparation 
on the other hand implies the “wider aims of recognition of the social rights of victims 
and repairing the social damage caused by crime” (p.376). Restitution however, may 
also be considered as leading to these same aims.  
 
The view of reparation as repairing social damage has been conceptualised within the 
‘dominion’ concept proposed by Braithwaite & Pettit (Zedner, 1994) in which 
reparation is conceived as a process which is beneficial to both the offender and victim. 
The victim is able to obtain material and emotional satisfaction and reassurances of 
non-repetition while the offender is expected to experience a transformation of 
attitude and behaviour. The ideal end of a reparation exercise would be to attain 
reconciliation among all the actors.  
 
On the other hand, there is a lot of reference to the concept of reparative justice, 
sometimes as a parallel to retributive justice but more as an emphasis to distinguish 
between the different approaches to victims and offenders relationship within the 
criminal justice process. Normally, reparations fall under the wider ambit of reparative 
justice of which other components such as restitution, compensation and symbolic 
measures are also identified.  
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McLaughlin & Muncie (2001) however identify two possibilities for payment of 
reparation. First are compensation orders. These comprise of court ordered payments 
to the victims by offenders. They may either be in addition to the punishment or as an 
alternative to punishment. In this case, it appears that the payment of compensation 
highly depends on the availability, ability and willingness of the offender to pay which 
implies that they have to be caught at the very least and convicted which raises the 
question of enforceability. More critical though would be the question of how both 
parties, the offender and victim feel about this arrangement. Are both parties availed 
the space to communicate the impact of the crime before an award is made? Does the 
offender express their remorse through the court decision? Or is the process simply an 
order that has to be complied with? According to Bonta, Jesseman, & Cormier (2007), 
court ordered payments are less restorative because the parties to a conflict are not 
fully engaged in the process. 
 
The second possibility according to McLaughlin & Muncie (2001) are state 
compensation schemes in which the responsibility to compensate a victim is placed on 
the state. According to the authors, these may be easier to implement but they exclude 
the offender and so there is a potential that this form of reparation may fail to meet the 
“traditional aims of punishment or the broader aims of restoration” (p. 376). 
 
The general aims of reparation are viewed as being victim centred.  For instance, 
Zedner (1994) points out that reparations aim to repair the damage caused by the 
crime, appease the victim so they do not take the law into their hands, prevent the 
victim from turning to crime and the prospect of reparation can encourage 
participation in the judicial process.  
 
Furthermore, Chalmers (2015), discusses the transformative element of reparations in 
which an offender experiences loss or a potential loss in paying or giving something 
they value. The voluntariness of the process or act affirms that it originates from the 
offender. The transformative aspect occurs when the act “changes the subject’s relation 
to oneself as well as to others” (p.19). They take on a new identity and position of less 
power. 
 
From the literature, two approaches to reparation within criminology stand out; 
Reparations through the criminal justice system and reparations through the 
Restorative approach. These are discussed below. 
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Reparations through the criminal justice system 
Reparations through the criminal justice system has sometimes been viewed as an 
alternative and/or complement to punishment. This is mainly through payments that 
are either state ordered or paid by the state. In this perspective, the main features that 
are highlighted are; (1) it is to be made to the victim (2) the offender, state or other 
authority undertakes the responsibility to pay the reparation and (3) it is viewed as a 
process of reforming or rehabilitating the offender. The context in which the reparation 
is made is through the criminal justice system where the offender is identified and goes 
through the criminal justice procedure. This however does leave some unanswered 
questions such as what happens when the offender is unknown and there is no criminal 
proceedings going on? Can the victims still access reparation when the offender is at 
large? What happens when the offender is unable or unwilling to pay? What is the 
significance of the source of reparation for the victim when it comes from an alternative 
source other than the offender?  
 
Walklate (1986) further argues that reparation is conceived primarily to benefit the 
criminal justice system, with a focus on the offender (Gromet, 2011).  This view 
however comes from constructing reparation as either an aide or alternative to the 
criminal justice system, such as when the offender agrees to reparation then their 
sentence is reduced or suspended or even charges not being placed by the victim. 
Looking at it from this angle, the focus of reparation becomes the offender because it 
aims at easing the demands on the criminal justice system.  
 
Ideally however, reparation is seen more as an interaction between the offender and 
the victim in which the offender atones for the harms they caused and the victim is 
gratified.  
 
The reparation effort is intended to principally come from the offender. Such an effort 
comprises of at least two dimensions; the material aspect of it where the offender pays 
for the harm or loss that they caused and the broader aim of repairing the social 
damage by acknowledgement of the damage their actions caused. Such reparation 
would comprise of either monetary benefits or the provision of a service to the victim 
or community that has suffered the damage. In case there is no identifiable victim, then 
the proposal is usually towards a form of community service for reparation. 
 
Reparation also rests on the active participation of both the victim and the offender in 
the process. The different parties are encouraged to communicate their views on the 
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crime and harm. In some cases, reparation proceedings are conducted as an alternative 
to formal court procedures. This is however more prevalent in mediation processes 
between the offender and victim. The victim-offender mediation can be done at various 
stages of the criminal justice process such as at the pre-prosecution, pre-sentence and 
post sentence. In it, the different parties seek to address the wider impact of the crime, 
identify ways whereby the offender can amend for the crime and also offer the 
possibility of social reintegration of the offender in the community. In this way, 
reparation becomes a rehabilitative instrument in which the offender recognises his 
wrongdoing and makes amends by paying back to the victim. For this to have a 
rehabilitative value however, the impetus has to come from the offender.  
 
Reparations and Restorative Justice 
A second approach to reparations is through a restorative justice perspective which 
focuses on a more holistic approach to crime and redress. Restorative justice provides 
for a more in-depth discussion of reparation. A restorative justice approach focuses on 
repairing the material and psychological harm and involves all stakeholders affected 
by the crime convening to discuss about how to deal with the crime (Gromet, 2011). It 
further emphasises active responsibility whereby the offenders and their communities 
of care take steps to right wrongs through reparation which may be material or 
symbolic. The involvement of a wider circle of carers and the active involvement of the 
offender has the potential of success than when the state or a remote entity such as an 
institution takes on such a responsibility (Braithwaite, 2005).  
 
However, the contexts in which restorative justice approaches have been applied in 
criminology have mostly been limited to low level offenders or crimes. It also assumes 
the victim and offender knowing each other before the processes are started therefore 
the emphasis on individual responsibility for the offences.  
 
The conditions under which reparations are awarded are however different in the 
context of international crimes. A lot of the violations are serious, occur on a large scale, 
sometimes over a period of time. The profile of the victim and perpetrator are 
sometimes not clear with many cases of victims and perpetrators not knowing each 
other. At local levels, restorative approaches have been undertaken, such as the mato 
oput in northern Uganda. Even in the context of victims and perpetrators not knowing 
each other, families of perpetrators take on an active responsibility to amend the 
wrongs. The values of such traditional processes in the context of mass atrocities are 
however still continually being debated (Baines, 2007; Tim Allen, 2007).  
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At national levels, however, reparations for international crimes is designed along the 
framework of the criminal justice process. The additional nuances, particularly in the 
content of the reparations and the context in which the reparations are provided are 
more detailed than in mainstream criminology. 
 
4.5 Linking Criminology, truth commissions and reparations 
 
Approaching criminology from the perspective of TJ, particularly focusing on truth 
seeking and reparation, two key elements stand out; first is the individual-centred 
focus of criminology where the key players are a known victim and a known offender. 
Second, there is a rather limited conceptualisation of truth seeking and reparation. 
Truth emerges mostly as an offender’s confession and where victims are involved, they 
serve as witnesses. Similarly, reparations are associated with restitutions and 
compensation despite there being varied options for reparation.   
 
Even when the discussion attempts to move away from individual low level crimes to 
for instance state crimes as with Stanley (2005), the contextualisation of the crime and 
the perpetrators still remains very silent on the unconventional nature of a number of 
international crimes such as civil wars. Individual-level processes also apply to truth 
seeking and reparations where it is carried out between the offender and victim. 
 
This does not mean that criminology has been void of any exploration beyond the 
individual. A growing body has focused on fields such as state crime, transnational 
crime, organisational crime and collective violence. Pruitt (2014) identifies the fields 
of state crime, organisational crime and collective violence as areas in which 
criminology has attempted to explore beyond the individual based analysis 
particularly in understanding genocide from a criminological angle.  
 
Smeulers & Haveman (2008:487) have further drawn attention to the need for 
criminologists to include international crimes because criminologists are essentially 
the “specialists in crime.” It would also be interesting to explore what criminologists 
perceive of scholars and practitioners from other fields discussing international 
crimes. Truth commissions, for instance, have focused on reporting and narrating the 
experiences of atrocious crimes but neither the approach they have taken in 
constructing the aetiology of a conflict nor its recommendations has had criminologists 
batting an eye. 
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As a point of caution on linking criminology and transitional justice or international 
crimes, I find Schabas' (2011) observation quite useful where he cautions that “some 
of our understandings about criminal behaviour in a peacetime domestic context are 
inapplicable to the types of situations that interest international prosecutions” (p.356).  
For instance, whereas issues of recidivism is pertinent in the domestic sphere, they are 
much more complex at the international level where perpetrators often reintegrate 
back into the community and in the best case scenario are harmless and no threat as 
seen in cases such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Uganda. In other cases, there is a fluid 
movement of perpetrators from being ordinary criminals to combatants in conflict 
situations or a transformation of the former combatants into criminal gangs  (Suhrke 
& Berdal, 2012). 
 
Drawing on this chapter, one overarching theme on the relationship between 
criminology and transitional justice has been the marginalisation of transitional justice 
issues in mainstream criminology and the impetus for creating synergies between the 
two as seen through the advocacy for specialisations in international criminology but 
also through subjects that have a strong base in criminology such as restorative justice 
and victimology exploring international crimes (Aertsen, Arsovska, Rohne, Valiñas, & 
Vanspauwen, 2008).  
 
Whereas most of the discussion has focused more broadly on the need to incorporate 
criminology in international crimes (Friedrichs, 2008; Parmentier & Weitekamp, 
2007), Parmentier & Weitekamp (2007) further narrow it down to proposing 
criminological considerations in understanding transitional justice mechanisms. For 
instance, they state that in seeking for the truth, criminology can have both practical 
and theoretical bearings. On the practical level, it can develop new techniques and 
interpretations of forensic procedures, create forums for victim participation and 
explore possibilities for victim-offender interaction. Theoretically, criminology can 
contribute to mapping crimes and their origins. This can be done by interpreting the 
existing criminological theories about the sociological and psychological causes of 
crime and developing new theoretical frameworks. For reparations, criminology can 
study and evaluate existing schemes, recommend improvements and provide deeper 
analysis of key concepts like harm and how to restore such harm through empirical 
studies. 
 
Despite the limited interaction between criminology and Transitional Justice, there is 
a growing advocacy for establishing positive links particularly in seeking to study 
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international crimes through the theoretical, conceptual and methodological 
frameworks of criminology. 
 
More specifically, the fields of victimology and RJ can be useful platforms for 
understanding the dynamics of international crimes. Both of these fields provide more 
nuanced approaches to victims, offenders and crime. A victimological approach to 
international crimes for instance can be applied to construct the nature of crimes and 
criminal behaviour as well as in understanding the nature of victimisation and needs 
of victims. Letschert, Haveman, de Brouwer & Pemberton (2011) have from this 
perspective proposed for a comprehensive approach beyond the legal responses while 
dealing with international crimes. Similarly, RJ avails a broad spectrum of mechanisms 
for bringing together the victims and offenders in order to repair the harm. Truth 
commissions and reparation programmes have at their core victims and promoting the 
interaction between victims and perpetrators in order to facilitate healing. Such a 
process would benefit from the detailed attention to victims, perpetrators and criminal 
behaviour offered in the context of victimology and RJ. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I attempt to address five issues; First, the status of the interaction 
between criminology and transitional justice. This is an area that is gaining the 
attention of both fields; second, the definition of international crimes from a 
criminological perspective. Here, a lot of the definition has focused on crimes that 
present with international components such as transnational, organisational, 
cybercrimes, trafficking, among others. International crimes as crimes against 
international criminal law is now just gaining prominence looking at the arguments in 
favour of analysing international crimes using criminology theories.  In issues three 
and four, I discussed the notion of truth seeking and reparation in criminology and 
what it can offer to the field of transitional justice. I was interested in the processes of 
establishing the truth and payment of reparation and whether there is any significant 
divergence in criminology and transitional justice. In the fifth part, I linked criminology, 
truth commissions and reparations and argued that both criminology and the 
mechanisms of truth commissions and reparations could be enriched by a closer 
interaction of the methodological, theoretical and conceptual frameworks. 
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PART III. OVERVIEW OF THE SELECTED 
CASES 
 
 
 
“DDR, TRC: All the same thing! …our wounds cannot be healed when we see the 
perpetrators being compensated and we get nothing” (Shaw, 2010, p. 112) 
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CHAPTER 5:  GHANA: “WAS THERE A TRC IN GHANA?” 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
Ghana’s history of human rights violations and the choice of the truth commission 
mechanism to confront this past is not widely known. This chapter therefore presents 
Ghana’s experience that culminated in the establishment of the National Reconciliation 
Commission (NRC). The Chapter traces the history of violence and abuse that 
consistently lingered from one regime to another. This persistence of state 
institutionalised violence remained largely unaddressed even when regimes changed. 
Impunity was further entrenched by the 1992 constitution through the indemnity 
provisions that protected the perpetrators. Ghana’s case further presents an example 
of where TJ mechanisms are instituted in contexts that did not experience full-blown 
conflict and where state institutions continued to operate despite a number of them 
being implicated in the atrocities. The analysis is divided into four parts. The first part 
presents the general background for the establishment of a truth commission where it 
discusses the political and legal contexts. In the second part, the set-up of the truth 
commission is discussed. The third part presents the reparation framework as 
recommended by the truth commission and in the fourth part, I discuss the post-truth 
commission proceedings. 
  
5.1 Context for a truth commission  
 
In contrast to most of the West African states, Ghana has been considered an oasis of 
peace in a region filled with civil wars (Afolabi, 2009; The Economist, 2003). Contrary 
to the popular impression however, Ghana has also grappled with a painful past. 
According to Valji (2006, p. 3), Ghana has faced a “long history of oppression, 
authoritarian and undemocratic practices in the country as well as continued use of 
violence by successive regimes.” In the course of its political history after its 
independence, Ghana has experienced at least four successful coups, a number of 
unsuccessful ones as well as periods of unconstitutional and authoritarian rule.  
 
The complexity in Ghana’s history generated deep seated divisions between rivalling 
political parties, inter and intra ethnic clashes and tensions between different 
chieftaincies.  Ghana’s legacy has also been tainted by gross human rights violations 
and the perpetration of a culture of silence (Alidu & Ame, 2013).   
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In 2001, as a follow up regarding his election campaign promise, President John 
Agyekum Kufour began plans to institute a National Reconciliation Commission to 
investigate human rights abuses and foster an environment of transparency and 
accountability. However, as will be elaborated in the coming sections, the partisan 
origin of the NRC was detrimental in that it was viewed as a New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
tool for embarrassing the other regimes.  
 
Unlike other truth commissions in Africa, the NRC has had considerably less attention 
by both practitioners and researchers. In addition to this, the commission was also 
contested locally with concerns over whether Ghana even needed a truth commission 
to address its past history. On the one hand, some of the critics argued that the events 
that needed to be addressed had happened too long ago, therefore, there was no point 
in bringing them to light again. They argued that some of the victims felt that they had 
already been able to move beyond the crimes and were not anxious about re-opening 
the wounds and publicising them by their participation in the commission. It was also 
perceived that the issues that Ghana was grappling with were not severe enough to 
warrant the use of a truth commission. However, on the other hand, the proponents 
observed that Ghana’s dark past with its history of deceit and negation needed to be 
addressed and the victims needed to receive some form of acknowledgment (Alidu & 
Ame, 2013).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
The justification for the truth commission was based on two contexts; the political 
context of the crimes committed and the legal framework for addressing heinous 
crimes of the past. 
 
5.1.1 The political context and the need for a truth commission 
 
Ghana’s political complexities date back to pre and post-independence struggles with 
different political parties striving for power. Notable among these are the United Gold 
Coast Convention (UGCC), the Convention People’s Party (CPP) and the National 
Liberation Movement (NLM). Consequently, the CPP won the general elections with 
Kwame Nkrumah as the head. The other political parties disapproved of the win and 
resorted to violence as a means of contestation. This set forth a series of violent 
incidents including bombings and assassination attempts (Ameh, 2006a, 2006b). The 
response to these acts of violence led to the enactment of the Preventive Detention Act 
(PDA) (1958), an equally violent and oppressive policy used to counteract the violence. 
Haynes (1991, p. 409) points out that “since the regime of Kwame Nkrumah (1957-66), 
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successive governments in Ghana have ruled by the use of tactics and policies designed 
to muzzle or even destroy opposition.” The consequences of such policies have been 
violations human rights, distrust of state institutions and divisions in the country. 
 
Drawing on the literature dealing with Ghana’s political history, the development of 
Ghana’s political crisis and violent past can be grouped into three waves; the first wave 
of post-independence violations, the second wave of coups and counter coups and the 
third wave of unconstitutional rule. With each period came a specific group of victims 
and although no specific group can be said to have been more victimised than the 
others, it was during certain specific waves that the most brutal and widespread 
violations occurred such as the John Jerry Rawlings AFRC regime of 4 June 1979 – 23 
September 1979 (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004). 
 
5.1.1.1 First wave: Post independence tribulations (1957-1965) 
 
According to the findings by the NRC, the path to independence and general elections 
of 1957 were not smooth. It was characterised by opposing political parties bitterly 
contesting among each other. The first violent manifestation were as early as 1954 
when an assassination attempt was carried out against Kwame Nkrumah, the head of 
the Convention People’s Party (CPP) (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004).   
 
Furthermore, civilian casualties as a result of sporadic bomb explosions in public 
places and functions took this conflict away from the politicians to the by-standers. 
This state of affairs created desperation and insecurity. In the  NRC report, they 
highlight the sense of insecurity that was heightened in the private sphere when 
children, notably members of the Ghana Young Pioneer (GYP) movement were 
encouraged to report their own parents if they suspected them to be involved with the 
opposition. This breach of trust and spread of fear in families was perceived to 
tantamount to a “violation of the sanctity of the family and of family life” and an 
“invasion of the family’s right to privacy” (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004, 
p. 36).  
 
Following Nkrumah’s win at the elections, continued opposition led to the enactment 
of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) 1958. The PDA gave powers to detain a suspect 
for up to five years without trial, among others. The PDA was amended in 1959 and 
later in 1962 where the detention period was extended indefinitely. The PDA has been 
viewed as a catalyst that promoted repression and dictatorial tendencies in Ghana (Hor 
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Vormawor & Atuguba, 2014). According to McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah (1994), it was 
estimated that between 400 and 2,000 individuals were detained by 1961 including 
prominent politicians such as Adamafio Tawai (Minister of state for presidential 
affairs) and Ako Adjei (Minister of Foreign affairs). As a result of the Act, various 
individuals were witch-hunted on the basis of their political views, detained, tortured, 
exiled and even killed.  
 
During this period, all opposition and organised groups such as ethnic, religious and 
political groups were banned. The country was declared a one party state in 1965 with 
Nkrumah becoming president for life. This period also witnessed the expulsion of 
persons whose presence was thought to upset the public good and public interest 
under the Deportation Act (1957). This expulsion was only to be applied to non-
Ghanaians, however it took on a political tone when some of the individuals were 
deported as a result of their political affiliations and activities (Rathbone, 2000). 
 
In general, this period constituted of consolidation of fear and silencing opposition 
(National Reconciliation Commission, 2004). The prevailing philosophy was that one 
was either for the state or against it and those against it were ruthlessly pursued. Those 
who opted out of “cipipification” were in effect eliminated. Cipipification was a word 
play on the acronym CPP of the ruling party referring to a process of indoctrination 
(National Reconciliation Commission, 2004, p. 137 & 296). The whole indoctrination 
spared none and children from four years to twenty one years were indoctrinated in 
the philosophy of “Nkrumahism” including university students who had to undergo a 
two weeks study at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (p. 37). Suspicion and 
fear pervaded the society and loyalists were encouraged to spy on and report 
opponents of the regime at all levels of society in homes, work and religious places.  
 
The violations during this period were targeted mainly at opposition groups and 
individuals who did not share the same ideological views as the ruling party. Although 
some individuals attempted to redress the wrongs through the legal system, it was a 
difficult process because of the lack of separation of powers between the executive, 
judiciary and other arms of government. Furthermore, the blatant influence by the 
executive in the judiciary not only undermined the judiciary and the notion of 
separation of powers but also sent a clear message that the people could not rely on 
the judiciary for a free and fair trial and procedure for justice. According to Bing (1968), 
the legal system was inadequate for dealing with the type of crimes, which he calls 
political crimes that were occurring during this period. More so, the legal system was 
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inappropriately used to target opposition politicians and individuals with dissenting 
views. Although not discussed in detail, civilian populations were as well caught up in 
these violations and suffered varying degrees of harm.  
 
5.1.1.2  Second wave: Coups and counter coups (1966-1981) 
 
The second wave was characterised by coups and counter coups with brief periods of 
constitutional rule. According to the National Reconciliation Commission Report 
(2004) each successive regime continued to perpetuate human rights abuses targeted 
at mainly dissenting voices as well to silence the population. Below is a brief look at the 
different regimes that operated during this period and the violations that occurred as 
highlighted by the NRC .  
 
Major Akwasi A. Afrifa – National Liberation Council (NLC) 
On February 24 1966, a coup d’état was staged by a group of military and police officers 
which brought to power the National Liberation Council (NLC). This was only a first in 
a period that was characterised by forceful and military take-overs as well as military 
rule. Over the next three years, a military regime was established and according to 
(Ameh, 2006a, p. 95, 2006b, p. 347), it was characterised by a “cycle of vengeance and 
vendettas.” The heavily criticised PDA morphed into “protective custody” and the 
culprits were CPP ex-functionaries who were detained in various prisons in the 
country. Any association with CPP was criminalised to the extent that persons were 
barred from holding any appointment in the public service for up to ten years from 10 
January 1968 under The Elections and Public Disqualification Decree, 1968 (NLCD 
223). Additionally, property and assets of CPP functionaries was confiscated by the 
state (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004). According to the report, this 
amounted to discrimination and a deprivation of their means of livelihood. It was also 
during this period that the concept of trying civilians by military tribunals was 
introduced following a January 1967 coup attempt which included three civilians. 
Furthermore, torture in prison was rampant whereby detainees were subjected to 
various forms of torture. Women were especially singled out for sexual abuse (National 
Reconciliation Commission, 2004). 
 
Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia – Progress Party (PP) 
Following a general election in 1969, Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia of the Progress Party (PP) 
became Prime Minister. This ushered in the second republic and an expectation of the 
return to democratic rule. However, far from that, the regime continued to perpetuate 
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the culture of fear and intimidation set by its predecessors. In the “Apollo 568” case, 
563 civil servants were dismissed in 1970 without due process on accusation of 
inefficiency and corruption. Despite one of the victims, E. K. Sallah appealing in court 
and winning the case, he was still not reinstated. (NRC Report 2004, p. 40). This 
reinforced the image of a government that did not respect the judiciary and fears that 
it was not any different from its predecessors.  
 
A mass deportation programme was also carried out under the Aliens Act, 1963 (Act 
160) in which all individuals considered to be non-Ghanaian were ordered to leave the 
country. The report states that individuals considered foreign suffered inhuman and 
degrading conditions in the implementation of the order. Many lost property or ended 
up in prison awaiting their fate. Additionally, a number of individuals who could not 
prove their Ghanaian citizenship were persecuted including third generation 
descendants of Lebanese and other neighbouring countries notably Togo, Nigeria. 
(NRC 2004, p. 41).  
 
According to Aglago (2014) some of the reforms and policies during the Abrefa regime 
were considered as anti-people  and alienated the regime. Two years and three months 
into his rule, the army organised a coup led by Lt. Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong 
which over-threw the government on 13 January 1972. This brought to power the 
National Redemption Council (NRC) and marked the country’s second return to 
military rule.  
 
Lt. Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong – National Redemption Council (NRC)/Supreme 
Military Council I (SMC I) 
One of the actions of the NRC was the enactment of the protective custody law. Using 
this law, the regime placed all functionaries of the previous regime in detention thereby 
perpetuating the cycle of vengeance and vendettas. The detention was also extended 
to all individuals who held and voiced an alternative view to the regime’s policies. In 
effect, hundreds of citizens ended up under detention (National Reconciliation 
Commission, 2004, p. 43). This reinforced the silence and instilled fear in expressing 
dissenting opinions.  
 
The NRC evolved into the Supreme Military Council (SMC) in 1975 and further 
militarised all aspects of governance and institutions. According to the NRC report, all 
the ministries, state enterprises and local administration were put under military 
officers while freedom of speech and association was curtailed through banning 
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independent newspapers, detaining journalists, breaking up student demonstrations 
by armed soldiers and repeatedly closing universities. These activities were 
implemented using force, torture and intimidation. 
 
The state militarisation was also extended to civilians, reminiscent of Nkrumahism 
except with this regime, militarisation was used as a disciplinary measure. Any civilian 
thought to be deviating from the regime expectations was subjected to military 
discipline. This included reporting late to work, striking and indecent dressing or 
perceived immoral lifestyles (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004, p. 43). 
Similar to the previous regime of Maj. Afrifa which had set the precedence by trying 
civilians in a military tribunal, the Acheampong regime under NRC/SMC I subjected 
non-military civilians to military discipline and military tribunals under the Subversion 
Decree, 1972, NRCD 90 and Military Law (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004). 
 
General Frederick William Kwasi Akuffo – Supreme Military Council II (SMC II) 
Lt. Acheampong was removed from power by members of the SMC in July 1978 through 
a non-violent coup and replaced by Lt. General Frederick William Kwasi Akuffo. During 
General Akuffo’s regime, torture continued to be used with severity, especially on those 
detained. The torture was both physical and psychological with the aim of degrading 
the individuals. The NRC recounts for instance individuals made to clean public 
lavatories with bare hands (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004, p. 46). 
 
Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings I – Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
Ten months into the Akuffo regime, Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings and a group of junior 
officers attempted an unsuccessful coup on May 15, 1979. However, a successful coup 
was carried out by military officers sympathetic to Rawlings a month later on June 4, 
1979 through which the AFRC gained power.  
 
Key during this regime was the purging of senior officers and execution of former heads 
of military governments such as Afrifa (NLC), Acheampong (SMC I), Akuffo (SMC II) and 
some associates of NRC and SMC. In the “house-cleaning” programme, the cycle of 
vengeance and vendettas was carried out within the security forces. The junior prison 
and police officers carried out this operation with zeal for the perceived ills they had 
endured during the previous regime. In flagrant disregard for the judiciary, specially 
created “peoples courts” tried culprits, mainly functionaries of the NRC and SMC who 
were sentenced to impossibly long prison terms of between 50 years and 105 years 
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and executions. The highlight was the execution of the seven generals including heads 
of state on 16 June and 26 June 1979. 
 
The policy of seizure of goods which were believed to be hoarded and forceful price 
cuts crippled the business population, many of whom were killed or maimed. 
Demolition of places which were believed to be storage for hoarded goods also had the 
same effect of destroying livelihoods. A well-known case was the demolition of Makola 
No. 1 market in Accra where some families had sold for generations. The widespread 
insecurity and torture on civilian and military population also continued during this 
regime (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004). 
 
As with previous regimes, individuals and political opponents were witch hunted for 
holding dissenting views. This period, 4 June 1979 – 23 September 1979 has been 
specifically highlight by the NRC as one with the most grave violations that surpassed 
all other regimes (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004). These included murder, 
abductions, disappearances, rapes, confiscation of property and the illegal dismissal of 
workers (Ameh, 2006a, 2006b). 
 
Dr. Hilla Limann – People’s National Party (PNP) 
In 1979 following general elections, Dr. Hilla Limann of the People’s National Party 
(PNP) ushered in the third Republic. He enforced a policy of forced retirement for 
Rawlings and his associates and dismissed striking public workers. The reforms and 
adjustments were met with opposition from both the civilian and security forces which 
made him and his policies unpopular. 
 
Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings II – Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
Roughly two years after PNP had been in power, Rawlings led another successful coup 
in December 31, 1981. He suspended the 1979 constitution, dismissed the president 
and his cabinet, dissolved parliament and banned existing political parties and formed 
the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). This was the last coup and as 
discussed in the subsequent section, Rawlings spent the next decade consolidating his 
stay in power. 
 
5.1.1.2  Third Wave: Politics of Violence (1982-1992) 
 
Following a coup in 1981, Rawlings took over power and remained head of state for 
the next 10 years consolidating a militarised state. In general, this regime was 
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characterised by repression, curtailment of freedom and breeding of successive 
violence with the norm being arrests, murders, disappearances and seizures of 
property (Oquaye, 1995). Violence and repression was institutionalised and Oquaye 
(1995) further notes that new institutions which violated and abrogated human rights 
and curtailed civil society participation were established. An example he highlights are 
the formation of committees to purportedly involve the populace in decision making 
but in reality were used to witch-hunt and intimidate dissenters. These committees 
included the Workers Defence Committee (WDC), Peoples Defence Committee (PDC), 
Citizens Vetting Committee (CVC), Regional Defence Committee (RDC), National 
Defence Committee (NDC) and public tribunals to try those accused of anti-government 
acts. In December 1984, all PDCs, WDC, NDC were dissolved and replaced by 
Committees for Defence of the Revolution (CDR). The perpetrators largely operated 
under the protection of the state. In what Oquaye (1995, p. 563) refers to as 
“revolutionary violence,” the individuals who unleashed these terrors were “generally 
perceived as ‘the people,’ ‘friends’ or ‘cadres’ of the revolution whereas their victims 
were ‘enemies’ of the revolution, otherwise known as ‘citizens’.” To further militarise 
the state, state approved militias were formed. In order to decentralise the use of arms 
and break the military’s monopoly over the use of violence, ordinary citizens were 
recruited into the militias and trained in the use of arms and armed in what has been 
termed as the “democratisation of violence” by the NRC (National Reconciliation 
Commission, 2004, p. 52).  
 
By operating under the cover of the state, the perpetrators in many cases were not 
directly known by the victims and could not be readily identified (Oquaye, 1995). 
Furthermore, because of the level of state institutionalised violence, the avenues 
through which victims might have sought redress for these crimes were in effect 
closed. It is highly unlikely that they could turn to the very institutions perpetuating 
the abuse of their rights for redress. The regime formalised the infringement of human 
rights by enacting various laws to support the repressive actions such as the PNDCL 91 
Law which provided that “courts had no power to inquire into any detention that the 
regime had made at its discretion under the protective custody law (PNDCL 4)” while 
the public Tribunal Law (PNDCL 78) allowed death penalty by firing squad for political 
offences and precluded the superior courts of judicature over the tribunal (Oquaye, 
1995, pp. 563–564). The regime in effect made use of the law to justify its acts and at 
the same time remove the liberty of the Ghanaians. The victims were not only limited 
to ordinary citizens but included prominent personalities including three high court 
126 
judges and a retired army major who were abducted and murdered on June 30, 1982 
(National Reconciliation Commission, 2004, p. 55). 
 
The regime made use of the law to justify their acts and at the same time remove the 
liberty of the Ghanaians. It perpetrated torture and abuse by government organs and 
agencies. During this period, the constitution was suspended, political participation 
curtailed by banning political parties, blocking civil societies and detaining party 
leaders while extra-judicial practices aimed at suppression flourished (Haynes, 1991).  
 
In all of these three periods, civil society and other institutions designed to check the 
excesses of the state were either complicit, indifferent, gagged up or fervent 
participants in the abuses. The public trust in these bodies steadily dwindled to the 
extent that in some instances, there was a preference to the military regime as they at 
least managed to get things done and maintain a semblance of order (National 
Reconciliation Commission, 2004).  
 
The abuses and violations were however not condoned. There were simply no avenues 
to seek for redress as highlighted in the subsequent discussion. When an opportunity 
to inquire into the past presented itself, it strongly gained momentum particularly 
because it was framed under the context of national reconciliation.  
 
5.1.2 Legal framework for addressing heinous crimes of the past justification for 
setting up a truth commission in Ghana 
 
The justification for setting up a truth commission in Ghana was that the existing 
frameworks did not adequately cover issues of how the past atrocities could be 
redressed. Before 1992, the very institutions meant to protect the people promoted the 
impunity while after 1992, after the return to constitutionalism, the perpetrators were 
protected through new laws and the reluctance of the victims to pursue such cases. The 
following section will highlight how three instruments: the 1992 constitution, the 
national courts and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice 
(CHRAJ) limited the pursuit for redress and underscored the significance of the truth 
commission.  
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5.1.2.1  1992 Constitution and the indemnity clause 
 
The Rawlings regime that had been in power since 1981 following a coup continued to 
face increasing pressure for a return to constitutional rule. In 1992 a new constitution 
was drafted. The regime however tactically shielded themselves from possible 
accountability by the insertion of the indemnity provisions in the transitional 
provisions. According to Posner & Vermeule (2003), this is typical of the behaviour of 
elites in an elite led transitional justice process where they will usually seek to protect 
themselves from post-transitional punishment and/or extract concessions. 
 
 Article 299 sections 34, 35 and 37 categorically indemnify the PNDC and its 
functionaries, and the previous military regimes. Ironically, though, after the 1979 
coup, one of Rawlings’ first acts of retribution against the previous regimes was the 
execution of three leaders of the military regimes – Maj. Afrifa, Gen. Acheampong and 
Gen. Akuffo. 
 
In section 34, any action or decision taken against the military regimes or persons 
relating to the overthrow of the government (34, 2a), the suspension or abrogation of 
the 1960, 1969 and 1979 constitution (34, 2b) or the establishment of the military 
regimes (34, 2c) is declared unlawful.1 Additionally, Section 34 (3) further emphasises 
specific protection for PNDC, AFRC and its functionaries.2 Both regimes were under the 
leadership of Rawlings (Government of Ghana, 1992).  
                                                        
 
1 Article 299 section 34 (1) (2) state that “No member of the Provisional National Defence Council, 
Provisional National defence Council Secretary, or other appointees of the Provisional National Defence 
Council shall be held liable either jointly or severally, for any act or omission during the administration 
of the Provisional National Defence Council” and “It is not lawful for any court or tribunal to entertain 
any action or take any decision or make any order or grant any remedy or relief in any proceedings 
instituted against the Government of Ghana or any person acting under the authority of the Government 
of Ghana whether before or after the coming into force of this Constitution or against any person or 
persons acting in concert or individually to assist or bring about the change in Government which took 
place on the twenty-fourth day of February 1966 on the thirteenth day of January, 1972, on the fourth 
day of June 1979 and on the thirty-first day of December 1981 in respect of any act or omission relating 
to, or consequent upon - (a) the overthrow of the government in power before the formation of the 
National Liberation council, the National Redemption Council, the Supreme Military Council, the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council and the Provisional National Defence Council; or (b) the suspension or a 
abrogation of the Constitutions of 1960, 1969 and 1979; or (c) the establishment of the National 
Liberation Council, the National Redemption Council, the Supreme Military Council which took office on 
the ninth day of October 1975, the Supreme Military Council established on the fifth day of July 1978, 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, or the Provisional National Defence Council; or (d) the 
establishment of this Constitution. 
2 Article 299 section 34 (3) “...It is declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or 
purported to have been taken by the Provisional National Defence Council or the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council or a member of the Provisional National Defence Council or the Armed Forces 
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Section 35 deals with property returns. It specifies that any property confiscated by the 
AFRC and PNDC under any decree or law made by that council shall not be reversed. 
Property can only be returned if it is proven to the Commissioner for Human Rights 
and Administrative Justice that the property was acquired lawfully (35, 1 and 2). 
 
The constitution further removes the parliament’s powers of amending the provisions 
in the constitution except through a referendum in which at least seventy-five percent 
of the persons vote in favour of the passing of the bill (articles 289-292). It however 
further notes in article 299, section 37 that, “Notwithstanding anything in Chapter 25 
of this Constitution [Amendment of the Constitution], Parliament shall have no power 
to amend this section or sections 34 and 35 of this Schedule.” The amendment of the 
indemnity provisions seems to be a sensitive issue and elicited divided opinions on 
whether or not it should take place according to a survey by the Centre for Democratic 
Development –Ghana (CDD-Ghana) (Ghana News Agency, 2010). 
 
Appiagyei-Atua (2000) points out that indemnity clauses and provisions were not a 
new thing limited to the 1992 constitution. Previous constitutions like the 1969 Section 
13(3) and 1979 section 15(2) and (3) also inserted impunity provisions and these were 
all similar to the 1992 provisions. Importantly however, unlike the 1969 and 1979 
transitional provisions which had a temporary time frame with a lifespan of five years, 
the 1992 transitional provision was well protected to near permanency with strict 
guidelines in order to rid it. Removal of the indemnity clauses would not only be a 
lengthy process but would have far-reaching consequences. For instance, the 
Constitutional Review Commission recommended for the retention of the indemnity 
clauses and, the Chairman pointed out that removing the clauses would criminalise all 
the governments and those that participated in the governments since 1966 when the 
first republic was overthrown. Furthermore, it would require the immediate handing 
over political power to the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) which was overthrown in 
1966. The Commission argued that rather than attempting to remove the indemnity 
and transitional provisions, the work of the NRC should be revisited to determine 
                                                        
 
Revolutionary Council or by any person appointed by the Provisional National Defence Council or the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person appointed by the Provisional National Defence 
Council or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in the name of either the Provisional National 
Defence Council or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council shall be questioned in any proceedings 
whatsoever and, accordingly, it shall not be lawful for any court or other tribunal to make any order or 
grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.” 
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whether further measures to provide additional reparations can be implemented 
(Modern Ghana, 2012) 
 
Irrespective of the indemnity clauses, the emerging popular human rights discourse 
with regard to international crime is one of non-tolerance and therefore, perpetrators 
can no longer hide behind the veil of national legislation or instruments that may shield 
them from being held accountable for their crimes. 
 
In Ghana’s case, in a survey carried out by CDD-Ghana, 97% of the respondents were 
in support of the establishment of the NRC and 95% were confident that the NRC would 
deliver when it would be set up (CDD-Ghana, 2006). 
 
5.1.2.2  National court system 
 
Appiagyei-Atua (2000) points out that Ghana which has ratified a number of 
international and regional human rights treaties is obligated under international law 
to take up the responsibility to provide redress for human rights violations.  
 
Despite the impunity clauses, cases of human rights violations could still be challenged 
in regular courts and (Appiagyei-Atua, n.d., pp. 33–41) highlights a number of cases 
that were conducted either through the courts or CHRAJ.  However, as pointed out by 
the NRC, the national judicial system did not instil faith or confidence in its ability to 
uphold the individual rights of the citizens, therefore a significantly small number of 
cases were pertaining to the past human rights violations were brought to the courts. 
Additionally, sensitive cases were either deliberately delayed or biased (Appiagyei-
Atua, 2000). 
 
Appiagyei-Atua (n.d.) also observes that most of the cases that made it to the regular 
courts were civil and political rights cases, mainly initiated by wealthy political 
organisations or plaintiffs.  CHRAJ has been more accessible because it is free and they 
have local district offices and therefore has received more cases although these are 
mainly concerning Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. He however points out that 
despite its accessibility, the working class has brought in more cases in comparison to 
the rural population.  
 
The national judicial system, despite the restrictions imposed by the indemnity clauses 
did have some limited loopholes through which cases could be initiated however few 
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cases made it to the courts, and it was mainly limited to a specific group who could 
afford it.  
 
5.1.2.3 The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) 
 
The commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) is the national 
body designed to safeguard the fundamental rights and administrative justice in Ghana. 
It was established in 1993 under the 1992 constitution by Act 456 (CHRAJ-Ghana, 
2012) and mandated,  
“to investigate complaints of violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms, 
injustice and corruption; abuse of power and unfair treatment of persons by public 
officers in the exercise of their duties, with power to seek remedy in respect of such acts 
or omissions and to provide for other related purposes” (CHRAJ-Ghana, 1993, 7(1)(i)). 
 
CHRAJ set the stage for the establishment of the truth commission in the way it handled 
the Kwesi Pratt Jnr. Case. This case involved a petition to investigate the disappearance 
of five hundred people during the PNDC regime (Appiagyei-Atua, 2000, pp. 205–212). 
According to Appiagyei-Atua (2000), the petition was rejected on three grounds: It 
contravened with section 12(6) of Act 456 (CHRAJ-Ghana, 1993). This section states 
that “where a person by whom a complaint might have been made under this act has 
died or is for any sufficient reason unable to act for himself, the complaint may be made 
by his personal representative or by a member of his family.” In this case, it was argued 
that the petitioner was neither a personal representative nor member of family of the 
individuals for whom the petition was filed and was therefore not considered an 
interested party. The commission argued that the complainant did not have sufficient 
interest according to section 13(2)(b)(iii) (Appiagyei-Atua, 2000). The implication is 
that in the case of a disappeared or dead individual, only a personal representative or 
family can stand in to register a complaint and so in the case of inability or 
unwillingness of the family to pursue the matter, other interested parties are 
prohibited from pursuing the matter.  
 
Secondly, under 13(2), the commission may refuse to investigate or cease to 
investigate any complaint if the complaint relates to a decision, recommendation, act 
or omission of which the complainant has had knowledge for more than twelve months 
before the complaint is received by the commission. In the Kwesi Pratt Jnr. Case, the 
complainant brought the case after the required time period. It is important to note 
that because of the political atmosphere and various other reasons, many of these cases 
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went unreported, albeit still strong on the memory of the victims. This clause therefore 
excluded a huge number of would be complainants or petitioners because some of the 
acts were committed decades ago. 
 
Thirdly and perhaps most important for the truth commission, according to Appiagyei-
Atua (2000), the mandate of the CHRAJ does not require or enable it to act on broad 
investigation into cases of disappearances and extra-judicial killings since 1982. He 
however argues that this interpretation could have been a tactical strategy by the 
commission to avoid dealing with politically sensitive issues or more pragmatically 
side-stepping the workload arising out of the cases. The commission therefore 
proposed that the petitioner apply for the setting up of a commission of inquiry.  
 
5.2 Getting there: The National Reconciliation Commission Act 2002 
 
According to Gyimah-Boadi (2002), Ghana’s road to formal national reconciliation 
exercise dates back to the early 1990s. The then president Rawlings offered an apology 
for all past mistakes in 1992. In the same period, during the transition to democracy, 
amnesties were offered to some political prisoners and the exiles were allowed to 
return home. The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) also proposed a 
National Reconciliation Forum in 1999 which however did not receive the support of 
the government. 
 
During the 2000 elections, the National Patriotic Party (NPP) recognised the local need 
for reconciliation and addressing past human rights abuses as a key concern and 
included the issue of national reconciliation in its manifesto during the campaigns. The 
presidential candidate, John Kufuor pledged to create an institution to facilitate 
national reconciliation (Hayner, 2011; Parmentier & Aciru, 2016; Valji, 2006). 
Following his victory, he began the process of establishing a truth commission. 
 
The National Reconciliation Bill was passed in parliament in late 2001 and signed into 
law on 9 January 2002 as the National Reconciliation Act, 2002, Act 611 (Parliament of 
the Republic of Ghana, 2002).  The Act established the National Reconciliation 
Commission to seek and promote national reconciliation among the Ghanaians by  
“recommending appropriate redress for persons who have suffered any injury, hurt, 
damage, grievance or who have in any other manner been adversely affected by abuses 
and violation of their human rights arising from activities or in activities of public 
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institutions and persons holding public office during periods of unconstitutional 
government to provide for related matter” (par 1). 
 
From the statements recorded by the NRC, expectations from the NRC were varied. 
Many of the victims of the violations suffered long term effects including economic 
hardship, bankruptcy, family disintegration, lack of education for children and health 
problems. They therefore hoped to receive monetary compensation. Other reasons 
however included obtaining, setting the record straight and demanding justice against 
the perpetrators (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004). This resonates with the 
survey by CDD in which respondents expected that one of the outcomes of the NRC 
process would be the offer of compensation or reparation. The expectation was that 
this would be in form of cash, housing or victims’ families being taken care of (Centre 
for Democratic Development - Ghana, 2006). Respondents also expected to be able tell 
their stories and for the commission to promote reconciliation and punishment for 
perpetrators from the NRC. 
 
5.2.1 Mandate of the National Reconciliation Commission 
 
The Commission in section 3 of the NRC Act 2002 was tasked with seeking and 
promoting national reconciliation among Ghanaians;  
  “The object of the Commission is to seek and promote national 
reconciliation among the people of this country. (a) by establishing 
accurate, complete and historical record of violations and abuses of 
human rights inflicted on persons by public institutions and holders of 
public office during periods of unconstitutional government, namely from 
(i) 24th February 1966 to 21st August 1969 (ii) 13th January, 1972 to 
23rd September 1979; and (iii) 31st December, 1981 to 6th January, 
1993; and (b) by making recommendations to the President for redress of 
wrongs committed within the specified periods. Notwithstanding the 
periods specified in subsection (1) (a), the Commission may, on an 
application by any person, pursue the object set out in subsection (1) in 
respect of any other period between 6th March 1957 and 6th January 
1993” (NRC Act 2002, Act 611, Section 3 (1) (2)). 
 
The Act identified several functions for the commission which can be broadly grouped 
into investigative, educational and suggesting recommendations. Under the 
investigative function, they were mandated to investigate the violations, the context in 
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which abuses occurred, individual and public responsibility for violations, whether the 
violations were deliberately planned and executed and any other matters which would 
require investigation in order to promote national reconciliation. They were further 
expected to seek the assistance of the police or any other public or private institution 
or person for the purpose of investigation. For the educational aspect, the commission 
was expected to educate the public on its work by providing sufficient publicity as well 
as encourage public participation in the proceedings. In suggesting recommendations, 
the commission was expected to identify the victims of violations and abuse and make 
appropriate recommendations for redress.  
 
Upon completion of the process, the commission was required to submit a complete 
report to the president. Besides availing information on the context of the violations 
and an accurate historical account of the investigations carried out, the commission 
was required to;  
i. Identify the victims of violations and abuse of human rights 
ii. Recommend the appropriate response to the specific needs of each victim or 
groups of victims 
iii. Suggest measures to prevent and avoid the repetition of such violations 
iv. Recommend reforms whether legal, political, administrative or otherwise. 
 
The Act further directs the commission to suggest recommendations on setting up of a 
reparation and rehabilitation fund (NRC Act, 20 (2)(h) from which monetary 
compensation would be disbursed. 
 
The commission was inaugurated on May 6th 2002. Mr. Justice Kweku Etrew Amua-
Sekyi, a retired Supreme Court judge was selected as the Chairman. It comprised of 
nine members, all Ghanaians and appointed by the president in consultation with the 
Council of State, a non-partisan constitutional body that advises the president on 
appointment to public office and other matters prescribed by the constitution.  The 
commission maintained both the mandate and time period prescribed in the NRC Act 
2002. 
 
The commission recorded statements from Ghanaians both within and outside Ghana. 
It received 4,240 statements from victims and witnesses and convened over 2000 
public hearings. The commission grouped the human rights abuses and violations into 
12 categories, namely: killings, both for civilians and security personnel. This included 
killings that occurred for individuals or in groups, executions and extra judicial killings; 
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disappearances and all the disappeared were presumed to be dead; torture, whether 
physical or mental; detention without trial; ill treatment which included a wide 
assortment of degrading treatment and punishment; invasion of property rights 
including seizure, confiscation or destruction of property; interference with the right 
to work, including dismissals and arbitrary releases from work; hostage taking; abuse 
of judicial process; violation of the right to die in dignity; and sexual violations 
(National Reconciliation Commission, 2004). 
 
5.3 Reparations  
 
The NRC drew its mandate to make recommendations for reparations from the NRC 
Act 2002, section 3(1)(b) that calls on it to “[make] recommendations to the president 
for redress of wrongs” and further in section 4(c) “identify and specify the victims of the 
violations and abuses and make appropriate recommendations for redress.”  
 
This task is reiterated in the NRC report where it emphasises that;  
“The law [NRC Act] required the Commission to recommend to the President appropriate 
measures to assuage the pain of, and make reparation to, those whose human rights were 
violated or abused during the mandate. The Commission was also required to recommend 
measures to prevent such occurrences in future.” (National Reconciliation Commission, 
2004, p. 5) 
 
The commission identified six objectives for its reparations policy. First, reparations 
are a right to individuals whose rights have been violated. These rights are enshrined 
in the 1992 constitution.3 The commission states that one of the principle objectives of 
the reparations policy is to “reinforce the citizens’ right to redress as well as respect for 
human rights, the rule of law and democratic accountability” (National Reconciliation 
Commission, 2004 (7.3.1.1), p. 171).  
 
Secondly, the commission views reparation as a means to achieve recognition of both 
victimhood and accountability. It talks of the need to acknowledge the violations and 
crimes to which the victims were subjected to as a serious violation of human rights. 
                                                        
 
3 Chapter 5 on fundamental rights and freedoms and article 33(1) states that “where a person alleges that 
a provision of this constitution on fundamental human rights and freedoms has been, or is being, or is likely 
to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action that is lawfully available, 
that person may apply to the high court for redress” (Government of Ghana, 1992) 
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The policy of recognition also calls for the responsible actors to be called to account for 
their acts hence be held accountable (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004 
(7.3.1.2), p. 171).  
 
Third, reparations are aimed at repairing and rehabilitating the victims. The 
commission recognises that the victims of these crimes have experienced negative and 
sometimes devastating effects as a result of their victimisation and therefore aim at 
alleviating their suffering.  
 
The fourth objective is to reform the institutions that perpetrated the violations. The 
reparation package therefore acts as a basis for non-repetition through which “the 
nation will be motivated to resolve that “Never Again” shall the State facilitate or preside 
over such gross human rights violations” (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004 
(7.3.1.4), p. 171) 
 
The fifth objective of the reparation policy is for reparations to be viewed as a means 
of portraying equality in the Ghanaian society and ensuring respect for all individuals 
irrespective of the social standing. The commission aimed to recommend reparations 
for all individuals who had suffered abuse irrespective of their social or economic 
status in order to cultivate respect. 
 
Finally, the commission aimed at recommending measures which were as realistic as 
possible to the resource constraints facing the Ghanaian state. They recognised the fact 
that reparations can never fully repair the damage nor restore the victims to the state 
they were in before the violations. There was a need to balance what could actually be 
provided with what would be considered an appropriate token of recognition and 
acknowledgment for the victims. It is thus with these considerations that the NRC 
recommended reparations in the form of monetary compensations, symbolic 
measures, social service benefits, community reparations and restitutions. 
 
5.3.1 Break down of the Ghana NRC recommendation on reparation 
 
The section on reparations is contained in Volume 1, Chapter 7 of the National 
Reconciliation Commission report. Broadly, it makes recommendations in five areas; 
symbolic, social service benefits, community reparations, restitution and monetary 
compensations as seen in table 1. The report was not explicit about who was 
responsible for some of the specific reparation measures. The general assumption 
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through the interpretation of the NRC mandate however that was the government 
would undertake the overall responsibility in directing the programme. Similarly, some 
of the specific categories of victims to benefit from the reparations was not explicitly 
indicated in the report. These ambiguities have been indicated using the phrase ‘not 
specified.’  
 
Table 1: Summary of Ghana NRC’s Recommendation for Reparation 
 
Category Specific Directed at  Category of victims 
Symbolic Apology  President Women, other victims, 
Yendi massacre of 1969 
victims 
Heads of public 
institutions 
All victims 
The executive 
branch 
Families of the three 
murdered high court 
judges and retired army 
office (30 June 1982) 
Monuments and commemorative 
events 
Not specified Not specified 
1. National Monuments in Accra Not specified Not specified 
2. Monument in honour of 
Ghanaian woman 
Not specified Not specified 
3. Monuments in regional capitals Not specified Not specified 
4. One-off national reconciliation 
day 
Not specified Not specified 
1. Annual 
thanksgiving/remembrance day 
Not specified Not specified 
2. National Reconciliation 
memorabilia (stamps, coins, 
badges) 
Not specified Not specified 
3. Annual reconciliation lectures Not specified Not specified 
Social Service 
benefits 
Scholarship up to Senior 
Secondary School  
Not specified One child of: deceased, 
disappeared, disabled 
or trader whose goods 
were seized  
Health benefits  
1. Join the National Health 
Insurance Scheme 
2. Establish a Trauma and 
Counselling Centre in every 
Regional and District Hospital. 
Not specified Living with health 
problems 
Community  Building of market in Namoo Not specified Border town of Namoo 
Restitution Property returns (lands, 
buildings) 
Government 
returns or 
negotiations 
Unlawful confiscation 
victims 
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with third 
party owners 
Restoration of good name Not specified Victims of false charges 
or accusations 
Flat sum to vehicle owners for 
seized or confiscated 
Not specified Victims of confiscated 
vehicles 
Compensation One off monetary payment Not specified Eligible victims 
Summarised from:  National Reconciliation Commission (2004, pp. 172–176) 
 
5.3.1.1 Symbolic measures 
 
This according to the commission is considered one of the most significant forms of 
reparations. During the hearing, the commission established four categories of 
petitioners. Some individuals were not interested in any awards which seemed to them 
like a payment for their suffering while another group was simply not interested 
because they had put the pain behind them. For some of the petitioners however, 
telling their story and knowing the truth about what happened to them or their loved 
ones was all they wanted. Another group of petitioners however clearly stated that they 
expected reparation for their suffering (p. 168). The commissioners recommended that 
the symbolic reparation be awarded together with other forms for meaningful impact. 
The symbolic measures recommended by the commission included the following: 
 
 Apology 
The commission recommended that apologies can be both verbal and in the form of 
letters. The apology letters are to be signed by the president and given to the victims. 
In addition, apologies should be made by the heads of public institutions who were 
main actors in violation of rights, including the president, as the Head of State and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Ghana Armed Forces. These are to be broadcast live on 
radio and television. A special apology should also be made to the Ghanaian women.  
 
In section 8.2.1-8.2.5, the commission recommended that apologies to be made to the 
following categories: The president should apologise to all victims of violations and 
abuses committed by holders of public office from 6th March 1957 to 6th January 1993, 
families of those killed, injured or maimed in the Yendi Massacre of 1969 and to the 
women of Ghana; Apology from the executive branch to the families of the High Court 
Judges and the retired army officer murdered 30th June 1982. Although it is not 
specified who should apologise, apologies should also be offered to families of all those 
who were killed or disappeared.  
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Additionally, apologies should also be made in conjunction with the restoration of the 
good name of individuals who were wrongly accused. 
 
Monuments and commemorative events  
Among the monuments to be built include: 
a. National monument built in Accra in honour of the killed, disappeared and unknown 
bearing the names of the victims, both known and unknown. 
b. Monument in honour of the Ghanaian woman. 
c. Monuments in regional capitals in honour of traders and other civilians 
d. A one-off national reconciliation day to unveil monuments and deliver apologies 
e. Annual remembrance/thanksgiving day 
f. National reconciliation memorabilia for instance, national reconciliation stamps, 
coins and badges. 
g. Annual reconciliation lectures with the aim of fostering respect for human rights, 
rule of law and democratic principles. 
 
5.3.1.2 Social service benefits 
 
The commission argued that from their findings, they recognised that some victims 
continued to suffer from medical conditions resulting from their abuses. A number of 
them had also not recovered economically and as a result, their children suffered from 
this dilemma. Reparations therefore also needed to be as realistic as possible and have 
real impact on the lives of the victims. These needs could be met through reparations 
in the form of access to social services. These types of benefits were recommended in 
two areas: Scholarships and health benefits. 
 
Scholarships 
This includes the education of one child up to senior secondary school level in a public 
school. The category to benefit from this award is a child born to a victim who is either 
deceased, disappeared, disabled or traders whose goods were seized. 
 
Health benefits 
This is directed to those who are living with health problems as a result of human rights 
violations. Their concerns should be taken care of by the National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) which was due to be established. The commission however does not 
detail the process of how this is to be carried out.  
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The Commission also recommended for the establishment of a trauma and counselling 
centre in every regional and district hospital. 
 
5.3.1.3 Community reparation 
 
The report directs this reparation to one specific recipient, the town of Namoo. 
According to the NRC report, the market which was located in the border town in the 
upper East region had to be shifted across the border into Burkina Faso due to 
unlawfulness experienced by traders. This deprived the people of Namoo of a means of 
livelihood as well as a means to enrich the Ghanaian economy. It was therefore 
recommended the construction of a market for Namoo town. It is important to point 
out that other markets were also destroyed, notably, Makola market in Accra. It is 
therefore not apparent from the report why only this market was singled out for the 
community reparation aspect. 
 
5.3.1.4 Restitution 
 
Restitution was considered both for property and individual reputation. The 
commission recommended for the return or restoration of properties that had been 
unlawfully confiscated, for instance, land or buildings. The exception was individuals 
who had unlawfully acquired multiple houses through loopholes or their status and 
had the houses confiscated (NRC, 2004 (7.4.2.1),  p. 174). 
  
Restitution was also in the form of restoration of the good name. Those whose 
reputation was destroyed through false charges or accusations were to have their good 
name restored. In addition, they were to receive a declaration for the restoration of 
their reputation as well as an apology letter signed by the president. 
 
For items such as vehicles which had been confiscated or seized, a flat sum of money 
was to be paid irrespective of the make or number. This would be a symbolic gesture 
mainly for pragmatic reasons. This is because the vehicles may not be available for 
restoration. If they might have been available, the state in which they would have been 
would not enable restoration. Additionally, converting the value of the vehicles to the 
current market value would have proven too costly for the government and 
reparations programme. 
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5.3.1.5  Compensation 
 
Compensation in the form of monetary one-off payment was to be made to eligible 
victims who were willing to access it.  The payments range from one million Ghanaian 
Cedis to thirty million Ghanaian Cedis. Monetary payments could be paid for loss of life, 
torture, disability, detention, exile, sexual violations, ill treatment, seizure of property, 
confiscation or destruction of property, dismissals and peace keeping victims who 
suffered as a result of non-delivery of “CIF items” for personnel of peace keeping 
operations (NRC, 2004 (7.4.3.3) pp. 175–176). 
 
The monetary compensations were to be awarded under the following conditions: 
i. A one-off payment  
ii. It should be available for those willing to access it 
iii. There is no cumulative compensation and so compensation will only be made 
for the severest violation or harm. This is for victims who fall under more than 
one category. However, those who suffered multiple violations under different 
regimes would in addition to being compensated for the severest harm, receive 
an additional two to three million Ghanaian Cedis. 
iv. Balancing the harm suffered and the ability to pay the proposed amount in 
consideration of the Ghanaian economy. 
v. Those who have already received compensation through other means are not 
eligible 
vi. Those who received partial compensation to receive a top-up. 
 
5.3.2 Reparation and Rehabilitation Fund 
 
Section 20 (2) (h) of the NRC Act 2002 recommended the setting up of a reparation and 
rehabilitation fund from which funds to run the reparation programme will be drawn. 
The commission endorsed the setting up of the reparations and rehabilitation fund and 
highlighted seven sources for generating revenue to build the fund. These include: 
i. Provision in the national budget towards paying reparation 
ii. Provision as part of the poverty alleviation 
iii. Percentage of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries funds (HIPC) towards 
reparations  
iv. Perpetrators' voluntary contribution 
v. Tax-deductible voluntary contributions from corporate bodies 
vi. Voluntary contributions from the public 
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vii. Proceeds from sale of the report and other memorabilia, for instance, national 
reconciliation stamps, coins and badges. 
 
The commission however does not elaborate on the frameworks or processes that are 
to be used to ensure that the recommended sources of income are made to work. 
 
5.4 Post-National Reconciliation Commission 
 
The NRC report was finalised and submitted to the government on October 12, 2004. 
It collected 4000 statements and held at least 2000 public hearings (Dovi, 2009; Perry 
& Sayndee, 2015). It also included testimonies from at least 80 perpetrators including 
former president Rawlings. 
 
The Ghana NRC did not direct specific recommendations to definite bodies or 
institutions to implement, rather, all the recommendations were generally directed at 
the government and left to the discretion of the government to decide which ministries 
or institutions should be responsible for each. The report does not also suggest a 
follow-up committee to monitor and evaluate the progress of the government during 
the implementation of the recommendations. 
 
The government thereby released a white paper in response to the recommendations 
of the NRC. In the following section, I highlight the reaction of the government on the 
issue of reparation for victims. 
 
5.4.1 The government white paper 
 
The Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, J. Ayikoi Otoo presented the government 
position regarding the findings and recommendations of the NRC in a government 
white paper on April, 2005 (Ghana Government, 2005). In a brief paragraph regarding 
the recommendation on reparation, the government agreed to the specific forms of 
reparation and the urgency expressed for implementing the recommendations on 
reparation.  
 
The government also accepted the proposal to set up a reparation and rehabilitation 
fund and expressed its commitment to establishing it within the year (2005) and 
support its work as a “healing tool for Ghana.” 
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It further made a commitment to avail the resources to the fund to enable it to carry 
out the implementation. It directed that the reparation and rehabilitation fund would 
be responsible for implementing the reparation programme.  
 
5.4.2 Follow up and implementation of the reparation recommendation 
 
After the end of the NRC and submission of the report, there has not been any detailed 
study into what has happened to the recommendations, specifically on reparation. A 
survey was carried out by  CDD-Ghana which was limited to the opinion of Ghanaians 
towards the NRC process including to the hearings, findings and the recommendations 
(Centre for Democratic Development-Ghana, 2006). Some of the studies have assessed 
the work of the NRC, including whether it has achieved aims such as reconciliation, 
democracy and rule of law  (Alidu et al., 2009; Robert Kwame Ameh, 2006a, 2006b; 
Attafuah, 2004; Odartey-Wellington & Alhassan, 2016; Valji, 2006) while others have 
focused on more specific aspects of the NRC such as gender issues (Gyimah, 2009) and 
the role of civil society (Alidu & Ame, 2013).  
 
Most of the literature on what happened to the reparations programme is from the 
media which provide brief highlights of what has taken place. An assessment of these 
reports shows the following. 
 
The total number of victims ranges from 2,000 (Dovi, 2009; IRIN, 2006) to 3.000 
(GhanaWeb, 2004; Perry & Sayndee, 2015). These are victims of human rights 
violations from 1957 up to 1992 although the majority of the victims claimed to have 
been abused during the Rawlings regime in the 1980s (GhanaWeb, 2004).   
 
According to the (GhanaWeb, 2006c), a member of the “NRC implementation Team” is 
reported to have pointed out that despite 4,000 petitioners to the NRC being registered, 
only 2,514 would be eligible for reparations with 2,117 receiving monetary 
compensation. A later article in 2007 however mentions a different figure of 2,177 
victims to benefit from the monetary compensation (GhanaWeb, 2007). The rest of the 
victims would either be reinstated or have their property returned  
 
The government in October 2006 released 13.3 billion cedis (GhanaWeb, 2006b) for 
the reparation programme although another source has stated it as 13.5 billion cedis 
or $1.5 million (GhanaWeb, 2006a; Kudzodzi, 2006). Payment commenced on 13th of 
the same month (GhanaWeb, 2006c). This amount was recommended by the 
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commission to cover the reparation programme based on the interviews, findings and 
the recommendations on reparation (Kudzodzi, 2006).  The money was released to the 
Ministry of Justice, the ministry responsible for implementing the recommendations of 
the NRC.  
 
According to  GhanaWeb (2006a), the process of identification of properties for de-
confiscation as recommended by the NRC under the property restitution 
recommendation was ongoing and in time the list and names of individuals and 
beneficiaries would be published. In a 2007 article, the Attorney General and Minister 
of Justice, Joe Ghartey, is reported to have expressed the practical and financial 
difficulties surrounding property returns. This was mainly as a result of third party 
ownerships and individuals who had genuinely acquired the confiscated property but 
also that the government had not budgeted for compensation of property owners in 
case they could not get back their property. Property returns was therefore deemed a 
sensitive issue which needed to be handled on a case by case basis (GhanaWeb, 2007). 
 
Claimant forms were published in the national newspaper including the names of the 
first 250 people to receive the reparations. This was meant to facilitate the payment 
process that was scheduled to end in December 2006 (IRIN, 2006). The payments 
began on 16 October 2006 (IRIN, 2006) and each claimant was paid between $217 to 
$3,300  (Dovi, 2009; IRIN, 2006).  
 
IRIN further highlighted the issue of managing victims’ expectations. Some victims 
expected to get the equivalent of what they lost or suffered at the existing bank rate 
which was not possible. Education and sensitisation was therefore a relevant topic 
identified by civil society during the reparations (IRIN, 2006). 
As discussed above, the available literature regarding the follow up and 
implementation of the NRC recommendations is mainly sourced from snippets in the 
media. A detailed study of what happened after is therefore a significant addition to the 
Ghana case. From the above, monetary compensations were paid out to eligible victims 
but the process or perceptions of the victims and other stakeholders is not captured. 
The focus is also only on the monetary, and to a lesser extent the difficulties in property 
restitution but is however silent on all the other forms of reparation recommended by 
the NRC. 
 
Conclusion 
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This chapter aimed to understand the background to the establishment of the truth 
commission mechanism in Ghana and how the commission defined reparation. It also 
analysed the response of the government and how the issue of post-truth commission 
is dealt with. It shows that the truth commission was considered a necessary 
endeavour for dealing with the past atrocities and attempting to facilitate national 
reconciliation. It also illustrates how interest in the commission lessens following the 
end of the proceedings. 
 
Ghana’s case highlights the expanding scope and flexibility of the truth telling 
mechanism in addressing past human crimes. It was established 10 years after the 
return to a constitutional government to deal with crimes that occurred over a 36 year 
period. The abuses were mainly committed by the state and state operatives and 
became institutionalised in the process.  
 
The truth commission in Ghana was also a domestic initiative wholly funded by the 
government. The Commissioners were all Ghanaians and after the NRC, the 
government financed the reparation programme. The case however brings to light a 
number of concerns facing truth commissions such as the role of politics in the process. 
The Ghanaian case became politicised and caused divisions along party lines. The 
newly elected NPP government was accused of using the NRC to gain votes as well as 
discredit the previous government. Despite the perception of the NRC being a partisan 
tool, it did not rule out the fact that there was need to address past human rights abuses 
in the country and foster national reconciliation.  
The truth commission operated over a two year period and produced a report 
containing its findings and recommendations, including a chapter on reparations. 
These comprised of symbolic, social service benefits, community reparations, 
restitution and monetary compensation. The total number of victims that petitioned to 
the commission was up to 4,000 individuals of whom at least half were eligible for 
monetary compensation. The rest of the victims were meant to benefit from the other 
forms. The government fully accepted the report and recommendations and two years 
after the submission of the report, released the money to start the monetary 
compensations. In contrast however, most of the other recommendations have 
stagnated.  
 
Ghana’s case reinforces the need for detailed and sustained studies into truth 
commission processes beyond the lifespan of the commission itself and the significance 
of a framework that can be used to study post-truth commission processes. For 
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instance, despite a fairly successful monetary compensation programme,4 there is very 
little information as to how this was carried out, the most accessible being through 
media reports. Other salient issues raised by Ghana’s case concerns the political 
undertones that impact on both the work and implementation programmes as well as 
civil society and local interest in the processes. 
 
  
                                                        
 
4 The usage of successful in the context refers to the fact that the money was paid out to the intended 
beneficiaries as per the recommendation of the NRC. 
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CHAPTER 6: SIERRA LEONE: LONG ROAD TO REPARATION 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
The 1991-2002 civil war in Sierra Leone captured international attention and received 
massive international input in resolving the conflict and during the transitional period. 
The truth commission was one of a number of mechanisms established to deal with the 
violations and promote reconciliation. It was packaged as a victim-centred effort to tell 
their stories and facilitate healing at individual, community and national levels. The 
commission reported extensively on the antecedents of the conflict and on the 
responsible parties in the violations. It further recommended reforms on a number of 
institutions as well as proposals on reparation and national reconciliation. This chapter 
examines the experience of Sierra Leone in linking truth commissions and the 
reparation programme. The discussion is divided into four parts: first it presents the 
background to the truth commission. Second, it discusses the set-up of the truth 
commission. In the third part, the framework for the recommendation on reparation 
and the follow up and implementation strategy is discussed. The fourth part presents 
the post-truth commission proceedings. 
 
6.1 The War: Context for a Truth Commission 
 
The 1991 - 2002 civil war has gone down in history as one of the bloodiest and most 
ruthless civil wars in Africa. It was both destructive and brutal (Reno, 2003), 
characterised by the use of child soldiers and horrendous abuses. The conflict was a 
period of massive suffering in which a large number of people lost their lives, families, 
body parts, property and livelihood (Hayner, 2007; Horovitz, 2006; Schabas, 2006).  
 
Although this period is the one most referred to, conflict, both intra and inter-state 
plagued Sierra Leone for much of the colonial and post-colonial era. After 
approximately 169 years of formal British colonial rule, Sierra Leone attained 
independence on April 27 1961.  This initially peaceful transition was short-lived as 
different political factions disagreed on how to move forward. This unrest displayed 
during the process of independence seemingly continued all through the political 
history of Sierra Leone which has been characterised by civil wars, coups and 
repression by the military and armed groups. The TRC report describes a complex 
history of slavery, immigration of freed slaves, colonialism and post-independence 
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squabbles which played a role in the making of Sierra Leone and the events that 
engulfed it (TRC, Sierra Leone, Vol II, 2004).  
 
This chapter however is limited to the period from 1991, the temporal scope specified 
in the TRC mandate and selects specific key events, particularly those pertinent in 
furthering the discussion on the implementation of victims’ reparation following the 
truth commission. I nonetheless concur with Ellis (2003) in his observation that it is 
futile to try to understand contemporary conflicts in the former colonial states in Africa 
without reflecting on the pre-cold war era, particularly the colonial and post-colonial 
struggles.  As such, reference will occasionally be made to the pre-1991 period. 
 
The “war of terror” (Dougherty, 2004) that raged for a decade bore the classic 
hallmarks of what (Kaldor, 2013) has referred to as “new wars.” She refers to these 
wars as those which typically “take place in areas where authoritarian states have been 
greatly weakened…the distinction between state and non-state, public and private, 
external and internal, economic and political, and even war and peace are breaking 
down” (p. 2). Furthermore, the nature of most of these conflicts is such that they 
migrate beyond state borders and are fluid in terms of targets, aggressors and 
ideologies. They are characterised by among others, deliberate attacks on civilian 
populations and massive destruction of infrastructure. The acts of violence are 
designed to kill, terrorise and destroy the basis of community life (Fletcher & 
Weinstein, 2002).   
 
The above reflection on the nature of contemporary war fare is especially useful in 
understanding the Sierra Leonean conflict. The TRC report asserts that this was a “self-
destructive” conflict largely “committed by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra Leoneans.” 
It targeted both individuals and groups aiming at dehumanising the victims (TRC, 
Sierra Leone, 2004, vol 2, p. 34). The report attributes responsibility to four main 
groups, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), AFRC, Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the 
Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Special Security Division (SSD), Guinean Armed Forces 
(GAF) and a number of unknown perpetrators are also reported to have committed a 
number of violations. In reality however, the distinction among the fighting forces was 
often blurry with fighters sometimes even collaborating. A fitting moniker to this 
soldier-rebel collaboration was coined. They were referred to as “sobels” or “soldiers 
by day, rebels by night” (Keen, 2005, p. 109; Reno, 2004). 
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By the end of the war, a significant number of the population had experienced loss in 
one form or another. “An estimated 50,000-75,000 people were dead, two million had 
been displaced, tens of thousands of women and girls had been raped or forced into 
sexual slavery, thousands of children had participated in the fighting, and some 4,000 
people had been the victims of purposeful amputation” (Dougherty, 2004). The most 
notable rebel groups were the RUF, led by Foday Sankoh and AFRC. The government 
backed CDF and SLA were also implicated in human rights violations. The war managed 
to divide families, neighbours and friends as the rebels engaged them in atrocious acts 
against one another.5  
 
In an effort to bring the war to an end, a series of peace agreements were drawn out 
between the government and different factions. These agreements were also vital for 
the course of events that took place during the transition to peace as discussed in the 
following section. 
 
6.1.1 Peace Agreements  
 
Negotiations for ceasefires and for peace in general featured prominently in the Sierra 
Leonean conflict. A number of peace agreements and accords were signed. The 1999 
Lomé agreement, which is more widely known was preceded and followed by a 
number of other agreements, notably, the Abidjan Accord (1996) and the Abuja I 
(2000) and II (2001) ( United States Institute of Peace, 2004). 
 
6.1.1.1 Abidjan Peace Agreement (1996) 
 
In 1995, international Alert, an NGO initiated peace talks between the government of 
Sierra Leone and RUF. This process was later taken over by the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU). The agreement, signed on November 30, 1996 was the first 
comprehensive agreement following nine months of negotiations (Hayner, 2007).  
 
Prior to the signing of this agreement, the RUF suffered defeat at the hands of Executive 
Outcomes (EO). This was a South African private security firm contracted by the 
National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) government of Sierra Leone to repel the 
RUF from Freetown area, secure government control of the diamond areas in Kono, 
                                                        
 
5 For detailed reports on the war, see Doyle (1999) BBC News Special report on Sierra Leone's civil war. 
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facilitate the country’s return to stability and retrain the army and Kamojor militia 
(Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, 2004, vol 3B, p. 68).6 Within ten 
days of their arrival, EO had driven the RUF out of Freetown and within a month, had 
cleared the diamond areas (Akinrinade, 2001). The presence of EO became a rallying 
point for the RUF during the negotiations who demanded for their withdrawal among 
other demands. The agreement thus stipulated that EO withdraws from the country 
within five weeks of signing the agreement. This withdrawal also applied to all 
mercenaries (Sierra Leone, 1996, article 12). 
 
A prominent feature of the 1996 Accord was amnesty in exchange for peace. Article 14 
ensured that “no official or judicial action is taken against any members of RUF/SL.” It 
further guaranteed the full restoration of the civil and political rights and protection of 
former RUF/SL combatants, exiles and other persons outside the country because of 
reasons related to armed conflict. The peace agreement also called for among others, 
the total and immediate end of hostilities and disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration of all combatants (article 5-8), transformation of RUF into a political 
party (article 13) as well as institutional and public services reforms. 
 
Article 3 called for the establishment of a commission for the consolidation of peace 
however its main role was limited to “supervising and monitoring the implementation 
and compliance of all the provisions contained in [the] peace agreement.” This body 
was also mandated to establish among others a citizens’ consultative conference, to be 
held once a year and a trust fund for the consolidation of peace. An optimistic 
interpretation of this article would be that they presented an awareness of the 
inclusion of the rest of the citizens especially in relation to the citizens’ consultative 
conference. However, in reality it offered extremely limited avenues for citizen 
participation, particularly victims of the conflict. 
 
On the whole, the issue of victims received very little attention and the agreement 
appeared to focus on the combatants and combatants’ concerns. Bangura (1997) in 
relation to the immunity clauses and the lack of reference to the atrocities committed 
against the non-combatants argues that considering that all forms of redress had been 
closed, it would only be fair to make an “effort to balance this provision [article 14] 
                                                        
 
6 See also Francis (1999) for a discussion on Executive Outcomes and other mercenary activities in Sierra 
Leone and on a general discussion on the privatisation of national security. 
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with the need for a truth commission which will not seek to punish RUF…but which 
will mandate RUF and other actors to explain to the public the atrocities they have 
committed while prosecuting the war” (p. 76). 
 
The RUF never complied with the terms of the agreement. Reno (2003) speculates that 
the RUF used the peace deal as a delaying tactic to recoup and regain their military 
strength. Akinrinade (2001) on the other hand hypothesises that the amnesty deals 
provoked further abuses since it made the rebels presume they could always negotiate 
another amnesty. According to the TRC, former president kabbah refers to the signing 
of the Abidjan Accord as a deception on the part of the RUF and a tactic to reduce 
international pressure on RUF and create space to regroup (TRC, Sierra Leone, 2004b, 
vol 3B, p. 71). In the end, the accord was not implemented and fighting resumed within 
two months of signing (Gberie, 2000). 
 
6.1.1.2 Conakry Peace Plan (1997) 
 
According to Mustapha & Bangura (2010), disarray within the RUF followed the signing 
of the Abidjan Accord. The RUF split into two groups, pro and against Foday Sankoh. 
The Splinter group accused the leader, Foday Sankoh of attempting to foil the 
agreement and therefore disassociated themselves from him. In the midst of the chaos, 
Johnny Paul Koroma initiated a violent coup that led to the overthrow of President 
Tejan Kabbah in May 1997 and formed a coalition government with members of RUF 
called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.  
 
The violence and abuses during this period prompted the ECOWAS to initiate peace 
proceedings. Mustapha & Bangura (2010) hypothesise that the RUF/AFRC coalition 
was met with opposition by Sierra Leoneans which prompted them to sign the six 
months peace plan to assuage opposition to their regime. 
 
This agreement was unique in that it was signed between AFRC and the ECOWAS 
committee of five on Sierra Leone rather than the deposed government. The Committee 
of Five consisted of Nigerian and Guinean Foreign ministers and Representative of the 
OAU and UN (Sierra Leone, 1997). 
 
Like the previous agreement, this accord paid scant attention to the victims but rather 
focused on appeasing the combatants. It further called for an immediate cessation of 
hostilities and the reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Tejan 
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Kabbah within a period of six months. It also specified power-sharing arrangements as 
well as a DDR programme and amnesty for the participants of the 25 May 1997 coup. 
 
Akinrinade (2001) and Mustapha & Bangura (2010) point out that the AFRC/RUF 
continued to flaunt the terms of this peace plan, particularly the plans to quit power 
peacefully and reinstate the rightly elected but ousted leader Kabbah. 
 
This peace plan suffered the same fate as the previous one. The ECOMOG forces 
forcefully ejected the military junta and carried out mob killings of perceived 
supporters. The reinstated government further instigated military trials and executed 
twenty four soldiers found guilty while at the same time disbanding the army. 
 
The end of this peace plan was another missed opportunity for addressing victims’ 
needs. Rather, the military government, reinstated government, ECOMOG and the Civil 
Defense Forces continued to use the civilians as pawns, launching indiscriminate and 
wanton attacks against them. 
 
6.1.1.3 Lomé Peace Accord (1999) 
 
Against the background of failed peace talks, continued violence and the absence of 
immediate military solution, the government of President Kabbah faced pressure from 
Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Mali who were contributing to the ECOMOG operations to 
negotiate a solution with the rebels. The pressure also mounted from the international 
community and civil society organisations. A unique feature about the Lomé talks was 
the robust civil society participation and input (Hayner, 2007; Rashid, 2000). The 
agreement was signed on 7 July 1999. 
 
In comparison with the previous two agreements, in both the content and 
participation, the Lomé peace agreement reflected an attempt to approach the 
negotiations from a broader perspective (Sierra Leone, 1999). The delegates to the 
proceeding were grouped into three committees; military and security committee, 
humanitarian and human rights committee and socio-economic issues and political 
concerns committee. The agreement addressed seven broad areas. These included 
ceasefire, power sharing, reconciliation, the constitution, military issues, human rights 
issues and implementation frameworks of the agreement (Rashid, 2000, pp. 34–35). 
For this discussion however, I have identified three major components which I argue 
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play into the processes that have impacted on the later reparation for victims efforts. 
These are the amnesty provisions, TRC provisions and the war victims’ provisions. 
 
6.1.1.3.1 The Amnesty provisions in the Lomé agreement 
 
Article IX of the Lomé agreement called for blanket pardon and amnesty with the aim 
of bringing “lasting peace to Sierra Leone.” These clauses authorised the government 
to “take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free 
pardon” (article IX(1). “Absolute and free pardon and reprieve” would also be granted 
to all “combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of 
their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement” (article IX(2). 
In article IX (3), the government is tasked to “ensure that no official or judicial action 
is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of 
anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those 
organisations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of the present 
Agreement.” It further provides for legislative and other measures necessary to 
guarantee immunity “to former combatants, exiles and other persons, currently 
outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict.”  
 
In reaction to these sweeping amnesty clauses, the special representative to the UN 
attached a disclaimer on the UN’s interpretation of the clauses stating that “article IX 
of the agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law” 
(United Nations Security Council, 1999). 
 
The amnesty clauses were also a rallying ground for human rights groups outraged at 
what they viewed as the government making deals with the rebels which appeared to 
reward the rebels (Doyle, 2000). Kalyvas (2001, p. 101) argues that these groups 
opposed to the amnesty “believed that the rebels were violent criminals and not 
political revolutionaries and that it was therefore immoral to grant them amnesty and 
invite them to participate in the new government.” Some groups however stressed that 
anything was preferable to continued war and bloodshed especially in the face of no 
other options presenting themselves (Akinrinade, 2001; Doyle, 2000). 
 
The Amnesty provisions placed the government between a rock and a hard place. 
According to Hayner (2007), this seemed like the only logical solution given the 
military weakness of the government and the real fear of continued fighting when 
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presented with threat of possible future prosecutions for the combatants. The rebels 
needed to be “attracted to the negotiation table” at all costs (p. 12). 7 
 
A related clause that did not attract as much attention relates to prisoners of war. 
Article XXI states that “all political prisoners of war as well as all non-combatants shall 
be released immediately and unconditionally by both parties.” This applied to all sides 
of the conflict. There is not much discussion relating to this however it is possible to 
assume that a number of the prisoners of war were party to the commitment of 
atrocities against civilian populations given the clashes between government and rebel 
groups. On the other hand, they could be victims of illegal detentions, and if this is the 
case, the agreement remains silent on any mechanisms for redress. 
 
A reflection on the amnesty clauses portrays the tough choices actors make in attempts 
to resolve conflicts and the compromises and concessions that get made. Often the 
focus is on the volatile groups which pose a real threat to stability. As shown by the 
Sierra Leonean case, the victims are expected to remain contented with the immediate 
cessation of hostilities which is an immediate real need as shown by several authors 
who pointed out that many Sierra Leoneans expressed the view to just give the rebels 
what they want as long as they stop the war and killing them (O’Flaherty, 2004, 2005).  
 
As such, demands for redress tended not to be a priority because there was a possibility 
that they could destabilise the peace making process. A departure from the previous 
agreements, as elaborated in the next discussion is the inclusion of victims’ needs, 
specifically, the need to know the truth. 
 
6.1.1.3.2 The Truth and Reconciliation provisions in the Lomé agreement 
 
A truth and reconciliation commission was one of the structures suggested for 
facilitating national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace in the Lomé peace 
agreement. 
 
Article XXVI(1) called for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission 
to “address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims 
and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of the 
                                                        
 
7 see also O’Flaherty (2004, 2005) 
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past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.” The agreement restricts 
the time frame to human rights violations from 1991 to the signing of the agreement. 
 
In reference to the functions of the commission, the agreement calls on the commission 
to “among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of the 
victims of human rights violations (Article XXVI (2)). 
 
In terms of the composition, the agreement recommends for the members to be drawn 
from a “cross section of Sierra Leonean society with the participation and some 
technical support of the international community.” In the same article, it recommends 
that this commission should be established within ninety days of the signing of the 
agreement and within twelve months submit the report to the government (Article 
XXVI (3)). 
 
Even with the explicit time frames for the establishment and report submission, it is 
only until February 2000, roughly seven months later that the TRC Act was passed. It 
took another two years for the commission members to be appointed and for the actual 
work of the commission to start, in 2002. 
 
Among other scholars, (Hayner (2007) argues that this delay was a result of continued 
conflict after the signing of the agreement and the fact that pursuing the quest for truth 
was potentially dangerous in the context of the fragile peace process. The combatants 
continued to violate the ceasefire and did not comply with the DDR provisions. 
However, following two new agreements, the Abuja agreement in November 2000 on 
a recommitment to the Lomé agreement and detailing a new ceasefire (Sierra Leone, 
2000a) and May 2001 joint committee agreement (Sierra Leone, 2001) which 
reinforced the commitment to peace and kick started the DDR process, attention could 
finally be turned to the TRC. 
 
In retrospect, this delay of what was considered non-volatile aspects such as the 
pursuit of truth continued to characterise government response and commitment to 
victims and their demands. 
 
6.1.1.3.3 War victims’ provisions in the Lomé agreement 
 
In relation to the truth seeking clauses, and again in contrast to the previous two peace 
agreements, the Lomé agreement specifically makes reference to victims of the war. 
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The Abidjan agreement (1996) briefly refers to war victims for special attention in the 
pursuit of post conflict reconstruction in article 22 which states that  
“In the pursuit of the reconstruction, rehabilitation and socio-economic 
development of Sierra Leone as a matter of the utmost priority, special 
attention shall be given to rural and urban poor areas, war victims, 
disabled persons and other vulnerable groups. The Government in 
conjunction with the Committee for Demobilization and Resettlement 
shall cooperate with all political parties and movements, including the 
RUF/SL, to raise resources internationally for these objectives during the 
initial phase of the consolidation of peace” (Sierra Leone, 1996).  
 
The Lomé agreement however delves much deeper into the issue of victims and dealing 
with victims needs in the post-conflict phase. In article VI, the agreement calls for a 
commission for the consolidation of peace to be established within two weeks of the 
signing of the agreement. The duty of this commission, among others was to implement 
a post-conflict programme that includes victims of the war. It is worth noting that in 
the nine structures proposed for facilitating national reconciliation and consolidation 
of peace, only one directly relates to victims, which is structure nine on the truth and 
reconciliation commission, discussed in the preceding section. 
 
Article XXVIII (2) also points out that women have been particularly victimised during 
the war and as such calls for special attention to their needs and potentials in 
formulating and implementing a national rehabilitation, reconstruction and 
development programmes. The plight of women was further drawn attention to in the 
TRC proceedings and as discussed further on, women victims were also identified for 
specific reparation benefits. 
 
A further brief reference to war victims is included in article XXIX where it calls on the 
“government, with the support of the international community [to] design and 
implement a programme for the rehabilitation of war victims. For this purpose, a 
special fund shall be set up.” There however is not any further elaboration on this 
clause which raises speculation on where and how the funds will be drawn as well as 
questions of commitment towards availing resources for the fund.  
 
This vagueness and ambiguity characterising the special fund and the agreement in 
general is picked on by Melrose (2009) who is critical on the impact of this clause. 
According to him, it lacked specific objectives, purpose and source of funding. He 
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further points out the unwillingness of Sierra Leone to provide token resources 
towards the fund and other reforms. 
 
Despite the progressive framing and approach to the Lomé agreement, it faced similar 
setbacks in terms of compliance to the clauses and implementation. According to 
Hayner (2007), there was slow implementation and a near collapse of the 1999 accord. 
The RUF did not commit to the agreement and violated several clauses, most 
specifically on the ceasefire. They resisted disarmament and took UN soldiers hostage 
in 2000. However, rapid international intervention, including the deployment of one 
thousand British troops and the strengthening of the UN forces prevented a complete 
breakdown (Bangura, 1999; Kabba, 2013). 
 
The significance of these peace agreements with respect to this research is that it 
portrays how victims and reparation of victims did not appear to be a priority in the 
peace making process. All parties were particularly focused on bringing the war to an 
end and using whatever it took to achieve that end. Clearly, the rebels maintained a 
formidable threat. By the time of signing of the Lomé agreement, they had taken over 
and controlled at least two thirds of the country. They therefore had a strong 
bargaining chip to bring to the negotiating table. The victims on the other had obviously 
posed no threat, more so, any demands on redress could have been misinterpreted 
hence jeopardising the peace process. 
 
In the earlier peace negotiations, there are no reports of victims’ demands or victim 
oriented organisations advocating for the consideration of victims. However, with the 
Lomé negotiations, there was a visible presence of civil society both local and 
international. These opposed the blanket amnesty provisions but they also advocated 
for the inclusion of victims in the negotiations resulting in the truth seeking and special 
fund for war victims’ provisions. 
 
6.2 Frame work for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The TRC Act 
 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 (Sierra Leone, 2000b) was enacted 
to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The Act is made of five 
parts; part 1 deals with the definitional issues. Part 2 details the framework for the 
establishment of the commission highlighting the composition and structure. In part 3, 
the Act clarifies the object for the establishment, functions and the reach of the 
commission. Part 4 discusses the administrative set-up and part 5 deals with the steps 
158 
to be taken after the end of the commission’s operations. In this section, I restrict my 
discussion to the sections that deal with reparation and on the follow up and 
implementation structures. 
 
According to Hayner (2011, pp. 75–77), the TRC Act is a critical instrument as it defines 
the powers and reach of a commission. She points out that these ‘terms of reference’ 
can impact on the functioning of TRCs. They can either be restrictive and limiting for 
instance to particular crimes, victims, perpetrators or events, or they can be broad and 
flexible. A broad and flexible mandate can create an opportunity for the commissioners 
to define the scope of their investigations whereas a stricter term of reference may 
limit the range of investigation and purpose of the commission. 
 
The SLTRC Act can be considered to have adopted a relatively broad and flexible 
approach to defining the mandate of the commission. It resulted from the Lomé 
agreement which specified the mandate under section XXVI. According to the TRC Act 
2000 in article 6(1), the object of which the TRC was established was to: 
“Create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human 
rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict 
in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing 
of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity; to respond to the 
needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation, and to 
prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.” 
 
In order to respond to these tasks, the functions of the TRC under article 6(2) were 
defined as: Investigative – research on the causes, nature and extent of the violations 
and abuses; Reporting – provide an account on the violations; and Reconciliatory - 
enable a conducive climate to promote reconciliation by providing an opportunity for 
both victims and perpetrators to share their experiences and engage in constructive 
interchange. 
 
6.2.1 Reparation in the TRC Act 
 
At no point does the Act refer specifically to reparation using the term ‘reparation,’ 
rather, it makes use of phrases that could be inferred to as reparation such as 
‘responding to needs,’ ‘restoring human dignity’ and promoting reconciliation. In 
defining the object of the commission, it calls on the commission to ‘[respond] to the 
needs of victims (article 6(1)). In line with this, it directs the commission in article 
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15(2), to make recommendations needed to achieve the object of the commission as 
stated in article 6(1). Similarly, article 6(2)(b) calls on it ‘to work to help restore the 
human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation.’ In the same article, it however 
specifies that the means of achieving this is by providing space for narratives of both 
victims and perpetrators and “creating a climate which fosters constructive 
interchange between victims and perpetrators.” Although establishing the truth may 
be considered reparation from the broad perspective, this was not particularly 
significant to the specific reparation recommended by the commission although they 
similarly argue for the restoration of dignity and reconciliation as the impetus for the 
specific reparation. 
 
A more concrete reference to reparation is made in article 7(6) which stipulates that 
‘the commission may provide information or recommendations to or regarding the 
special fund for war victims provided for in article XXIX of the Lomé peace agreement 
or otherwise assist the fund in any manner the commission considers appropriate.’  It 
however further emphasises in Article 7(6) that the commission does not have any 
responsibility towards the said special fund as it “shall not exercise any control over 
the operations or disbursements of that fund.”   
 
As noted with the Lomé agreement, this cursory reference to the fund with no 
definition or elaboration on its role, reach or even specific beneficiaries can be alluded 
as an oversight on the drafters. The fund could have potentially been a rich resource 
for kick-starting and sustaining the reparation packages. In contrast to the South 
African commission which played a significant role in disbursing interim measures, 
this act takes away such a responsibility. Whereas this was a pragmatic move in trying 
to get the commission not getting bogged down by payments, it also played against 
them. The act of not disbursing material or monetary benefits reinforced resentment 
towards the commission from some sections of the population. As presented by a 
number of authors, victims often attached their participation in the commission to the 
expectation of immediate benefits or refunds (Kelsall, 2005; Millar, 2010, 2011, Shaw, 
2005, 2007). 
 
6.2.2 Follow-up and implementation framework in the TRC Act 
 
Hayner (2011) highlights a critical challenge facing truth commissions, that is,   the 
weak implementation record of its recommendations. In her discussion, she points out 
that even truth commissions which have presented relatively strong recommendations 
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have faced a laxity in implementation. The TRC Act briefly touches upon the post TRC 
period but does not provide a comprehensive approach into the follow up and 
implementation process.  
 
The Act in article 19 calls on the president to dissolve the commission within three 
months of the submission of the report to the president.  It is clear from this article that 
the commission ceases to exist and there are no additional roles and functions for the 
commissioners or staff of the commission. In addition to this, there is also prospect of 
the commission transitioning into an implementation or enforcement mechanism. 
Despite this finality to the functions of the commission, the Act however attempts to 
address the issue of continuity as elaborated below. 
 
Under article 15 (1, 2), the commission was tasked with submitting a report of its work 
to the president at the end of its operations. The report includes a summary of the 
findings and recommendations. Copies or summaries of the report are also to be made 
available to the wider audience and public by the commission while the president 
facilitates the submission of a copy to the UN Secretary General and parliament. 
 
In article l7, the act calls on the government to “faithfully and timeously implement the 
recommendations of the report that are directed at state bodies and encourage or 
facilitate the implementation of any recommendations that may be directed at others.” 
Besides the ‘faithfully and timeously’ there is no further definitions or more specific 
time frame of what it means and contains. As such, this leaves it open to varied 
interpretations. 
 
Article 18 tasked the government with establishing a follow up committee upon the 
publication of the report to monitor the implementation of the recommendations and 
to facilitate their implementation. The follow up committee is to be comprised of the 
moral guarantors of the Lomé peace agreement. The government is mandated to 
provide quarterly reports to the follow-up committee in which it summaries the steps 
taken towards implementation of the recommendations and the follow up committee 
in turn publishes the reports and reports to the public quarterly its evaluation of the 
government efforts. 
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6.2.3 The Truth Commission 
 
Following an elaborate process of nominations, public campaigns and community 
involvement, Bishop Joseph Christian Humper was selected the Chairman of the 
Commission. On November 2002, the TRC finally began its operations. It comprised of 
seven members, four of whom were citizens of Sierra Leone and three were non-
citizens. 
 
The commission identifies its objective as  
“to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of 
human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed 
conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the 
signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to 
the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to 
prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered” (TRC, Sierra 
Leone, 2004a, p. 10).  
 
By the time the commission concluded its hearings, it had collected between 7,000 
(Conibere et al., 2004) and 9,000 (Hayner, 2007) testimonies from Sierra Leoneans, 
living in Sierra Leone and also as refugees in Gambia, Guinea and Nigeria and from both 
victims and perpetrators. The commission sought to appear as broad based as possible 
by attempting to engage in all the districts in the country. In the end however, nine out 
of the one hundred and forty nine districts were left out due to security and 
accessibility concerns (Conibere et al., 2004, Hayner, 2007). 
 
 The final report was submitted to the President on October 5, 2004 as stipulated in the 
TRC Act 2000, Section 15(1) and presented to the UN Security Council on October 27, 
2004 (TRC Act 2000 Section 16(2). 
 
6.3 Recommendations of the Commission on reparation 
 
According to the TRC Act 2000 in article 15(2), the TRC was required to “make 
recommendations concerning reforms and other measures, whether legal, political, 
administrative or otherwise, needed to achieve the object of the commission.” The aims 
of the recommendation are two-fold; to address the underlying causes of the conflict 
and ‘remedying particular wrongs committed against specific groups’ (TRC, Sierra 
Leone, 2004b, p. 121). The first aim is in line with the finding which identified 
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structural and institutional shortcomings as some of the central causes of the war. 
These included corruption, overwhelming control of the executive, colonialism effects, 
subverting traditional systems, abuse of death penalty and misuse of emergency 
powers against dissidents (TRC, Sierra Leone, Vol II, 2004, pp. 25-109).  
 
Salient among the findings was that certain groups found themselves persistently 
targeted and were highly vulnerable, an example being women and children. Some of 
the violations also impacted more heavily upon the physical and psychological abilities 
and capabilities of the victims.  
 
In terms of expected deliverables, the report divided the recommendations into three 
categories: ‘imperative’, ‘work towards’ and ‘seriously consider’.  
 
The ‘imperative’ recommendations are those that ‘ought to be implemented 
immediately or as soon as possible ... [they] fall strictly within the peremptory 
obligation as stated in the Act. The government is required to implement these 
recommendations “faithfully and timeously.”’ The ‘imperative’ recommendations are 
those that ‘establish and uphold rights and values’ and the commission tasks the 
follow-up committee to monitor their implementation closely and regularly (TRC, 
Sierra Leone, Vol II, 2004, p.119). 
 
The ‘work towards’ recommendations are categories where ‘the government is 
expected to put in place the building blocks to make the ultimate fulfilment of the 
recommendation.’ Unlike the ‘imperative’ recommendations, these have a less 
stringent time frame for implementation; however, they are required to be 
implemented within a ‘reasonable time period.’ Here, the role of the follow-up 
committee is to maintain an on-going monitoring of the government’s performance 
(TRC, Sierra Leone, Vol II, 2004, p. 121). 
 
The ‘seriously consider’ recommendations category comprise of those that the 
government does not have an obligation to implement. It is however expected to 
thoroughly evaluate these recommendations. The follow-up committee is required to 
provide occasional monitoring and there is no specific time frame within which to 
implement these. 
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The following section details the content of two elements; the recommendations for 
victims’ reparation and the recommendations for follow-up and implementation 
frameworks. 
 
6.3.1 Victims Reparation  
 
The issue of reparations is extensively covered by the commission in its report. Chapter 
four of the TRC report, volume Two has especially been dedicated to address the 
question of reparation. According to the report, the TRC Act (2000) does not explicitly 
use the term ‘reparations’. It instead refers to addressing the needs of the victims, 
restoring the human dignity of the victims and promote healing and reconciliation 
(TRC, Sierra Leone, Vol II, 2004, p. 227). The commissioners however interpreted 
‘addressing needs of the victims’ and ‘restoring the human dignity’ broadly to include 
measures aimed at repairing and restoring the harm that had been inflicted upon the 
victims. 
 
The TRC further acknowledged that reparations are necessary to enable some 
individuals to move beyond the position they find themselves in as a result of the war. 
It is not enough to attempt forgiveness and reconciliation when the conditions are not 
conducive to break the cycle of suffering. The consequences of war and victimisation 
such as humiliation, dependency and social exclusion often lead to re-victimisation of 
the victims thereby creating conditions under which thoughts of revenge fester and 
grow (TRC, Sierra Leone, Vol I, 2004, p. 84).  
 
6.3.2 Framework for victims’ reparation 
 
The TRC draws its directive to recommend reparation from article XXVI of Lomé peace 
agreement which directs the commission to “among other things recommend 
measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations.” In 
article XXIX it further calls for the design and implementation of a programme for the 
rehabilitation of war victims for which a special fund for war victims would be set up.  
 
These two articles are further picked up by the TRC Act of 2000. Article 6(2)(b) directs 
the commission to help restore the human dignity of victims and promote 
reconciliation. Under article 7(6), the commission is directed to make 
recommendations for the special fund for victims provided for by the Lomé agreement.  
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The commission is further directed to make recommendations concerning the reforms 
and other measures, legal, administrative or otherwise needed to achieve the object of 
the commission, including those that respond to the needs of the victims and promote 
healing and reconciliation (article 15(2). 
 
It is important to note that the issue of reparations in the report are categorised under 
the ‘work towards’ recommendations. In retrospect it would be useful to consider this 
framing of the reparation recommendation against the enthusiasm placed on their 
implementation.  
 
6.3.2.1 Categories of Victims  
 
The report distinguishes between three broad categories of victims as shown in figure 
1 below; the general population, direct victims eligible for the specific reparation and 
indirect victims, some of whom are also eligible for reparation. 
 
Figure 1: Break down of the victims by The Commission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Adapted from Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone, Vol II, (2004, pp. 242-261) 
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are therefore all victims. It however also recognised that it would not be feasible to try 
and make individual payments to every individual who is considered a victim. To 
counteract this, it adopted a two-pronged strategy: prioritising beneficiaries and a 
reparation strategy based on the provision of social service packages. 
 
6.3.2.2 Beneficiary prioritisation 
 
The commission made a selection of the most vulnerable victims as beneficiaries of the 
reparation programme. These are “victims who were particularly vulnerable because 
of the human rights violations they had suffered and the harm that they continued to 
live with” (TRC, Sierra Leone, 2004b, p. 229). Most vulnerable victims were also to be 
determined by the current needs of the victims in order to determine what benefits to 
accord them. 
 
It further proposed that the reparation programme for the most vulnerable victims 
should focus on rehabilitation of the victims and symbolic measures (exhumations, 
proper burials, laying of tombstones, national memorial services, pouring of libations, 
carrying out of traditional ceremonies and the erection of appropriate memorials  
(TRC, Sierra Leone, 2004b, p. 229).  
 
Under this most vulnerable victims group, the commission distinguished between the 
direct victims and indirect victims. The most vulnerable victims included; the 
amputees, other war wounded,8  victims of sexual violence, children and war widows. 
The direct victims are those upon which the actual harm was inflicted while the indirect 
victims comprise of their dependents.  
 
The report emphasises that reparations are intended to deal with victims needs and 
include interventions in the following areas: health, pensions, education, skills training 
and micro-credit, community reparations and symbolic reparations. 
 
 
                                                        
 
8 ‘Other war wounded’ are victims who have become temporarily or permanently physically disabled, either 
totally or partially as a consequence of abuse other than amputation.  For example, ‘victims who have received 
lacerations, lost body parts other than limbs (fingers, ears, lips and toes), gunshot wounds, bullets or shell 
fragmentation ... totally or partially disabled as a consequence of a human rights violation,’ (TRC, Sierra Leone, 
vol II, 2004, p. 194). 
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6.3.2.3 Provision of social service packages 
 
Rather than focusing on individual reparation payments, the commission selected to 
concentrate on the provision of social service packages based on three arguments. 
 
First, social service packages were the most favoured choice by victims during the 
testimonies. They requested for assistance or redress in the form of social services 
rather than individual cash payments  (TRC, Sierra Leone, vol II, 2004, p. 235, 245). 
  
Second, in consideration of the available resources, it was perceived that individual 
payments would go beyond the means of the state to implement due to other 
demanding needs in the post war recovery effort. It argued that “any amount awarded 
as an individual reparations payment would probably only serve the immediate needs 
of the victim. Any recommendation enshrined in a service package offered more 
opportunity for sustainable assistance than one time cash payments” (TRC, Sierra 
Leone, vol II, 2004, p. 245).  
 
Third, the prevailing conditions of poverty would make individual cash payments lead 
to strife and division rather than a sense of social solidarity as is the intention of 
reparations programmes. 
 
To be eligible for the reparation benefits, the individuals have to prove that they 
suffered the harm as a direct consequence of the war between 23 March, 1991 and 1 
March, 2002. Both citizens and non-citizens were deemed eligible for reparations if 
they fulfilled the eligibility criteria. 
 
The TRC additionally differentiated between the elements which would bring about 
reparative effects and those that were direct benefits for specific categories it identified 
as most vulnerable. The recommendations within the framework of institutional 
reforms, national reconciliation and aspects of symbolic reparations would target the 
wider range of victims while specific reparations which were more narrowly defined 
were aimed at addressing the direct harms certain individuals faced and continue to 
live with. The following section analyses the specific measures of the reparations 
programme. 
 
 
 
 
 167 
6.3.3  Break-down of the recommendations on Reparation 
 
The commission made recommendations for specific reparation measures in the 
following areas as highlighted in the table 1: health care; education; pensions; skills 
training and micro-credit/projects; community and symbolic reparations. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Sierra Leone TRC’s Recommendation for Reparation 
 
Area Target Type of reparation Line Ministry 
Health Amputees Free physical health care 
Free prosthetic and orthotic 
devices 
Free rehabilitation services 
Training (prosthetic devices) 
Free physiotherapy and 
occupational therapy 
Training of technicians  
Ministry of Health 
and Sanitation 
Wives/husbands 
of amputees  
Free primary health care 
Children Free primary health care 
Other war 
wounded 
Medical support  
Wives/husbands  Free primary health care 
Children Free Primary health care 
Adult and child 
victims of sexual 
violence  
Free physical health care  
Fistula surgery and gyn. health 
HIV/AIDS testing and treatment 
 scar removal 
Pensions 
 
adult amputees Monthly payments (cash 
payments to eligible 
beneficiaries (amputees, 50% 
reduced earning capacity and 
adult victims of sexual 
violence) 
Ministry of 
Finance war wounded  
sexual violence 
Education All children Free education at basic level Ministry of 
education, science 
and technology 
Specific 
(Children of 
direct victims or 
children victims) 
Free secondary level education 
Scholarship to tertiary schools  
Skills 
training 
&Micro-
credit/micro-
projects 
All Skills training and micro credits 
(skills training and business 
management programmes, 
micro credit) 
Ministry of 
Labour and 
NaCSA 
Community 
reparations 
General 
community 
Infrastructure development 
(reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of areas that 
suffered the most destruction) 
Ministry of 
economic and 
development 
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planning and 
ministry of lands 
Symbolic General 
community and 
specific 
beneficiaries 
Acknowledgement, memorials, 
apologies, commemoration 
ceremonies and dates 
Dissemination of the reparations 
programme on large scale 
translated into local languages 
Identification of Mass graves 
and reburials 
Monuments and 
Relics 
commission 
 
Summarised from TRC, Sierra Leone, Vol II, 2004, pp. 251-265 
 
As shown in table 1, the recommendations on reparation are spread out in seven 
different areas: Health care, pensions, education, skills training and micro-
credit/micro-projects, community reparations, symbolic benefits and individual 
benefits. These programmes were directed at the five categories deemed as the most 
vulnerable groups comprising of amputees, other war wounded, children, women 
victims of sexual violence and war widows. Below is a summary of the 
recommendations contained in the report (TRC, Sierra Leone, vol. 2, 2004, pp. 252–
270). 
 
6.3.3.1 Health care 
 
According to the commission, the effect of the war on the health system, among others 
was its effect on the physical and mental health of the people, disruptions in terms of 
damage to facilities, loss of personnel and other resources. The biggest burden for most 
Sierra Leoneans is accessibility of health services due to the high costs. The health care 
programme is therefore designed around removing the prohibitive costs, 
strengthening the services and availing accessibility. The health care support proposed 
included the provision of physical and mental health care, including trauma counselling 
for eligible victims. Thus four basic short term plans were identified:  
i. Identify medical centres with expertise in the needs of a particular condition 
ii. Provide transportation  
iii. Prioritise basing on most vulnerable identified by the commission 
iv. Recruitment of temporary internationally trained physicians   
 
Amputees 
First, the commission recommended a lifetime access to free physical health care, 
including surgeries. This service is extended to immediate family members such as 
wives and children under the age of 18 years. The facilities should be accessible at all 
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levels, that is, primary, district and tertiary units although the Connaught hospital in 
Freetown would be the coordinating centre for all of the amputees. It also calls for 
raising awareness about the centres where health care is available for the amputees 
and providing the necessary transportation. 
 
Second, the amputees would also be provided with free prosthetic and orthotic devices. 
The government is to act as a coordinating agent to facilitate access, assist 
organisations that train the technicians and offer incentives to retain trained 
technicians. 
 
Third, the amputees to be provided free rehabilitation, physiotherapy and occupational 
therapy services as well as training on the use, repair and maintenance of the 
prosthetics. This would include the government providing assistance to the existing 
rehabilitation centres including those established by NGOs, establishing rehabilitation 
centres in every district and supporting Community –based rehabilitation activities. 
 
Other war wounded 
The commission recommended the provision of free primary, secondary and tertiary 
health care, including rehabilitation and physiotherapy services to eligible individuals 
depending on their level of injury or disability. This is extended to children under 18 
who fit in the other war wounded category unless their level of injury requires lifetime 
treatment. 
 
Additionally, for the victims who experience a 50% reduction in their earning capacity 
as a result of the injuries, the services of free physical health care is also to be provided 
to the wives and children under 18 years of age. 
 
Victims of sexual violence 
For both the adult and children victims of sexual violence, the commission 
recommended free primary, secondary and tertiary health care depending on the 
degree of their injury. The child victims are entitled to the medical care until the age of 
18 years unless their injury necessitates the continuation of medical intervention. 
 
This benefit is also extended to the direct beneficiaries, that is, children under the age 
of 18 and wives of male victims of sexual violence. It is however silent on the husbands 
of the female victims of sexual violence. 
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The commission further recommended more specific interventions for this group in 
two areas. The first is in the treatment of fistulas. This includes free fistula surgery, 
government assistance to organisations rendering services to the Princess Christian 
Maternity Hospital (PCMH) in Freetown where fistula surgery is performed, provisions 
for the employment and retention of qualified international surgeons, assistance 
towards the setting up of a fistula repair and training centre in Freetown. The second 
is in the Provision of HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI) interventions. 
These include free HIV/AIDS and STI testing services, assist organisations that provide 
HIV/AIDS counselling training, increase the number of counsellors, free medical 
treatment for victims and their family members who test positive, assistance to 
medical facilities that provide such services, provide incentives to attract medical 
personnel specialised in HIV/AIDS and STI treatment and train national physicians. 
 
Children 
The commission recommended that in addition to the other medical services, the 
government assists organisations providing scar removal surgery and facilitate the 
provision of this service to the children who might require it, including inviting 
international surgeons and medical staff. 
 
The proposals in health care included direct benefits to the victims, improvements to 
the health system and facilities to either create or improve accessibility to the proposed 
care and assist existing organisations and facilities already providing similar services 
in extending their services to the eligible victims.  
 
6.3.3.2 Pensions 
 
For all eligible adult amputees, victims of sexual violence and other war wounded who 
suffer 50% or more reduction in earning capacity, the commission recommended a 
monthly payment to be determined by the implementing body. The commission 
however recommended that it reflects the prevailing standard of living and amount of 
money already being paid to the ex-combatants. As such, the amount should not be 
lower than 60,000 Sierra Leonean Leones per month. The exact amount is to be linked 
to the earning capacity loss and be adjusted for inflation. 
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6.3.3.3 Education 
 
As with the health care facilities, the education services suffered during the conflict 
through the destruction of schools and loss of personnel. Despite the services geared 
towards improving education by both government and international organisations and 
initiatives to assist children affected by the war, accessibility to education still 
remained a challenge.  
 
The commission therefore recommended for free education until senior secondary 
school level to eligible children, assist and expand existing programmes facilitating the 
education of children who are victims, assist teacher training programmes, provide 
incentives to attract and retain teachers to remote areas and prioritise the education 
of all permanently disabled and sexual violence victims, both children and adults. 
 
6.3.3.4 Skills training and Micro credit/micro-projects 
 
The basis for the skills training was to enable the victims to become economically 
independent. The proposed recommendations included the following: Assist the 
organisations already providing such services to extend their services to the victims, 
conduct a market assessment to ensure that the skills provided are suitable for the 
needs of the market, include a small scale business management course in skills 
training and provision of micro-credits or micro-projects. 
This programme was directed at all the categories of the most vulnerable victims 
however the commission provided that the amputees, other war wounded with 50% 
reduction in earning capacity and victims of sexual violence could choose one family 
member to participate in this programme if they were unable to. 
 
6.3.3.5 Symbolic benefits  
 
The basis for the symbolic reparations was to contextualise “individual reparations 
within a wider and social and political context” (TRC, Sierra Leone, vol. II, 2004, p.263) 
and ensure continued acknowledgement and remembrance of the harms. The 
following programmes were recommended as part of the symbolic reparations. 
i. Public apology from individuals, groups, bodies and organisations that bear 
responsibility for the atrocities committed as well as from the government on 
behalf of the actions or inactions from previous governments. 
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ii. Memorials, including a national war museum and memorials in different parts 
of the country. These may comprise of monuments, renaming buildings or 
locations and transforming victims’ sites into meaningful projects. 
iii. Commemoration ceremonies for the victims, identification of mass graves and 
reburials according to religious and cultural customs. It further recommended 
for the establishment of a National Reconciliation Day on January 18 where 
various commemoration activities can be organised. 
iv. Wide dissemination of the reparations programme, including translating it into 
different local languages.  
 
6.3.3.6 Community reparations 
 
This would comprise of reconstruction and rehabilitation of regions that faced a 
significant level of destruction through capital and technical support. Although it does 
not pinpoint the specific regions targeted for reparations, it proposes a close 
collaboration between government and local and international organisations in 
identifying and assessing the level of destruction, reconstruction efforts and what still 
needs to be done. 
 
In general, a key consideration to the recommendations on reparation was the 
commission’s awareness of the country’s socio-economic situation. It pointed out that 
several institutions had broken down and were lacking personnel hence the 
government was faced with the insurmountable task of reconstruction. The 
commission therefore did not wish to put the government in a position of choosing 
between availing reparations and rebuilding the country. Additionally, poverty and 
deprivations were generally widespread and access to basic social services was equally 
difficult not only for the most vulnerable victims but the rest of the general population 
as well. The proposed programme therefore aimed at complementing the existing 
programmes and services by incorporating a reparations component and facilitating 
accessibility to the group it considered the most vulnerable victims. 
 
6.3.4 Framework for the Follow up and Implementation of Victims’ reparation 
 
As shown in figure 2, the commission recommended a detailed follow up and 
implementation framework. The system was decentralised to the district level.  
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Figure 2: Outline of the Structure of the Commission’s Reparations Programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from TRC, Sierra Leone, Vol II, 2004, pp. 266-268 
 
 
Independent victims’ oversight group: monitor the implementation of the recommendations 
Reparations unit 
 
NaCSA/Ministry district offices 
Beneficiary 
Advisory Dissertation 
Follow-up Committee 
National Commission for Social 
Action 
Implementation sub-unit 
(NaCSA) 
Special Fund for War Victims 
Fund raising board: Solicit and collect 
funds 
District offices 
Ministry of 
Health and 
Sanitation 
(HEALTH) 
Ministry of 
Land, 
Housing, 
Country 
Planning and 
Environment 
(HOUSING) 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Accountant 
General’s 
Department 
(PENSIONS) 
Ministry of 
Education, 
Science and 
Technology 
(EDUCATION) 
Ministry of 
Labour 
together with 
NaCSA (SKILLS 
TRAINING and 
MICRO-
PROJECT) 
Ministry of 
Development and 
Economic 
Planning together 
with Ministry of 
Lands 
(COMMUNITY 
REPARATIONS 
Monuments 
and Relics 
Commission 
(SYMBOLIC 
REPARATIONS) 
To monitor and facilitate the implementation of [ALL] the recommendations. 
Human Rights Commission with representation from civil society (four) one 
for women, youth) [PS. No victim representation to the follow-up committee] 
Assist and oversee the actions of NaCSA (government, line ministries, 
civil society, victims’ organizations and international community 
Implementing body: oversee the implementation, coordinate and 
oversee activities of line ministries, governing the special fund for 
war victims, amending recommendations or additional information 
where necessary (with consent from the advisory board) 
Decentralise the implementation of the  
programme 
174 
The sole responsibility for the implementation of all the reparations was placed on the 
government which was expected to “faithfully and timeously implement the 
recommendations directed at state bodies and encourage or facilitate the 
implementation of any recommendations that may be directed to others” (TRC, Sierra 
Leone, vol. II, 2004, p.247).  
 
The commission recommended the establishment of a follow-up committee required 
to closely and regularly monitor government performance towards the 
implementation of recommendations. The follow-up committee is responsible for 
keeping an eye on the whole range of recommendations and not only specific to 
reparations. The commission recommended that the Human Rights Commission 
should take up the role and further include four representatives from civil society 
groups. 
 
Specific to reparation, the commission reiterates the argument that reparation is 
principally the responsibility of the government and it therefore directed the 
recommendations at the government, particularly in financing the reparation 
programme. This could be done in three ways: financing the measures described, 
continuing a service where an organisation or body does not have the capacity or 
mandate to maintain its activities, and seeking outside financial or donor support (TRC, 
Sierra Leone, vol. II, 2004, p. 250). 
 
In terms of implementing the recommendations, the report proposed that reparation 
programs be coordinated and implemented by NaCSA (p.266). It also suggested that an 
advisory committee be formed to monitor the work of NaCSA comprising of members 
from the government, line ministries highlighted in the recommendation, civil society, 
victims’ organisation and the international community (p.267). 
 
NaCSA is a body that was established by the government in the post war period to deal 
with issues relating to social reconstruction and rehabilitation, in the areas of 
education, community infrastructure, health, sensitisation, resettlement and 
agriculture. The commission argued that it was logical to task an already existing body 
working with war-affected communities with the implementation of reparation rather 
than creating an entirely new one (TRC, Sierra Leone, vol. II, 2004). The role of this 
body is “to oversee the implementation of the reparations programme … coordinate 
and oversee the activities of the line ministries to ensure that all aspects of the 
reparation programme are implemented” (p. 267). In addition to this, NaCSA is 
 175 
entrusted with governing the special fund for war victims and determining future 
decisions pertaining specific reparation requirements such as amount of monthly 
pensions, among others. 
 
The commission further exercised flexibility in determining the role of the 
implementing body by entrusting the body to amend any of the recommendations, with 
the consent of the advisory board. 
 
Readjusting NaCSA to accommodate reparation involved three aspects; creating a sub-
unit within NaCSA to focus on reparations and govern the special fund for war victims, 
the reparation sub-unit creating an office in every district in order to decentralise 
implementation and creating an advisory committee comprising of members from the 
government, line ministries, civil society, victims’ organisation and the international 
community to “assist and oversee the actions of the implementing body” (p.267). 
 
From the recommendations, NaCSA is not tasked with carrying out the actual 
implementation but rather the agency is meant to oversee the implementation process 
of the different line ministries and to govern the special fund for war victims. Each line 
ministry therefore is tasked with ensuring the implementation of the 
recommendations that falls within its jurisdiction.  
 
6.3.4.1 The Special Fund for War victims 
 
As stipulated by the Lomé agreement, the commission also made specific 
recommendations regarding the special fund for war victims.  
 
The commission suggested that a special fund for war victims be established within 
three months of the publication of the commission’s report. It further called for the 
establishment of a fundraising board comprising of “respected Sierra Leoneans and 
friends of Sierra Leone” (p. 269) to solicit for funds. This group is to report to the 
advisory committee. NaCSA is required to make annual public reports on activities and 
financial status of the fund to parliament.  
 
Below are the proposed sources of revenue for the special fund;  
i. The government through prioritisation of reparation in the budget, revenue 
generated from mineral resources and debt-relief-for-reparations-scheme. 
ii. Reparations or peace tax 
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iii. Donor support 
iv. Seized assets 
v. Voluntary in-kind contribution from ex-combatants 
vi. Other legal sources 
 
There is however no detailed information on how to ensure there is a meaningful and 
sustainable cash flow from the listed sources. 
 
6.3.4.2 Implementation Time Frame 
 
The implementing body was required to identify and register all the eligible victims 
taking into consideration victims who are difficult to access, input from local leaders 
and civil society organisations, privacy of sensitive groups such as victims of sexual 
violence and sensitisation activities to facilitate the registration.  
 
The commission accordingly recommended specific time frames as below: 
i. The establishment of a subunit in NaCSA: within three months after submission 
of the report 
ii. The Special Fund for War Victims: Three months after the submission of the 
report 
iii. Most urgent reparations: Six months after the submission of the report 
iv. The implementation of the reparation programme within six years except those 
that need to be continued for the lifetime of the victim. 
 
6.4 Government response to the recommendations 
 
The first setback in the post-TRC was experienced on two fronts; the delayed 
publication of the final report and the release of the government White Paper in 
response to the recommendations addressed to it. The delay negatively affected the 
continuity of the TRC process because it was used as an excuse by both the government 
and CSOs not to move forward. The government stated that it could not issue a 
response without referring to the final copy while the CSOs were constrained in 
accessing the available versions but also hesitant to use them because they might not 
have been the final versions which might be altered after the final production of the 
report (The Sierra Leone Working Group on Truth and & Reconciliation, 2006; 
WITNESS, 2006).  
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WITNESS, an international human rights NGO that popularised a video format of the 
TRC findings and recommendations took on the mantle of advocating for the release of 
the government White Paper as part of its TRC follow-up project. According to its 
January 2006 final report, this was a full-fledged endeavour that included involving a 
number of local civil society organisations as well as international pressure, the most 
notable being bringing on board international film star and actress, Angelina Jolie who 
personally met with the president in Freetown and urged him to release a government 
response and work towards implementation of the recommendations (WITNESS, 
2006). 
 
6.4.1 The Government White Paper 
 
Eight months after the submission of the TRC report to the president, the government 
released the White Paper on June 27 2005 containing its responses and strategies for 
implementing the recommendations. The White Paper in itself however left a lot to be 
desired. It contained a number of typography and content errors and has been 
criticised as not meeting the standard set by the report. WITNESS contends that “it does 
not appear to grasp the seriousness of the issues at hand [and] treats the TRC process 
with contempt” (p. 16) and further highlights cases where they point to the 
government’s dishonesty and disregard of the commission’s recommendations. 
 
The White Paper contains responses to all of the recommendations made in the report. 
However, this part only focus on the recommendations on reparation. 
 
The response on the recommendation on reparation is contained in only one 
paragraph. This is in contrast to the TRC report which devoted a whole chapter where 
they spelt out the rationale, beneficiaries and implementation framework. The White 
Paper does not make any reference to this detailed version but focuses on the summary 
found in the recommendation section. 
 
Whereas the government in general acknowledges the reparation recommendations, 
it remained non-committal on a definitive implementation strategy. It states that it  
“Accepts in principle the findings and recommendations therein 
contained. However the Government will use its best endeavours to 
ensure the full and timely implementation of various reparation 
programmes recommended by the commission, subject to the means 
available to the state, taking into consideration the resources available 
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to it and assistance received from the international community and the 
countries mentioned in the report” (Sierra Leone, 2005, p. 16). 
 
The White Paper response it not clear on the general framework it will approach to 
ensure implementation and phrases its response in vague concepts such as “best 
endeavours”, “subject to means available”, “resources available”, “assistance from 
international community.” The vague approach to its commitment could be used to its 
advantage as there are no tangible work plans to which it can be held accountable.  
 
This vagueness of interpretation is also reflective in the TRC definition of “faithfully 
and timeously” in the TRC Act which they interpret as government taking “all 
reasonable steps within its means” (TRC, Sierra Leone, Vol II, 2004, p. 118).’ This leaves 
it open to varied interpretations and as such can infer its inaction or delays as events 
beyond its means in a context where it is trying its best. In retrospect, the TRC report 
however does specify explicit time frames for the implementation. 
 
The content and approach of the White Paper caused the government’s commitment to 
follow up and implement the recommendations to be questioned especially by the civil 
society. More so, because the White Paper lacked a tangible and specific strategy and 
timeline for the implementation (Sierra Leone TRC, n.d.; The Sierra Leone Working 
Group on Truth and & Reconciliation, 2006).  
 
In a letter to the president, the civil society in their response to the government White 
Paper, expressed their “concern” at the “unconventional manner” in which the paper 
was “composed and released” and state that it is “vague and non-committal” and in 
need of “substantial revision.” They refer to it as being “akin to a “green paper” which 
serves to instigate a period of public consultation in advance of a government policy 
proposal” (Paul, 2005). 
 
Despite the civil society response, there was no revision or further response regarding 
the White Paper. 
 
6.4.2 Follow up activities 
 
Following the TRC, CSOs continued to play an active role in advocating for continuity 
of the commission’s output, particularly in setting up mechanisms to implement the 
recommendations. It particularly worked towards dissemination of the findings and 
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recommendations (Svärd, 2010; The Sierra Leone Working Group on Truth and & 
Reconciliation, 2006).  
 
In 2006, The Sierra Leone Working Group on Truth and Reconciliation (WG) conducted 
an assessment of the work of the truth commission and was quite critical about the 
delay in instituting follow up mechanisms and the sluggish response of both the 
government and the international community (The Sierra Leone Working Group on 
Truth and & Reconciliation, 2006). The WG study further expressed serious 
reservations about the follow up framework particularly, the role of the Human Rights 
Commission of Sierra Leone (HRCSL) which had not yet been established despite a 
2004 legislation enabling it.  
 
Specific to reparation, the study established that respondents felt that NaCSA would be 
compromised because it is a parastatal body and perceived it as corrupt. There was 
also exasperation expressed at the delay in establishing the special fund for war 
victims. The WG were of the view that the commission should have proposed an 
interim follow-up committee. It briefly mentions the civil society-led TRC Follow-Up 
Project that aimed at coordinating with the government to start on the implementation 
phase however there is no further information regarding the group. 
 
A report by WITNESS however indicates that it spearheaded the TRC Follow-Up Project 
in May 2005 to advocate for the implementation of the recommendations of the TRC. 
This was a follow up to the previous “Witness to Truth” project in which they supported 
four local NGOs in disseminating the TRC report using the Witness to Truth Video.  
WITNESS partnered with a consortium of international and local NGOs for a 
coordinated follow up project.9 The WITNESS consultant however departed from 
Sierra Leone in December 2005 after eight months (WITNESS, 2006). Besides the 2006 
report, I was unable to access any further documentation regarding the work of the 
follow up project. 
 
                                                        
 
9 These organisations included: Conflict Management and Development Associates (CMDA), Campaign 
for Good Governance (CGG), Centre for Co-ordination of Youth Activities (CCYA), Centre for Democracy 
and Human Rights (CDHR), Conciliation Resources (CR), Forum for African Women’s Educationalists 
(FAWE), Forum for Democratic Initiatives (FORDI), Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Programme 
(SLCMP); Women’s Forum; Legal Access through Women Yearning for Equality Rights and Social Justice 
(LAWYERS); Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA). The Sierra Leone Association of Journalists 
(SLAJ) and the Bar Association. Internationally, WITNESS collaborated with Human Rights Watch, Fund 
for Global Human Rights and the former Head of Investigations at the TRC, Howard Varney. 
180 
In December 2006, the HRCSL was inaugurated (Human Rights Commission of Sierra 
Leone, 2011). However, in addition to its follow up responsibility as stipulated by the 
TRC recommendation, it was inundated with its other terms of reference concerned 
with human rights issues (Svärd, 2010). Nonetheless, in 2007, the HRCSL, jointly 
organised a national consultation with The United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra 
Leone (UNIOSIL) and developed a matrix of the implementation of the truth 
commission recommendations. In the 2007 matrix, it indicated a stalled reparation 
programme. However a task force was established to advise the government on a 
reparation strategy. A proposal for funding was also presented to the UN Peace 
Building Fund.  
 
A follow up consultation was organised in 2010 by the HRCSL and United Nations 
Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) where the 2007 matrix was 
reviewed and updated. According to the matrix, some progress was made in terms of 
emergency medical support such as fistula surgeries, aspects of the symbolic 
reparations, skills training for victims of sexual violence however the bulk of the 
reparation remained unimplemented. HRCSL and UNIPSIL report that they 
endeavoured to physically visit the different agencies and ministry for updates 
however they faced difficulty in obtaining the relevant information from the different 
ministries as well as attracting their participation (Sierra Leone TRC, n.d.).  
 
According to the implementation matrix, significant efforts was made in the following 
areas: amending the NaCSA Act which mandated it as the implementer of the 
reparation programme; funding of USD three million from the UN Peace Building to 
kick-start the reparation programme and Launching the reparation programme and 
Victims Trust Fund in 2009.  
 
In terms of actual activities, the NaCSA embarked on a beneficiaries’ registration 
programme, micro-credit grant of USD 8010 to 21,000 beneficiaries, fistula and other 
surgery to 235 victims and 36 victims respectively and educational support. NaCSA 
further developed a five year strategic plan 2010-2014 amounting to USD 112 Million 
to roll out the rest of the reparation programme although it had not yet received any 
                                                        
 
10 The exact amount awarded was Le 300,000, although depending on the exchange rate, it is usually 
framed as USD 80 to USD 100. 
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commitment for funding either from the international donors or the government 
(Sierra Leone TRC, n.d.). 
 
The above follow up projects contained in the implementation matrix were concerned 
with all the recommendations in general, although I only selected the reparation aspect 
for discussion above. The most detailed study focusing only on reparation was carried 
out by ICTJ (Suma & Correa, 2009) . The study assessed the operation of NaCSA one 
year after the UNPBF had been provided to kick start the reparation programme. The 
report reiterated and provided more detail on the specific activities carried out as 
highlighted in the matrix. It further recommended that the government embark on 
defining a long term reparation programme for all the measures recommended by the 
TRC. This report focused on reviewing the activities carried out by NaCSA in the one 
year period, which it does in a very detailed manner. However, it does not frame it 
within the broader reparation proposals in terms of comparing what the actual 
reparation plan was and what has been done. 
 
Although the bulk of the advocacy towards implementing the recommendations was 
carried out by CSOs, several other CSOs, both local and international continued in their 
activities in the provision of basic social services and infrastructure development 
(Africa Region External Affairs Unit (AFREX), 2007). Government and international 
organisations also focused on general reconstruction and development efforts.  
 
Despite the recommendations on reparation being framed around linking them to 
ongoing civil society and government programmes, the SLPP and subsequent APC 
government did not attempt to align its reconstruction efforts to the TRC 
recommendations (Svärd, 2010). Neither did civil society despite providing similar 
services. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to present the background to the establishment of the truth 
commission and an understanding of reparation within that context. It also discussed 
the post-TRC phase and the response of the government.   
 
The TRC emerged as a component of the peace negotiations.  It was a compromise 
between amnesty for the ex-combatants and doing nothing for the victims. The TRC 
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and reparation programme therefore appeared to be framed based on the benefits that 
the ex-combatants received and continued to receive.  
 
The 1999 Lomé agreement under Article XXVI(1) called for the establishment of a truth 
and reconciliation commission to “address impunity, break the cycle of violence, 
provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell 
their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and 
reconciliation.” In 2000, the TRC Act was passed and it specified that the TRC would 
investigate on the causes, nature and extent of the violations and abuses; Report on the 
violations; and create a conducive climate to promote reconciliation by providing an 
opportunity for both victims and perpetrators to share their experiences and engage 
in constructive interchange. 
 
The TRC began operations in 2002 and following intense and closely followed 
proceedings, it produced a report on its findings and recommendations in 2004. Among 
its recommendations was an extensive proposal on reparation for the war victims. The 
reparation recommendations focused on complementing or supplementing existing 
government and CSO programmes.  
 
The report highlighted five categories of victims for the specific reparations. They were 
selected based on their level of vulnerability and included amputees, other war 
wounded, children, victims of sexual violence and war widows. The specific reparation 
programmes consisted of health care, pensions, education, skills training and micro-
credit projects, symbolic benefits and community reparation. The proposals also 
included a detailed report consisting of its findings and recommendations, as well as a 
framework for the follow up and implementation of the recommendations.  
 
Since the submission of the report there has been limited follow up and 
implementation efforts. Following funding from the UNPBF, registration of victims was 
carried out, as well as proving cash grants and aspects of the symbolic reparations.   
 
In general, the post-TRC processes point towards an uncoordinated effort, heavily 
reliant on civil society and donor funding. More so, scholarly research on Sierra Leone 
has focused more on linking the TRC to issues such as reconciliation, democratisation, 
rule of law and victims perceptions towards the TRC and other mechanisms rather than 
on the specific details of the implementation thereby reinforcing the relevance of this 
study. 
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CHAPTER 7: SYNTHESISING THE TWO CASES  
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
As pointed out by Posner & Vermeule (2003) the processes that determine the 
selection of a particular TJ tool can have repercussions on the outcome of the selected 
mechanism. The dynamics concerning the inclusion or exclusion of the mechanisms 
can act as pointers into the attitudes of the different stakeholders in the post-TJ phase. 
Chapters five and six therefore sought to explore the circumstances under which truth 
commissions and their recommendations on reparation were framed in the selected 
cases. It presented the background that led to the selection of the truth commission 
mechanism and the inclusion of reparation in the recommendation. It unpacked the 
meaning of reparation from the perspective of the truth commission and how these are 
framed, including the follow up and implementation mechanisms. Finally, it analysed 
the government response to the recommendations by examining the government 
White Paper issued following the submission and publication of the truth commission 
report. 
 
In chapter 3.4, the Third-way or an integrated approach to studying implementation of 
reparation following truth commission was proposed. It argues that truth commissions 
and the reparations should be viewed as being on a continuum whereby the processes 
that occur before the existence of the commission are equally critical to both the 
commission operation itself and the outcomes of the commission. The integrated 
approach proposes that in studying implementation, it is essential to go back to the 
beginning to question why and how an approach was adopted in order to make sense 
of why the outcome is heading in the direction it is.  
 
In the preceding chapters, I present a comprehensive background of the cases of Ghana 
and Sierra Leone in their endeavours to address past human rights violations using the 
truth commission and reparation mechanism. The following discussion uses this 
background information to further develop the integrated framework through an 
analysis of the secondary literature to identify variables pertinent to studying 
implementation of the recommendations on reparations. It identifies five main levels 
of analysis: pre-truth commission, framing of reparations, content of the proposal on 
reparation, frameworks for follow-up and implementation, and post truth commission. 
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7.1 Pre-truth commission 
 
At this level, a study of the implementation seeks to understand the circumstances that 
influenced the setting up of a commission and the inclusion of the reparations in the 
debate. It identifies three variables: the motivation, agency and mandate. 
 
7.1.1 Motivation 
 
This variable analyses the motivation for the selection of the truth commission 
mechanism. The reasons why a truth commission is established are as varied as the 
cases. Sometimes, truth commissions may appeal as an easy way out and a façade that 
the government is doing something about past human rights violations. In other cases, 
it may be an alternative to doing nothing while in others it is to complement other TJ 
mechanisms. In other cases, however, it may appear as the most pragmatic approach. 
Where the motivation is questionable, it rarely results in any tangible output because 
either the report is never released or the commission disbanded before the completion 
of its mandate. Higher levels of incentive for being set up conversely produce 
significantly higher outcomes.  
 
In the background information of the cases, Sierra Leone and Ghana experienced 
different forms of motivation. The Sierra Leone truth commission was as a result of the 
1999 peace negotiations and the prioritisation given to the ex-combatants through the 
ceasefire and DDR processes. The debate about a truth commission only became 
apparent in the 1999 Lomé agreement despite there being earlier peace negotiations.  
 
In Ghana, the truth commission debate emerged almost a decade after the transition to 
a constitutional government. Following the Kwesi Pratt Jnr. case (1994) which was 
turned down by the CHRAJ, it proposed that the petitioner apply for the setting up of a 
commission of inquiry to investigate such cases of disappearances that occurred during 
the unconstitutional regimes (Appiagyei-Atua, 2000). It was during the 2000 elections 
that the space was availed for a discussion into the setting up of a commission through 
the inclusion of this point as an election manifesto. 
 
The Sierra Leone case presents a late entry of truth commission in the peace 
negotiations that was primarily concerned with bringing the war to an end and 
ensuring that the combatants do not renew any fighting. Priority therefore was given 
to the programmes concerned with the ex-combatants over the truth commission 
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process. Ghana on the other hand emerged with a politically inspired commission with 
the new regime intent on fulfilling its election promise and politics continuing to 
remain relevant in its lifetime.  
 
7.1.2 Agency 
 
Secondly, the framework considers the agency or the actors responsible for pushing 
through the inclusion of the truth commission mechanism. It considers whether such 
an impetus was from specific individuals or groups and whether it was a grassroots 
civil society, local or international or a political decision. As seen in the Argentina and 
Chile case, local, grassroots driven processes tended towards tangible outcomes as 
opposed to internationally driven processes such as in El Salvador and Haiti. 
 
The Sierra Leonean case tended towards a mixture of local and international civil 
society pressure for the inclusion of victims and mechanisms to address victims’ needs. 
The presence of ICTJ and substantive funding in TJ issues further reinforced this 
direction (Africa Region External Affairs Unit (AFREX), 2007; The Sierra Leone 
Working Group on Truth and & Reconciliation, 2006). Civil society and victims 
representation in the 1999 peace negotiations was therefore instrumental in placing 
the issue of the commission on the agenda. 
 
In Ghana, despite the political origins, civil society became influential in making the 
truth commission a reality. ICTJ also had a strong presence in Ghana and a number of 
organisations under the civil society coalition advocated for the establishment of the 
truth commission following the electoral victory of NPP in 2000. 
 
In both of these cases, what was not obvious was the issue of reparations for victims 
during this advocacy. In the literature analysed, there was neither detailed information 
regarding the context of the truth commission advocacy nor the goals of civil society 
activism during this period.  
 
7.1.3 Mandate 
 
A truth commission derives its terms of reference from the mandate and it is important 
how it frames the issue of reparation. 
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In the Sierra Leone TRC Act, there is no direct mention of reparation per se, however, 
the Act uses phrases such as ‘responding to needs,’ ‘restoring human dignity’ and 
promoting reconciliation (article 6(1 and 2b)). It also calls on the commission to 
provide information regarding the special fund for war victims (article 7(6)). It is these 
references that the commission interpreted to mean reparation for victims.  
 
The Ghana NRC Act was more direct on the issue of reparation. The commission was 
required to make appropriate recommendations to the president for redress of wrongs 
(section 3(1)(b), 4(c). The commission therefore interpreted its mandate to make 
recommendations as a directive from the Act.  
 
As will be discussed further on, the Sierra Leone commission emphasised linking the 
reparation programme to existing programmes while Ghana’s programme focused 
more on recognising the individual harm by providing token measures.  
 
Moreover, it could also be hypothesised that the mandate has an impact on how the 
government responds and it is therefore more responsive to implementation where 
the legislative instrument enforcing the commission had a direct reference to the issue 
of reparation as opposed to where it is simply implied.  
 
7.2 Framing of reparations  
 
At this level, a study of implementation seeks to understand how the truth commission 
interpreted the concept of reparations. It identifies two variables: interpretation of 
reparations and the existing conditions that determined the type of reparations 
proposed. 
 
7.2.1 Interpretation of reparations 
 
As discussed in 2.2.3, reparations can be defined either broadly or narrowly. A broad 
conceptualisation for instance, as outlined in the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines, 
while being ideal and comprehensive may be overwhelming to implement. A narrow 
interpretation could however exclude certain victims or harms. The interpretation is 
also significant in understanding the response of the implementing government. 
Apologies for instance appear to directly infer responsibility which may result in 
reluctance to implement. Likewise, already existing programmes could overshadow a 
reparations programme framed as social service benefits. 
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Sierra Leone interpreted its reparation programme on two levels. The first level would 
generally benefit all Sierra Leoneans. These were benefits to be enjoyed from the whole 
TRC process including the recommendations on institutional reforms and 
reconciliation. These were meant to address the structural and historical violations and 
change the structures that perpetuated the violations. The second level was the specific 
reparation programmes which were narrow and targeted at specific beneficiaries 
identified as the most vulnerable.  
 
The commission in its report however does not show a direct link between a specific 
harm and specific reparation but rather reparation is based on the level of vulnerability 
resulting from the harm. For instance an amputee was considered more vulnerable 
than an individual who lost their property and the amputee was therefore entitled to 
the reparation benefits. As discussed in 6.3.3 reparation was framed in terms of access 
to services intended to improve the lives of the most vulnerable victims. This appeared 
to be a pragmatic approach by the commission considering the large number of victims. 
The commission argued that all individuals, both Sierra Leonean and non-Sierra 
Leonean were considered victims of the conflict. Following this logic, they could not 
therefore award specific reparations for everyone. This approach of defining 
victimhood by vulnerability however had its shortcomings in terms of individual 
perception of victimhood. As discussed in 9.1.2 some of the individuals who considered 
themselves eligible for reparations were excluded.  
 
For Ghana, the reparations were defined more narrowly and framed as awards to 
acknowledge and recognise victimhood. Specific harms were identified and evaluated 
using a monetised scale and awarded according to the harm, although not necessarily 
according to the scale of harm.  
 
It was therefore a more direct process of linking specific violations to specific benefits. 
The victims identified themselves and stated their harms. The commission thereby 
proposed the amount to be paid as compensation for the specific violation. For 
instance, for human rights violations resulting in the loss of life, the beneficiaries could 
be awarded between 20,000,000 – 30,000,000 Ghanaian Cedi while an individual 
detained for between six months and two years could be awarded 5,000,000 Ghanaian 
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Cedi.11 The proposed amounts can be found in the report (National Reconciliation 
Commission, 2004, pp. 175–176). 
 
In both cases, the benefits did not appear to be proportionate to the harms thus, a 
strong emphasis was placed on framing the benefits as tokens of acknowledgment and 
recognition of harm, rather than as direct payment to match the harm. The selection of 
the beneficiaries for specific reparations was in both cases determined by the 
respective truth commissions and in this way, they have attempted to demonstrate that 
this process and the benefits was based on actual victims’ needs.  
 
7.2.2 Context 
 
This variable looks into the aspects that inspired how the commission framed the 
reparations. It considers the existing socio-economic, political and cultural conditions 
that influenced the eventual forms of reparations recommended by the commission. 
 
In Sierra Leone, the commission was aware of the widespread poverty and destruction 
of infrastructure and institutions. They were keen on reparations not putting a strain 
on government or organisations providing similar services. They therefore focused on 
complementarity of the benefits and linking them to existing programmes. It also tried 
to respond to the victims’ needs as closely as possible by posing questions directly 
about what the victims needed. Additionally, due to the overwhelming levels of 
victimisation, it strove to narrow down the victims to benefit from the specific 
reparation programme so that the programme does not overwhelm the government.  
 
Meanwhile, Ghana approached reparation by considering it as a token payment for 
individual harm. It therefore emphasised the intrinsic value or meaning behind the 
programme, which was acknowledgement and recognition of victimhood, rather than 
a payback programme. It also emphasised that the NRC Act called on it to make 
recommendations according to the victims needs but stressed that it would be 
impossible to equate the reparations to the respective needs which re-emphasises 
reparation as a token. 
 
                                                        
 
11 Following the devaluation of the Ghanaian Cedi in 2007 this amount changed to 2000 – 3000 Ghanaian 
Cedis, approximately, $ 454 - $ 680 at the current exchange rate. 
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7.3 Content of the proposal on reparation  
 
This is an area in which significant discussion has already taken place (3.2.2). From 
these discussions, it is implied that the design aspects of reparation programmes are 
critical to the implementation. A number of characteristics have been identified which 
are purported to maximise the chances of implementation being carried out. de Greiff’s 
taxonomy in this case provides a comprehensive set of variables against which the 
content of the reparations proposal could be tested  (de Greiff, 2006a, pp. 5–13).  
 
The discussion on features that impact a reparation programme was however more 
sporadic and less generalised. However in 3.3, five features were identified from a 
cross section of discussions. These include considerations on resources, socio-political 
dynamics, legislations, the reparation context and the regime in power. 
 
Both the Ghana and Sierra Leone recommendations appear to be comprehensive in 
that they consider the features identified in both the taxonomy as well as take into 
account several of the issues that the different studies identified as being pertinent to 
implementation.  
 
7.4 Frameworks for follow-up and implementation 
 
This level examines whether the commission proposed any frameworks for following 
up and implementing the recommendations and how detailed such a framework is. 
This includes two aspects: the proposed structure and funding base. 
 
7.4.1 The structure 
 
This variable analyses the structures proposed by the commission, if available to carry 
out the implementation. 
 
The Sierra Leone case identifies a detailed structure to follow up and carry out the 
implementation of the reparation programme (figure 2). Ghana on the other hand does 
not specify any particular framework.  
 
In both cases, the role of the truth commission and commissioners ceases following the 
submission of the report and there is no option of continuation. Ghana’s 
recommendation is particularly stricter on the issue of reparation. It specifies that only 
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those who testified and are identified as victims are eligible for the reparation benefits 
and there is no option for new cases. Sierra Leone on the other hand does leave a 
loophole for the victims who might decide to come forward after the end of the 
commission. 
 
7.4.2 Funding base 
 
In framing reparations, commissions are often conscious of the funds necessary to 
carry out the specific programmes and may additionally propose funding sources.   
 
Both Sierra Leone and Ghana highlighted a number of avenues that could be used to 
finance the reparation programme. In both cases however, these are vague suggestions 
without any enforceability mechanism. There is an emphasis on the voluntariness and 
an implied sense of government and donors’ willingness to fund the programmes, an 
assumption which might not necessarily hold. 
 
7.5 Post-truth commission. 
 
At this level, the study considers the responses of the different stakeholders following 
the submission of the report and the end of the commission. It identifies two variables: 
Responses of the actors and the output. 
 
7.5.1 Responses of the actors 
 
Through an analysis of the different actors, a study of implementation can determine 
the relevance of the issue of reparations in the post-truth commission agenda and 
conversely whether it is a priority or not. 
 
In Sierra Leone, the first set back to implementation was the delay in releasing the 
public report which to an extent slowed down the momentum of the different actors. 
It likewise impacted on the dissemination efforts. Furthermore, whereas the post-truth 
commission discourse was framed around the implementation of the truth 
commission’s recommendations, it did not specifically focus on reparations but rather 
the entire body of recommendations. Civil society remained vibrant in the advocacy for 
implementation, however, it focused mainly on the “imperative recommendations” 
which did not include reparations. Reparations was categorised under the “work 
towards” recommendations (TRC, Sierra Leone, vol. II, 2004, pp. 199-120-225). 
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Furthermore, the victims’ organisations registered a minimal presence and therefore 
were not influential enough to put reparations on the agenda. 
 
In general, the government and other external response was tepid and noncommittal 
to the issue of reparation considering its response in the White Paper.  
 
The delay in setting up specific bodies highlighted by the commission to follow up with 
the recommendation was also another setback. The commission did not fully consider 
the legislative implications of the frameworks such as the establishment of the HRCSL 
which required a legislative decision. This took at least two years after submission of 
the report before it was passed. Similarly, the alterations to NaCSA, the implementing 
body also required legislative approval.  
 
In Ghana, although there were limited copies of the report released by the government, 
its response in the White Paper was more positive. It agreed with the findings and 
proposals for recommendations of the commission and committed itself towards 
implementation of the said recommendations. The civil society organisations also 
remained involved immediately in the post-truth commission phase, continuing to 
advocate for the implementation of the recommendations.  
 
7.5.2 Output 
 
This variable considers the documented output in terms of implementation and 
whether this is reflective of what is in the proposal. 
 
In both cases, there is limited documentation regarding the implementation process. 
In Sierra Leone, through mainly civil society reports, the analysis shows that the 
reparation programme is different from the proposed programme while a number of 
the reparations are still on hold. 
 
In Ghana, this information could mainly be accessed from media reports and they 
indicate one form of reparations has been carried out, the monetary compensations, 
and there is no information about the other types of reparation that were 
recommended.  
 
This initial framework or model for studying the implementation of truth commission 
recommendations on reparations focuses on the available literature regarding the 
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commission, including the report and other documents. Whereas it is insightful, 
particularly on the factors that necessitated the commission or the issues surrounding 
how the reparation was framed, it is restrictive in other areas such as the interpretation 
of the different stakeholders, particularly information on the beneficiaries’ attitudes 
and other perspectives towards the whole process and on what happened. In Ghana, a 
victims’ survey was carried out immediately following the TRC but this was limited to 
gauging their attitudes about the process and there has been none regarding 
implementation.  
 
In both cases, there is also no information on the step-by-step processes following the 
submission of the report as well as on the follow up mechanisms and processes. What 
is available is largely from the media and civil society reports with little analysis of how 
or why different actions were taken and their implications. Such limitations thus 
provide the impetus for an empirical study into the follow up and implementation 
processes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed at synthesising the background to the two cases by applying the 
proposed integrated approach to studying implementation of the truth commission 
recommendations on reparation. It identifies five main themes and a number of 
variables under each as indicated below: 
 
i. Pre-truth commission  
a. Motivation for selecting the truth commission mechanism 
b. Agency or responsibility for getting the reparation issue on the agenda 
c. The TC mandates and how they frame reparations 
ii. Framing of reparations 
a. Prevailing circumstances that influenced the framing of the reparation 
proposal 
b. Interpretation of reparation by the commission 
iii. Content of the reparation proposal and whether they meet the recommendations 
proposed by different studies on how to design a reparation programme. 
iv. Frameworks for following up and implementation 
a. Proposed structures by the commission to aid in follow-up and 
implementation 
b. Proposed funding sources for the reparation programmes 
 193 
v. Post truth commission 
a. Responses of the different stakeholders 
b. Output with a focus on what has happened and it is what was expected to 
happen. 
 
The integrated approach views reparation as a continuum linked to the design and 
work of the truth commission. Limiting a study to only the post-truth commission 
processes provides an incomplete interpretation to studying implementation. 
Similarly, focusing on the secondary literature results in a number of limitations, 
particularly in the information that can be obtained such as the interpretation of the 
different stakeholders about the whole process and outcomes as well as the detailed 
analysis of what took place, why and how. 
 
The subsequent section therefore presents the empirical findings from the cases, 
Ghana and Sierra Leone following field visits in each country.  
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PART IV.  RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL 
STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
This hand is cut off but nothing in the brain is cut off. 
I expect to do something for myself … 
We don’t believe that government does not have money. 
Government take up the responsibility of the soldiers, 
of the police but suddenly no money for the victims? 
This hand is finished but the life is not finished.” 
(Amputee, Freetown) 
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CHAPTER 8.  GHANA: “IT’S NOT PERFECT, BUT IT IS BETTER 
THAN NONE.” 
 
8.0 Introduction 
 
The first person I secured an interview with was a member of the Reparation 
Committee. He also happened to have survived being killed in 1982. This was a state 
orchestrated killing of three high court judges. In his story, he had been asked to report 
for an assignment in Nairobi and it was during his absence that the killings occurred. 
Such state organised violations and abuses characterised the history of Ghana. He 
describes the situation as “anarchy” where violence from state sanctioned security 
groups permeated all aspects of society. The perpetrators of such crimes were rarely 
brought to justice and after the transition to constitutional rule, the 1992 constitution 
provided safeguards which protected the perpetrators but also made it difficult for 
individuals to pursue such matters. The NRC therefore emerged as an opportune 
mechanism for dealing with the legacy of violations and impunity and promoting 
national reconciliation. The perceptions towards the process and its outcome however 
are mixed.  
 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical study on the implementation of the 
recommendations on reparation following the NRC. This was carried out in Accra, 
Ghana from 30 January – 25 February 2011 and 1 September – 21 October 2012. A total 
of sixteen open ended formal interviews were carried out. The respondents included 
the academia, former TRC staff, Reparations Committee, Civil society and victims. The 
main challenge to the field work in Ghana was the limited pool of respondents as the 
emphasis was obtaining expert views on the NRC and post-NRC process. It structures 
the discussion under five main themes (1) Operations of the commission (2) 
Commission’s recommendations on reparations (3) Follow-up of recommendations on 
reparations (4) Implementation of recommendations on reparations, and (5) salient 
issues arising from the interviews and my observations. Where direct quotes have been 
applied, they have been used verbatim. 
 
8.1 Operation of the Commission 
 
Under this theme, I sought to understand the context for the establishment of the truth 
commission in Ghana. In comparison to other countries in Africa, Ghana has generally 
been considered stable and with functioning institutions. It therefore comes as a 
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surprise to many that they established a TJ mechanism. The commission itself was a 
domestic initiative and has not been privileged with extensive research. This section is 
therefore concerned with establishing whether the commission was considered a 
necessary endeavour, why it was necessary and the role of civil society in propelling 
the cause. 
 
8.1.1 Necessity of a truth commission 
 
From the interviews, there was a general consensus that Ghana had experienced a 
tumultuous past and was therefore in need of a tool to bring about healing and 
reconciliation. It was however apparent that there was a divide between proponents 
for the truth commission and those who felt that it had been misused as a political tool 
and therefore had lost its authenticity in achieving its goals.  
 
The proponents argued that Ghana’s case showed that issues of transitional justice are 
not only limited to post-conflict situations but also include transitions from 
authoritarian regimes to democratic processes. It is in the latter context that Ghana’s 
experience became relevant.  
 
The militarisation of the country, coups and counter-coups and institutionalisation of 
violence created what one of the respondents described as “pure anarchy.” Violence 
had become normalised up to the local levels where state operatives could be misused 
to settle personal scores. An example given by one of the respondents was as such,  
“If I had a quarrel with you, I would just go and tell the police you owe me 
ten thousand. Then the police would come, ‘give her her ten thousand.’ If 
I don’t, I would be shot or beaten to death. That’s anarchy!” (Reparations 
Committee member) 
 
There was consensus from the respondents that a lot of atrocious acts were committed 
against the people in the past. This was manifested through fear and suspicion that 
ostracised individuals and groups as well as severed the trust between the state and 
the people. 
 
They further argued that despite the change to a constitutional government in 1992, 
the individuals who perpetrated the atrocities remained in power. It was considered a 
superficial transformation and did not attempt to address the previous injustices. 
Similarly, the previous governments did not address those wrongs. Reconciliation, at 
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the individual, local and national level was therefore considered necessary to heal the 
divide.  
 
The issue of national reconciliation and redress for past harms became more 
galvanised during the 2000 national elections. The National Patriotic Party (NPP) 
promised that a national reconciliation committee would be established to address 
past harms because the nation needed to appreciate that certain wrongs had been done 
and it was time for healing. The advocates for a truth commission considered it 
important that the past harms and victims needed recognition and acknowledgement 
in order to bridge the divide that had engulfed the country.  
 
However, the political undertones with which the truth commission had been 
introduced was picked on by certain sections of people who viewed it as a political tool 
to further political goals. Those advocating for it were however quick to point out that 
much as it had a political aspect to it, it was still relevant for the Ghanaian society to 
address the past human rights violations.  
 
One of the respondents who argued against the truth commission pointed out that 
much as it was necessary to address past human violations, the truth commission 
approach for Ghana was not an appropriate tool because it was being manipulated for 
mainly political gain. He stated that whereas “some people were genuinely inspired by 
examples in Latin America and also South Africa … [however] there’re others who saw 
the propaganda value or political propaganda value in getting victims to tell their 
stories”  (CSO). According to him, such individuals were in charge of the commission 
and were therefore using it to push their political agenda and “discredit their 
opponents” through the stories that would emerge. On further discussion, it became 
apparent that besides his disagreement with the political undertones of the 
commission, he felt that the NRC was not comprehensive enough particularly in its 
method of recommending compensation for only a specific group of individuals.  
“The period between 1982 – 1992, is a period where ethnic tensions were 
exacerbated, now you don’t throw money at ethnic tensions, you engineer 
programmes to bring people together and [so] people [get a ] better 
understanding of their situation and that was not done which says to me 
that everything was so superficial.” (CSO) 
 
A more useful approach according to the respondent would for instance include a more 
independent body, unencumbered by political intrigues which would have served a 
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better purpose, such as a parliamentary committee or any other constitutional bodies 
or even a body more “familiar to the cultural set up and context.” 
 
This polarised view on whether or not the commission was necessary was also 
expressed by individuals with whom I had informal discussions. The main concern 
raised was the political tensions arising from the commission.  
 
Despite the different opinions expressed, my perception is that the divisions originated 
from how the commission was utilised rather than whether it was necessary or not. 
The arguments of those who challenge it mainly revolve around how it was misused 
for political purposes thereby escalating divisions rather than the intended 
reconciliation. The proponents do not necessarily disagree with the political 
intonations but emphasise on the healing it brought to some victims through the 
acknowledgement and recognition of the harms. 
 
8.1.2 The TRC as the lone choice  
 
A point of agreement for both the proponents and challengers of the commission was 
that there were not many options for addressing past human rights violations and 
providing redress for the victims. Following the return to constitutional rule, the 
indemnity clauses protecting members of the previous regime effectively closed off the 
judicial route in the pursuit for accountability as explained below. 
“The constitution had made provisions for indemnity for those people who 
were perceived to have committed those human rights violations which 
meant taking the judicial path was going to be difficult because of the 
indemnity [clause which] says nobody should be tried for any of those 
things which took place then. So it was also important for this reason that 
also if we could not go the judicial way, then the next option would be a 
TRC.” (University professor) 
 
The TRC was therefore perceived as an alternative method of providing recognition 
and acknowledgement for the victims and establishing an official narrative. It was also 
viewed, as seen in the next explanation, an accountability tool that could be used for 
naming and shaming those people who had perpetrated the atrocities. 
“[The TRC was a means] at least for us to document what happened and 
if you cannot try somebody, calling the person to the TRC was really [a] 
sign for sort of punishment, that sort of thing, so that was an important 
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part but maybe the judiciary could have gone ahead and tried some of 
those cases but there was the immunity.” (University professor) 
 
From the explanations from the respondents, some cases had made it to the courts but 
these were far in between. The courts were also mostly accessible to few people who 
could afford it and follow up the cases, sometimes for years. Given the limitations of 
the different mechanisms which would have supposedly been used, the NRC therefore 
emerged as an accessible and extensive attempt for righting the historical wrongs.  
 
8.1.3 Civil Society participation 
 
The civil society organisations proved to be instrumental in setting up the commission. 
They played an advocacy role in calling for a solution to addressing the atrocities the 
victims had suffered in the past through the establishment of a truth commission, 
particularly since all other avenues for redress had been difficult.  
 
During the set-up of the commission, CDD and the coalition of civil society 
organisations closely followed the drafting of the NRC Act. The coalition was composed 
of “civil society organisations that were mainly interested in this reconciliation issue.”  
(CSO). They contributed to the discussions surrounding the Act and made proposals to 
the government regarding the Act before it was passed into law.  
 
The coalition was also active in awareness drives among the community. This involved 
sensitization campaigns about the truth and reconciliation mechanism and process so 
as to encourage people to not only accept the process but also to open up and 
participate in the proceedings 
 
During the hearings, they mobilised support for the NRC as well as victims for the 
hearings. According to one of the members of the coalition, they sent people around 
the country to find out those who had suffered injustice and facilitated the process of 
bringing them to appear before the commission to tell their stories for instance by 
organising transportation services. 
 
Throughout the proceedings, CDD and the coalition were instrumental in dialoguing 
with the commission. They identified best practices and published research and policy 
briefs to guide the commission on their drafting of recommendations, particularly on 
the reparation programme. 
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Following the NRC, the CDD launched a study to gauge victims’ perception of the 
process. This study focused on victims who made statements and appeared before the 
commission and those who submitted statements but did not appear before the 
commission. According to a member of CDD, they were interested in finding out what 
the victims thought of the whole process and also in terms of the implementation of the 
recommendations. This has been the only cross country post-NRC survey on victims’ 
perception that has so far been carried out. But this only goes to show how divorced 
from public discourse the post-NRC environment turned out. 
 
The CDD and the coalition involvement however waned after the release of the report 
and at the time of the field work, I did not come across any civil society group whose 
work revolved around the post-NRC recommendations. There was the exception of the 
National Peace Council (NPC) whose area of focus revolved round promoting peace and 
national reconciliation. However after a brief discussion with the administrator, I 
verified that the NPC is a recent governmental institution set up to promote 
reconciliation. Its mandate is not in any way related to the NRC process and neither 
have they sought to coordinate their work with the recommendations made by the 
commission. They have also not looked into the matter of reparations for victims. 
 
Some of the respondents however were of the view that civil society groups were not 
free of partisan tendencies. Considering the history of Ghana which was characterised 
by strong state control, the respondents were still sceptic about the impartiality of the 
civil society groups and they were thought to be acting in the interest of the political 
groups. 
“After authoritarian regimes and after conflicts it’s very difficult to have 
any non-partisan groups … NGOs and so on will still have their own 
leanings …. It’s difficult after situations in which we need transitional 
justice to find people who have not been affected in one way or the other 
by the situations leading to it.” (University professor) 
 
One of the more significant features of civil society activism in the truth commission 
process was the change in the level of involvement. Prior to and during the NRC, the 
organisations were exceptionally vibrant in getting the matter on to the agenda and 
keeping it there.  
“CDD Ghana led the process … over two dozen civil society organisations 
came together, formed a coalition and strongly, strongly, strongly 
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supported [the NRC]. We met with them regularly, they gave us their 
criticisms, their recommendations in helping us to chart our way around 
… they went to the field and did public education, the outreach and when 
we closed the doors to statement taking they went out there, taking 
statements. They found the money you know, to go and do statement 
taking and bring us feedbacks some of it we actually had and all of it we 
investigated and immediately after our work, they pushed and pushed 
and pushed until government came out with a white paper which was 
overly delayed.” (Former NRC staff) 
 
However once the NRC process was completed and the government White Paper 
released, CDD and the coalition did not remain as involved in the post-NRC. Specific to 
reparations, the recommendations on reparations were not taken up as an issue by any 
organisation and as of 2012, one CSO member confirmed that it was not the main 
agenda of any civil society organisation. 
 
I could not find a conclusive reason for this stance however a number of respondents 
alluded to the fact that CSOs mainly rely on external funds and expertise. The ICTJ had 
been instrumental in the truth commission process and collaborated with NGOs and 
the Ministry of Justice. At the time of the field visit, they were no longer involved and a 
number of the consultants who had worked on the project were either not in the 
country or had shifted their interest to other issues. The CDD, a close collaborator with 
ICTJ during the NRC process had also changed their area of focus to what they 
described as more developmental and democratisation issues. The link between 
funding and priority areas is based on my own assumption since the respondents did 
not directly admit that the change of focus was due to funding interest of the donors. 
They simply pointed out that other areas become more prioritised.  
 
8.2  Recommendations on reparation 
 
The basis for this set of questions was to understand the motivation behind the way 
the reparation was framed. The first motivation was from the views expressed by the 
victims. As explained by a former staff of the NRC, a number of victims who testified 
before the commission did not prioritise a material payment for their testimonies but 
were rather focused on the process of participation and getting their story told. This 
was attributed to the pre-NRC outreaches that focused on the non-monetary benefits 
from participating in the commission proceedings.  
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“We did not build up peoples’ expectations on reparations. From day one 
I was careful to make sure that our people went out there, including civil 
society, to educate that reparations may even be only symbolic and that 
reparations where it is monetary may be only a token and we expressed 
so much so that the concept of token, that it is just a token became sort of 
popularised so we didn’t raise huge or high expectations.” (Former NRC 
staff) 
 
The respondent also mentioned that despite the outreach programmes, some of the 
victims still explicitly stated that they expected some form of material compensation 
for their losses. 
 
Irrespective of the expectation, the commission took the view of making 
recommendations for reparations for all the individuals who participated in the 
proceedings whether they expected to receive benefits or not. 
“For us it was best to rather make recommendations for all; Those who 
said they did not want recommendations (sic), forget about them [the 
reparations], those who were silent on reparations and those who were 
explicit on reparations … it is up to the person to say, ‘I take it’ or ‘I leave 
it.’” (Former NRC staff) 
 
The respondent further elaborated that the idea behind recommending reparations 
was drawn from the general human rights principle of remedying wrongs but also the 
moral viewpoint on redress for harms. As such reparations was considered a moral and 
philosophical obligation. More important however was that the NRC Act 2000 called 
on the commission to make such recommendations for reparation.  
 
The commission sought to propose a realistic reparation programme that would not 
overwhelm the government and at the same time be able to convey acknowledgment 
and recognition of the violations. The former NRC staff and members of civil society I 
interviewed reiterated the views already expressed in the TRC report about how 
appropriate the content of the reparation was, considering the socio-economic and 
political atmosphere in Ghana. 
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8.3 Follow-up of recommendations on reparations  
 
For the Ghana case, this is one aspect with limited literature could be found. Besides 
media reports, a detailed analysis of what happened after the submission of the report 
remained unexplored and neither were reports from the Reparation Committee 
available. On requesting for such a report, I was given a five page undated briefing 
summarising what had already been done. This section therefore focuses on clarifying 
what happened after the completion and submission of the report. 
 
8.3.1 Frameworks for following up the recommendations on reparation 
 
The NRC report did not make any reference to structures or frameworks for the 
implementation of its recommendations but rather directed them at the government 
to determine the way forward. According to one of the former commissioners, the 
justification for this was based on the mandate of the NRC which only called on the 
commission to make recommendations to the president for redress of wrongs.   
“If TRCs are created and given a mandate of making recommendations, 
then the TRCs that are created as a result of the legal framework cannot 
but make the recommendations.” (Former commissioner) 
 
As far as the members of the commission were concerned, they had fulfilled their 
mandate by producing a report which explained the historical antecedents of the 
injustices, identified the victims and categories of harms that had been committed and 
made the appropriate recommendations to the government to facilitate national 
reconciliation and award reparation to the victims.  
 
Some of the respondents however questioned such a structure in which all the 
recommendations are left to the government and the commissioners and members of 
the commission become uninvolved in the post truth commission period. They were of 
the view that the mandate of the commission should have been broad enough to allow 
the commission to oversee the implementation as well. One of the respondents in 
particular pointed out that this framework creates a gap for inaction.  
“The fact this thing [the TRC] winds up soon after they have given their 
report. Who is even there to remind the government that it’s supposed to 
do this? So even if it’s not the TRC, if there could be yet another body to be 
in charge of the monitoring, something can be done. Otherwise the 
government will decide that it has forgotten all about that, there will be 
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nobody specifically to remind them and that sort of thing.” (University 
professor) 
  
The slow pace and lack of activity in terms of follow up and implementation was also 
attributed to the absence of an institution specifically for monitoring the progress of 
the recommendations.  
“There is nobody to see to the implementation, an outside body ... to see to 
the implementation, and the issue of funds will always be used as an 
excuse. And you know countries like that are always also with financial 
distress so using non availability of funds as an excuse can always be there 
and the international community too doesn’t come in to help.” 
(University professor) 
 
He further added that:  
“[There was] no public awareness. They [the victims] went there, they 
went [and] said all that they would say and this thing was published and 
that was the end. Perhaps it goes up to the fact that if we should have 
some institution to deal with the post commission period. To educate, 
maybe it could have been taken on by the National Commission on Civic 
Education as part of it, but nobody was given that job specifically so it just 
faded into disuse … Nothing was done to say even educate the people 
about what came out of the report. Nothing. No institutions. So maybe 
this idea of having some sort of body to be responsible for monitoring and 
even disseminating this information and so on.” (University professor) 
 
The respondent might have been partly justified in pointing out this lack of follow up, 
especially considering that there were limited publicly available reports of the 
commission. However, civil society was quite involved during the NRC and 
immediately following the release of the report, as discussed in 8.3.3, particularly in 
popularising the findings and advocating for a follow up regarding implementation.  
 
Some of the respondents also argued that the government did not articulate a clear 
outline for the implementation of the reparation recommendations with one 
respondent arguing that there was no formal document produced by government 
regarding its implementation plan.  
“Why do you say Ghana reparations policy? I think you are articulating a 
view about something that doesn’t exist. There were recommendations 
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for reparations, and maybe I am being technical about policy … but I don’t 
think government sat down, whether as the let’s say the Attorney 
General’s department or Cabinet or anywhere anybody sat down and 
said, ‘hmm this report of the NRC, they’ve made a lot of recommendations 
for XYZ’ and ‘let’s take the reparations part, what can we do about it?’ If 
there was a policy, it was contained in the white paper.” (Former NRC 
staff) 
 
As already highlighted in 5.4.1, the White Paper contained a brief paragraph on 
reparations affirming government agreement to the content and urgency in 
implementation.   
 
Although some of the respondents expressed their opinion that there were no 
concerted awareness drives following the NRC, all of the respondents in both the 
formal and informal discussions mentioned regularly following or at least being aware 
of the proceedings during and after the NRC that were run in the media. This was 
because the proceedings were broadcast through the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation 
TV and in the words of a respondent, “there were so many radio discussions, many media 
discussions on the report and on the conclusions and then the findings, just to let people 
know about it.” (CSO) 
 
Two main issues regarding the media and NRC stand out. First, the government not 
appear to take particular control and advantage of the media attention to roll out a 
more concerted awareness campaign. CSOs therefore dominated this media platform 
and in most cases had particular areas of interest in the report. The respondents I 
spoke to confirmed that most of the sensitization about the TRC came from the CSOs. 
However, as pointed out by one CSO member, much as they were advocating about the 
NRC, CSOs are mostly “interested in specific issues in the report and they were doing that 
[raising awareness on issues that served their interests].” (CSO) 
 
Secondly, many of the respondents felt that the debates and programmes in the media 
about the NRC was tainted by political views. “I wasn’t much enthused about the media 
aspect because once again, it was skewed politically. People were looking at it [NRC] with 
political lens.” (CSO) 
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From the discussions, the respondents felt that government did not take an active role 
in popularising the NRC. Both the pro and anti-NRC respondents shared the view that 
government could have used this opportunity to express their impartiality.  
 
8.3.2 What happened after the completion of the NRC report 
 
Once the NRC had completed its work, it was required by the Act to submit a copy of 
the report to the president. In October 2004, two months before the general 
presidential election, it submitted its report. One of the former commissioners 
described this as a “tense and victorious moment” as there was a lot of criticism and 
opportunistic individuals waiting to capitalise on this aspect of not being able to submit 
the report as a failure of the NRC.  
 
The president in principle accepted the report with a promise to have it reviewed and 
a White Paper released. However there was uncertainty about the future of the report 
due to the on-going presidential elections. This waiting period was described by one of 
the respondents as a “nail-biting period”. The future of the NRC report was literally 
being determined by the outcome of an election between the NPP and the NDC. The 
NDC had already expressed its dissatisfaction with the process including boycotting 
the parliamentary proceedings during the drafting of the NRC bill as well as the 
hearings. It was therefore unlikely that they would follow it up if they won the election.  
 
Despite the tension and the probable political gain from the process, it was pointed out 
by several of the respondents that the then ruling party (NPP) opted not to use it as a 
campaign tool. In fact the whole NRC issue was put on hold during the election period, 
at least by the NPP.  
 
It would be prudent to however acknowledge that despite this public stance of not 
wanting to gain political capital out of the NRC process, indirectly, the ruling party had 
already scored from this endeavour by availing the opportunity to set up such a 
mechanisms and in the commission having carried out its work.  
 
Moreover, some of the respondents pointed out that prior to the elections, sections of 
the report were leaked and published by pro-government newspapers although it was 
not verified whether it was leaked by the government or opposition. The assumption 
from the general population at that time however was that the leakage was meant to 
discredit the former president Rawlings and the NDC. The information about the leaked 
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report was inconclusive as none of the respondents could confirm the assertion. The 
respondents however stated that the stories about the leak did damage the image of 
the NRC and reinforce the idea that it was being used as a political tool more interested 
in witch hunting the former NDC regime rather than facilitating national reconciliation.  
 
The pro-NRC respondents however still maintained that despite the leak, the ruling 
party should be commended for not trying to gain political capital out of the report. It 
was seen as a positive sign of the government’s commitment to the victims and putting 
the victims’ interest over politics. It was even interpreted as a sign that government 
was serious about the findings and its commitment to implement the 
recommendations. 
 
The optimism in the government willing to foster reconciliation was further renewed 
when six months after the NPP had won the elections, they issued a White Paper on the 
report accepting the findings and recommendations of the commission’s work. In it, 
they made a commitment to among others, set up a committee to implement the 
recommendations and findings.  
 
According to one of the members of the Reparations Committee, doubts about the 
commitment of the government began to creep in when it took almost one year before 
the implementation committee was set up. In 2006, two years after the submission of 
the NRC report, the Reparations Committee was created. 
 
From the discussion with the Reparations Committee, I understood that the 
responsibility for working out the modalities for the implementation of the 
recommendations was given to the Ministry of Justice which was further delegated to 
the Attorney General’s office. Specific to the recommendations on reparation, a three 
member committee was set up within the Attorney General’s office to manage the 
implementation. What was most striking was that the issue of reparation took centre 
stage and when talking about implementation of the NRC recommendations, it is often 
associated with reparation. To corroborate this, when I went to the Ministry of Justice 
to discuss the progress with regards to the implementation of the NRC 
recommendations, I was immediately directed to address all my concerns to the 
Attorney General’s office and from the Attorney General’s Office, I was referred to 
Justice V.C.R.A.C Crabbe, one of the members of the Reparation committee who was 
actively managing the office. 
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In terms of the actual set up of the committee, there was minimal bureaucracy in setting 
up the implementation process as explained by one respondent.  
“This is what the recommendation said, government got the committee, 
government made the money available, we implemented it.” 
(Reparations committee) 
 
This implementation however was specific to monetary payments. According to a 
committee member, they wrote to the cabinet about other aspects of the reparation 
recommendation for instance the reconstruction of the border town market of Namoo 
between Burkina Faso and Ghana but there has not been sufficient follow-up on this 
issue. 
 
8.3.1.1  Structures for implementation 
 
I found it intriguing that Ghana, without an implementation framework suggested by 
the commission had made strides in its implementation programme. I therefore 
inquired what the respondents thought about the approach taken by the NRC and 
whether or not the recommendation of implementation frameworks by the 
commission was relevant.  
 
Some of the respondents commented that the issue of proposed structures is not 
relevant but rather what comes out as a result of these structures.  
“I believe if you want to look at the effectiveness [of implementation], we 
should not limit ourselves to the structure proposed by the various 
commissions but we should rather look at what has come out of the 
implementation of the report based on these structures.” (CSO) 
 
Therefore, rather than looking at the structures in isolation, it would be helpful to 
scrutinise what the implementers have achieved with or without the structures and the 
effectiveness in discharging their duties and responsibilities assigned to them. 
If you compare just the structures without looking at what they have been 
able to achieve using those structures you might realise that [one without 
proposed structures] might even have gone further [in implementation] 
than [one with proposed structures].” (CSO) 
 
And that is precisely what happened in the Ghana case. The government was able to 
mobilise a follow up programme to carry out the implementation.  
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It was however suggested that proposing specific timelines would have been a more 
suitable alternative strategy for strengthening the frameworks for implementation. 
The NRC did not propose any time frames and it was therefore not possible to hold 
government accountable on the perceived delays before the implementation.  
“The TRC coming out with a recommendations and proposing a structure 
and maybe giving government some kind of deadlines that ‘within this 
period, have to have this committee in place, within this period, this 
committee should [have done this].’ I think if they have the legal backing 
to do that, that would be more effective plan because now everything has 
the legal basis.” (CSO) 
 
Of course it was pointed out that the advantage of having a structure with different 
lines of responsibility was the ability to know who to hold responsible if 
implementation did not take place. Such structure or framework can also act as a 
reference point, for instance in terms of looking for funds.  
“A framework will demand that an institution or commission is put out 
there, that commission will definitely source funding from government to 
do things, or that commission will have the legal backing even to work 
with donor institutions … and they have the legal backing of government 
to go and source for funding.” (CSO) 
 
Furthermore, the presence of such structures have the potential of ensuring continuity 
of the implementation process because it is able to identify the responsible institutions 
for following through with the recommendations and hold them to account. One of the 
respondents proposed that it was because of the lack of such mechanisms to facilitate 
continuity that the issue of the NRC fell off the radar in Ghana. 
“Because we [Ghana] don’t have that kind of framework, for now we don’t 
even know of anybody that is talking about the NRC recommendation, 
there is none.” (CSO) 
 
 However it was emphasised that there is always more to just the structure. The 
structure is a guide and there needs to be concrete action following the structure,  
In terms of [follow up] structure, they may have the good structure, it may 
be very very good. The steps that you need to follow all spelt out well. But 
in terms of what’s coming out of the implementation of the 
recommendation by people who are on these structures, that is to me 
what counts … Ghana may not have the structure but possibly, I’m not 
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saying we did but possibly the committee that was set up might have done 
well in terms of reparation … [another country] that might be having 
whole structure and yet the people there never did any good work and so 
how do you conclude?”  (CSO) 
 
The emphasis is that whereas a good structure may be important, what is even more 
essential is the outcomes of such structures and whether they have been adequately 
used to achieve the initial objectives. If the structures remain redundant and are not 
put to use, then they do not serve any purpose. As such, the context is important and 
each case needs to be evaluated on its own merit. The specific situation in each case 
determines the structures and mechanisms for ensuring implementation and 
influences the level of compliance or noncompliance. 
 
8.3.3 The role of civil society organisations 
 
The role that civil society organisations played following the NRC process could also 
not be missed in the conversations. CDD especially took on an advocacy role. In the first 
instance, it carried out the victims’ survey and used the findings from this survey to 
influence government action towards the implementation. Their strategy was to 
influence government policy to adapt to the realities regarding a specific policy. A staff 
of CDD commenting on their publication, Democracy Watch, which also featured 
information about the NRC “during those times [of] NRC issues” pointed out that one of 
the strategies was to ensure that government and the vital institutions got copies of 
their reports and other publications addressing specific issues of the TRC. 
“We try sending them [government] copies so that they can also get a 
sense of what should be done and what will not help, what will help and 
all those things.” Advocacy targeted at the policy makers is meant to 
empower “them to accept some practical issues and deal with them so 
that it will resolve some challenges or problems.” (CSO) 
  
A second aspect of civil society participation was on sensitisation by educating the 
public on the findings and recommendations of the NRC and acceptance of the report 
and the reparation benefits.  
“[Public education] for the citizens, we are looking at how best they will 
also embrace and accept certain things. So that was the approach we 
adopted … we were trying to let them know that some of these things are 
things that cannot be paid for.” (CSO) 
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In line with this, they were instrumental in popularising the concept that the benefits 
that victims would receive from the government were a token of acknowledgement 
and appreciation of their suffering rather than a pay back of what they had lost or 
suffered. 
“What we [civil society] used to do at the earlier stages after the report 
came out was to encourage people to accept the fact that no amount of 
money for compensation can actually pay for whatever pains and 
sufferings they have gone through in the past. (CSO) 
 
The advocacy work was also directed at the government by making government aware 
of the peoples’ needs and giving them a direction in how to implement the 
recommendations. One of the issues raised in the survey for instance was the public 
perception about the recommendations, particularly the monetary payment. 
“We kept on kept on trying to also encourage government to do what the 
report says, the recommendations part … let me give you a practical 
example of what we went through … we tried tracking how much people 
think should be the minimum and then a maximum compensation that 
government should [pay] based on what has already been decided around 
2 million – 30 million cedis. If you ask this question to the people, then 
most of them were not happy with it. They saw the figure to be so low and 
therefore I remember when I did the first presentation on the report … I 
pointed that I believe when the report comes out, there is definitely going 
to be a problem people accepting the monetary recommendation, the 
rich, and therefore there will be a need for the government to do some 
kind of public education and sensitize the people what they are trying to 
do.” (CSO) 
 
According to CDD, the emphasis of this education and sensitisation should be on 
managing expectations because based on the survey, many of the potential 
beneficiaries expressed dissatisfaction with the suggested amount. This view on 
sensitization and education was also reiterated by a member of the Reparation 
Committee who explained that it would be beneficial to explain the meaning of the 
monetary benefits. 
“Let them [the beneficiaries] know that whatever is being offered to them 
is not for payment for whatever they went through but rather a small like 
government acknowledging that ‘yes, at a point in time in your life, the 
state did something to you which wasn’t right’ so they should look at it 
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from that angle and not from the value or the point of the money … just 
try to sensitize the people to understand what that compensation stands 
for.” (Reparations committee) 
 
The scheduling of the survey and proposal by CDD to the government was also timely 
in that it was carried out just after the commission had concluded its activities and 
submitted the report to the government. The CDD therefore urged the government to 
carry out these sensitization drives before the report was released to the public. As 
explained by a member of CDD,  
“We [CDD] was calling for those pre-education programmes so that 
people will accept this kind of recommendation … [from] the reactions we 
gathered from the field, we were trying to compel the government, to 
encourage the government to undertake that kind of education so that 
people will accept it.” (CSO) 
 
The respondent went on to recount a traumatic experience he had with a potential 
beneficiary to emphasise the role sensitization would play. Apparently, they tracked 
him to his office after hearing a radio show in which he was discussing the 
compensation amounts.  
“He nearly beat me up! … he was seriously losing it that we should go and 
tell the government that 2 million – 30 million wasn’t good. ‘How can I 
suffer this? I lost my 3 cars, I lost this, I lost that,’ he was just mentioning 
the things he lost during this period and this period, ‘and then you give 
me 30 million?’ It was hell for me. And so that incident even told me that 
government will have a problem.” (CSO) 
 
8.3.4 The Reparations Committee 
 
In order to kick start the reparation programme, a Reparations Committee was set up. 
A member of the Reparations Committee described the process of setting up the 
committee as “purely administrative … there was no instrument, no law made.”  
 
The responsibility was delegated to a three person team working under the office of 
the Attorney General.  
“Carrying [out] an implementation of their report, there was no law. 
There wasn’t even a cabinet meeting, but the matter was discussed in 
parliament … they told the Attorney General to have a small committee 
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who would determine peoples’ situation, then they made some ceremony. 
Then it was all announced. Then we started going around the country 
…but there wasn’t an instrument, at most probably a cabinet decision and 
as you know, cabinet papers are not released.” (Reparations committee) 
 
The small committee comprised of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General 
and Retired Supreme Court judge, Justice Crabbe, who appeared to be the most visible 
face of the team. 
 
The Reparations Committee had their offices located at the Office of the Attorney 
General premises.  
“Well, this is the office [where the interview was taking place]. We had a 
room there [down the corridor] where people could come and make their 
complaints. There were people downstairs. We had personnel. We had an 
accountant and other staff … they were looking after the papers and then 
they organised and we went round the whole country.” (Reparations 
committee) 
 
By the time of my field visit, the monetary compensation had already been paid, I 
therefore inquired whether the Reparations Committee was still functioning and what 
it was currently involved in. 
“To an extent, yes, in the sense that anybody can still come and make a 
complaint but we then we always write back and say, ‘did you appear 
before the national reconciliation?’” (Reparations committee) 
 
However, it was not clear whether the Reparations Committee followed up any 
compensation claims by persons who did not appear before the commission since they 
worked with the list that was compiled by the NRC of eligible beneficiaries. For such a 
person who did not appear before the commission, it was explained that they had to 
write a petition to the president and the case would then be followed up. However, they 
had not yet had any successful petitions by the time of the field work. 
 
In terms of a time frame for the reparations committee, there was no time within which 
they had to have completed the work. As long as the money was made available, they 
made the necessary payments.  
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“No we didn’t have a time frame. We had the money and it was a question 
of going around the country paying people and that’s the end of it. If we 
finish paying, that’s it.” (Reparations committee) 
 
Regarding the line of reporting, I inquired as to who the Reparations Committee was 
accountable to, I was informed that it was accountable to the government. The 
Reparations Committee reported directly to the Attorney General who was in turn 
accountable to parliament. The Committee “occasionally wrote reports to the Attorney 
General” who then presented them to the parliament. The report usually summarised 
the activities that had taken place.  
“We reported on [on] questions of money, how much money, what we 
have done, how many we’ve paid, what remains to be done.” (Reparations 
committee) 
 
My perception was that this committee worked independent of other stakeholders 
such as the former commissioners or civil society or victims. In theory it was a three 
member committee but in practice, it appeared only one of the members was actively 
involved in the day to day activities.  
 
8.4 Implementation of the recommendations on reparation 
 
From the discussions, I established that the role of implementing the recommendations 
on reparation was delegated to the Reparations Committee. This was headed by the 
Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General and a retired Supreme Court judge. By the 
time of the field visits, it was still being managed in the Attorney General’s Office 
although with a reduced number of staff. In the next sections, I elaborate on the specific 
activities that took place in regard to implementation. 
 
8.4.1 Government’s response to implementation 
 
According to a former NRC commissioner, the commission, in making the 
recommendations was confident of government compliance. They had the support of 
government in setting up the NRC as well as during the proceedings and they were 
therefore expectant that it would comply with the recommendations. 
“We did not foresee government not implementing the recommendations. 
We could not reasonably have foreseen that. Government was very 
enthusiastic about the work, about the commission, government was 
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really really really supportive of the NRC … based on government 
behaviour and its attitude towards the commission and the excitement 
that was in this country at the time of the work of the commission there 
was not reasonable basis for anyone to have anticipated that government 
might not implement the recommendations.” (Former NRC staff) 
 
The president on receiving the report was also positive about the recommendations 
which reiterated the assumptions of the commission members of government 
commitment to the report. 
“They [government] said they would let the attorney general go to school 
on it and they would take it seriously and would do what is right. That 
was that was the promise and it, it vindicated our position – government 
was going to act on these things. Government wanted it.” (Former NRC 
staff) 
 
8.4.2 Funding 
 
The NRC and the implementation of the recommendations on reparation was mostly 
funded by the government.  
“Government funded almost exclusively with the exception of the Soros 
foundation and a bit of fund from USAID and that sort of thing.” (Former 
NRC staff) 
 
From the report I received from the Reparations Committee, in terms of funding, it 
indicated the following; 
“The government made available thirteen billion, two hundred and eleven 
cedis (¢13,211,000,000.00) to the National Reconciliation 
Implementation Secretariat. One billion (1,000,000,000) of this amount 
was apportioned for administrative expenses while twelve billion, two 
hundred and eleven cedis (¢12,211,000,000) was for reparation award to 
2177 victims as recorded by the National Reconciliation Commission 
(NRC). The commission specified the amounts to be paid out to the listed 
victims in the report.” (Report of the Reparations Committee) 
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8.4.3 The role of the commissioners 
 
The former commissioners did not continue to be involved with the NRC once they had 
submitted the report. According to one of the commissioners, this is because they were 
not mandated to. Also, they did not want their actions to be misinterpreted. She further 
stated an interesting analogy on why the commissioners should not be expected to 
chase after the report once it has been submitted to the responsible parties.  
So you go to the doctor because you’re ill, the doctor prescribes 
medication for you, the doctor ensures that it’s the medication that is 
good for you, tells you how you should take it and all of that and then you 
expect the doctor to come to your house and put it in your mouth? What 
would that do? And what would that tell? Did you need to go to the 
hospital? If you did, why won’t you take the medication? And why does it 
take the doctor [and] not members of your family for example to 
encourage you to take? Yes it’s bitter medicine and all of that but you need 
to get well … members of your family and your friends and so on 
encouraging you to do what the doctor prescribed so that you get better. 
It shouldn’t take the doctor.  If the doctor came in everyday to make sure 
you had put the medicine in your mouth and all the members of your 
family just stood around and stared, won’t people start thinking this 
doctor has an agenda?” (Former NRC Staff) 
 
Therefore, in addition to the mandate being clear on the role of the commissioner 
which does not extend beyond the compilation of the report and submitting it, 
engaging in the post-commission implementation would mean that the commissioners 
were attempting to carry out what is beyond what they were expected to do. In a 
contested political atmosphere, such endeavours might be misinterpreted and could in 
the end undermine what the commission set out to achieve.  
 
From the above explanation, the role of the commission and the commissioners was 
not to pursue the implementation of their recommendations but to produce the report 
from their investigations and it was important to clearly demarcate the roles. 
Additionally however, the commissioners and other staff, particularly at the top had 
other positions elsewhere and once they had finished with the commission, they went 
back to their previous positions. 
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8.4.4 An Implementation Matrix for the implementation of reparations 
 
With the setting up of the Reparations Committee, the programme for reparations was 
started in 2007. Below is a matrix of what was carried out.  
 
8.4.4.1 Monetary compensation 
 
The actual implementation involved country wide travel to meet with individual 
victims.  
“We went round the country, we had the recommendations, we had one 
of these reports, [it] had at the end the list of the names of the people to 
whom reparations should be paid and the amount which should be paid 
and it became our responsibility to evenly distribute to them. So we went 
round the country, we did that.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
According to the NRC report, flat sums of money was to be paid based on the amounts 
proposed by the NRC. The notion of the flat sums was however questioned by some of 
the respondents because it appeared not to give any consideration to the individuality 
of the victims. 
“You pay 5000 Cedis for a general’s life and you pay 5000 Cedis for the life 
of you know somebody who was pushing a truck. Surely that’s human life, 
value [is] the same but the socio-economics of it, very different.” (CSO) 
 
8.4.4.2 Symbolic measures  
 
For the symbolic reparations, it appears that that there has not been an effort towards 
effecting action.  
“Erecting monuments, none of it was done, rendering apologies, 
commemorative events, conferring national honours, those were the 
symbolic reparations. Zero! Zilch! Zero score, none of them was done.” 
(Former NRC staff) 
 
This zero-implementation observation was shared across the board by all the 
respondents. All the respondents were aware of the symbolic measures and how these 
had not been carried out.  
“I know some of the recommendations even said we should set up 
monuments and all those things acknowledging some people for all the 
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pains they went through especially those that we cannot really give them 
anything. I don’t think we have even done any monuments to that effect.” 
(Reparations Committee) 
 
The Reparations Committee was aware of the symbolic reparation recommendations 
but was unable to implement them because in the first place the committee only 
received the funds for the monetary compensation and secondly, there was a sense of 
unwillingness by the government to commit to the symbolic reparation, particularly 
the apologies. One member of the Reparations Committee explained that they made 
the effort to pursue the symbolic reparations but the government was unresponsive. 
“We made recommendations, we prepared letters to go for apologies. 
Now we hit a [snag]. ‘How can I apologise for something I haven’t done?’ 
You see these things were done by other people.” (Reparations 
Committee) 
 
When the issue of apology letters reached the cabinet for approval, there was 
reluctance about their implementation.  
“’Why do we have to apologise? … Are we going to apologise on 
somebody’s behalf?’ But there were political implications because some 
of the people who were responsible for some of the atrocities were out of 
government and they were saying these things and that’s why they ended 
the apologies.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
Some of the things they were saying included having no regret for the course of events 
during their regimes and justifying their acts, a fact the ruling regime considered would 
dilute the apologies because they would be apologising on behalf of individuals and 
governments that did not have any remorse for their actions. 
 
An incident that was particularly recounted was of the former President Rawlings 
allegedly declaring that if he had the opportunity that was presented before him in 
those times he would do the same kind of things again. This attitude was interpreted 
by the majority of the Ghanaians that he was not remorseful for his actions.  
 
The Ghanaian apology fiasco became complex and was described by one of the 
respondents as being;   
“A case of the one living person whose ‘I’m sorry’ would have made a 
difference was unwilling to apologise and the one with the official 
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authority to apologise on everybody’s behalf was not the one who did the 
things.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
In this case, the apologies would have remained hallow because the antagonist 
remained unrepentant. Had he been dead, perhaps the apologies would have been 
accepted. This impasse meant that the apologies issue was therefore left hanging. 
 
8.4.4.3 Property Restitutions 
 
Property restitutions as a programme was started before the commission took place. 
The Reparations Committee continued with the process of property returns as 
recommended by the commission.  
 
For those who fell under the category of property losses, the Committee facilitated the 
process of returns. In some cases however, it was still either investigating or 
negotiating for the returns. 
“Restitution for victims of illegal seizures of properties, lands, houses, 
farms and vehicles, most of it has been done. A lot of properties were duly 
confiscated, they had been confiscated by the state but they were returned 
to their rightful owners. Except in circumstances where third party rights 
had accumulated … then there was need for negotiations and I think some 
of it is still going on.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
For those whose reputation had been tarnished, the ‘restoration of their good name’ 
has not yet happened. 
 
8.4.4.4 Community reparation 
 
In this case, the NRC recommended a market be rebuilt in Namoo. This also has not 
happened.  
“We recommended that government helps them to restore the community 
[by building the market], it didn’t happen.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
8.4.4.5 Scholarship scheme 
 
I did not come across anyone who had benefitted from this scheme however according 
to the Reparations Committee, this was covered under the monetary compensation. 
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“We made some recommendations for scholarships for the children of you 
know people who had suffered atrocities, that one was paid, it was part 
of the monetary compensation.” (Former NRC Staff) 
 
The process under which it had been carried out was however not detailed.  
 
8.4.4.6 Social security/pensions 
 
It was not clear whether this scheme had taken off or if there were any beneficiaries 
from the programme. 
“We made recommendations for social security provisions to be made … 
they were very few, they concerned some soldiers that had been deprived 
of some facilities during some of these missions and when we looked at 
their grievances part of the solution for them consisted in getting some 
sort of social security payments to them and not just one off payment but 
like a pension scheme … but I honestly don’t know that one [the 
progress].” (Former NRC Staff) 
 
According to one of the victims, who had been a soldier, he had only received the 
monetary compensation due to the violations he had endured during detention and 
exile but he was not considered for the social security provisions and was attempting 
to pursue that. As far as he was concerned he was not aware of any of his former 
colleagues who were also victims on such a scheme. 
 
8.4.4.7 The Reparations Fund 
 
There was not much awareness about this fund from respondents and it was even less 
talked about. One of the staff of the Reparation Committee however pointed out that 
there was consideration about this fund from the committee but it was not followed 
up.  
“They even nominated the people [to compose the commission] but in the 
long run they didn’t. When the reparations implements (sic) were made 
from the government coffers, they didn’t set up this fund.” (Reparations 
Committee) 
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As far as any of the respondents could tell, the fund had not been instituted and there 
were no contributions being made. The money for reparations was paid directly to the 
implementation secretariat in the Ministry of Justice and not to the fund.  
 
8.4.5 Reactions to the reparation 
 
According to the Reparations Committee, they encountered three responses to the 
payments that were being made.  
 
The first category of beneficiaries were overwhelmed with the gesture and the amount 
that was being given. The respondent particularly refers to a case of a market woman 
who had lost all of her property during the destruction of a market in northern Ghana.  
“We were in a place [in the north of Ghana] and I called this woman to 
the office, interrogated her, I was satisfied that she’s the person. I gave 
her a million [Cedis]  and she just stood there looking at me, so I didn’t 
understand her, I said that’s your money and she’s looking at me, we were 
at the Attorney General’s office so I called the senior lawyer there and I 
said, ‘look, I am having this difficulty, I have given the woman the money 
she’s standing there and she doesn’t want to go away … he said the 
woman standing there had never, let me put it in Uganda money, you 
know, has never had a shilling in her life, she never had a shilling like this 
in her life and now you are giving her a million shillings she doesn’t know 
what to do … my officer went with them and opened a bank account for 
the woman.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
 In this case, the amount received was clearly beyond what the beneficiary expected. 
 
One of the former NRC staff reported that for some individuals, they were grateful that 
the process of the NRC took place and that they were able to be compensated.  
“People meet me and say ‘oh you were the so so and so of the NRC’ and 
every now and again it comes up but in a very opportunistic manner in 
partisan political discourse. People will use it against the other side to say 
that you are the ones who unearthed the evil or you are the ones who 
perpetrated the evil but the victims who receive reparations, I meet them 
and they come forward and say thank you.” (Former NRC Staff) 
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A second category felt that the amount that they received was not proportionate to the 
suffering they had endured.  
“Other people were not as grateful. Somebody says, ‘I suffered and that’s 
all that you’re giving me, take your money away.’ And I had to call them, 
talk to them … ‘How much do you pay for someone who was killed? We 
are giving you something to start life again. If you reject it, we’ll take it 
back. That is not nice, somebody is trying to be nice to you and you are 
trying to be offensive to that person.’ Eventually she agreed, she took the 
money and that kind of thing.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
A third category did not even care about the monetary benefits distributed.  
“Some people have come to me and they said, ‘look, I don’t need money, I 
am happy that there is a document which my children can see which tells 
them that something wrong was done to me, I’m satisfied with that. 
Money cannot pay me for my suffering.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
The reaction of the individuals according to a member the Reparation Committee all 
boils down to the individual temperaments.  
“[It is) human nature. Somebody is forgiving, somebody harbours a 
grudge until he dies … some people have written wonderful letters for me 
to thank the government on their behalf for having done such a sensible 
thing and having the reconciliation. The little money which some people 
get, they set up businesses. Other people are still crying for the money, ‘it’s 
not sufficient, they took my 5000, 50, 60,000 Ghanaian Cedis, if you take 
it to American dollars at that time and the worth of the American dollars 
now is even so much more, now you’ve given me this and they’re fighting 
over it … human nature, those who understand and are willing to forgive, 
those who understand but they feel they should have more than they have 
been given.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
On the other hand, a popular view was that following the NRC, people had moved on 
and were not expectant of the reparations.  
“My preliminary thinking is that Ghanaian society was healed and 
reconciled with the realities of the past whilst the proceedings were on 
the way and people moved on with their lives. And those who received 
reparations, very few of them actually waited expectantly.” (Former NRC 
Staff) 
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This as quite similar to my observation of the general attitude of individuals I 
interacted with regarding the issue of reparations. Whereas they considered it an 
important gesture, it was not viewed as a priority.  
“I think that for most people, it was like a [bonus], even if it had not come, 
even if they had not received monetary reparation or compensations, they 
would have been just fine … I do not think that you will find many 
Ghanaians who are sitting there waiting for some reparations from the 
NRC report to happen … I think they have moved on.” (CSO) 
 
Of course, it is important to point out that this view was expressed by individuals who 
did not consider themselves direct victims of abuses. 
 
The choice to focus on monetary payments over other forms has been viewed as an 
insufficient approach to addressing the issue of reconciliation in Ghana. The 
reconciliation component was regarded as being more significant. Selecting to focus on 
the money component was likened to pulling the plug on what many consider a huge 
step to the healing process. One of the respondents who was deeply involved with the 
NRC process and keen on the follow up commented that the selection of the form of 
reparation carried out undercut the work of the commission and undermined the 
recommendations. 
“I thought it was a shame because the recommendations were quite 
helpful to strengthen the reconciliation process, issues like reconciliation 
day, issues like education for people who suffered and experienced abuse 
were helpful but the selectivity in terms of picking and choosing what to 
implement in my view was one of the greatest disservice that was done to 
the NRC.” (CSO) 
 
 The government was criticised for selecting what suited them in consolidating their 
image. The payments coincidentally were also launched close to the end of the NPP 
term in 2007/2008 and has sometimes been viewed as being used for political gains to 
“more or less get people to side with the party.” (Individual, informal interview) 
 
The respondents were also of the view that the selection of the monetary payments 
was because it was easier to carry out. It would resonate more strongly with the direct 
victims but also at the same time give credence to government’s assertion that it had 
done something with the recommendations. 
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According to a respondent from CDD who had carried out the victims’ study following 
the NRC, some of the victims were not contented with the amount and timing of the 
monetary payments. The amount was too low for some of them who were expecting 
much bigger amounts but also the period between the NRC and actual payment took 
too long. He was nonetheless eager to distinguish between the “reconciliation process” 
and the “payments” because according to him, the reconciliation process empowered 
the victims into making their suffering public and this opportunity to speak of their 
experiences was useful to their healing. Reparation was therefore viewed as a bonus to 
the reconciliation process rather than a facilitator in this case. 
 
8.5   Salient themes arising from the interviews 
 
This section consists of topics that emerged from the interviews which I considered 
relevant in contextualising the social, political and economic understandings of the 
NRC and implementation. A number of them relate to the themes highlighted above but 
also cut across. I therefore considered it more pragmatic to discuss them separately.  
The discussion is divided into three parts; the key issues, challenges observed in the 
implementation and proposals for an ideal implementation programme.  
 
8.5.1 Key issues  
 
The key issues contains general observations by the respondents regarding the truth 
commission and the reparation programme. 
 
8.5.1.1 Politics  
 
Politics featured prominently in the establishment of Ghana’s truth commission and 
the processes that followed it. One respondent pointed out that, 
“The whole programme became like a battle ground between two 
political parties … it was difficult for one side to really accept some 
recommendations.” (CSO) 
 
In most of the narratives, the respondents explained that the political undertones 
manifested as a division between one political party and the other, have always been 
part and parcel of Ghana’s political scene. With the transition from the military to 
constitutional governments, this divide became even sharper with the rhetoric of ‘us’ 
against ‘them’.  
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First, after the transformation to constitutional rule in 1993, a large number of the 
personalities from the PNDC military regime remained in power. After the 2000 
presidential elections, the same crop of leaders remained because it had transformed 
itself into a political party, the NDC, and had won the elections. However, there was no 
will to address the past violations. A key reason being that the political elites were 
heavily implicated in perpetrating the very atrocities they were meant to address.  
 
The discussion around the need for the truth commission became most pronounced 
during the 2000 presidential campaigns.  The then opposition party of NPP made the 
issue of addressing past injustices a central component of their campaigns. “The Kufour 
government had made it part of its election manifesto. That when he comes to power it is 
one of the things he is going to do.” (University Professor) 
 
Secondly, there was a lot of disagreement on the mandate and protocol for the 
operation of the TRC.  
“Both sides [NDC and NPP] agreed there was a need for some form of 
reconciliation but they did not agree on some of the modalities ... In fact 
the Rawlings group had to boycott the discussion on the bill, the national 
reconciliation bill and it was because they felt that there was a deliberate 
effort on the part of the Kufour government to witch hunt the Rawlings 
government.” (University Professor) 
 
In the narratives, it was pointed out that a key issue that arose from the debates was in 
defining the real purpose of the NRC and this was not properly done. Whereas the pro-
NRC perceived it as a tool set up to genuinely address victims concerns and facilitate 
national reconciliation, the anti-NRC looked at it as a political tool to enhance the image 
of one group over the other or what one respondent referred to as the ‘political 
propaganda value.’ This is because it was a well-known fact that some of the 
perpetrators were in positions of power and one of the main political groups, the NDC 
had a history of being instrumental in perpetuating the abuses.  By bringing to the open 
the atrocious stories about their supposed opponents, it would discredit their 
opponents while at the same time paint the incumbent as sensitive to human rights 
issues. 
 
The source of the disagreement stems from the decision to attempt to restrict the scope 
of the truth commission to only the non-democratic regimes of which Rawlings played 
a large part. This was therefore perceived as an anti Rawlings proceeding.  
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“People felt that, the other side felt that since Rawlings had been involved 
in two military coups, it was a direct attack on them. So they were 
advocating for including all regimes.” (CSO) 
 
The attempt at excluding certain military and coup periods was also interpreted as the 
government protecting its own history. This strategy further fuelled the criticism about 
the partiality of the whole NRC process as explained below. 
“I remember the first period that was proposed, the current 
administration [NDC] which was then in the opposition kicked the bill 
[out] simply because that period excluded I think the 1969 [coup] period 
… and people believe that coup was supported by the administration that 
was then the incumbent [2001 - 2009] which is now the opposition. So 
they saw it like a deliberate attempt to exclude their past and include the 
past of this current administration.” (University Professor) 
 
In the end however, all regimes right from independence in 1957 to 1993 were 
included. However, the damage had already been done by the Kufour government’s 
insistence on the military regimes. The political skirmishes had already divided up 
sections of the population between those supporting the TRC and those remaining 
suspicious depending on their political affiliation. 
“The government was too insistent which to me was unnecessary. If they 
had initially allowed to say [investigate] all regimes, it would have taken 
away that [suspicious] perception. In the end, more of the [findings] 
which would have been made would have still been under the Rawlings 
regime. So by the government party dragging this thing on and on, it 
created problems for the whole process right from the beginning and once 
that partisanship idea came into it, people were dealing with it along 
those lines … People supportive of the Kufuor government think it is a time 
for them to come and say all those things that happened to them while 
these people, the Rawlings group were on the offensive.” (University 
Professor) 
 
Had the Kufuor administration been tactful, they could have eliminated the suspicions 
of partiality because according to all of the respondents, the Rawlings group which was 
crying foul would still have had the more incriminating findings against their various 
previous administrations because they had held power the longest.  
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“They [NPP] failed at that time to understand the fact that, forgetting 
about the AFRC [following Rawlings’ 1979 Coup] which was just about a 
year and 6 months or so sort of regime, the PNDC, right up to NDC, PNDC 
alone was in power for about 18 to 19 years, so definitely when you are 
looking at human rights abuses of past regimes, they will carry a whole 
lot on their head already, more so it was a military regime. So I think that 
was what they failed to appreciate … because I can’t see how a military 
regime that was in power for 3 years would have so much human rights 
abuses compared to one that was in power for 18 years and over.” 
(University Professor) 
 
These political debates over the NRC were then interpreted as one political group 
attempting to tarnish the image of the other.  
“I also share the opinion that it was a calculated attempt by the 
incumbent at that time to weaken the opposition by bringing out their 
atrocities that they committed for people to see how badly they were and 
all those things … you know politicians will do whatever they have to do 
in order to maintain power … so even if they have to dig your past and 
paint your past which is a bit brighter in a more darker manner for you 
to look not presentable to those who will be voting, they’ll do. So people 
also believe that was the mentality of the administration at that time and 
that was how the whole process was run.” (CSO) 
 
Despite the political brawls, the whole process of the NRC was not written off, 
particularly, its potential benefit to the victims. However, the respondents 
continuously emphasised how the inclusion of political issues tarnished its image and 
possible impact.   
“I personally think it [the NRC] was a good exercise. If we had tried as 
much as possible to take out the politics, it would have been a very very 
successful thing … politics down-played some of the success stories we 
could have witnessed about the whole process.” (CSO) 
 
One respondent raised an interesting observation regarding the politicisation of a truth 
commission process and the implementation of the recommendations.  
“When you adopt that stand now [accusing the government of using the 
NRC as a political witch hunting tool], now if you even see the 
recommendation to be something good, will you have the moral right to 
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do it because people will start judging you. When you were in the 
opposition, you saw this to be political and now you’re implementing the 
same political agenda recommendations?” (Individual, informal 
interview) 
 
This observation is reflected in the fact that since the NDC took over power in 2009, 
the issue of the NRC or the continuation of the implementation of the recommendations 
was shelved. At the time of the field work, only the Attorney General’s office through 
the Reparations Committee appeared to be the only institution still concerned with 
reparation or the NRC. In every interview, either the respondent expressed that they 
were not aware of what was going on or they would refer me to the Attorney General’s 
office for further information.  
 
The third issue related to politics has been on the selection of which aspects of the 
recommendations to implement.  By focusing on reparations, which happens to be 
more visible, it has been interpreted as a political decision aimed at bolstering the 
image of the government and adding to its credibility as for instance a more human 
rights friendly government concerned about the rights of those who had been 
victimised. The timing of such programmes very close to the elections was also seen as 
a strategic tool to gain votes and get re-elected. So in a way it was motivated by the 
“selfish interest” of the government to front themselves as caring about the victims. 
 
Furthermore, it was argued by some of the respondents that it was inappropriate for 
Ministry of Justice and the office of the Attorney General to be given the responsibility 
of implementation yet they are political positions. Their involvement made the whole 
process liable to political influences. For instance when the government changes, these 
positions also change and in most cases, it will be party loyalists appointed to such 
posts. 
 
8.5.12 Classification of victims 
 
In Ghana’s case, the victims were not dominated by a particular group or class but it 
cut across society. Political elites as well as the local populations were all targeted. 
“[The violence] cut across because some of the things that they did, 
sometimes ordinary traders at Makola [market], they say you’ve sold 
above control price, and so all your things are taken away or your shop is 
burnt and things like that … they went into villages and maltreated 
 231 
people and so on while others were also targeted as political elite … when 
the government took over there were several political elites to whom they 
targeted (sic).” (Reparations Committee) 
 
The NRC did not provide a breakdown of the socio-economic status of the victims and 
neither did the different respondents. However, the response of the different victims 
to the reparation and in particular the monetary compensation could be related to their 
status as victims. Whereas some actually needed it, for some it was inconsequential 
while for others it was not enough. 
 
8.5.1.3  Indifference to the post NRC process 
 
During the field work, it was obvious that a lot of the ordinary people were not 
following the NRC process or outcome. A lot of the times, although many were aware 
of the content of the reparation recommendation they confessed that they had not read 
the report. When I asked specific questions about items contained in the report, they 
responded that they had not been able to read the report.  
 
A similar response was also given regarding the status of the implementation. For 
instance, one respondent who was quite knowledgeable about the NRC and the 
circumstances surrounding its establishment surprisingly expressed unfamiliarity to 
the payment of reparation. 
“There was recommendations for reparations but I remember for a very 
long time nothing was said about it and once, at one time it came in the 
papers that they have started paying. Whether or not they actually paid, 
I don’t remember but there were recommendations for reparations.” 
(CSO)  
 
When I inquired into the respondents’ views on the work that the Reparations 
Committee had done so far regarding the processes they had used to identify and pay 
out the monetary compensation, I often got a variation of statements such as;  
“I have to confess, I really don’t know much about the process. That I have 
to confess, I really do not know much about it.” (Individual, informal 
interview) 
 
A lot of the people relied on media for such information.  
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“most of the times, you get the stories from the dailies and all those things 
… people would even call and find out, radio host programmes would call 
key people like those ministries and then the committees and find out 
from them what has been happening. So we’re getting that information 
… in terms of the process, whether you need to go here, go and register, 
do A, B and C before you get your funds, whether the funds are transferred 
to your account or you are given physical cash and all that. If I tell you I 
know I would not be fair to myself that I say I know it. I do not know the 
process.” (CSO) 
 
This confession of not knowing about what is happening would then be followed by, 
“but have you heard any information on that [reparation]?” directed at me. It was 
puzzling whether the question was asked in genuine curiosity or to gauge how much I 
knew about what was happening. 
 
From the interviews, it was also evident that the respondents interpreted the fact that 
government had not carried out the implementation of symbolic measures as 
indicative of the government’s and the rest of the Ghanaian population’s apathy 
towards the symbolic measures.  
“Those ones [non implementation of the symbolic measures] are glaring 
signs of we not really bothering because if I believe for instance if we’ve 
done the monuments, people would definitely acknowledge that okay, this 
symbol is also telling others that whatever stories I’m telling that I went 
through this period is true and that also would have been a source of 
maybe joy for some people.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
8.5.1.4  Changing priorities 
 
For a number of individuals and civil society organisations, once the commission had 
closed its doors, they moved on to different areas. One respondent who had been active 
with the NRC argued that he had to concentrate on other areas where he could get an 
actual income. Besides, the NRC was not ‘catchy’ anymore. 
“As with all things when life is reduced to trying to make a living. I 
changed my writing priorities, I was writing a lot on the NRC … [but] some 
things became more compelling … [things] that affect policy 
immediately.” (CSO) 
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The post-NRC phase seemed not to be financially rewarding. The government was 
dragging its feet on the implementation processes and the priority areas for both 
government and the international actors had shifted which therefore drew a large 
section of actors away from the process. 
 
8.5.1.5 The willingness and ability to implement recommendations 
 
Whereas there was consensus on the impact of limited funds for the implementation 
of the recommendations on reparations, a number of respondents pointed out that 
there is a difference between the will to implement and the ability to do so. Even if the 
ability to implement is there but the will is lacking, then the whole programme has the 
likelihood of failure. The ability in this context mainly refers to the funding while the 
will is the desire to see that the intentions are transformed into action. 
 
“All these important recommendations will be made but sometimes it also 
entails funding to implement them and the government after even 
allowing it to take place thinks it has done more than enough and they 
decide to do something else or they claim it will not have enough of those 
resources to do it and it will all go back to for what purpose was the TRC 
set up, if the main purpose was to tarnish the image of one group, then by 
just going through the process, we would have done so and so the 
government will not even have the eagerness and the political will to 
continue from there.” (CSO) 
 
It was also interesting that the government chose a scheme that was financially more 
demanding, that is, the monetary compensation, over those which might have cost less, 
such as the symbolic measures. One argument advanced for this was that it could be 
viewed as a tangible sign that the government was actually getting the work done. 
“Payment of monetary compensation constituted an immediate 
announcement to people who were yearning for it or who were eager for 
it that government was anxious to implement the recommendations. And 
from a political standpoint, once you started that, you could always say 
that you are working on it. The surprising thing is that government in my 
view did the things that were far more expensive, financially expensive 
and didn’t do the things that would have cost nothing – apologising to 
women for example. Two bundles of paper, two reams of paper with an 
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apology or a certificate would have been sufficient for the symbolic 
reparations [apologies].” (Former NRC Staff) 
 
He further elaborates as below;  
“Even if the monies were small individually, collectively it was a huge 
amount for government to come up with. They could easily erect bronze 
statues, one in the centre of every town, the ten capital cities in Ghana I 
mean the regional capitals. They could easily cause the hospitals, ‘here is 
a circular, build.’ And they can take 100 years to do but the point is you 
can say that government was doing something about it. Apology, they 
could have done it so easily, all these things, community reparations in 
that village you give the command to the district chief executive the MPs 
common fund, they apply some of it in two years the community would be 
rejuvenated. These are things they could have done and a reparations 
implementation committee could easily make measures one could easily 
have been established to ensure that this gets done. Not one was done. 
Not any of these were done.” (Former NRC Staff) 
 
A number of the respondents also argued that implementation of reparations, 
particularly those involving structural or institutional changes would have the 
potential of benefitting more members of the society than only the victims in the long 
run and thereby contribute to the overall development if put in place.  
 
In one case, a respondent discussed a paper he wrote as part of the National 
Governance Programme in which he recommended that as part of reparation, 
government should also focus on institutional building. 
“institutional arrangements which will outlive the government itself … so 
if you created a trauma and counselling unit or department at every 
district and every regional hospital, five or ten years later it will not be 
about victims of atrocities in the past, it will be about accident victims 
and people suffering domestic violence and all of that. It will serve the 
greater social and public good. It is a shame that government didn’t do 
those thing.” (CSO) 
 
Similarly, with the symbolic gestures, it was perceived these could have been done in a 
way that would have gone a long way in showing the government empathising with the 
victims.  
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“The apology for women for example it would have been a one off thing 
but it would have been hugely symbolic of government’s remorse and one 
could say that the president had on behalf of the people apologised to 
women for whatever it would have been worth.” (CSO) 
 
The reluctance by the government to implement the symbolic aspects of reparation to 
an extent was interpreted as the government having had ulterior motives to the whole 
NRC and reparation agenda.  
 
It however also raises a complex issue of expecting the incumbent to take responsibility 
for atrocities committed by a previous regime. As elaborated by one of the respondents, 
in Ghana, the previous regime actually made it difficult for the incumbent government 
because they refused to show remorse for their actions. How could the NPP then offer 
apologies while members of the NDC and their apologists continued to justify their 
actions? What would be the impact of these apologies or monuments to the victims?  
 
8.5.1.6  Role of the international community 
 
Ghana’s TRC was exceptionally localised in terms of funding, participation and media 
coverage. Despite this, a number of the respondents felt that the international 
community should have been more involved, particularly in terms of making the 
government prioritise reparation and in funding the implementation. 
“The international community too can be of help. This it can insist that 
some of these things must be done not just going through the process but 
the implementations stage and indeed that also, the international 
community will also be able to put its own resources to assist in the 
implementation.” (CSO) 
 
“Issues of human rights is now international, it’s no longer, in fact we now 
talk of sovereignty with responsibility so if it’s matters about human 
rights, the international community can intervene ... issues of human 
rights must be of interest to the international community and it must do 
whatever it can to see and to help to see to the implementation.” 
(University Professor) 
 
The role of ICTJ was however commended by CDD and the organisations who were 
involved in the coalition. Furthermore, one of the former staff of the NRC explained 
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how they networked with both regional and international experts on truth 
commissions to improve the Ghana process. As much as the funding and impetus for 
the commission was local, there was still international involvement, albeit at a lower 
scale in comparison to other commissions.  
 
8.5.1.8  Context specific approaches 
 
A number of the respondents emphasised that one needed to understand Ghana’s case 
within Ghana’s context rather than understanding it from the lens of other societies 
that have gone through truth commission mechanisms, particularly those initiated 
after a war. 
“How some people conceive of or conceptualise TRCs, it’s the problem. 
Because they think of it in mostly in terms of post war which I think is a 
flawed thinking. Because they think of it in terms of post war situations 
then they expect post war responses or post war measures.” (CSO) 
 
According to the respondent, sometimes these contexts within which a commission 
emerges determines the perceptions towards it and the outcomes. In Ghana’s case, 
whereas the truth commission was a necessary endeavour, mainly because of the 
experiences of repression, it was assumed that payment of reparations did not stand 
out as a priority. What was considered critical was the importance of the overall 
process of striving to attain national reconciliation.  
“My view is, in the case of Ghana, it was so so necessary [for the 
commission to take place]. To be confident to say it was so so necessary, 
you must read not just reparations, it’s an end product, but the means 
matter, the process also mattered and I think that in Ghana the process 
mattered more than the outcome.” (Former NRC staff) 
 
Additionally, the focus in Ghana was in getting the narrative out by giving an 
opportunity to the victims to tell of their experiences and for most of the respondents, 
it was assumed that the victims did not come with a mind-set expectant of 
compensation. 
“In Ghana you have a situation where most people who came forward 
were surprised when sometimes the commission would ask ‘so what do 
you want us to do for you or in other words when they ask questions about 
reparations because most people didn’t come with a reparative motive in 
mind.” (former NRC Staff) 
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Reparations therefore took on a different meaning beyond material or quantifiable 
benefits. 
 “They [the victims] felt that there was an opportunity to come and vent 
[through the TRC], tell what happened to them and most did it with that 
in mind, not the expectation of reparations. So for the woman who says, ‘I 
just wanted to know how my loved one died, is it true that they tied 
cement block on his back and threw him into the high seas?’ or ‘I want my 
father’s remains so I can bury it, I don’t care how, I just want to give him 
a dignified burial.’ That’s the reparations they were seeking. For those 
who said, ‘well, you know, our loved ones were tortured, and murdered or 
executed by the state and buried in mud graves we want to bury them in 
a befitting manner.’ That’s the reparations, so once we were able to 
exhume their remains, identify them properly, preserve them, hand them 
over and they went and buried and put a mark there and that’s their loved 
ones graves. Then the children who were then you know 18 or 23 know 
that their father, that’s their father’s grave. For them that was it.” 
(Reparations Committee) 
 
From this perspective, there was a lot of emphasis on the process of narrating the 
experiences through the NRC and what it did for the victims. 
“Was that process in any way valuable to them, the healing, does it come 
in the reparations? I believe that the implementation of a reparations 
programme would undoubtedly contribute to the healing process I think 
but most importantly it would contribute to the rehabilitation of people, 
that’s what the reparations will do. But if it is about reconciliation, if it is 
about the healing I think that a good chunk of it happens during the 
hearing process, the activities surrounding the mere fact of making a 
statement, the fact of testifying before the commission, the fact of the 
state itself coming forward and commiserating with the victims, the fact 
of victims having a space to congregate not under trees playing draughts 
and celebrating misery or whatever but sometimes coming together to 
articulate strong views and even the demands that become part of the 
reparations programme.” (CSO) 
 
Of course, this perception draws quite heavily on the purpose for which the 
commission was created. National reconciliation was a key component to the existence 
of the commission and therefore it was highly likely that the perceptions to its 
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outcomes would be viewed through its conformity or nonconformity to facilitating 
reconciliation.  
 
Most of the respondents therefore argued that rather than focusing on the outcomes, 
in this case meaning its compliance with the implementation of reparation which was 
the focus of my research, the NRC should be studied in tandem with the process.  
“There is a good deal of value in the TRC process itself which should not 
be ignored or glossed over even as we pay attention to the outcomes. But 
if you look only at outcome and your outcome is measured in terms of 
what has happened to the things written in the book? There are things 
that as I have told you in the case of Ghana, there are things that have 
happened not as a result of what came out of the book but they have 
happened because of the process, the military making changes, the 
security, I mean especially the police revamping their courses, the course 
structure, command and control introducing human rights and 
democratic policing principles or courses.” (CSO) 
 
A lot of the times, the respondents pointed out that it was not about monetary benefits 
but letting their experiences be known.  
“[There was] a woman who came and said ‘my son who was slightly 
mentally handicapped was shot and he didn’t understand what a curfew 
was and soldiers chased him into the house because he had broken a 
curfew, he was mentally unwell and rushed into the house. They chased 
him and shot him in the back and then when I picked him up in my arms 
they pointed a gun at me and said I should leave him and so my son bled 
to death and this was just about 6:30 in the evening, curfew was 6 until 
the next morning, 6am when the curfew was lifted then you could go to 
the aid of your dying son.’ Now for that woman, twenty something years 
on 1979 to 2003, coming forward to share that story was not about 
monetary reparations and when she was asked that question, she looked 
surprised because for her it was about not money but coming to say this 
is what these people did to me.” (Former NRC staff) 
 
This is not to say that all those who testified did not expect reparations. However, it 
was clear that those who were particularly well-off tended not to pursue the issue of 
reparations. Others however clearly expected a payback for their losses. 
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“There were people who came [to testify because of the reparations] and 
there were people who were even embarrassed at the suggestion [of 
reparations]. And some people didn’t come to testify because they felt that 
the public will think that they came to the commission because of 
reparations.  A lot of rich people did not … want to testify in public 
because of the tag of reparations seeking, rent seeking behaviours. But 
there were those who came and said … ‘soldiers seized my tray load of 
doughnuts and it was the family’s capital. We had even borrowed money 
to buy the flour and the baking powder and all of that and soldiers just 
sold it or ate it and whatever. It was at that time let’s say 4 pounds, in 
today’s terms maybe it’s about 800 Ghana Cedis and I would want it back. 
There were people who came forward and said so.” (Former NRC staff) 
 
It is unfortunate that these views expressed by respondents about the importance of 
the process over the outcomes could not be corroborated due to the few numbers of 
victims I interviewed. Those I interviewed clearly wanted and expected reparations, as 
highlighted in the CDD survey following the TRC. The view is therefore dependent on 
the position of the respondent. 
 
8.5.1.9  The Individual versus National 
 
I encountered instances where the respondents attempted to explain the distinction of 
the outcome of the NRC process at the individual level and the national level. This was 
particularly in respect to the reconciliation aspect of the commission. They argued that 
at the individual level, there was a more positive outcome than at the national and there 
was a snag in transferring the individual experiences to the national.  
“It’s the difficulties in trying to transfer that healing and reconciliation at 
the individual level to the national level … I think from the individual level, 
it worked for some people but moving it from that level to the national, 
that is where we started looking at the political side of it … I don’t think 
we really really appreciated this thing, the kind of healing if we had 
allowed the whole process to go on without the political undertone it 
would bring to this nation … we achieved so much from it but I believe we 
could have achieved more if we had allowed the whole process go without 
the political undertones.” (Former NRC Staff) 
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My perception was that the individual healing was again an aspect speculated upon by 
individuals who were not direct victims. It was not possible to verify this position 
because of the small sample size of the direct victims I encountered. Although the 
victims I interviewed reported “feeling happy” with the process from the perspective 
that it gave them a chance to tell their story, they still conveyed that they were not 
content with the entire process because of what they received as reparation. I would 
therefore be hesitant to refer to that as having experienced “healing” or “individual 
reconciliation.” 
 
8.5.2 Challenges in implementation 
 
Below are the challenges identified by the respondents in the implementation of the 
reparations process. 
 
8.5.2.1 Expectations 
 
During the implementation of the reparation programme, some of the respondents 
pointed out the disparity between what the victims expected to get and what they 
actually got. The financial compensation was paid out not on the basis of what the 
victims lost but rather a token sum that was fixed at between two million and thirty 
million Cedis. Sometimes, the amount that a victim got was considered by them as not 
being proportionate to the loss they had suffered and they therefore expressed 
disappointment.  
 
According to a staff at CDD, after they had carried out the victims’ survey, they urged 
the implementing institution to take on the issue of expectation seriously.  
“We also straight away went on to say that we’re asking that whatever 
institution will be put in place to start working on this reparation should 
not just jump [in] … they should first start looking at how to get people to 
accept whatever they are going to give them … and we were calling for 
the education before the payment starts so that if the person is coming to  
take, whether one million or two million, the person knows that this is just 
an acknowledgement of the state wrong doings some time past and not 
the state paying you for the wrongs you suffered.” (CSO) 
 
One of the victims I interviewed had received 1,500 Cedis as compensation and he was 
bitter over the amount because he felt that it did not come close to representing what 
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he had been through. He was arrested, shot, tortured and detained for nine years and 
after his release in 1992, he went into exile for eight years. In addition to this, he was 
laid off from his military position and not awarded the pensions he believes he is 
entitled to. Although it was not clear from the discussion whether his disgruntlement 
was with the army for not paying him his due pension or with the NRC and the 
reparation for awarding a small amount, he still expressed that it was unfair to 
categorise him with other individuals who might have suffered less harm but still 
received the same amount. 
 
Despite his concerns, he was using the experience and evidence from the NRC to pursue 
legal action against the army for denying him the pensions because according to him, 
the commission had established that his arrest and detention were unlawful and 
should therefore be interpreted as being in active service which would therefore 
compute a higher number of active service years in the army than had been computed 
for him. This would entitle him to receive pensions for which he had been ineligible. 
 
8.5.2.2 Missing information in the report 
 
According the Reparations Committee, they ran into the issue of persons whose names 
appeared in the report but no monetary compensation was allocated to them. 
“There were other people who actually appeared before the commission, 
their names are in the book but no recommendation was made by the 
report … we asked them to write a petition to the president. It was 
forwarded to the attorney General, I had it I went to brief, sometimes 
called them and interviewed them, and then later reparation managed to 
be paid to them.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
This same format of writing a petition to the president and verification process by the 
Reparations Committee was also carried out for individuals whose name had not 
appeared on the list.  These are individuals who had submitted testimonies but were 
not entitled to the specific reparations. 
“Looking at the report of the NRC, the report itself enumerated certain 
people who should be paid and the amount they should be paid … we had 
a situation where people’s names were mentioned as having suffered this 
but unfortunately, when they made the list of people who should be paid 
anything, their names wasn’t there. They also made a request to us and 
we had to prepare a supplementary list for two occasions. For authority 
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to be given to us to pay the money. I think we paid some and then we were 
expecting some 5 billion to come which never came.” (Reparations 
Committee) 
 
By the time of the field work, these cases were still unresolved according to the 
Reparations Committee since it was unlikely that more money would be released. 
Additionally, the former NRC staff were not in agreement with the issue of the 
supplementary list of victims suspecting that there could be cases of fraud and yet the 
Reparations Committee might not have a similar rigorous method of verifying the 
narratives of the victims.  
 
8.5.2.3 New testimonies 
 
Similar to the point above, once the payment of reparation had started, the Reparations 
Committee reported that they encountered various individuals who showed up 
claiming for reparation. These individuals claimed that they were victims but had not 
got the opportunity to appear before the commission. Like the previous category of 
missing information, they were also directed to write a petition to the president and 
were reviewed on a case by case basis.  
“After the commission had finished its work and we started paying them, 
people got to know and ‘ah! I missed an opportunity, why didn’t I go 
before the commission?’ And they come and tell me what I call cock and 
bull stories, how they were sick, how they couldn’t do anything. In all 
those cases, then I say, write a petition to the president so that the case 
can be examined.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
From the discussion with the Reparations Committee and former NRC staff, it appears 
that for such individuals who turn up to claim for compensation, as long as they did not 
appear before the commission or have their testimonies recorded, then they could not 
proceed further in their claims.  
“NRC is now being used as a yard stick. If you had been dismissed from the 
army or you had damaged whatever the case and you didn’t appear 
before the NRC and now you are asking for certain things, then now you 
see the NRC as the yard stick. Did you appear before the NRC, no you 
didn’t, that’s the end of it so even if you were entitled to something [there 
is no way].” (Reparations Committee) 
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8.5.2.4 Fraud 
 
A staff of the Reparations Committee cited cases of fraud by members of public who 
would try to take advantage to defraud the committee by pretending to be bona fide 
victims.  
“People who had hadn’t lost anything or had lost something but they 
thought ‘oh this was an occasion to go and make money.’ You know 
Africans our names are really similar. They’ve mentioned a name but the 
person had to bring an identity … you had to get to the story, to make sure 
this is the person.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
“At times we had mistaken identity. I remember on about two occasions, 
somebody came and sat down, because all these things were published, 
the person was able to tell stories that were not his.” (Reparations 
Committee) 
 
The best approach to this according to the Reparations Committee was to attempt to 
verify the stories and individuals, including finding witnesses to corroborate their 
stories if there was any doubt. My opinion from observing how the Citizen Registration 
system works in comparison to other African countries was that such cases of fraud 
would not have been too common. 
 
8.5.2.5 Conflicting structures  
 
The Reparations committee also raised an issue of cases where institutions responsible 
for paying the victims were either reluctant or were not updating their compensation 
payment schemes to reflect the changing economy. The two cases the respondent 
highlighted are related to the military compensations for dismissal.  
“[Some people] who even appeared before the commission, the 
commission says pay them compensation but the military people are 
saying, ‘ah, they were dismissed in 1981 therefore we’re going to pay them 
1981 rates.’ I have a file here, Mrs [names withheld], do you know what 
she is going to get? Two Cedis for 37 years’ service to her country. Two 
Cedis!” (Reparations Committee) 
 
In such cases, the victims sought the counsel of the Attorney general and the 
reparations committee. They accordingly pointed out that it was unrealistic to use the 
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conversion rates based on the period in which the individual was dismissed which 
should be amended.  
“We’ve written to them. We had a meeting with the military people and 
we decided that we are going to amend the law to make it possible and 
they should be paid at the current rate so the processes of reconciliation 
is going on.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
Additionally, it was pointed out that dealing with the military regarding certain awards 
was problematic. 
“You take the military for example, we wrote a cabinet paper that certain 
soldiers should be given certain honours. It was accepted and then 
soldiers came back and said, ‘ah you might be driving a wedge between 
us, there are other people who do not think that they should, so you should 
be careful.’ You see the problem? (Reparations Committee) 
 
I did not see the problem because he declined to elaborate on the issue however, by 
including it in the challenges, it highlights how sometimes the reparations and 
implementing systems can sometimes clash with established institutions. 
 
8.5.2.6 Overlapping programmes 
 
Before the commission and its recommendation, a process of returning property that 
had been seized during previous regimes had already been implemented and was being 
carried out. A committee chaired by Betty Mould-Iddrisu was set up in the Attorney 
General’s office to oversee the property returns. 
 
 The commission also proposed property returns as one of the recommendations in 
reparations. The office of the Attorney General had already been involved in this 
process and the Reparations Committee simply built on what was in place. 
 
According to the Reparations Committee, property returns tended to be more 
complicated and often lengthy processes. In some cases, the sitting occupants simply 
refused to vacate the property. 
“It’s not all smooth sailing. It took me three years to get somebody from a 
house which had been confiscated. She says, ‘Oh it shouldn’t be given to 
that man. I was in the security, such a very bad man, he did this, he did 
this, he did this.’ I said, ‘thank you very much, the government says give 
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his house to him.’ Each time we would write a letter, put a decree to get 
[her] out of the house. Eventually, [she] realised that [she] could not 
continue, then [she] did [left].” (Reparations Committee) 
 
In other cases, the property had changed ownership through a purchase which 
complicated the process. In some cases however, a decision had already been made 
about it in the courts, which in many cases took precedence. 
“We have also in respect of certain properties [which] had been given to 
some people and it was not recorded in the Council. So as far as our 
records read, the properties are confiscated with government. They gave 
the property to the real owner and some body goes there and says, ‘ah ah 
ah, I bought the property, these are my documents.’ Which means 
somebody at that time had done something unknown to cause all sorts of 
complications, legal and otherwise.” (Reparations Committee) 
 
Similarly, some of the programmes that were recommended under reparations were 
carried out outside the context of reparations.  
“Establishment of special facilities such as trauma counselling 
departments at each of the hospitals, that wasn’t done as a government 
policy but as a result of the horrendous testimonies that came out. Some 
of the hospitals took it upon themselves to mainstream trauma 
counselling and that sort of thing. Some of them have it, not because 
government said do it but because the hospital administration or 
administration decided to do it. I do not know whether to count that as 
[reparation being] done or not done, I think it’s not done … government 
could have easily issued a directive, and it would have been done as a 
government policy.” (CSO) 
 
According to this respondent, this was an oversight of the government in not 
promoting these programmes under reparation since the NRC had proposed similar 
measures. 
 
8.5.2.7 Political influences 
 
The issue of politics and its divisive tendencies has been persistent in the NRC process. 
In terms of implementation, it was pointed out more as a case of unwillingness than 
inability. 
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“Sometimes politicians have other priorities. The will to fully implement 
the recommendations of the report was there, the heart was, I wouldn’t 
say the flesh was weak, I think they had other priorities which to them 
seemed more important.” (CSO) 
 
The limited popularisation of the report was also attributed to political issues. For 
instance a number of the respondents wondered how I was able to access the NRC 
report because it was not in circulation.  
“Kufour’s government introduced the NRC and this government [Atta 
Mills Government of the NDC] saw the NRC as an attack on its heritage … 
one of their first acts, the first things they did was to pull the NRC report 
off the government website.” (CSO) 
 
The respondents also wondered whether the government going silent upon receiving 
the NRC report was not a means to counteract the arguments that were being fronted 
of the NRC being used by the sitting government for political gains during the election 
campaigns and further on to malign the previous governments. 
“I suspect that once the government got the report, it was October 2004, 
elections were in December 2004 … elections were just at the corner and 
for whatever reason I think they took the view that they would not make 
political capital out of it. The NDC which was then in the opposition but 
now in government was crying foul all along that this was intended to 
embarrass them and would be used for political purposes and 
campaigning and all of that. Throughout the 2004 campaigns, the 
elections, nobody made reference to the NRC report, government didn’t 
try to use it to paint the opposition black or to get mileage out of it.” 
(University Professor) 
 
Similarly, the reduction of the NRC discourse in public has also been attributed to the 
change in government. After 2009, the NDC which was mainly opposed to the NRC took 
over from the NPP that set it up. It was therefore not in their interest to acknowledge 
an exercise that publically outed their past atrocities nor attempt to pick up from where 
the previous government had left off. 
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8.5.3 Proposed framework for implementation 
 
A number of the respondents also expressed what they observed as being a more useful 
framework for the implementation of reparations as elaborated below. 
 
8.5.3.1 Nonpartisan institution 
 
A number of respondents viewed the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General’s office 
as being partisan because the heads of these institutions were appointed by the 
government. As such, it jeopardised the future of implementation if another party won 
an election. The respondents were of the view that an independent institution or 
government body takes over the implementation programme. 
“A ministry, government department or agency on its own which has 
nothing to do with politics so it doesn’t matter which party is in power, 
they [the institution] are looking at what the laws of the land says and the 
legal documents we have and they can deal with these sort of issues 
without necessarily looking at it from the party angle.” (CSO) 
 
Similar to the issue of a nonpartisan institution, the respondents also proposed that the 
individual that heads the implementation needs to be independent of partisan 
influence, whether the ruling government or the opposition.  
 
The fact that the Attorney General was instituted as the implementing office already 
influenced the thinking that it would not be free from political influences simply 
because the Attorney general is a political appointment dependent on the government 
or party in power or as aptly referred to one of the respondents, he is a ‘party man.’ It 
would therefore be more practical to appoint a body whose set up and personnel would 
not be changed with the composition of the government which therefore would give it 
a power of independence. 
 
8.5.3.2  Safeguarding the report and recommendations 
 
Some of the respondents argued that the NRC and its recommendations were not 
protected enough to ensure continuity. 
“The Laws establishing future TRCs should consider including making the 
recommendations, the findings mandatory for each successive 
government to follow so that citizens can hold them accountable. As of 
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now … once the regime is no longer there, it is seen that this regime came 
with it, it’s gone with it.” (CSO) 
 
Commissions take place within a political context and it is difficult to separate the 
political influences from the work of the commission itself. A change of regime for 
instance can have significant impact on the commission. This was particularly 
perceptible in Ghana following the political contestations surrounding the commission. 
With this in mind, there was a concern for finding means to safeguard the commission 
and its outcome from political influences and ensure that it can survive and operate 
from outside the political controls. According to them, the commission should not be 
left at the mercy of the whims of the outgoing or incoming regimes as happened in 
Ghana. Despite the political context and manifesto of each group, there needs to be a 
process that ensures continuity for the commission despite a change in government. 
 
A number of the respondents further pointed out that implementation could become 
difficult because there is no law that can be enforced to encourage implementation. 
Whereas there is a law establishing truth commissions, there is no such safeguards to 
guarantee the outcome of their recommendations, more so where no frameworks are 
even suggested.  
“They [truth commissions] have the legal backing setting them up but in 
that legal instrument, do they have the authority to decide that ‘we 
recommend this, and we want this to be done?’ More so, that institution 
is not a permanent institution, it finishes its work, it’s off.” (CSO) 
 
This issue is even vital considering that implementation of the whole range of 
recommendations is usually not a one-off matter but realistically is spread over time. 
The regulations would therefore make it mandatory irrespective of the power holder 
or government. 
 
8.5.3.2  Recommendations and development 
 
The linkages between development, the TRC and reparations were highlighted in the 
discussions.  
“A lot of the recommendations more or less dovetail into national 
developmental processes … [and] most countries do have what we call 
national development programmes and so if societies are able to infuse 
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these recommendations into the national agenda so it becomes part of 
the [national development programmes].” (CSO) 
 
This approach is not only specific for reparation but the whole range of 
recommendations. It gives a more holistic perspective to the work of the commissions 
which goes beyond the individual aspect to societal harms. Even if such 
recommendations in the short term may target individuals for instance in terms of 
prioritisation or preferential treatment, in the long run they can be broadened to serve 
the entire community. The key is in recommending sustainable measures that meet not 
only the short term individual needs of the victims but fit into the development agenda 
to uplift the entire society. An example that was cited by one of the respondents for 
instance was that the NRC recommended that a psychological unit be set up in each 
regional or district hospital. Whereas this may target victims, indirectly, it also serves 
the general community because there are a number of other reasons that would make 
a psychological unit necessary. It is therefore paramount to ensure that once such a 
unit is established it has to be sustainable and this means incorporating it in the 
development agenda, allocating a budget for it and focusing on long term goals for it 
rather than a one-off project that caters to the victims and then is disbanded or 
abandoned with a change in government. 
 
Society and development should be viewed as mutually inclusive. The harms suffered 
by individuals could cause them to withdraw from being active participants in society. 
In repairing these individuals, the goal should be to ensure they are reintegrated back 
into and made part of the society and so repair is not only for the individual but 
repairing the society to become more inclusive. Similarly, the commission itself was 
not intended to benefit only the individuals but the society as a whole. So the issue of 
reparations should be looked at from multiple layers, responding to the individual and 
also to the deficits that made the abuses occur. 
 
8.5.3.4  A multi-layered approach 
 
The implementation of the reparation programme was sometimes viewed as 
unsystematic. The focus on a lump sum one-off payment excluded the potential 
benefits that would have been reaped from other forms of redress. In practice, there 
were different levels of need that went beyond the one-off payment. For instance it is 
valid that some of the victims needed the money to recuperate the losses they had 
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suffered, particularly small business owners like the market women but it was not 
possible to pay a corresponding value to victims who suffered larger property losses. 
 
There was also constant reference that reparation needed to be ‘a real statement’ of 
which it was not. By this, they expected to witness remorse. The reference to this was 
in the apologies that never occurred. The assumption was that such a move would have 
shown that the commission was a genuine endeavour to facilitate healing and 
reconciliation rather than political propaganda. This was particularly a view I 
encountered from respondents who voiced criticism about the commission and were 
also not among the beneficiaries of the reparation. From the limited pool of victims I 
interviewed and who had received the payment, they were more concerned about the 
quantity of the payment over the apologies. Nonetheless, the observation still remains 
relevant because it cannot be assumed that victims’ needs are homogenous. 
 
Similarly, the assumption that victims should be contented with the monetary payment 
as a token of their suffering was not interpreted in the same way by the victims. The 
victims’ concerns were that a reparation programme should adequately reflect and 
address victims’ current needs. Some victims have continued to suffer which they 
attribute to the violations they encountered. More so, when they compare their current 
situation with their peers who did not experience the harm they suffered, they feel like 
they have been unfairly treated. A reparation programme should address that gap and 
find means of closing it, what one victim referred to as “resettling” them.  
“The first question is, what can this person do? Resettle those people. Most 
of us who even came, we were still young, we had our colleagues, our 
mates, they were still young, why don’t you reassign the person, he do his 
work?” (Victim) 
 
To place the above in a clearer context, the respondent felt that since his release from 
detention, he should have been re-employed in the army but instead he was sacked and 
he went into exile. On his return and after the commission, when it was determined 
that such violations had been unlawful, he should then have been reinstated which did 
not happen and he has therefore remained unemployed since. He is now of an age he 
should be receiving his pensions but this has not happened while his colleagues with 
whom he joined the forces are enjoying those benefits. In this context, he felt that the 
NRC and reparation programme did not meet his needs. 
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In the same way, victims need to be looked at on a case by case basis and a token 
proportionate to the suffering awarded rather than a uniform rate.  
“You need to sit down with the victims themselves. You know every 
individual, their suffering, their problems. You can know what the nation 
can do for such a person … I mean somebody who has spent exile nine 
years one month, somebody who has spent two years [in prison], you 
tortured somebody, if I remove my dress and you look at my back, you will 
be shocked ,,, the scars are still there. Then you come and give me [1500] 
then you give that person 15,000,000,12 I don’t see the fairness. Nine years 
[and] two years can never be the same. If I look at seventeen years of my 
life have been cut off … needs to be looked on a case by case basis.”  
(Victim) 
 
Of course the official narrative is that the payments were not meant to replace what 
the person went through but a token of appreciation and acknowledgement. On the 
contrary, this narrative invalidates the victims’ experiences because they see their 
current situation as a direct consequence of their experience and are keener on a more 
tangible programme that would seek to correct this imbalance beyond mere tokens 
and appreciations. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter aimed to give a wider context to the Ghana case considering the gaps in 
the literature regarding the post-NRC process, particularly in explaining what took 
place, how it happened and why it happened the way it did.  
 
The context in which Ghana’s NRC emerged and operated shows a strong division along 
political lines. Much as there was a consensus about the need for a mechanism to 
address past human rights violations and facilitate national reconciliation, the political 
disagreements that surrounded this discussion remained important to its existence 
with a strong division between pro and anti-NRC mainly based on the political party 
one subscribed to. Nevertheless, it is one of the commissions that emerged 
domestically with considerable input from civil society and the government in terms 
of funding. 
                                                        
 
12 In 2007, the Ghanaian Cedi was devalued by striking off four zeros. There is still reference using the 
old currency interchangeably with the new, therefore 15,000,000 Cedis is the same as 1500 Cedis 
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A key refrain from the commission was addressing the past violations to promote 
healing and reconciliation. As such, its recommendations on reparation drew on this 
approach and emphasised the purpose of reparation as a tool to provide healing 
through recognition and acknowledgement of the suffering rather than a pay back of 
what individuals had lost. It therefore recommended proposals for both monetary 
awards as well as symbolic, community and social service benefits.  
 
Unlike other cases, it did not propose a framework for implementation but rather in 
accordance with its mandate submitted its report and the responsibility of instituting 
a follow up body to the president. A Reparations committee was established that 
focused on the monetary compensation and as of the time of the field work, other 
aspects of the reparation programme were still pending. 
 
The recurring issue raised by the respondents was how framing the NRC within a 
political context derailed the entire process and impacted on its outcome, including the 
implementation. Some aspects of the reparation proposal plan such as apologies could 
not be implemented due to the conflicts between the political groups. It was argued for 
instance that how could the incumbent apologise on behalf of the previous regime 
when the previous regime that was implicated in many of the atrocities did not even 
show any remorse for their actions? Furthermore, following a change in government 
with the implicated regime taking over power, the issue of the NRC seems to have been 
set aside, particularly since they had maintained their opposition to it from the very 
beginning.  
 
The interpretation of the process from the perspective of the different respondents 
reiterates the argument for a holistic approach to studying implementation that takes 
into account the before, during and post events and attempts to understand the context 
in which they took place and which specific choices were made. This analysis therefore 
links the implementation of reparation to the entire lifecycle of the NRC including the 
factors that determined its establishment, the mandate, the decisions and design of the 
reparations as well as the socio-political, economic and cultural settings following the 
NRC.  
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CHAPTER 9.  SIERRA LEONE: IMPROVISING WITH LIMITED 
RESOURCES  
 
9.0 Introduction 
 
The Sierra Leone TRC recommendations on reparation come across as being 
comprehensively drafted. The report reflects an awareness of the local realities and 
attempt to strike a balance between redressing harm and facilitating overall socio-
economic development. A progressive aspect to the recommendations was in 
proposing an implementation framework, structures and potential avenues of funding 
for the programme. A decade later, the vision of a robust reparation programme has 
not been realised in exactly the same way it was pictured. Along the way, faced with a 
number of concerns such as uncertainty of funds and decline of reparation issues from 
public discourse, the current reparation programme is a shell of what it was intended. 
Overall, the reparation programme in Sierra Leone is an example in improvisation and 
an attempt to align the programme as closely as possible to the proposed 
recommendations. 
 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical study on the implementation of the 
recommendations on reparation following the SLTRC. This was carried out in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone from 4 January – 29 January 2011 and 22 October – 18 
December 2012. A total of twenty nine open ended formal interviews were carried out. 
The respondents included the academia, former TRC staff, NaCSA, Civil society 
organisations, victims and individuals from different ministries. The emphasis was on 
obtaining expert views on the TRC and post TRC processes resulting in a limited pool 
of respondents. It structures the discussion under five main themes (1) Operations of 
the commission (2) Commission’s recommendations on reparations (3) Follow-up of 
recommendations on reparations (4) Implementation of recommendations on 
reparations, and (5) salient issues arising from the interviews and my observations. 
Where direct quotes have been applied, they have been used verbatim. 
 
9.1  Operation of the selected truth commissions 
 
For a mechanism that started with a high momentum, the weak responses to its 
proposals are puzzling. I therefore considered it appropriate to question the attitudes 
of the respondents towards the truth commission process and whether this could have 
an impact on the low levels of attention towards its recommendations. In this section, 
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I consider three aspects, first, whether the respondents considered the truth 
commission a relevant endeavour on both an individual and societal level. Second, the 
perception of victimhood. I deliberate on whether the truth commission’s classification 
of victimhood resonates with what the victims perceive themselves as. This is however 
limited because the scope covered by this study was only limited to the amputees and 
war wounded. In line with this, I also explore perceptions of victimhood following the 
limited implementation. Thirdly, I question the expectation that the victims had about 
the reparation programme and whether these expectations fit within their ideas of 
what reparation entails. 
 
9.1.1 Necessity of a truth commission 
 
One of the criticism levelled against the truth commission in Sierra Leone was that it 
was not consonant with local beliefs and practices. The presence of the SCSL also 
contributed to diminishing the significance of the work of the commission. Some 
sections of victims such as the amputees were also initially hesitant to participate in 
the proceedings. As such, I was interested in understanding the attitude towards the 
setting up of the TRC. Granted that this may be an inquiry coming in at least a decade 
after the process, I considered it relevant to understanding current attitudes towards 
the implementation. Could how they perceived it in any way explain the momentum 
with which it is presently being approached?   
 
A lot of the reflections focused on the need to establish an exhaustive narrative to 
clarify the events that happened not just during the war but before the war and which 
created the conditions that led to the war. The narrative would be useful not just for 
the current generation but future generation as well. 
 
“When our story is told, it is often told in the context of what happened 
during the eleven years of the civil war but the conditions that basically 
created the war still needed to be explained. The younger generation 
needed to know what happened, why did we get to 1991 or how we did 
we get to 1991 … [it needed to be explained] in an impartial, objective and 
a sort of nonpartisan way” (CSO). 
 
In general, it was understood that the war did not just happen spontaneously but was 
a culmination of injustices that had been perpetuated over time through successive 
regimes. It was important that these injustices not be repeated. It was also equally 
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important to know what these circumstances were and to make both the current and 
future generations aware of the divisive and problematic past so that the mistakes do 
not recur. For this, the truth commission was considered an effective tool in 
establishing an impartial, objective and nonpartisan narrative of what happened. 
Informal discussions with various sections of society also confirmed this view of the 
understanding of truth commissions as a tool to facilitate knowing the country’s past 
and keeping that memory alive through the public testimonies, media publicising and 
the report in its various disseminated versions. 
 
On a more specific level, I encountered a difference in the way various individuals 
related to the truth commission experience.   From the elite, there appeared to be a 
better understanding of the TRC and its limits. It was considered a “necessary” venture 
because of the complexities experienced during the conflict. They for instance 
highlighted the flexibility and limited number of alternative mechanisms available.  
“There are several ways of seeking justice … if truth commissions are able 
to do an effective work, I think they would go a long way towards healing 
the wounds from the war … practical aspects like the cost hinder formal 
justice systems” (University professor). 
 
These categories of respondents pointed out that the war was complex and therefore 
necessitated a creative approach for accountability.  
“This was a civil war, it was also complex where you could find members 
from the same family belonging to different camps … you could have one 
who would be a member of the Civil Defence Force, another who would be 
a rebel or sobel and in situations like these, it becomes difficult who to 
punish and what form of punishment without creating further problems” 
(University professor). 
 
What is interesting is that during this transitional period, there was an influx of civil 
society organisations, many of them disseminating transitional justice information, 
particularly on truth commissions. The rhetoric employed by these sections of 
respondents is quite similar to the advocacy literature on transitional justice which in 
a way points to the impact and success of sensitisation activities in popularising the TJ 
framework for post conflict recovery. 
 
Among the non-elite, the purpose and work of the TRC was largely misunderstood. One 
of the respondents, a member of a CSO speculated whether it wouldn’t have been more 
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appropriate to pursue a less formal mechanism than the commission to try and connect 
with and appeal to who he referred to as a largely illiterate population. Such a 
mechanism would have been more compatible with local beliefs and systems.  
 
One of the sources of the misunderstanding of the mandate of the truth commission 
was the DDR programme. A number of the respondents pointed out that the common 
understanding was that once the combatants had been taken care of through the DDR 
programme, the attention would then be turned to the victims through the TRC. 
 
The TRC therefore tended to be viewed as a body designed to take care of the victims. 
The proposed reparation programme was particularly reflecting the DDR packages.  
“If we did not get the reparation programme, the victims will remain to 
suffer for life. Because we had addressed the needs of the perpetrators in 
their programme and those  [victims] who had lost part of their own 
livelihood in terms of any part of their body ... that’s why we have those 
reparation programmes” (Former TRC staff). 
 
It is this same rhetoric that was employed to the victims during the sensitisation 
campaigns. The TRC was presented as a mechanism that would benefit the victims both 
emotionally, by telling their story but also as a future reference to demand for their 
benefits. 
“There is a reason that we would participate in the TRC because of the 
fact that that could be a document that we would be able to fight the 
government in due course if they fail to implement the reparations 
process” (Amputee victim). 
 
Following this discussion, I construe that despite the misunderstanding regarding the 
purpose of the commission as a tool for the victims as the DDR was for perpetrators, 
the TRC was generally considered a necessary mechanism for understanding the 
complexity of the conflict as well as an instrument that could be employed in the future 
for holding government accountable for providing the necessary redress.  
  
9.1.2 Victimhood 
 
The commission in their report was quite specific on whom they considered victims 
and who was eligible for the specific measures of the reparations programme (TRC 
report Vol 2, 2004:243). From the interviews however, I found a more dynamic 
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conceptualisation of victimhood. Of course many of the respondents agreed with the 
commission’s discourse that all Sierra Leoneans are victims both directly and indirectly 
and for the need for extra assistance to certain groups who suffered more harm and 
continued to face numerous hardships such as the amputees who “have been deformed 
for life, they cannot fend for themselves … [such] cases do not require debate” (University 
Professor). Such categories would best benefit from a strategy that employs long term 
assistance. 
 
A number of individuals also felt that they had been left out in the categorisation of 
victims to benefit from the specific measures of the reparation programme.  In 
Freetown during the war, many took on the burden of caring financially and materially 
for their relatives who were in the countryside and were therefore the primary source 
of resources for their family and relations in the provinces.  
 
Another case was those who suffered material or property losses but did not 
experience physical harm on their bodies.  
“There are many victims, they are identified because of their physical 
disability. Those who were never, I was never, nobody chopped my fingers 
off, my house got burnt, if I wasn’t so skilful, I would have died!” (Victim 
not categorised as vulnerable). 
 
A number of the victims felt that they should have been included in a reparation 
programme because they experienced losses as well and have since failed to recover 
and there are no other options available to them. 
“I was badly affected because number one it [the war] devastated my life. 
This way, I was a working gentleman, when the war came to Freetown, 
all my livelihood went away, they took it away from me … my house was 
burned down, the evidence is still there black with smoke. It has not yet 
been reconstructed … People were killed right in front of my eyes. That’s 
something I was unable to contain. The trauma, any time I remember that 
I just feel bad about life. The life I cannot make, somebody taking it away 
just like that. I’m devastated, straightforward, let me be frank.” (Victim 
not categorised as vulnerable) 
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9.1.3 Continued suffering of the victims 
 
Eight years after the TRC, a number of victims are still carrying the wounds from the 
war. Despite the advocacy of the forgiveness discourse, many of the victims bear 
physical reminders of the war as described by one amputee.   
“As for me, I told them, I will forgive but I cannot forget because this thing 
[amputation] is part of me now. This is not a house that being burnt today 
they will rebuild tomorrow. This is forever, so I cannot forget. Whenever 
I do this [lifts up arm stump], I see it.” (Amputee victim)  
 
He further goes on to describe some of the psychological distress such as nightmares 
and terrors.  
“At times, something like a nightmare comes to me because when I saw 
the, when I think over the man who was doing the action, I remember 
when he took that big axe, when it goes over my head, ‘put your hand 
down, hold your hand, I’ll blow your head off’, then it was amputated 
forcefully, whenever that comes in me, if I’m home, I just lay down and 
perhaps sleep.” (Amputee victim) 
 
A number of victims have remained visible, such as the amputees and war wounded. 
Immediately after the war, amputee camps were established and later, the amputees 
were relocated to amputee camps in several locations around the country. A number 
of them have however resorted to begging on the streets. Other groups of victims 
however are hardly seen either voluntarily or have outgrown the category such as 
children. 
 
From the discussions, three key priorities stood out for the victims: educating their 
children, access to health care and livelihood support. They argued that despite the 
introduction of free primary education in 2003, there are still multiple and prohibitive 
hidden costs such as for stationery, uniforms, school feeding, transportation, extra 
classes. They also mentioned that a number of the government schools in which the 
free education is offered are of poor standards and yet they cannot afford the private 
schools. Their children are therefore unfairly disadvantaged because even when they 
are able to go to school, it is of poor quality. The future they foresee for their children 
is not very bright. They of course directly link this inability to provide quality education 
for their children to their disability and inability to make a decent living. The Chairman 
of the AWWA continuously emphasised the negative consequences from witnessing 
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the helplessness of their parents as a budding resentment which could make them 
“another rebel tomorrow.” If the amputees do live long enough to see their children into  
adulthood, there is also no guarantee the children will be able to take care of them 
because they have not been able to provide a foundation to build a successive life for 
them as expounded on by the Chairman below, 
“If they are educated, then they will forget about their father’s plight. 
Some of them will be able to take care of their families as it is our 
tradition. We don’t have welfare but that’s why you work hard for your 
child to go to school, that he should help you.” (Amputee victim) 
 
Access to health care for both themselves and their families was also of concern to the 
victims. They reported that when they get sick, they cannot afford to access the care in 
the hospitals.  
 
Many of the amputees stated that they rely on begging and handouts. It is a well-known 
issue in Freetown for the amputees to move from shop to shop or street to street 
begging. When they enter a business establishment, the first reaction is to let them 
know that there is nothing to be given as described by one amputee, 
“It really touches me when I want to buy something in the street, 
whenever I go to the shop, they will say, ‘ah nuttin no dey’ because they 
are all branding us that we are the same, I want to beg to the shop. Oh 
this always pains me. Yeah, at one time I want to buy, I go to one shop to 
buy a flask, as the shop boy saw me, ‘eh nuttin no deya papa’ then I said, 
‘you stupid nonsense man, do you think that I come to beg here?’ They are 
used to seeing these people begging, I said but I can’t blame you, I say it’s 
ourselves.” (Amputee victim) 
 
While talking with the amputees and war wounded, I made inquiries into what they 
were engaged in before the amputation. Their professions ranged from student, to 
petty trade, farming and vocational employment such as car mechanic. Whereas it was 
difficult to verify the accuracy of their claims, it was obvious that many of them have 
not been able to engage in income generating ventures after the amputation. There 
were some exceptions such as the President of the AWWA who turned to photography 
from car mechanics after his amputation. A few engage in petty trade but the majority 
do not have a clear source of income or been able to go back to what they were doing. 
Even for those who are engaged in an activity, the proceeds are barely enough to scrap 
by. 
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They also believe that this atrocity that was committed against them is through no act 
of theirs and so they should be entitled to a livelihood support, what was being referred 
to as “social security” or “welfare”. They even argued that since the perpetrators were 
already receiving similar packages despite their involvement in the war, it is only fair 
that they as victims should be afforded the same consideration. By 2012, there was talk 
of a proposed monthly package of Le 250,000 (€ 52) for the amputees, a figure the 
President of the AWWA deemed too low considering that “a bag of rice is over 150,000, 
mind you a father having or a mother having 4 or 5 children.”  He was also opposed to 
the exclusion of the severely war wounded on the grounds that despite them not having 
lost full limbs as per the classification in the TRC report, they were also in similar 
conditions, many of them unable to engage in gainful employment. During the 
interview, he called over a staff member, employed as the receptionist at AWWA who 
is classified as a war wounded because it is only the fingers that were amputated and 
exclaimed, “Is this man not vulnerable? He is vulnerable!” The chairman was therefore 
advocating for at least a minimum of Le 450,000 (€ 93) per month for both the 
amputees and the severely war wounded. 
 
9.1.4 Abandonment 
 
The respondents I interviewed expressed a sense of feeling abandoned by both the 
society and the government.  
“We get our problems here, they don’t even care … let me say, the welfare 
of the war victim is much mishandled.”  (Amputee victim) 
 
Many of the amputees and war wounded are suffering from medical complications 
arising out of their injuries and are unable to access medical care, either because of the 
prohibitive costs or because they do not trust the medical system and the government 
at all. There is a perception that they are deliberately being killed in order to get rid of 
them. 
“When we go to the hospital, these people want to finish us, what I am 
going to ask for is hard cash. We’ll find out own doctors. They will give us 
slow injection for us to die … we go one by one quickly. We were going one 
by one some every two months, but when we go for free medical care now, 
they’ll kill us in fives.” (Amputee victim) 
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The assumption is that when they are all dead, then the government will be free from 
its responsibility to provide reparation.  
 
Houses were constructed in resettlement camps for the amputees and war wounded, 
however, the location of these houses also fuelled the sense of abandonment. Many of 
them are located far away from Freetown and it is difficult to travel to and from the 
camps with public transportation. They argue that getting them out of the city centre 
reduces their visibility which will make people forget about them. Many people have 
moved beyond the war and the amputees are some of the reminders of that period who 
are being erased.  
 
9.1.5 False expectations of what the TRC can provide 
 
When the TRC was in the process of carrying out its activities, some of the victims 
expected some sort of tangible benefit either in exchange for their testimony or for 
appearing before it. That did not happen because it was not in the mandate of the TRC 
to award benefits, although according to the former Commissioner, they did avail 
counselling and psychological services to the victims who were in need of it when they 
came in to give their testimonies. 
 
On another level, it also emerged that many of the victims felt that the truth 
commission limited itself and its influence by failing to incorporate aspects of 
traditional healing and reconciliation mechanisms in its procedures. For instance, one 
respondent pointed out that, 
“although it [TRC] recognised the importance of rituals in the whole 
healing process, I mean traditional ceremonies, they were not effectively 
made use of, you know, either because they [the commissioners] did not 
strongly believe in them because of the background of the commissioners 
… that was not fully utilised which in my view was a serious problem, 
omission on the part of the TRC … because these ceremonies like all others 
have their shortcomings but they also play an important role in the lives 
of the ordinary people.” (University professor) 
 
Despite the sensitisation campaigns, there was a false understanding of the capabilities 
of the TRC. In reality, the TRC is only guided by its terms of reference which is clearly 
spelt out in the mandate. The narrow focus of the mandate has also been pointed out, 
particularly its temporal scope. The Act for instance calls on it to investigate abuses 
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from 1991 but as shown in the report as well as by respondents, “the seeds [of the 
conflict] had been sown long before that [1991].” (University professor). They argue that 
the legacy of structural violence that has characterised the socio-political environment 
stretches as far back as 1961, the time of independence. The commission even stretches 
it as far back as the resettlement of former slaves and colonial experience.  
 
There may be criticisms against the TRC for instance about its composition, operations, 
reach, mandate, output among others but what stands out is that it was a tool that was 
widely known. However, the specifics about its work and its relationship with other 
mechanisms may not have been clear. During its operations and shortly after it ended, 
it received a lot of attention. The report was widely disseminated in different versions 
both online and in hard copy. The Open Society Institute for West Africa (OSIWA) made 
it possible to host an online archive of the report and other supporting documentation. 
Through the website, one can access the final report as well as the secondary school 
version and TRC report for children. WITNESS also supported the production of a video 
summary of the report summarizing the key findings and recommendations. A music 
CD, was also produced with the assistance from United Nations Integrated Office in 
Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). It comprises of catchy renditions of the findings and 
recommendations, sang by local artists in Krio. 
 
This contextual analysis establishes that the TRC was not some obscure mechanisms 
but rather well known and popularised.  
 
9.2 Recommendations on Reparation 
 
The recommendations on reparation were generally viewed as significant for 
acknowledging the victims’ suffering, giving them the recognition as victims and for 
helping them to cope with their deprived livelihoods, summed up as giving them a 
“sense of closure and justice.” (CSO) 
 
It was however continuously pointed out that the potential of reparations to benefit 
the victims and the entire nation has not really been realised because of the inefficient 
and ineffective reparation programme so far. What has however not been disputed has 
been the content of the specific measures of the reparation programme which has been 
viewed as a holistic approach to meeting the social and economic needs of the victim. 
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9.2.1 Content of the specific recommendation for reparation 
 
The basis of the reparation package comprised of facilitating access to specific services 
such as health, education, and housing among others. The commission argued that this 
would enhance accessibility for an already disadvantaged group. Respondents often 
pointed out that the war and the trauma from the war created severe disadvantages 
for some categories of individuals therefore, such a package addresses the socio-
economic needs of these victims.  
 
Some other respondents also argued that it should not be the commission to tell the 
government to provide such services as these are facilities that government should 
provide irrespective of the situation. However, in contexts such as in Sierra Leone, 
these services are already either lacking or in a poor state and while emerging out of 
the war situation, the government is faced with the pressure to develop these services. 
By incorporating or modifying reparation programmes to fit within the development 
agenda, it would not only facilitate the victims into accessing these services but also 
contribute to the overall development programme, thereby hitting two birds with one 
stone. 
 
Given the high rate of non-implementation however, I was interested in whether the 
recommendations were considered too ambitious. In all of the discussions, none of the 
participants deemed it an outrageous set of recommendations and even considered it 
to be quite modest. 
 
9.3 Frameworks for following-up reparation 
 
The commission proposed a detailed framework for the implementation of the 
recommendations on reparation (see 6.3.8). This included an oversight body, 
implementing body as well as specific line ministries in whose jurisdiction a 
recommended service was proposed. It also detailed potential sources of funding for 
the victims fund. 
 
 
9.3.1 Follow-up frameworks 
 
Below is a discussion of the follow-up frameworks and the perspective of the 
respondents concerning the frameworks. 
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National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA)  
 
According to a NaCSA staff member, NaCSA as an implementing agency is guided by the 
terms of reference drafted in the TRC report. NaCSA was initially set up as a 
government agency to facilitate the delivery of social services. It had also been involved 
in the post-conflict reconstruction, resettlement and rehabilitation services. NaCSA’s 
facilities extended all the way to the local level at the chiefdoms which made it a well-
known agency with experience in service delivery. It also coordinated the DDR 
programme in its previous mandate which broadened its experience. The commission 
therefore recommended that NaCSA coordinates and implements the reparation 
programme in addition to administering the special fund for war victims.  
 
On the whole, the respondents agreed with the strategy of commissioning an existing 
agency that had experience interacting at the grassroots. According to them, NaCSA had 
the potential to register a wider impact on the implementation of the 
recommendations because of its reputation. It was already well known. 
 
Assigning the implementing responsibility to NaCSA, an already existing body had its 
merits, the most obvious being that it was already facilitating similar delivery of 
services and facilities in the context of general reconstruction.  
 
There were however doubts as to whether NaCSA was able to meet the requirements 
necessary for facilitating a reparation programme. One of the respondents pointed out 
that the context in which NaCSA operates is different from a reparations programme. 
“NaCSA is more of a social delivery mechanism than the human rights 
thing, you know, they are more interested in providing social … engaged 
in putting up structures, you know, community structures, could be a 
school, it could be a market, it could be a community centre, you know, 
those kinds of things.” (University professor) 
 
Issues of accountability were also of concern, particularly regarding the lines of 
responsibility. One respondent pointed out that there are not very clear monitoring 
and evaluation mechanisms by raising the question of “Who is monitoring NaCSA?” In 
discussion with NaCSA, there did not seem to be a robust structured monitoring and 
evaluation mechanism specific to the reparation programme. When I inquired about 
reports, published or otherwise, the respondent who was a staff at NaCSA deferred the 
request to a later date so he could get permission from higher up but he did promise to 
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avail the exact figures of victims and beneficiaries. In the end I did not get any of the 
reports although the figures of the victims and beneficiaries was read out to me. This 
is contrary to the TRC report which called for NaCSA to produce annual reports and 
financial status of the fund (TRC Report Volume 2, 2004:269). 
 
In terms of monitoring the NaCSA activities, the impression I got was that NaCSA has 
worked closely with government as there was a strong emphasis on the regular 
meetings they have at different levels at the ministries, parliament and president’s 
office and through these meetings have apprised the relevant bodies on their activities. 
However, the scepticism over being accountable to the government was raised during 
the interviews.  
“The government is not the best agency to do that [monitoring]. This 
should have been done by some non-governmental thing, you know, 
council of elders, you name it or you know, who do not have any direct 
interest in politics, you know, to ensure that these things work well.” 
(University professor) 
 
NaCSA’s internal structure has also been a cause of concern, particularly what one 
respondent referred to as the politicising of issues. It was assumed that the changes in 
government and its priorities had an impact on the composition of the staff at NaCSA 
dealing with reparations. 
 “NaCSA management, every senior person there was gotten rid of, 
because they felt that on one way or another they had been associated 
with the past regime.”  (University professor) 
 
The implication, particularly at NaCSA was that there was a new team that was 
criticised for not having been involved from the beginning with the reparation issues 
and were not able to fully grasp the context and subtleties of the reparation 
programme. 
 
 
Human Rights Commission 
  
The commission recommended that the Human Rights Commission serves as an 
advisory body (TRC report Volume 2, 2004:193). This is in addition to its role in 
monitoring and facilitating the implementation of all the recommendations made by 
the TRC (p.205). By the time of writing the TRC Commission report, a commission on 
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human rights was still non-existent.  The commission was eventually created in August 
2004 and as seen from the said recommendations, was already clearly overwhelmed. 
 
Operation-wise, it has focused more on the general human rights situation for what 
they are mandated over reparation which has remained a small component of their 
overall programmes. 
“Well the Human Rights Commission is there and they have been 
publishing. They have been producing annual reports where they more or 
less monitor and give reports of human rights situation in the country 
including abuses and improvement.” (University professor) 
 
Nevertheless, it established a Reparations Desk Officer and has collaborated with 
NaCSA on a number of issues regarding the reparations such as seeking for resources 
and sensitisation campaigns. Overall, the involvement of the human rights commission 
has remained minimal. 
 
Civil Society Organisations 
 
The commission recommended at least four representatives of CSOs, two of which 
should represent women and youth, be included in the follow-up committee. This 
requirement was however in reference to the whole range of recommendations and 
not specific only to reparations (TRC report volume 2, 2004:205). 
 
According to some of the respondents from civil society, a TRC working group that 
included NGOs was formed to coordinate the implementation of the recommendations. 
They were however not clear on the exact composition and the respondents pointed 
out that the group gradually lost interest in the entire process. Each organisation came 
with its own interests and focused on aspects within the recommendations that were 
in line with their organisation focus. 
 
Specific to reparations, two representatives from two NGOs were nominated to 
represent the CSOs and work with the reparation committee. There has however been 
minimal coordination in debriefing the rest. The CSO members I interviewed expressed 
their disappointment in this shortcoming.  
“Since they went in that committee, we have been running after them for 
our copies [of the report], no meeting, I personally have been running 
after them for a meeting, no meeting and these are your colleagues, what 
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do you want, we can’t meet them, they are very busy, their number is off, 
so it’s like a whole mess.” (CSO) 
 
The proposed structure for following up on the implementation of the 
recommendations may have been a step in the right direction. However the practical 
aspects of it may have been overwhelming. In general there has not been much of a 
systematic and structured mechanism to keep track of the whole process. 
 
9.4 Implementation of the recommendations on reparation 
 
The status of the reparation programme has not really met the expectations of what 
was proposed by the TRC. “Messy” was the most common adjective the discussants 
used to describe the implementation. In general, the implementation has suffered 
several hiccups along the way. From a failure to set it rolling to inability to attract funds 
to a haphazard start roughly four years after the end of the truth commission. One of 
the respondents described the Sierra Leone process as such,  
“You’re researching, you find a very beautiful baby standing here, well 
dressed, that is the report and when you read that report you go back and 
say oh wonderful things we have here. You come on the ground that is 
your downfall.” (Former commissioner) 
 
This description appropriately describes my experience and dilemma in attempting to 
unravel the proceedings of the implementation process. I met a lot of dead ends along 
the way, particularly with the respective ministries mentioned in the report and in the 
end discerned that a lot of the elaborate structure was actually toned down and centred 
round NaCSA. This was also reiterated by a number of the respondents who constantly 
referred me to NaCSA because they are “in charge of the reparations.” 
 
 
9.4.1 Understanding of implementation 
 
First, I wanted to make sure that when I asked about implementation, both the 
respondent and I were referring to the same thing. Implementation according to the 
respondents was interpreted as the act of transforming the proposals into actions that 
they were intended to produce. For a number of respondents, it did not matter who the 
actors that facilitated this change were as long as the end product is observed. This 
definition was necessary to get beforehand because a number of the actions that were 
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recommended by the commission during the course of time have been taken on by 
NGOs and so when reference is made to implementation, it encompasses a wide range 
of actors. 
 
Nevertheless, there is an awareness by the respondents, particularly the victims that 
the primary responsibility for implementation lies with the government. The 
prevailing view therefore is that government has not made any effort and has in fact 
been reluctant to implement the recommendations on reparation. When I asked about 
what they thought of the implementation process, I got variations of “nothing has been 
implemented!”  
 
The majority of the respondents argued that reparation was not being viewed as a 
priority by both the government and international organisations. For instance, even 
with Sierra Leone’s inclusion on the Peace Building Commission agenda, reparations 
was not part of the programme. I reviewed the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation 
Framework and it indeed shows that the issue of reparations as an item did not feature 
in the agreement. There was reference to the general TRC recommendations under the 
justice and security sector reform. The framework proposed that the implementation 
of the TRC recommendations be used as a strategy to raise the populations’ confidence 
in the justice system and ensure timely and equal access to justice (Peace Building 
Commission, 2007:5, 9). 
 
Coincidentally, the peacebuilding cooperation set up occurred during the period close 
to the 2007 elections where the APC won the elections. The agenda of the cooperation 
leans heavily towards general peacebuilding efforts which has been argued by some 
respondents was intended to consolidate the image of the APC over a wider electorate 
than a specific group. 
“A peacebuilding commission was set up in 2007, just before elections and 
they had their own priorities. These people came and initially you know, 
they too they had their own priorities and when they came, this was in 
consult with the UN, the peacebuilding commission, when they came, 
their initial interest was in energy, providing electricity for Freetown and 
a substantial amount of the peacebuilding fund was used initially for that 
you know.” (University professor) 
 
The energy sector was only one of the six priority areas but it did stand out to the extent 
that many of the respondents associated it most with the peace building commission. 
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A number of the times, the reparation efforts were compared with the DDR and special 
court with the resultant observation being that a great amount of funds had been 
injected into the DDR and  yet reparation efforts  in total would cost much less than 
what the other programmes cost.  
“What is required for the reparation programme is just a fraction of what 
was spent on DDR … and I think a third of what is being spent on the 
special court would go a long way in implementing all these 
recommendations of the truth and reconciliation commission, just a third 
of what is being spent.” (CSO) 
 
The general perception was that reparations were not considered as a priority area for 
implementation both internally and from the international partners. Locally, whereas 
there was a high level of appreciation for the justice component provided for by the 
special court, it was argued that sometimes justice needs to be felt in more tangible 
forms.  
“I think given the option for some, given the option between the special 
court and the reparation programme, much as they would still want the 
special court to be there, but if they had to choose between the two, I think 
they would not have found that a difficult decision to make.” (CSO) 
 
My observation was that implementation tended to be linked with foreign assistance 
which is known to be earmarked for specific target programmes that comply with 
donor specification over local needs. A lot of this aid evolved from funding Transitional 
Justice efforts notably DDR, Truth Commission, SCSL and to an extent reconciliation 
exercises and then switched to reconstruction efforts such as institutions and physical 
infrastructure 
 
9.4.2 Actors in the TRC and Reparation process 
 
At different stages of the TRC process, there have been changes in composition of 
participants. One respondent for instance pointed out that many of those who were 
actively involved in developing the TRC were not able to, for one reason or another 
continue with their involvement.   
 
During the signing of the Lomé peace agreement for instance, the main actors were the 
government and rebel groups. Civil society and victims were not directly involved in 
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the actual negotiations. They were already side-lined from proceedings and were more 
or less props facilitating the process.  
“We as civil society members were there [Lomé agreement signing] to 
build up the confidence between the two parties, the government 
delegation and the rebel delegation. We were not directly involved in the 
actual negotiation.  There was a lot of hostility and suspicion initially and 
part of our job really was to break the ice as it were …. So they could start 
to build up confidence.” (CSO) 
 
This is quite contrary to the perception portrayed in the literature about the active 
involvement of the civil society in the peace negotiation process. They were present for 
the meetings but as deduced from the interviews, this participation was more 
superficial and they did not participate in the core of the negotiations. For instance, on 
asking about their opinion on the direction that the TRC took, one respondent pointed 
out that they had to operate within a framework which had already been decided upon. 
“When we were involved to do the preparatory work after the Act had 
been passed so we had to operate within that framework [of the Act] 
unfortunately … we were not involved in for instance writing out the 
objectives of the commission, what it could do, we only came in to do the 
spade work, prepare the ground for the commissioners, do some 
background research for them you know, but we came in after the Act had 
been passed.” [University professor] 
 
Some of the respondents argued that the TRC could have been organised differently. 
They particularly pointed out that it did not reflect local realities and expectations. For 
instance, they felt that some aspects of traditional peace building mechanisms needed 
to have been incorporated in the workings of the TRC which could have increase the 
acceptance of the TRC among the local communities.  
 
The secondary role civil society played meant that they could only be involved at 
particular times for specific activities such as sensitisation. This role was carried out in 
addition to the organisation’s regular programmes. Therefore, when their need in the 
TRC was exhausted, they moved back to their core activities for which they were 
assured of regular funding.  
 
Similarly, a section of respondents were of the view that the TRC did not manage to 
attract powerful actors, specifically, notable perpetrators like the Special Court did and 
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this likely hampered its effect. Some of the victims I interviewed acknowledged that 
they were able to face the individuals who had harmed them. The perpetrators asked 
for forgiveness but it did not really matter because their situation has not changed but 
became even worse due to their daily needs not being met. More so, the high profile 
perpetrators whom many of the victims were eager to see appear before the 
commission such as Norman Hinga were not able to, either because they were not 
willing to or because of operational complications between the TRC and the Special 
court. 
 
From the discussions, it appeared that the role of the different actors was something 
that was not clear-cut. The significance of the participation of the various actors, 
particularly the civil society was definitely acknowledged however, in practice, it was 
less vibrant. The civil society is survival-driven and therefore engages in activities that 
will ensure its future existence. 
 
Another issue that was raised particularly in the implementation aspect was the 
replacement of actors. New individuals who had not been involved from the beginning 
were appointed and the perception was that these new individuals were not as 
attached and knowledgeable in the interests of the commission as the original 
members. Following the securing of funds, one respondent felt that he and some of the 
key members became side-lined.  
“I was put on that initial committee to prepare the initial papers for the 
reparations programme. It’s in the committee stage, in the thinking and 
processing of what was required and what was not required, what should 
[be] eliminate[d] from this and what should benefit from this, I was there, 
but as soon as the funding came, we were put in the back warmer, we do 
not know what was happening, up to this day I don’t know what is 
happening” (University professor). 
 
The effect of not involving the same persons is that they lose out on the insights that 
went into constructing a particular programme up to the level that it is at, a term one 
of the respondents referred to as ‘institutional memory.’ 
“Getting new people on board, what happened with that? And it became 
disastrous. All of those who prepared the reparations programme paper 
from the committee stage to the implementation stage, when the 
government came on board they dropped off all these people and put in 
new people so there is no institutional memory. That is a bigger hiccup. 
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No institutional memory, those who were there, holding the nitty gritty 
from that paper point to the implementation point they are not there, 
some of these are coming they claim they know, they go and read the TRC 
report but the TRC report is just a paragraph.” (Former TRC staff). 
 
The employment of new individuals to take over the implementation process was 
viewed as coming at a cost because many of the new individuals and organisations 
were considered inexperienced in terms of not being aware of the background 
complexities that were involved in setting up the programme.  
 
9.4.3 Irregularities in registration 
 
One of the initial activities carried out by NaCSA following the release of the peace 
building fund was the registration of victims. However, a number of respondents 
observed that the process that was used to register and distribute the money was 
flawed and as such a number of unintended beneficiaries were absorbed. They claim 
that some of the victims got their injuries in circumstances outside of or not related to 
the war but were able to manipulate the process and gain inclusion.  
“The great mistake was this, during the registration of war victims, it was 
on the radio, it was said every war victim should come and register for 
such money. I can tell you that the non-victims, that were victims 
amputated before the war, where are they today? All have been absorbed 
to the war victims, they are all taking part… there were people who were 
accidentally, got accident by car, or those that fell from palm trees, those 
that fell from mango trees, all are now inside the war victims.”  (Amputee 
victim) 
 
Although this claim could not be substantiated, these perceptions of irregularity 
continue to dog the process making it difficult to develop trust between the various 
parties. It was expressed that the verification process was not vigilant enough and it 
could have been made more secure by involving the victims’ association.  
“We [Sierra Leone Amputees and War Wounded Association] should have 
[been] involved in this registration, because we know the questions that 
we can ask … we were already in place.” (Chairman, AWWA) 
 
The questions for instance revolve around the context of their injury for example 
hospitalisation stays, documentation and alibis such as individuals who shared the 
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same experiences of amputation, hospitalisation or living in the IDP camps for the 
amputees. 
 
Against the background of this suspicion, there have been calls for the verification of 
the current amputees and other war wounded through a process that should involve 
the victims as well. 
“I highly commend NaCSA for the work so far but I would like to inform 
them that they need to verify most of the amputees that they registered … 
We should involve in on verification (sic). We know ourselves. We have 
certain questions which we will ask any disabled person who says it’s the 
war.” (Chairman, AWWA) 
 
However, the verification is a process that is unlikely to happen. The president of the 
AWWA claims that all they are receiving are promises of being involved in the 
verification exercise but no real effort towards making it happen.  
”So they, they are promising me but they don’t want to do that ‘eh eh Eddy, 
we are going all over the country so that we can do fresh registration but 
they are just dragging it, dragging it so I am putting it on them that we 
should do this verification.” (Chairman, AWWA) 
 
Another flaw in the registration process highlighted by the victims was the deliberate 
manipulation of the registration process by authoritative figures within the victims’ 
association to include family members who normally would not be eligible for the 
payments such as wives and children.  
“Ok, he [name withheld] registered his wife, five children plus himself, 
that makes to seven while we only as the family heads received that 
money, not our wives, not our children, not our other dependants, so that’s 
all the massive corruption on that reparation. This was not for family 
members.” [Amputee victim) 
 
The extent to which this was a standard practice or speculation could not be verified 
but such assumptions heightened the mistrust in the institutions involved in the 
implementation process. 
 
9.4.4 Role of civil society 
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Several civil society groups were actively involved in the initial reparation process. 
They formed a steering committee to work with NaCSA. A number of them picked up 
issues that had been recommended by the commission such as health care and 
education services to advocate for. An Amnesty International Sierra Leone staff for 
instance revealed that they came to be involved with NaCSA because of the work they 
were doing on reporting on victims of sexual violence and so were instrumental in 
proposing frameworks to address this issue in the reparation agenda. 
 
NaCSA has also highlighted the key role played by these organisations in the reparation 
exercise once the initial process had taken off. This was in the area of sensitisation in 
terms of what benefits were to be disbursed and how it would be done in order to 
manage expectations. They involved organisations that were based at the local district 
levels and therefore had access to minority groups. 
 
According to NaCSA, in the implementation of symbolic reparation, various local 
organisations were also resourceful partners in facilitating these processes in 
collaboration with the local communities. NaCSA involved local organisations working 
directly with the communities in organising and implementing the commemoration 
and memorial activities. According to NaCSA, they simply facilitated in terms of 
providing them with the resources. 
 
My observation was that unfortunately the support from the civil society has not been 
sustained. From the discussions, in comparison to how galvanised they were prior to 
and during the commission, particularly spearheading the needs of victims and acting 
as their mouthpiece, such support in coming together as civil society and making 
victims’ reparation a major advocacy issue has been lacking.   
 
The number and the composition of the victims has also not enabled the victims to have 
a voice that can direct the political leadership into action. Many of them are poor and 
concerned about basic needs like food. Begging is a common occupation of particularly 
the amputees. They are also less visible as they have been moved out of the centre of 
Freetown to the outskirts in settlements. Getting to and from these locations can be 
difficult as I experienced during my visit to Waterloo and Grafton settlements. Grafton, 
for example is about 22km outside Freetown.  Besides the prohibitive costs, for a 
victim, one needs to navigate the challenging public transport system which sometimes 
discriminates against people with a disability and many of these persons need wheel 
chairs or other mobility aid. A lot of structural and economic issues inhibit victim’s 
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participation and activism and many of them are more concerned with survival and as 
such, they need to be empowered and bolstered by the civil society. 
 
9.4.5 An implementation matrix in Sierra Leone  
 
The TRC in Sierra Leone made detailed recommendations on specific measures for 
reparation, including specific beneficiaries, benefits and a time frame. The 
implementation process has however not been as meticulous as the proposals. Two 
major observations stand out in this; one, the shift from primarily service oriented 
benefits to monetary awards and secondly, a lot of the services which were contained 
within the reparation recommendations have been carried out by NGOs. These NGOs 
have mainly worked with the approval of the government but my concern lay on 
whether these can be considered as reparation fulfilled or do they remain as 
development assistance irrespective of the fact that they primarily targeted the 
categories identified by the TRC as beneficiaries of the reparation programme. In this 
section, I present an overview of these programmes reflected against what the 
reparation programme had intended.  
 
According to NaCSA, in 2007, the UNPBF provided funds amounting to USD 3,000,000 
to set up the reparations programme. This included putting up the relevant structures, 
registering victims and dispensing benefits. 
 
A reparation unit was created within NaCSA and by September 2008, it became 
operational. They were however only able to fully access the funds in early 2009. From 
2009, they started working out the modalities with the ministries for the 
implementation programme. The main challenge of this fund was that it was intended 
for a one year programme and there was no guarantee of a renewal or a sustained 
contribution from the funding agency.  
 
The TRC had recommended for NaCSA to maintain a supervisory role however, 
following the receipt of funds, NaCSA was involved in directly implementing the 
programmes. They were aware of this issue as seen in the response by a NaCSA official. 
“Of course, some of the recommendations were not to be implemented by 
NaCSA directly. We are to work with government agencies, government 
ministries and other departments in the implementation of these 
recommendations and these require planning.” (NaCSA) 
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On inquiry into the modification of this mandate I got a mixture of responses all relating 
to the conditions of the initial funding. First, the money was specifically directed at 
NaCSA and tied to specific activities. NaCSA was therefore not in a position to use it in 
such a way as to follow the reparations schedule as designed by the commission.  
 
Second, the process of setting up a fully-fledged reparations scheme as proposed by the 
commission necessitated more resources than what was provided.  
 
Third, a number of the recommendations required collaborating with other ministries, 
departments and agencies. This would require coordination and time to work out the 
modalities of cooperation.  
“We need to have meetings … we need to see what policies are already in 
place? Know what are the policies in place that are relevant to these 
recommendations so you will not, you are not like reinventing the wheel 
and you will not duplicate for example, if you do not try to know policies 
in place, you will not know for example that there is a government policy 
of free primary education so you will in planning your programme will 
make provision for tuition fees when in fact this is already covered by the 
existing policy … you need to plan properly, you need to have meetings 
with other partners, the other partners are going to help you in 
implementation of the programme … you need to have meetings on and 
off, you need to identify the gaps, you need to know how they can be 
addressed, what will be the role of the implementing agency, that’s 
NaCSA, what will be the role of the ministry, then you agree upon 
something, procedure for the victims to access these services that are 
being recommended through these ministries.” (NaCSA) 
 
When the initial funding was provided, NaCSA had to make a decision within the limits 
of the funding condition on how to carry out a programme. There were a number of 
concerns expressed such as the victims who were still waiting for their benefits, 
stakeholders that needed to be on board and the funds provided was barely enough to 
roll out a programme as envisioned by the commission.  
“So you see my point now? We have a programme, we need to plan with 
the implementing partners. The victims are out there. They are in urgent 
need of these services so we decided that yes, we can go ahead with the 
planning but we can also come up with measures to respond to the needs 
of these victims which would be consistent with the services that they are 
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to be provided with … when we are going to end these discussions? When 
we are going to have the modalities? We don’t know.” (NaCSA) 
 
In line with this thinking, NaCSA came up with three measures: urgent interim 
reparation, symbolic measures and emergency medical assistance. These measures 
were infused into the original reparation proposal such that some aspects of the 
reparation were implemented as shown below.  
 
9.4.5.1 Physical Health care 
 
The outcome of the recommendations on health accessibility did not turn out as had 
been envisioned by the commission. Below is a recap of the recommendations on 
health benefits:  
 Free physical health care for victims and their families to the degree of injury and 
strengthening referral systems between primary health units, district hospitals and 
tertiary care units  
 Provision of free prosthetic and orthotic devices, coordinating access to 
organisations that provide such devices and provide incentives and facilitate the 
training of prosthetic and orthotic technicians 
 Free rehabilitation, physiotherapy and occupational therapy. In the short term 
assist existing organisations and in the long term establish such centres; support 
the implementation of community based-rehabilitation activities and offer 
incentives to attract therapists. 
 Establishment of specialised centres such a Fistula Repair and Training Centre 
 Support for scar removal services for branded children 
 Mental health care including counselling and psychosocial support and assisting 
programmes that provide trauma counselling  
 
9.4.5.1.1 An Alternative strategy: emergency medical assistance 
 
Health concerns remained a priority for the victims. Health benefits have been very 
limited and access to health is still critical among the demands from the victims.  The 
death rates were also alarming. The chairman of the AWWA for instance mentioned 
that in the period of August to September 2012, a total of eight amputees had died due 
to health complications.  
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When the grant from the peacebuilding fund was made available, addressing the health 
needs was therefore an urgent concern. The reality however was that it could not be 
enough to roll out the extensive, long term health services as recommended. NaCSA 
instead focused on what it termed as the emergency medical assistance. This was in 
response to the number of victims who had life threatening physical conditions as a 
result of the war. A NaCSA official cited one case of an individual who had been living 
with a bullet close to his heart and had been unable to access the necessary services for 
the removal of the bullet. A number of them had bullets lodged in their bodies for up to 
a decade. Below are the activities and services that have been carried out and/or 
provided in the framework of health benefits. 
 
Reconstruction surgeries and scar removal 
According to NaCSA, besides the bullet wound cases, a number of them also had 
debilitating wounds or injuries or had been victims of sexual violence and incurred 
physical injuries such as fistulas. So the emergency medical assistance was in effect 
designed to address these emergencies. 
“The emergency medical assistance. This was actually designed to 
respond to the needs of the victims who were in a critical condition and 
in need of urgent medical attention. Those who could not wait until the 
mainstream health policy is rolled out … they could not wait until we plan 
with them, until they communicate to their district offices, until we arrive 
at something for them to access the services, so we say even whilst we are 
planning with the ministry of health, since one of the benefits 
recommended for them was health benefits, let us see those who are in 
urgent need of health benefits, access this service while we plan with 
them.” (NaCSA official) 
 
In total, 49 victims had surgeries to repair serious injuries, either bullet related or 
otherwise. 235 victims of sexual violence were also identified and treated according to 
their injuries. The Aberdeen West Africa Fistula Foundation (AWAFF), a programme 
supported by Mercy Ship carried out the surgeries. Marie Stoppes, another medical 
organisation also provided non-surgical gynaecological services to other victims who 
were experiencing gynaecological related issues. 
 
Comparing the total number of victims (32,110) to the ones who were able to receive 
the emergency medical assistance shows how skewed this assistance is. I was informed 
that the criteria for the selection was the level of vulnerability and the severity of the 
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injuries. Stringent as it was, a number of victims missed out on this health benefit. I met 
one such victim during the interviews in the amputee settlement at Grafton. It was 
obvious that he was in agony during the interview, although he insisted he wanted to 
participate. He was suffering from a mysterious illness that left him immobile and in 
pain. Besides being unable to access any of the health care as recommended by the 
commission, he had also sold off all of his property in order to pay for his medical care. 
Additionally, all of the victims interviewed expressed various health concerns which 
they all believed stemmed from their amputation or injury and the difficulty they had 
in accessing health care due to the costs. 
 
For the case of the emergency medical assistance, the actual medical assistance was 
being done by NGOs, for instance Mercy Ship, AWAFF, Marie Stoppes. I inquired about 
what the role of NaCSA and whether the provision of these services could be considered 
as reparation.  
 
According to a NaCSA official, the reparation aspect was in facilitating access to these 
services for the victims.  
“The reparation [aspect] there, the programme identified these victims in 
need, providing transport for them to come to access these services, 
providing them with stipend to take care of their needs whilst they are 
there in terms of feeding, transport allowance et cetera.” (NaCSA official) 
 
In 2012, Sierra Leone Venner (SLV) also continued to facilitate medical assistance to 
the amputees and severely war wounded. SLV usually hires a car and driver who goes 
all over the country to take individuals to the hospitals. The nurse working at the offices 
of the AWWA, who himself is also a war victim was funded to study the nursing course 
by the Country Director of SLV, Madam Elise as she is popularly known among the 
amputees and war wounded. He was employed to oversee the health needs of the 
amputees and war wounded and to coordinate their transportation to various health 
facilities.  
 
Prosthetics 
For the amputees and war wounded, a number of them received prosthetics however, 
these have not for the majority improved their quality of life.  
“If I was given good prosthetic that can handle something tighter, I am 
going back to the [mechanical] workshop … this kind will do nothing, it’s 
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just a symbol. It’s just to give you fitness. I have never used it … poor 
quality.” (Amputee victim) 
 
 In fact, during my encounters, I did not meet anyone, with the exception of one, who 
was using their prosthetic. He’d had his fixed in the United States of America through 
sponsorship with NGOs and it was quite advanced to the extent that he could use it to 
write, which he demonstrated. 
 
Rehabilitation 
The victims I interviewed claimed not to have received any rehabilitation services, 
whether physical or mental. In asking this question, I framed it in terms of whether 
they had received any counselling, training on how to use the prosthetics they were 
given or training on managing their disability. 
“Rehabilitating what? There are all just, rehabilitate by what? … we 
rehabilitate ourselves because we don’t see them [the NGOs] since the war 
finish, when  people are going to camp, giving us, encouraging us, for us 
to forget.” (Amputee victim) 
  
When I inquired into whether they received any counselling or psychological help, a 
number of them pointed out that they self-counselled. Religion also played an 
important part in the healing process as shared by one amputee.  
“Ok for me, I only counselled myself with the words of the bible as I am a 
Christian. I counselled myself, I even counselled other ones. You put this 
thing [violation] in your mind, you’re gone, you leave your children … but 
as for me, this is part of my destiny. That each one of us have a book, I 
have a register before God and his predictions never fail. He wrote in my 
register that ‘Edward you, I am sending you into the world, you go there 
with two hands but when returning back, you’ll come back with one but 
I’ll give the hand when you come,’ so I accepted that, that is part of 
destiny, that’s why I am always happy, I don’t worry, only my worry is my 
colleagues.” (Amputee victim) 
 
Indeed, concerning this one respondent, I met him on a number of occasions during my 
two visits and he was constantly up-beat and positive and full of concern for his fellow 
amputees. 
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I also observed that the respondents generally elected to talk about their amputation 
even when I did not ask about it. This could have been a learned response given the 
high number of research activities into the lives of the amputees but it could also have 
been a form of seeking for validation for their harm. As such, I spent a couple of minutes 
with each interviewee learning about the circumstances under which they were 
amputated and how this had changed their lives. 
 
The challenge in the alternative strategy for health programme was that the health care 
was provided to a limited number of victims. It was not long term and also not extended 
to dependents. In terms of content and structure, it falls far short of the type of health 
care that was recommended by the commission. Nevertheless, at the level of NaCSA, 
the emergency medical assistance was viewed as a service that was meant to fulfil in 
part the recommendations on health. 
 
One of the issues that arises from this non implementation of the health services is the 
lack of trust in the health personnel and the services. There is a perception by the 
victims that there is a conspiracy to kill them off faster particularly when they go to the 
hospitals. This is because they “have become a pressure group” and they feel like their 
presence is not tolerated. 
 
9.4.5.2 Education 
 
As with the health plan, the proposal for education as reparation was also elaborate. 
Below is an outline of the proposed recommendations for education. 
 Free education be provided until senior secondary school for selected beneficiaries 
 Assistance to and expansion of existing education programmes including teacher 
training and providing incentives to teachers in remote areas 
 Prioritise education to permanently disabled victims and victims of sexual violence 
 
The Sierra Leone government passed a progressive Education Act in 2004 which 
among others required all children to complete basic education. To facilitate this, it 
abolished tuition fees for all children in government assisted primary and junior 
secondary school (The Education Act, 2004). 
 
The feedback I got from the victim respondents indicated that they still need to finance 
the education of their children. This was in terms of the other costs that accrue such as 
feeding, extra lessons and scholastic materials. 
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“Look look look Monica, before they say free education, let me say, 
because why the teacher ask the school children at basic level is more 
than school fees … you the parent provides the uniform, the parent 
provides the books, the pencil, the lunch, where is the free education … 
even the tuition is being taken in another form … oh lessons, you pay 
lessons because there the public schools, hmm … the public schools, 
nothing is happening, they are just asking for money.” (Amputee victim) 
 
As of 2012, there were no tangible frameworks in place to support the facilitation of 
the specific measures of education recommended by the commission. According to 
NaCSA, they were having on-going meetings with the ministry of education to 
determine how to set up education programme with reparation components for the 
victims. 
 
9.4.5.2.1 An Alternative strategy: Urgent interim reparation 
 
Urgent interim reparations were cash grants given to the victims as an “interim 
measure” as they wait for the fully-fledged reparation policy to be put in place. The 
commission was quite clear on its position on monetary awards versus service benefits 
and NaCSA was aware of this position however, the funding they received would simply 
not have been adequate to meet the reparation programme like it was envisioned, yet 
many victims continued to suffer.  
 
In total, 300,000 SLL, an equivalent of $100 at prevailing exchange rate was paid in 
2009 to a total of 20,107 out of the 32,110 victims, of which 13,123 were adults and 
6,984 were children. Accessibility was based on the level of vulnerability among the 
categories of the most vulnerable group as elaborated,  
“For example, war widows, we looked at for example the number of 
children. There are some widows, you may have a widow with four kids 
all going to school and you have a widow living alone or with one kid. In 
terms of prioritizing, of course we’ll consider the one with four kids. That’s 
just an example but these are some of the factors we took into 
consideration. Like even war wounded, you may have some who, well, of 
course they are all suffering, but you may have some for example, some 
are still in pain while others may have received medical attention 
probably from some NGOs or others. So you need to attend to those who 
are in urgent need. You see?” (NaCSA official) 
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Similarly, the Le 300,000 was interpreted as educational support to meet education 
needs. According to NaCSA, some of the children who received it used it to enrol in 
school. A number of the children had dropped out of school because they could not 
meet the various costs associated with education but with this money, they were able 
to re-enrol and continue with their education. For how long they were able to remain 
in school however is questionable on the account that the amount is just too little for 
sustained educational expenses. I was also not able to verify this claim because I did 
not encounter children beneficiaries. However, a number of the victims did express 
that a portion of the money was put towards educational expenses for the children 
although it did not last long.  Education continued to remain an issue of concern and I 
was usually asked for help to pay school fees for some of the children as well as connect 
them to sponsors and organisations who could support their children’s education. 
 
9.4.5.3 Microfinance  
 
The commission recommended Skills Training, Micro-credit and Micro-projects for 
Individual or Collective Groups of Beneficiaries as part of reparations. Below is a brief 
outline of the recommendation. 
 Facilitate the inclusion of specific beneficiaries by providing assistance to 
organizations and bodies providing skills training  
 Conduct a market assessment to match the skills training with the skills needed on 
the market 
 Incorporate a small-scale business management training course in the skills 
training course 
 Provision of micro-credit or micro-projects to beneficiaries who complete the skills 
training 
 
As discussed below, the microfinance aspect was not fully implemented as 
recommended but modified to benefit a few individuals. However, the interim cash 
grant given to the victims was interpreted as microfinance, albeit without the skills 
training. 
 
9.4.5.3.1 An alternative strategy: Cash grants 
 
The 2009 ‘interim cash grants’ according to a NaCSA official was meant to assist the 
victims to take care of the services recommended by the commission but which were 
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not yet being provided, for instance health care and scholastic materials. However, this 
payment has also been referred to as ‘micro-grants’ in public discourse.  In the media 
and also in discussions with officials from NaCSA, the purported benefits of this money 
to the victims were continuously emphasised. In 2011, the approximately 13,000 
victims who had missed out during the first round were also given the Le 300,000. Also 
in 2011, the amputees were given Le 940,500, financed by the UNPBF for livelihood 
support because of their degree of vulnerability. 
 
Framing this support as a micro grant has however been questioned as expressed by 
one of the victims, “Who they gave microfinance? To who? To who did they give 
microfinance? When? Well, I am not aware of that.” (amputee victim) 
 
Realistically however, it is questionable how it was expected that such an amount 
would be used to start a business because it was very little. Additionally, the victims in 
general are living on the barest minimum, many of them with pending financial 
obligations such as food, school dues and health concerns. In the resettlement camps, 
all of the victims I interviewed claimed that not a trace of the money was left. When 
they received the money, it immediately went into catering for their basic needs. Only 
one explained that he had used it to construct an extra pit latrine. 
 
In 2010, another conditional funding of one million dollars was received from the UN 
Trust fund for Women through UNIFEM. This was to provide training and micro credits 
for women victims of sexual violence. In total 650 women out of the 4602 registered 
victims of sexual violence were identified for training in livelihood skills between 2010 
and 2011 and at the end of the training 500$ was given to each of them. This 
programme only accounted for 14% of the total victims of sexual violence.  
 
I was not able to verify whether this process had already taken place or how efficient 
it had been. It was however acknowledged by both the media and general population 
that indeed such a programme had taken place. 
 
This specific activity also deviates from the commission recommendation as the 
recommendation on micro finance grants to victims was not only specified to a 
particular category but across the board. Moreover, the total number of women victims 
of sexual violence is much higher than the number selected for the training. Although 
this project was referred to as a pilot programme, there is no concrete agenda on its 
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continuation or sustainability so it is not certain whether it will eventually involve all 
women victims of sexual violence or even the whole range of victims. 
 
As with other cases involving education and health care, the implementers had to 
improvise and work within the parameters that had been set for them by the funders. 
For instance, as pointed out by one of the NaCSA staff,  
“TRC recommended specifically skills training for all categories of victims 
who express willingness to benefit. Unfortunately the funding we received 
for that training was designated for the VSVs [victims of sexual violence] 
but at least it meets the recommendations of skills training so in as much 
as we’ve not done much for the other categories of victims in terms of 
skills training, at least we’ve done for the VSVs.” (NaCSA) 
 
Although the interim cash grants were phrased as micro grants, the idea behind it was 
to provide money for the victims to be able to take care of the basic needs. It was not 
foreseeable at what point the services envisaged by the TRC could kick in so this acted 
as an alternative service. 
 
9.4.5.4 Symbolic Reparations 
 
The key issues raised in recommending the symbolic reparations were continued 
public acknowledgement and support to remembrance initiatives. The specific aspects 
include the following. 
 Public apology from the government individuals, groups, bodies and organisations 
who bear any responsibility for the abuses and violations 
 Establishment of at least one national war memorial and memorials in different 
parts of the country 
 Organising commemoration ceremonies including symbolic reburials 
 Declare a National reconciliation Day during which government organises and 
supports commemoration activities. 
 Dissemination of the reparation programme including translating to local 
languages 
 Identification of mass graves 
 
The implementation of the symbolic reparations has to a greater extent had better 
success than the other programmes in terms of translating the proposal into action. 
However, as will be shown, it has also been limited in its application. 
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Apologies 
 
The most significant of the apologies was the president’s formal apology to women and 
all who were affected by the war in 2009. However, this was viewed as figurative 
because it was offered by a government that many felt had not been involved in the 
war. The previous government that had been in office during the war had been 
reluctant to apologise which many interpreted as being afraid that they were taking 
responsibility for the war. 
 
Ideally the intention of apologies is to show remorse for actions. In the case of the 
victims I interviewed in Freetown, the offers of apologies were largely accepted but 
they were not taken as meaningful gestures. This is partly because the victims 
continued to suffer. 
“I heard them when the TRC was in process, I heard them saying ‘we’re 
sorry over what we did.’ As for me, sorry to them but I promise them that 
I will be better than you people … the apologies, I look at the apologies, I 
never looked [at] them serious[ly] … apologies are not significant for me. 
Let them take their apologies. Am on way trying to do what for my life 
until God takes me away … apologies, I don’t know.” (Amputee victim) 
 
Additionally, apologies without the tangible benefits were considered ineffective. 
 
My perception was that whereas the victims expressed that it was commendable that 
the perpetrators and government were offering apologies, it did not change the 
conditions they were living in. They would still continue begging and struggling to 
survive. In fact, the apologies were even considered more meaningful to the 
perpetrators because they were clearing their conscience but for the victims they could 
not eat the apologies nor use it to pay school fees or hospital fees. 
 
War memorials 
 
The Relics and Monuments Commission initially explored the idea of setting up a war 
museum. One of the members of the commission discussed how they were involved 
with the West African Museum Programme (WAMP). They also attended a workshop 
on the impact of civil war on the cultural heritage where emphasis was in preserving 
memory. 
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“How one could relate historical events to sites so that these sites become 
visual sites, they become sites of conscience as well. A Sierra Leonean will 
go to that site, they know the reasons for that site, what did it entail, what 
happened? You just don’t go and look, you need to think, you need to be 
conscious of actions that had  taken place or taking place you know, then 
you reflect so that stuff like that does not happen in the future … change 
your attitude. That was the reason for that workshop.” (Member, Relics 
and Monuments Commission) 
 
The Relics and Monuments Commission however did not pursue memorialisation 
using the war museum project. For one, they were not in charge of the project, they 
simply had two members from their commission represented in the war museum 
committee. Lack of funds was also raised as one of the challenge. By 2011, they were 
not actively involved in the memorialisation project.  
 
As of 2013, the premises that housed the Special Court for Sierra Leone had been 
transformed into the Sierra Leone Peace museum. Information on the website of the 
peace museum indicates that this was through a recommendation from the 
government of Sierra Leone to establish such a project after the closure of the court.  
 
The Open Society of West Africa was also involved in a project of documenting the 
impact of civil wars through photography and video. This was in partnership with the 
WAMP and Sierra Leone National Museum. While I was in Freetown in 2011, an 
exhibition on the civil war was going on in the museum in which photographs and 
artefacts from the war were on display. Part of the package included a guided tour with 
full narratives of the pieces and photographs. The acting curator explained that they 
regularly organise educational awareness raising programmes in the context of the 
civil war. 
 
The war museum project was however not seen in a positive light by the victims 
considering the amount of money that would be spent on it and the still pending 
reparation programme. In the first instance, they expressed support for it in their 
statement as elaborated below by one amputee. Perhaps this was a tongue-in-cheek 
response because it was preceded by a dry laughter and shaking of the head. 
“They have spent almost around one hundred ninety something thousand 
dollars. They want to build a monument at the special court, all 
documents of the special court, the TRC, people like you will come 
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tomorrow there to get some facts so I welcome that … I think that 
programme is on course and I would like that monument for the future of 
this country, for the generation yet unborn to know about what happened 
in Sierra Leone today, people born in the outside world will come one day 
and look. I honour the monument, it will be built very soon … it took $ 
195,000 to do that job at the special court.” (Amputee) 
 
However on further probing regarding the money spent on building the monuments 
and their situation, they expressed the concern that they would have rather seen the 
funds go into the trust fund for their livelihood benefit but as it is, they have no control 
over the allocation of funds.  
“Yes I requested them to send this money to the trust fund but there was 
no way, the programme writer said no, this will be a monument that will 
live for, that a war legacy would be there for long years, thousands of 
years, the people from all over the world will come one day and look 
because they are going to build a library … so I know that whatever I say 
there they won’t release that money for us so I just say, I say, ‘ok build it’.” 
(Chairman, AWWA) 
 
There is indeed a genuine concern over memorialisation and remembrances. The 
amputees I interviewed worried about being forgotten and about how they are the face 
and the reminder of the war and once they all die, the war will be forgotten but on being 
given a choice between the memorials and their livelihood enhancement, they would 
prefer the latter.  
“[what is] the point of a monument? The people are dying, they’re 
suffering … it don’t go down well with us.” (Amputee victim) 
Commemoration ceremonies 
 
These were a series of ceremonies, tailored to specific chiefdoms to facilitate 
community healing. The symbolic measures were to facilitate reconciliation and 
healing. 
“Bring about community healing. For people to come to terms with the 
past … [the war] affected not only individual lives but it also affected 
communities. It affected people’s belief system, there was a deliberate 
attempt to destroy some of the social fabrics of society … people were 
forced to commit certain acts considered to be sacrilege within their 
specific regions … traditional societies, traditional practices were 
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brought to disrepute, traditional authorities were abused … the symbolic 
reparations was actually to promote the process of healing these 
communities, making them come to terms with what had happened, sort 
of trying to win back the bond.” (NaCSA) 
 
According to NaCSA, the process of carrying out the ceremonies was participatory 
where local communities were involved in identifying measures that would enable 
them to come to terms with what happened and help them to go back to normal 
traditional practices. The role of NaCSA in these endeavours was to provide the support 
to people who have the expertise to carry out these rituals in the specific communities. 
The support included the financial resources and specific items required for the 
ceremonies.  
“For example, for all those who were killed, we had what was called the 
symbolic burial for all those who were killed and buried without 
ceremony. It is a belief that when somebody die that individual, a human 
being is different from the dog, for example a dog can just be buried but 
if a human being died, dies, we need to take him or her to the church or to 
the mosque, prayers are said for him or her before being buried so what 
we did was, we go to a particular chiefdom, that is just one aspect of the 
symbolic reparations … we will conduct the symbolic ceremony, we go to 
the church, prayers are said for all those who lost their lives during the 
war in this chiefdom who were buried, the Christians who were buried 
without being taken to church for their bodies to be prayed for. This 
service is for them, we conduct the service and then there is a symbolic 
reburial wherein, not a real corpse but a symbolic corpse is taken to the 
grave site. The funeral, all the funeral rites, all the Christian rites will be 
followed, the same for the Muslim, all the Muslim funeral rites will be 
followed on behalf of all these victims so at least if you have a relative, you 
know you are a Christian, he was killed, this was done. You will know the 
government has done something.” (NaCSA) 
 
Additional support was also provided to the secret societies such as bondo and poro in 
particular chiefdoms to carry out ceremonies for acts of desecration during the war. At 
the end of these ceremonies, the community was also encouraged to propose a 
commemoration symbol in terms of a monument, which was constructed in all of the 
chiefdoms in which these ceremonies took place.  
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In total 40 chiefdoms out of the 149 chiefdoms had such ceremonies, rituals and 
monuments established by the end of the one year project. 
 
National Reconciliation Day 
 
The TRC recommended that January 18 be designated as a national reconciliation day. 
This was not being celebrated nationally however while I was in Freetown in 2011, the 
University of Sierra Leone’s department of Peace and Conflict Studies organised a 
series of lectures to mark the event. 
 
Dissemination of the recommendation on Reparations 
 
In the interviews, I inquired about what they knew about the reparation 
recommendations and it was clear that the victims were aware of the basic content of 
the reparations. They listed among others free treatment at the hospitals, school fees 
and materials for their children, pensions and micro finance grants. This knowledge 
was not only limited to the victims but also extended to the wider population who 
supported the award of these benefits to the victims, particularly the amputees. 
 
Extensive sensitisation campaigns were carried out to raise awareness about the 
recommendations and clarify on what the benefits would entail. This was done through 
radio and television debates and shows. Much of this information is also accessible 
online through the running website of TRC with the full report and alternative versions 
such as for children and secondary school. 
 
There is also a video summary of the TRC report which was shown across the country 
as well as a music CD. Although none of the respondents possessed a copy of these 
items, they had heard of or seen excerpts either over the radio or TV. WITNESS 
supported the production of a video summary of the report summarising the key 
findings and recommendations while the music CD was produced with the assistance 
from UNIOSIL. It comprises of catchy renditions of the findings and recommendations, 
sang by local artists in Krio. 
 
Identification of mass graves 
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None of the respondents I interviewed expressed any awareness on the identification 
of mass graves. According to NaCSA, this feature of the symbolic reparation has not yet 
been implemented.  
 
The symbolic reparations, particularly the apologies and memorial events may have 
been carried out but these were not perceived as wholly satisfactory for the victims.  
“You are telling me that it is a symbolic reparation, what do you mean by 
symbolic reparation? What we need now is money where to push our 
lives.” (Amputee) 
 
9.4.5.5 Pensions 
 
The commission recommended that a minimum of Le 60,000 monthly pension be 
awarded to adult victims who had experienced 50% or more reduction in their earning 
capacity. 
 
During the period that I was in Freetown, the chairman of AWWA said he was in 
discussion with NaCSA over the issue of pension for the amputees and war wounded 
but the meetings did not seem to be registering any significant progress. He identified 
two areas of contention; the proposed amount and the narrow scope of victims.  
 
According to him, the amount that was being proposed was Le 250,000 per month for 
the amputee victims only and the payments would start in 2013. He opposed this plan 
because the amount would not be enough to meet their living costs. It also excluded the 
other war wounded, some of who had debilitating injuries. He therefore proposed Le 
450,000 and the inclusion of all other war wounded victims. 
 
An official at NaCSA however clarified that the scope of beneficiaries would be 
determined by the recommendation of the TRC that proposed that the beneficiaries 
would be adult amputees, adult other war wounded with 50% or more reduction in 
earning capacity and adult victims of sexual violence. It is not clear where the 
communication hitch occurred but it resulted in bitterness within the AWWA. 
 
The NaCSA official was also reluctant to give a specific amount for the pensions because 
the amount was still being debated and would probably be reflected in the 2013 
budget. But overall, they are engaging with the responsible institution, NASSIT to map 
out a plan for the inclusion of the victims into a social security plan.  
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In an interview with a staff at the ministry of finance however, he explained that the 
inclusion of a group on the pension scheme is a detailed procedure that requires legal 
requirements in place. 
“This particular information which regards payments of pensions to 
victims of the war have not yet been concluded by parliament.  Because I 
am working as an accountant here, I do make payment to people when I 
receive the appropriate from the ministry or parliament and it should be 
a statutory instrument. That was a working document that was prepared 
by the TRC and it needs to go through parliament, then parliament will 
make the necessary recommendations, how are we going to pay them, 
how much are we going to pay them, like for instance …Just like for the 
military as I have rightly informed you, we pay them according to their 
disability percentages so this one I think is yet to be completed by 
parliament … I have not received any documents with regards to that and 
my responsibility is to make payments according to instructions being 
given to me from either parliament or from the minister himself and the 
minister also have instructions from parliament, so while I have the 
parliamentary document or instrument giving mandate for a particular 
payment to occur then we are not obliged.” (Staff, Ministry of finance) 
 
In a later communication with the Chairman of AWWA, he reported that the pension 
scheme was put to rest. In 2013, which would have been the year when they would 
have implemented the project, they were given a one-off $ 1,400 each and requested to 
sign documents guaranteeing that they would not request for any more money. This 
amount was limited to the amputees and some of the other war wounded. 
 
9.4.5.6 Community Reparation 
 
I consider the TRC conceptualisation of community reparation rather broad and 
ambiguous. Its emphasis is on a programme of reconstruction, rehabilitation and 
consolidation of institutions in certain regions and communities that are considered to 
have suffered more devastating effects of the war to “make them whole again through 
the provision of capital and technical assistance.” (TRC Volume 2, 2004:265). The 
criteria for selection of these regions was to be based on assessments by different 
bodies and organisations such as “the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 
 293 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), National Commission for Social Action, 
Department for International Development (DFID), Sierra Leonean Rural Reintegration 
Project (SLRRP), and others on the level of destruction of infrastructure in districts and 
what work remains to be completed or initiated in some cases.” (Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone, Volume II, 2004:265) 
 
In the discussions with NaCSA, this aspect of reparations was not yet being considered 
but on the whole such programmes targeting reconstruction and consolidation of 
institutions were being carried out as part of the national development agenda. 
 
9.4.5.6.1 An Alternative Strategy: Housing  
 
SLV, a Norwegian organisation took up the construction of houses for the amputees 
and severely war wounded. In total, by 2012, 850 houses had been built in different 
areas of the country. The role of the government in this project was to provide the land 
and this was acquired through the permission of the paramount chiefs in whose 
jurisdiction the houses are constructed.  
 
During the interviews, the respondents maintained that they were accepted in the 
communities they had relocated to and were living peacefully. This claim was also 
corroborated by the President of the AWWA who said that they carry out sensitisation 
and awareness campaigns among the local communities and also between the 
beneficiaries and their future neighbours where they emphasise peaceful living.  
“Before we send them to their different locations throughout the country, 
we inform the paramount chiefs, elders, they even make some 
performance … make the community understand that these people are 
coming to stay with you, you should take them as brothers and sisters and 
you the victims, you’ll go there, live with them together as brother and 
sister.” (Chairman, AWWA) 
 
This harmonious living is not a claim I could ably verify because the other members of 
the community were reluctant to participate in the interviews although in informal 
discussion with a couple of them  for example while eating at the local restaurant, they 
said they had no problem with the amputees settling in their community. I also 
observed that the areas around the camps seemed to have a business vibrancy to it. 
One of the respondents claimed their presence, in terms of increased infrastructure 
was a boost to the development of the area.  
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“I can remember my location in Waterloo when we were repatriated in 
2002, we were alone in that site but now we are the centre of the area, all 
this area has been built houses.” (Amputee victim) 
 
9.4.5.7 Victims Trust Fund 
 
The victims Trust Fund, was launched in 2009, five years after it was meant to be 
established. Its purpose was to finance the reparations programme or a basket fund 
where all money intended to benefit the victims would be channelled through. This 
launch in a way has been viewed as a willingness by the government to put victims 
concerns into consideration. 
 
This fund has however been faced with the unavailability of resources. According to 
one of the programme officers at NaCSA, the major challenge is encouraging people to 
contribute to the fund and this cuts across the board, whether Individuals, parastatals, 
private business houses or donor community. There have been some contributions 
from individual organisations, although I was not able to access the specifics.  
 
A NaCSA official mentioned that they were continuing with emergency medical 
assistance on a case by case basis using the funds in this trust fund however the 
chairperson of the AWWA disputed this assertion as he pointed out that he had been 
trying to follow up individual cases that required medical attention but these had not 
been forthcoming.  
“Right now, I have somebody whose case is very serious on that, you know 
these people are just lying on people, lying. Now I have somebody who 
wants to be, he is already admitted at the hospital, he is already there 
right now in the hospital but they don’t care, and I reported that matter. 
And there is somebody whom I asked for them to do operation, he got 
some problems, some hernia to do operation but it has taken almost a 
year just to do that operation, nowhere … I have been behind these people 
… there is someone doing a diploma, gave me his tuition fee papers. I 
presented it to NaCSA so they told me that they will see into that, up to 
now, now they are soon or later they will drive the man out of the college 
because of no tuition. It is about nine hundred and something thousand.” 
(Chairperson, AWWA) 
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9.5 Salient issues arising interviews 
 
In the following section, the issues presented were perceived as significant to the 
direction the implementation of the recommendation on reparation took. 
 
9.5.1 Significance of the limited implementation 
 
One of the outstanding consequences of the limited focus on reparation issues has been 
the creation of a feeling of abandonment for the victims. The amputees I interviewed 
reiterated how they were being ignored because they were not a threat as compared 
to the combatants whose programme was swiftly funded and implemented. They also 
believed that there was a conspiracy to get rid of them, particularly the amputees who 
bore the physical reminders of the war. 
 
The feeling of remorse for not fully implementing the reparation programme was also 
shared by other members of the community who considered it a shame that these 
individuals who through no fault of their own continue to suffer unfairly. All of Sierra 
Leoneans suffered but some of them have managed to cope and rebuild their lives. The 
amputees and other vulnerable groups on the other hand have not been able to 
overcome their difficulties because the means through which they would have started 
afresh was taken away from them. As one respondent pointed out, the consequences 
of ignoring the victims are far reaching beyond the individual. 
“We’re not really very seriously as a people and as a country taking 
reparations aspect of reconciliation very seriously and that has very 
serious political implications because if those who suffered directly 
continue to suffer and they see those who were responsible for their 
suffering enjoy, then they begin to recall all those sad memories. It even 
becomes worse when some of those who were directly responsible for 
their suffering are now seen along the corridors of power.” (University 
Professor) 
 
9.5.1.1  Activism 
 
The AWWA stated that they were taking action to publicise their plight.  
“We wrote a letter of protest that we are ready to come to the streets for 
the whole world to know that nothing is being done for us and we are 
dying every day.” (Chairman, AWWA) 
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 Interestingly, the AWWA had been founded as early as 2002 but had lacked the 
vibrancy and visibility. During the first meeting in 2011, the incoming Chairman of the 
association was restructuring and seeking to attract funding and publicity for the 
Association. They were compiling and updating the database of their members but had 
also come to the realisation that they would have to specialise their cause to amputees 
and war wounded rather than the entire spectrum of victims.  
 
In 2012, the Association had a physical address with a newly built and furnished office 
in Freetown. Whereas previously we had to meet in restaurants, during my second 
visit, the meetings were held in the Chairman’s new and comfortable office complete 
with a full time staff of five. 
  
The Chairman of AWWA also reported that he had been called for a meeting with the 
president and he seemed quite vocal about their demands and what the content of the 
meeting would entail for instance he indicated that he would focus on cash payments 
for the amputees.  
“I am going to ask for cash and I am going to give them dates, they don’t 
give us, we go to the streets, we die, we forget about it.” 
 
After the meeting with the president, I inquired into his threat for the planned 
demonstration and he reported that he was bold in his demands.  
“I say, are we responsible for what is, what happened to us? So I say I am 
desperate, I will not wait any longer, we are going to make a peaceful 
demonstration very soon if we don’t get any good answer, we don’t get 
good word from state house, we are going to match peacefully 
throughout the whole country. I say I am going to inform all my 
chairpersons at the different districts, then, perhaps I will wait when you 
are celebrating your independence, while you are celebrating, we are 
outside … I was desperate.” 
 
9.5.1.2  Resilience  
 
A number of amputees have been able to reinvent a vocation to bring in an income.  
As for me, when I got this problem [amputation], I was a mechanic … I 
think what to do because I don’t want to go to the street and beg but my 
mechanical know-how gives me an idea, that I should do photographing. 
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I was doing photographing this past years. I was getting my living with 
my family, taking care of my family.” (Amputee victim) 
 
9.5.1.3  Resentment of the international Community 
 
There seems to be resentment towards the international community which is 
perceived to have left an incomplete process. Their heavy involvement immediately 
after the war in the truth commission process apparently did not transition into the 
post truth commission phase.  
“The international community was only to see that Sierra Leone got 
peace, so they came in with their money and finished with the war … this 
was sheer wickedness by the international community. They should have 
completed their job but they left it hanging. They should have taken over 
our problems. They could have said okay government 50%, we 50% …the 
government of Sierra Leone, they have so many assignments on their 
hands, implementing this reparations without the help of the 
international community, it would be very difficult.” (Amputee victim) 
 
9.5.1.4  False speculations 
 
The delay in implementation has caused speculations about the intention of the 
implementers. They have alleged that the whole process is filled with corrupt officials 
who are swindling the money for personal gains.  
“They don’t just want to do it [implement]. The money is there. They’re taking this money 
within their pockets, the money is there but they are just greedy and selfish.” (Amputee 
victim) 
 
“My conscience is convinced that they are giving them the money.” 
(Amputee victim) 
 
One of the respondents further narrated a case where a victim was hospitalised and a 
bill was presented to NaCSA which they believe was exaggerated and is meant to 
benefit some individuals.  
“You know in this part of the world, let me say here in Africa, all over 
Africa, when someone gets a chance where he can make money, because 
there is no body to ask him why, why did you do this, why did you do that? 
So they do things they like…it’s a coordination, a coordination between 
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workers from here [NaCSA] and with the doctors, they work 
together…with such kind of money, it actually tells me that something is 
wrong with that bill…That is why I told them doctor or no doctor, give us 
money we find our own doctor.” (Chairman, AWWA) 
 
With regards to the trust fund, there was speculation about the availability of funds in 
it which are however being cleverly embezzled as put by one respondent,  
“To my understanding, that trust fund because they only tells [sic] me that 
there is 200 million … but that trust fund is a trust fund they are trying to 
exhaust with on medical bills, exorbitant medical bills, look at this one is 
for the medical bills, 7,000,000 … so they are now trying to exhaust this 
little money in the trust fund with medical bills while we don’t benefit.” 
(Chairman, AWWA) 
 
Even when they are fighting for a change in the situation, there is still a sense of 
hopelessness. There is no guarantee that the situation will change for the better.  
“Hope you come back, perhaps you will meet us where we are today, same 
thing, same story, you don’t know these people.” (Amputee victim) 
 
9.5.1.5  Sustained suffering  
 
As proposals which were meant to improve the lives of the victims and enable them to 
meet their basic needs continue to be put on hold, their suffering is stretched on as put 
by the chairman of AWWA. 
“Nothing, nothing has been implemented, nothing, nothing, tell them 
nothing, there are people dying up there, dying every day, I remember 
when I went to Port Loko, I met a lady who was so sick that after I was 
running to Freetown to somewhere where I could get money so that they 
can take her to hospital … I was called that she had died.” (Chairman, 
AWWA) 
 
9.5.2 Vision of what a reparation programme would entail  
 
As pointed out in the preceding section, there was a considerable amount of criticism 
against the reparation programme, either over its content or its non-implementation. I 
was therefore curious about what a reparation programme would entail. 
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9.5.2.1 Addressing the root causes of the conflict 
 
On a general level, respondents pointed out the need for a TJ process to address root 
causes of a conflict and seek answers as to why the war happened in the first place. 
Such a holistic approach would entail that structural injustices are effectively 
addressed. 
“Injustices in the system, social, economic, political injustices … if you 
want to guarantee that we do not repeat that kind of thing, you have to 
ensure that those things which caused the problems in the first place are 
eliminated.” (University professor) 
 
A reparation programme should therefore promote social, political and economic 
equality.  
“How do you ensure that, you know, people have a stake in the governance 
system of the country? How do you ensure that the common people, you 
know, are able to earn a living? … the enabling environment as you call it 
is created so that people can make full use of their potentials because 
when people are usefully engaged, the thought of engaging in violence is 
very minimal but when the brain is idle … any so called liberator will come 
from nowhere and recruit them easily … reparations thus should focus on 
the structural imbalances.” (University professor) 
 
9.5.2.2 Preference for cash 
 
There was a strong preference for cash payments or “hard cash” as it was referred to. 
On further probing, the President of the AWWA estimated that they would ask for 
10,000,000 SLL for each amputee and war wounded victim although he was very much 
aware that this would not be the final amount.  
“Let’s say we are bargaining, we can ask, you always ask high then they 
will beat it down. So that’s it … it will be a hard tussle. I can’t say it [the 
final amount] now because I too I will be very hard.” (Chairman, AWWA) 
 
Also, in lieu of the services that are to be offered such as health or education, the victims 
also preferred cash but through a periodic payment scheme. For instance the 
chairperson of the AWWA argued that,  
“Let them give us the hard cash, we just find our medical doctor … what I 
am planning is, we make it like a payslip, medical, this is the money for 
300 
your medical, monthly or quarterly or any two quarters of the year, then 
this is for medical.” (Chairman, AWWA) 
 
By giving cash, it would mean closure and no holding onto promises.  
“In this country, people easily forget. For me I wanted, I want these people 
to do everything [give the money], we forget about them they forget about 
you, this is what I want. Give us the hard cash, then we forget about you, 
how we live, [is] how we live.” (Chairman, AWWA) 
 
9.5.2.3 Trust fund for victims 
 
Based on the findings, I established that there was no direct representative of victims 
on the management of the trust fund. On inquiry into how a trust fund could be run, the 
common thread was on having representatives of victims on board which would 
enhance transparency and create a more target driven assistance since such a 
representative would know victims needs better, being a victim themselves. 
“The most rational thing I would see done is for yes this is the official, the 
government official but there has to be an amputee, a victim who will be 
a part of that administrative hierarchy to see that everything is being 
done accordingly. That person will be the messenger to go and tell the 
companion to know that this is how we are operating. When they know 
that there is a representative in that executive hierarchy then there is 
confidence. Then they will not feel like their money is being squandered. 
That is our problem at this particular point in time, they see that they 
receive this money on their behalf but they don’t see it [the money].” 
(Former TRC staff) 
 
9.5.2.4 Neutral body 
 
“A neutral body that overlooks the implementation” was preferred to the current 
reliance on NaCSA and other government agencies to oversee the implementation of 
the reparation process. 
 
9.5.2.5 International influence 
 
The respondents had a strong feeling of abandonment and betrayal by the 
international community who were initially supportive of the truth commission 
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process and then did not continue with the similar level of support towards the 
implementation. 
“This implementation should not be solely with government there has to 
be an intervention by the UN to appoint personalities to work with 
government in the implementation…not much will happen [with the 
government alone].” (Former NRC staff) 
 
9.5.2.6 The implementation process 
 
The respondents pointed out that an implementation process needs to be systematic 
and consistent with the proposals as suggested by the commission.  
“Somebody else will have to come back to look at what is in the report? 
What does this implementation entail? Is it viable? Does it [resonate with] 
the views of the commission? There is nobody who has done.” (Former 
TRC staff) 
 
Similarly, the respondents also had views on the ideal character trait of the 
implementers. 
“One that is apolitical, a politically conscious somebody who belongs to a 
particular party will seek the interest of that party in power, that is 
critical.” (CSO) 
 
“A judicious implementation programme implementer is one who has the 
nation at heart.” (CSO) 
 
9.5.3 Challenges in implementation 
 
The respondents identified a number of challenges in the implementation of the 
reparation programme as discussed below. 
 
9.5.3.1  Delays in implementation 
 
There were considerable delays in starting the reparations programme. The actual 
implementation started in 2008, four years after the release of the report. 
 
A number of explanations have been put forward for this delay. Two main reasons 
stood out; inadequate resources to follow through with the recommendations and 
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political will. Respondents argued that for a country that had just emerged from a 
decade long war, it was faced with competing demands. Reparation, in this case, 
although considered important did not fit into the overall reconstruction picture. There 
is an accepted understanding that the government does not have the available 
resources and therefore has to prioritise and victim reparation at the moment is not a 
priority in the face of other pressing issues. 
 
For instance on the issue of constructing monuments and symbols, one of the 
respondents pointed out that it was understandable that government could not commit 
to that venture because it had other duties to fulfil. 
“But there was no, there was insufficient funding for that, and the 
government was not in a position to say build a war museum when they 
have starving people, when people need houses, damage onto their 
properties, so the priorities were refocused, never mind they were 
contained in the TRC report but due to the limited resources available, 
they had to refocus.” (Member, Relics and Monuments Commission) 
 
Secondly, it was not until 2007 when funds were made available by the UN Peace 
Building Fund that the reparation programme was kick-started. As pointed out by an 
official at NaCSA, this was because government turned its attention on the reparation 
issue. 
“It was because the government put reparations on the agenda and in 
negotiating to trying to secure assistance from our development partners. 
They forwarded the reparations as one of the key areas to move forward 
with so one can also say the political will was demonstrated at this latter 
part though there was change of government and based upon the fact 
that it was put on the agenda we started in 2008.” (NaCSA) 
 
The change of government referred to here is the switch from the SLPP to the APC 
through a presidential election in September 2007. 
 
The UNPBF was provided for one year only despite the expectation that it would 
continue and this brought the reparation programme to almost a standstill. Even when 
the unit received funding in 2010, it was not nearly half of what they had got earlier. In 
addition, the TFWV continued to not attract any contributions which greatly hindered 
the reparation programme. 
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Since 2010, NaCSA re-strategised and turned its focus on attempting to mobilise 
resources internally by working directly with the government.  
“Towards the end of 2010 when it was realised that we are not going to 
get much in terms of funding from external partners, we started working 
with the government … a concept paper was developed by the director 
and forwarded to the president’s office highlighting the areas, some of 
them were on the recommendations of the TRC for example percentage 
of mineral resources, budgetary allocations et cetera highlighting key 
areas where they will be able to mobilise resources internally to finance 
the programme.” (NaCSA official) 
 
9.5.3.2  Managing expectations 
 
The victims had witnessed what the combatants had gone through during the DDR 
process. They were also aware of similar reparation programmes in other countries, 
notably South Africa. They were therefore expectant of a sum of equal proportion or 
even larger than what the perpetrators had received, after all, they were victims who 
had suffered during the war. It was therefore a real challenge on how to manage the 
expectations of the war victims against the resources that were available. 
“When we started, you know it’s a new programme, we, we were faced 
with the challenge of managing expectations of the beneficiaries. You 
know they have all been waiting for this reparation, now it is here, they 
wanted everything from reparations, so managing their expectation was 
a big challenge.” (NaCSA official) 
 
In an attempt to manage the expectations of the victims, NaCSA engaged in a 
programme of massive sensitisation about what the reparation would entail. The 
campaigns were carried out in both electronic and print media. They did interviews, 
participated in talk shows on both radio and television. They were also able to develop 
and engage institutions at the local level as a means of disseminating the appropriate 
and relevant information. The Programme Director of NaCSA was confident the 
sensitisation programme was a success because they were able to foresee more 
realistic targets. Sensitisation however also came with financial obligations which 
again limited their scope. 
 
It should also be noted that a lot of effort had been directed at popularising the 
recommendations, therefore, the victims were aware of, at least superficially, what was 
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contained in the recommendations on reparation. They are aware that they are entitled 
to free medical care, free education of their children, a monthly pension, community 
reparations and symbolic reparations. Some also mentioned free public transportation 
services. 
 
9.5.3.2.1 The profile of the victim 
 
In discussing the life of the amputees, I asked them what they were doing 
professionally before the amputation. I got a mix of four responses; student, petty 
trade, farmer or a vocational trade such as tailoring or mechanic. Also many of the 
victims were from the provinces where the heaviest of the war took place. The general 
profile of the victim is a non-elite with little to no formal education. The recurring 
question therefore was how does a programme engage in providing relevant livelihood 
training? This was an issue also raised by a NaCSA official during the discussions. 
“You might want to say you provide skills training facilities to these 
people but if these people are adults … they’ve never been used to school 
setting, they’ve never been used to going to vocational institutions for 
them to be trained, some of them don’t know how to read and write. For 
you to capture their attention so that you can teach them these skills for 
them to be self-reliant is another big challenge.” (NaCSA) 
 
The victims, during the discussions were however keen on becoming self-sustaining 
rather than relying on handouts. Although many of them emphasised that they would 
like to be engaged in trade, they were still overwhelmed with meeting their basic needs. 
For most, the urgent interim reparations was used to meet some of these needs, rather 
than for micro-projects as speculated by NaCSA. 
 
9.5.3.2.2 The reluctant victim 
 
Some of the victims fell through the cracks either intentionally by deliberately 
disassociating themselves from the harm or inadvertently by simply missing out on 
issues like deadlines for registration. I for instance interviewed one female amputee 
who said she had not received the first payment of Le 300,000. When I probed further, 
she said they told her that her number was not in the system. Interestingly though, she 
had received the second instalment of Le 940,500. She preferred not to pursue the issue 
of the missing funds though. 
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The most prevalent reluctant victims as pointed out by NaCSA are the victims of sexual 
violence who because of the stigma associated with sexual violence, were reluctant to 
come out or register as victims. Some of them therefore end up being excluded in the 
reparation programme.   
“There are thousands of them, they have not come out, some feel that if 
they come out, they will lose their positions in society, they will lose either 
their marital status or the position that they hold for fear that people will 
say these were victims of sexual violence, they will look at them from a 
negative lens.” (NaCSA) 
 
A strategy to deal with this group was in engaging women organisations who had dealt 
with them during the war. They were then able to persuade some of them to 
participate. In the end, some came out to register but still others, particularly those 
who are highly placed in society, refused entirely to get involved with the reparation 
programme.  Early in the field work, I was also informed by a respondent from a 
women’s organisation that it would be challenging to get in touch with this group for 
research, particularly because I was based in Freetown and only for a limited time. 
 
9.5.3.3 Administrative hurdles 
 
The administration of the reparation programme faced a number of challenges as 
discussed below. 
 
9.5.3.3.1 Operational  
 
The reparation unit in NaCSA was a new creation and therefore experienced the 
difficulties that come with getting it operational, particularly in terms of staffing and 
resources.  
“Now we have skeleton staff to run the programme, of course we are 
operating, the unit is operating within NaCSA and we are making use of 
the district staff of NaCSA but they also have other activities. We do not 
have staff in the region who are there specifically for reparations, so 
that’s some of the challenges but that’s dependent upon funding.” 
(NaCSA) 
 
It was also pointed out that reparations being a new concept meant that there was need 
for a lot of technical input in order to be able to address the various aspects of the 
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programme. The NaCSA team closely liaised with civil society who were more 
conversant in transitional justice aspects to learn more but also participated in regional 
trainings and conferences with a focus on reparation.  
 
9.5.3.3.2 Regional distribution 
 
Sierra Leone is divided into four regions: western, Southern, Northern and eastern. 
According to a NaCSA staff, any intervention needs to be perceived as being fairly 
distributed among the four regions otherwise concerns of favouritism arise. The 
reparations programme equally had to meet this criteria in its implementation so that 
none of the inhabitants in a particular region feel like they are being left out which 
could be a potential source of disgruntlement against the programme.  
“It has to be fair distribution of the resources you have otherwise you will 
be reprimanded. They will say oh, because he is doing more things in the 
north because he comes from the north or you are segregating those in 
the western area because you are from the provinces and so on and so 
forth, so you have to be mindful of that.” (NaCSA) 
 
9.5.3.3.3 Integrating the programme into government services 
 
A large portion of the recommendations related to making certain services accessible 
to the victims. Such services were already in existence under the general development 
agenda. However limitations related to for instance associated costs or location 
hindered the majority of victims from enjoying them.  Bridging the gap between the 
reparations and government programmes necessitated integrating aspects of 
reparation into the ministerial agenda. 
 
None of the ministries recommended in the report had as yet set up reparation units 
as provided for in the report. But as explained by the Programme director, NaCSA, this 
issue again relates to the funds. The government and relevant ministries have their 
own agenda and budget. Reparations are unique because they are targeted at a specific 
category of individuals. However, service delivery as reparations requires going an 
extra step beyond what is already being provided to the entire population.  
“It’s like giving you [the victims] everything free, free, free whereas there 
[regular government programmes] you have to programme yourself to 
make sure if you are providing education you know you only have to set 
up the structures, you pay teachers but for the students they have to pay 
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for themselves whereas a reparation programme will tell you, you have 
to allow the victims to be taught freely.” (NaCSA) 
 
The free services however come with associated costs and going by the number of 
victims, the ministries become reluctant to incorporate such services without an 
accompanying budget to cover their provision. 
 
Streamlining these programmes within the ministry also involves a more complex 
process of being approved by the cabinet and parliament.  As explained by the 
Programme Director (NaCSA), the process involves the necessary laws being drafted 
by the law officers department in each ministry which then go through cabinet where 
they are given cabinet decision. They are then sent to parliament for ratification after 
which they become law. It is only then at this point that they will be implemented. 
According to NaCSA, they have developed a cabinet paper which they are using to 
engage the line ministries so that they are able to carry forward those functions. 
 
The framework proposed by the TRC recommended that NaCSA remains an oversight 
body to coordinate the implementation of the reparation programme. It delegated 
various aspects to different bodies. However in the process of the reparation that has 
so far been carried out, NaCSA has taken on the lead role, carrying out the functions of 
implementation as well as oversight. The perceived monopoly held by NaCSA has 
created speculations of exclusion of other organisations and the suspicion that the 
people at NaCSA want to keep all the money for themselves.  
 
The reparation unit also has to work to rebrand their image particularly because 
NaCSA’s role was already established as a social delivery organisation. 
“NaCSA is more of a social service delivery mechanism than the human 
right thing you know they are more interested in providing social, it’s a 
social form you know they are more or less engaged in putting up 
structures you know, community structures could be a school, it could be 
a market, it could be a community centre, you know those kinds of things.” 
(CSO) 
 
Despite this initial perception of NaCSA, more and more people are associating it with 
the reparation programme, particularly for the victims. 
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Another prominent institution which is facing challenges to integrate the reparation 
aspect into their programme is the HRCSL. The commission however does have a 
Reparations desk officer who is working with NaCSA in terms of “advocating for 
resources and sensitisation programmes.” (NaCSA). But again, the bulk of the HRCSL 
remains monitoring of human rights violations in the country, and not reparations. 
 
9.5.3.4 Shifting interests 
 
Another of the issues raised was that many of the CSOs programme areas shifted 
following the end of the TRCs. This was a survival mode whereby the organisations 
have to rebrand to attract donors.  
“When the war ends, a year or two people find newer sports where they 
struggle and they move away.” (CSO) 
 
During the TRC process, there was widespread civil society involvement, a number of 
these NGOs were very visible but have not been quite vocal in the post TRC phase.  
“There have been organisations who have been working in the truth and 
reconciliation, they have been working around about the process of 
reconstruction. They were right at the heart of human rights issues and 
they’ve been in the areas of the conflict and even after, you know how 
involved are these organisations in the reparation process?” (CSO) 
 
Although this claim was made by some respondents, they were not able to provide 
specific names of such organisations.  
 
The civil society has also been accused of not being vocal or involved in issues of 
ensuring the reparation for the victims as expressed by the Chairman of AWWA,  
“Even I called the attention of the civil society, up to date, they don’t give 
us a word, they are just, even when they talk, talk, talk, talk, nothing 
comes out of it, I am the only one going down knocking doors this, that, 
so it is very difficult, very difficult.” (Chairman, AWWA) 
 
This assertion could very much be valid because when interacting with a section of civil 
society organisations, they expressed that victim reparation was not in their core 
programme areas. 
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Another aspect to the NGO involvement has been that when they do get involved, it is 
rarely a combined strategy. Each NGO comes in with its own agenda such that rather 
than approaching the issue of reparation as a whole, each organisation selects aspects 
that reflect their organisational goals. Amnesty International in Sierra Leone for 
instance was interested in women victims of sexual abuse and their involvement was 
to drive this issue on the agenda and advocate for the women victims’ reparation 
programmes.13 Even as part of the Reparations Committee, their objective was on the 
inclusion of women victims of sexual violence in the reparations package.  
 
NGOs however have to survive and one of the respondents referred to them as “survivor 
organisations” where they are dependent upon external funding and so will adapt their 
programmes to fit into the existing sources of funding.  
“Running around government to implement recommendations, it’s not 
very interesting. Running around donors to do a quick implementation of 
a project could be more beneficial.” (CSO) 
 
9.5.3.5 Sustainability  
 
Seeing the struggle to implement the reparations using the limited funds raised the 
issue of sustainability of such programmes. It was pointed out that it is important to 
address the issue of availability of funds to cover the entire programme. 
“Making recommendations is fine but then at the end of the day, how do 
you implement them? You need funding and by then the war had cooled 
down, other conflicts had taken precedence or centre stage elsewhere in 
the world.” (University professor) 
 
The issue of sustainability was also raised in terms of how long the services they intend 
to provide would last and if they would have an impact. One of the respondents 
expressed his doubts over whether they would be able to maintain for instance the 
provision of access to services. 
 
                                                        
 
13 See for instance, Amnesty International’s 2007 publication on reparation for survivors of sexual 
violence (Amnesty International, 2007a) 
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“These things that you’re calling here [social services] when they started 
it, let me say, this month [it might work], next month it will be very 
difficult to get things, it will be very very difficult.” (Amputee victim) 
 
The experience from the programme so far implemented by NaCSA already indicated 
that reparation programmes were one-off yet most of the victims faced lifelong 
hurdles. 
 
9.5.3.6 Funds 
 
Reparations require money and a whole lot of it. Unfortunately, for post war Sierra 
Leone, there are a lot of demands on its resources, even over a decade after the end of 
the war. According to the Programme Officer, Reparations Unit in NaCSA, this has been 
one of the key challenges of the reparations programme. The focus of government 
regarding transitional justice has been on mechanisms to foster and consolidate peace 
and restructuring institutions.  
 “You can’t continue providing more resources to the war victims, you 
don’t have light, you don’t have medical facilities, you don’t have water, 
you don’t have educational facilities for the general population. If you 
look at the percentage of the demand for the general population and the 
victims, their poles are vast as well.” (NaCSA) 
 
According to the programme officer, faced with the various demands, the government 
could not inject direct cash grants into the reparation programme but rather 
contributed in kind in terms of infrastructural support such as offices all over the 
country to ensure that the staff who could implement the reparation programme were 
provided the conducive and enabling environment to implement the reparations 
programme. 
 
However, the offices referred to here are the NaCSA offices which had already been in 
existence prior to the reparation programme. These were therefore not entirely new 
structures but buildings the NaCSA reparations unit could access at all levels. 
 
The funds that were received to implement the reparation programme clearly fell short 
of financing a fully-fledged programme. In 2009, the UNPBF provided three million USD 
towards the reparation programme with a caveat that 75% of that was to go directly 
to the war victims. Three million versus 32,373 victim’s at the most basic level without 
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meeting other additional expenses and requirements would mean roughly US$ 92 per 
victim. At this initial stage, NaCSA therefore decided to pay out an equivalent of USD 
100 to 19,207 victims selected on the basis of the level of their vulnerability in addition 
to carrying out the registration exercise, emergency medical assistance and symbolic 
memorialisation and commemoration activities. Similarly, the one million USD 
provided by the UN Trust Fund to end violence against women could only cater for 650 
of the 4602 victims of sexual violence for a training and micro finance programme 
projected to last two years.  
 
Other sources of funding included the German government that contributed technical 
assistance, although it was not entirely well-defined what this aspect involved. The 
government also provided contributions in kind to augment what had been given by 
the other donors. In the first year, it provided $ 240,000. Much of it was in kind in terms 
of infrastructure provision but part of it was also for the salaries of the staff. In 2011, it 
allocated approximately Le 700,000,000 ($155,988), most of it also in kind support or 
“operational and administrative aspects.” 
 
Whereas the unavailability of resources has been a constant challenge for the 
implementation, this is not such a clear cut matter. Many view the funding challenge as 
the willingness or reluctance of government to allocate necessary funds to a particular 
programme. 
“Let nobody tell you that the country does not have the funds to bankroll 
an effective reparations programme.” (CSO) 
 
One civil society member argued that it has less to do with the funds than with 
commitment, both from the government and the international community. The 
contribution to the Trust Fund for War Victims has not exceeded one million dollars 
and the total for entire reparation programme has not exceeded seven million dollars. 
In contrast, as of 2009, 208 million dollars had been spent by the special court. This 
disparity clearly shows where the priority of the government and international 
community lie. Also in 2009, the government introduced a free health care programme 
for lactating mothers, children under the age of five and pregnant women across the 
country. This programme received massive support from the international community 
but key was also the government commitment to seeing it happen, which sadly has 
been lacking in the reparation programme. 
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9.5.3.7 Government’s unwillingness 
 
The commission proposed a detailed implementation framework for implementation 
of the recommendations. The government however was perceived as portraying a 
noncommittal attitude particularly in its response to the recommendations.  
“One of the things that I think was missing was government strategy to 
address the recommendations because the white paper that government 
published a few months after the recommendations was like, it was vague. 
It really did not show a correct and clear strategy of how can we engage 
with this. If you look at some of the recommendations, some of the 
recommendations needed like process change, others had to do with 
organisational assistance, others had to do with policy, ok to be honest, a 
committed government would have been able to take all of this, from the 
time the report was launched up to now. For example, look at the one 
where government needed to make public apology to all the women of 
this country. That took almost six years before that happened. So to me it 
is about commitment.” (CSO) 
 
The government’s unwillingness has also been interpreted in its decisions not to 
include funds for war victims in the budgetary allocations or tax revenues from 
minerals. These were some of the suggestions that were proposed by the TRC to 
generate funds for the war victims’ trust fund. 
“Í say, as a government, where you made your first mistake, during your 
fiscal year where you budget for each and, you never budgeted for the war 
victims. I told them that there you started making mistake, this the 
problem of the war victims, during the fiscal year they never budgeted for 
them so that is lack of neglect.” (Amputee victim). 
 
A respondent argued that because the TRC was established by an act of parliament, the 
government is therefore mandated to implement the recommendations. The 
government’s agreement of the recommendations can also be implied from its 
acceptance of the recommendations in the white paper. It is with this understanding 
that they intend to go to court to get it to order the government to comply with the 
recommendations on reparation. 
 
The government commitment need not only be through words but portrayed through 
action for instance as elaborated by one civil society member. 
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“What you really need to do is some concrete planning and that concrete 
planning has to feature prominently in your [government] annual budget 
… NaCSA for example says we need $15-20 million to get this done and 
then the government says every year over the next four years, we 
contribute five million dollars, that is how you show commitment and it 
is there and it goes into NaCSA’s account every year and you know that in 
three or four years, you’re done with it.” (CSO) 
 
Such a level of commitment and steady flow of funds has been lacking in the 
programme and whereas many accept the validity in the argument that the 
government might be cash strapped and have many other competing demands, they 
also see the various developmental projects that are going on such as road 
constructions, schools and other infrastructure and they question where that money is 
coming from. They argue that if government can afford to carry out those activities then 
it is just plain indifference to the reparations because if it really wanted to, it could find 
the money for implementing reparations. 
 
Some respondents have also argued that the government’s reluctance is because there 
are no potential financial benefits from reparation or what a respondent referred to as 
‘kick backs’. Reparations are not ‘flashy’ or economically beneficial or have influential 
people to drive it.  
 
Additionally, the victims are also not considered a threat, whether politically or 
physically. One respondent argues that as long as the victims’ issue does not upset the 
status quo, then they will continue to be considered non-priority. 
“Hey, who are the victims you are talking about? Give or take 30,000 
victims. They do not vote as a block, so that is the unfortunate thing how 
these things are done. As long as it is not an election issue, as long as it is 
not going to cost anyone a parliamentary seat or indeed presidential 
elections, it is not going to be top on the sort of priority list of the 
government.” (CSO) 
 
This argument was also raised in reference to the treatment of ex-combatants whose 
DDR programme was swiftly executed so they do not threaten the ensuing peace. 
Victims however do not carry such similar threats.  
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9.5.3.8 Post-TRC institutions 
 
Once the mandate of the TRC came to an end, there was no option of continuity either 
for the commissioners or follow up post TRC institutions to spearhead the follow-up 
and implementation of the recommendations. 
“There was nothing like a working committee after the TRC report had 
been finalised to follow up on the recommendations. You know what am 
saying, because the TRC, when they had just published the report, that 
was when the whole commission of the TRC, that was when their mandate 
expired. I think that was the very big mistake, all the commissioners 
disconnected from the entire process and they were not there to see the 
fruit of their labour. I think that was the very first problem we had.” (CSO) 
 
It would therefore act as a form of continuation of the TRC as well and would serve as 
a post-TRC engagement.  
“Post TRC engagement will give you the opportunity of meeting some of 
those who would have appeared to give testimony but could not because 
of the apprehension. Victims or perpetrators, particularly will have the 
audacity after so much time this has happened to their companions, 
nothing has happened to them, they will now come and relate their 
stories.” (Former commissioner) 
 
When the follow-up committees were eventually formed, they remained fragmented 
and focused on individual organisational goals. The follow-up role was an extra 
responsibility that they took up rather than an activity that required their full and 
undivided attention.  
“There was a TRC working group set up … they lost interest in the entire 
process. The problem is these TRC working groups, these are civil society 
organisations coming together and leading themselves … they were 
working in diverse directions. (CSO) 
 
A viable option proposed by the former chairperson of the commission which did not 
take effect was the establishment of a centre to act as a platform to continue monitoring 
the political situation in Sierra Leone and the continent. Such a centre would facilitate 
networking among societies facing similar challenges. 
“Nationals to come and write about their political situation and 
international perspective, what is it we are doing in Africa that is not 
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bringing about the desired peace? We do not have that centre here, we 
only have civil society, NGOs, workshops … and then they write fabulous 
reports, here and there, that is all, no follow up.” (Former commissioner) 
 
The centre would also act as a follow up structure to keep track of the commitments 
proposed in the report rather than leaving it all up to the civil society. It would also 
foster dialogue between “personalities and parliamentarians and government officials” 
to facilitate processes to prevent the recurrence of wars. 
 
9.5.4 Key concerns about the TRC and implementation of reparation 
 
Below is a cross section of issues raised regarding the truth commission and the 
implementation of the reparations process. 
 
9.5.4.1 Localness of the TRC 
 
Some of the respondents expressed their doubts about whether the concept of the truth 
commission was locally embedded and whether the need for such a mechanism 
originated from the communities themselves. 
“TRC itself I think I don’t know if it was a home grown idea or if it wasn’t 
thrust on us by the wider international community you know, so in terms 
of the understanding of the gravity or the importance of it may not have 
sank through or gone right through or permeated because if it was home 
grown idea in my opinion, much would have been done in that direction.” 
(Member, Relics and monuments commission) 
 
The amputees also expressed similar reservations about the TRC although the reason 
for their initial boycott of the process was due to perceived maltreatment from the 
government and organisations while in the Amputee camps. 
 
9.5.4.2 The TRC and the Special Court 
 
From the discussions, the TRC and Special Court were perceived as competitive rather 
than complimentary mechanisms as envisioned for Sierra Leone. The TRC was viewed 
as a “restorative means of providing justice and closure to the victims” while the special 
court was “a retributive mechanism which said that there can be no peace without 
justice” (CSO). In much of the post-war discourse, these two mechanisms are seen as 
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having different aims and therefore what is expected from each of the mechanism is 
different. There is somewhat an aloofness towards the special court with a ‘let them do 
their job’ attitude in prosecuting the perpetrators who bore the greatest responsibility. 
The truth commission, despite the questions about how local it really is, is viewed more 
as a closer to the grassroots initiative with the herculean task of achieving 
reconciliation. A lot of the discussions on the commission often began with the 
respondent questioning if the commission had in fact reconciled the nation.  
 
 In terms of funding, the Special Court enjoyed a considerably higher budget averaging 
about $30,000,000 a year (Gberie, 2014). The funding issue alone created the 
impression that, “there was more premium put on special court” (Former 
commissioner). The TRC on the other hand suffered delays and limitations to its 
influence because of inadequate funds. Despite this imbalance, there were higher 
expectations from the TRC as explained by one respondent.  
“The TRC was to magnetically draw all those people who were either 
afraid to come out or for some reason did not want to come out … a lot of 
focus was put on it because it was day to day stories, listening to people 
who you know, who you heard about, coming in testifying I did this or so 
and so, I am sorry I did this, this was done to me and in a way what was 
going on, things really were being revealed … Special Court was going on 
smoothly because you had high profile people being indicted and giving 
evidence, so in a sense the TRC became neglected whereas TRC was the 
main vehicle for the country to forge ahead, to move ahead.” (Member, 
relics and monuments commission) 
 
It was also argued that the partiality for the Special Court over the TRC had an impact 
on the TRC achieving its objectives and having its recommendations implemented 
because if the focus had been on the TRC, then either an equal or more money would 
have been spent on the TRC rather than the Special Court. 
“The main problem as far as I am concerned was the emphasis was put 
on the special court as opposed to the TRC … when you think of the 
number of millions of dollars, the amount of millions of dollars was spent 
on the special court to get one, there might be five, six, seven, eight major 
players … this has cost us of course … over $ 100M. We have a TRC which 
recommends a healing of the country and actually it did not spend that 
much money on the TRC, you see? And then because the nature of the TRC 
was such that or the nature of the country at that time was that we had 
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to get those people out of the bush and get them back into society so they 
were the first beneficiaries and then there was not much money coming 
in after that, so it’s only now that the victims are getting their redress or 
compensation.” (Member, Relics and monuments commission) 
 
On another level, there was suspicion created about the purpose of the TRC, 
particularly in their aim of constructing a narrative of events. It was viewed as a means 
for collecting information for the special court.  
“To a large extent, it [Special Court] prevented so many people to appear 
before the TRC because some of the people consider the TRC, which 
originally people were happy to have, once TRC was established, they 
consider it a conduit that we were meant to gather information and pass 
that information on to the special court. And by sheer historical accident, 
their premise they established was just a few yards away from the 
premises we finally secured for our TRC so they tell me there is an 
underground tunnel.” (Former TRC staff) 
 
The rumour of an underground tunnel between the TRC and special court continued to 
persist even after the end of the commission because it was roughly seven years later 
that I was in Freetown and some of the respondents still hinted at this fact during the 
interviews.  
 
The relationship between the two mechanisms and later with the reparations 
remained strained mostly because the amount of funds which was provided to the 
special court. The overall perception was that once the special court was set up, 
attention shifted away from the TRC to the special court. A significant amount of 
resources went into the special court to try not more than 12 people while the majority 
of the perpetrators were out there free and the victims continued to suffer without 
redress. 
 
9.5.4.3 Role of the international community 
 
The presence of the international community was strongly felt in post-conflict Sierra 
Leone. Many of the programmes, whether reconstruction, institutional building or 
victims and perpetrators issues revolved around donor funding and international 
organisations. The choice of which transitional justice mechanism was also strongly 
influenced by the international discourse.  
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One respondent cited the sense of powerlessness of the incumbent governments or 
political players when they have to rely on external sources of funding. Ultimately the 
programmes that get done are predetermined by the donors. 
“If I’m gonna go and source for money as a government, I’ll have to justify 
the money and maybe the guys that give me the money will say ‘hey so so 
so, this is what happens, clear this out, clear that out’ you know” (CSO). 
 
“He who pays the piper calls the tune. Those who were paying the piper 
felt that bringing Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh and all those people 
would create more of an impact on the African continent than some of the 
Sierra Leone’s problems internally.” (CSO) 
 
The DDR, TRC and Special Court all received a large portion of their funding from 
international aid. Similarly, the reparation programme that was kick-started in 2008 
was almost entirely donor funded and it is an accepted fact that without international 
fund they would never have been able to establish a reparation programme. However, 
the international community has been described as thrill seekers, looking for the next 
action.  
“The international community … [when] the war ceases, to them that is 
the end …. They will record that. That we spent so much money, we sent 
so many people, the war has ended, peace has come. Whether it is 
superficial peace that has come or it’s different, it’s not their business. 
They feed their record that they did this one. They focus their attention to 
some other areas.” (University professor) 
 
A section of the respondents have however also blamed the government for not 
‘striking while the iron is hot.’ They argue that whereas the government is dependent 
on donor funding, they are in a position to prioritise areas to which such funds can be 
utilised and unfortunately reparation did not feature as a priority. For instance, one 
respondent felt that the government should have spearheaded a drive to attract funds 
into the victims’ trust fund right after the TRC completion, while the excitement was 
still high.  
“The government was late in establishing the war victims’ fund, only last 
year. That was a minus on the part of government, the previous 
government they failed to establish the war victims fund when the 
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situation was so right at that moment where international [community] 
would have come in to chip in.” (Former TRC staff) 
 
The relationship between the international community and government is somehow 
complex but the prevailing attitude was that one cannot expect the international 
community to show an interest in the reparations programme when the government 
itself is not prioritising it. 
 
9.5.4.4 Corruption 
 
Although not explicitly referred to as corruption, a number of respondents made 
references to irregularities in conducting the reparation programme which could be 
construed to imply corruption. With regard to the trust fund and its composition, one 
respondent for instance remarked that, “this is Africa. What I know is that when it comes 
to this monetary aspect, some senior affected victim will arise [to claim to represent the 
victims].” (CSO) 
 
Although none of the respondents could support their assertion concretely, they 
nevertheless insisted that a number of the beneficiaries were false. On a number of 
occasions when I inquired about the number of beneficiaries, the response was that, 
“some of the beneficiaries are those who were never supposed to be beneficiaries.” 
(Amputee victim) 
 
The issue of corruption was also brought up in the registration exercise and 
disbursement of funds where it was viewed that some of the beneficiaries were not 
genuine victims of the war but had managed to manipulate the system to get in. 
 
Corruption was also implied in the allegations of the chairman of AWWA in which case 
he cited exorbitant medical costs that are purported to be paid by NaCSA for the 
treatment of some victims and he is of the view that such bills are inflated and NaCSA 
is in cohort with some doctors and hospitals to benefit from such services. 
 
9.5.4.5 Reparations and development 
 
In Sierra Leone’s case, the reparation recommendations had a strong social services 
provision component. The key being priority for the victims for such services. In 
general, a number of the respondents did express their concern over what they 
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referred to as ‘conflating transitional justice or reparation issues with development’ 
given the Sierra Leonean context characterised by inadequate resources, widespread 
poverty and competing developmental demands. A development oriented reparation 
programme with prioritisation of victims nonetheless tended to be more acceptable. 
Such a programme would facilitate the victims in accessing services which they would 
have been constrained in receiving due to their situation. By prioritising them, they 
were being acknowledged, given the recognition and assurances that the state is doing 
something to respond to the violations they suffered. 
 
The most significant component in the reparation-development discussion is in the 
timing. The argument is that a reparations programme is “time bound and specific.” 
Reparations need to be carried out when and how they are supposed to be carried out 
and not delayed and incorporated into other programmes which may resemble the 
earlier proposed reparations components. Even if it is the same benefits that are being 
awarded at a later date, it cannot be referred to as reparation. Delays and incorporation 
into a national development strategy makes the reparation aspect lose its essence.  
“If somebody has to receive X amount of Leones because he or she lost a 
limb, that person must receive it. If she doesn’t receive it and three or four 
years down the line a government sort of adopts a policy that says 
everyone must receive X amount of money every month and that would 
include victims of the war. Even though the victim of the war will receive 
that money but it does not exactly mean the same to him or her if she or 
they had received that money as part of a reparation programme … if 
those [reparation] issues are not addressed effectively now, ultimately all 
of these issues will now be addressed as part of development issue.” (CSO) 
 
The above comment was prompted in part by the passing of legislations and policies 
that provide similar benefits as was recommended by the commission to all citizens 
who qualify. An example is The Persons with Disability Act in May 2011 which for 
instance proposes certain rights and privileges to persons with disability such as free 
education, medical care, and non-discrimination, among others. The amputees 
automatically qualify in this category but if at all they receive any benefits under this 
act, it is not specific to their harm as a result of the war but because of the situation 
they currently find themselves in along with other persons with disabilities.  
 
The argument was that with such a benefit, it misses the acknowledgement and 
recognition, or as has been described by one of the respondents, the ‘justice’ aspect. 
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Similarly, some of the respondents pointed out that the 2010 free health care policy for 
pregnant women, lactating mothers and children under five seems like an insult to the 
victims. The recommendation on free health care was not implemented to the 
approximately 30,000 victims but the health care policy was applauded and funded by 
the government and international organisations to a much larger number of 
beneficiaries and the victims can only benefit if they somehow fall under the targeted 
categories of children under five, pregnant or lactating mothers. The fact that the 
government is able to bankroll such a programme for these categories while it failed to 
do the same for the victims has been interpreted as the victims not being a priority for 
the government. According to a respondent, free health care for the victims will 
probably not raise the government profile in the development indices but free health 
care to children under five, lactating and pregnant mothers will. 
 
At the time of the interviews in 2012, the perception was that there is simply no 
incentive to set up a separate programme or body to look at reparations alone, rather 
the focus is on promoting development that cuts across the whole society instead of 
providing facilities for just one group of people. After all, the reparation proposals 
themselves focus on developmental issues which are of concern to the entire 
population and not just for the victims. 
 
9.5.5 Proposed framework for implementation 
 
Given that there was no methodical structure for the implementation and following it 
up, I sought to gain an understanding into what aspects of implementation would be 
considered important by respondents.  
 
9.5.5.1 Victims survey 
 
Much as the TRC categorised the victims and established a victims’ list, it was 
imperative that a detailed victims’ list be drawn up. It was proposed that a survey 
should be done to establish who the victims are, the categories of victims and their 
different levels of vulnerability. This should be the basis for determining who needs the 
most urgent assistance and what sort of assistance can be provided. 
 
In line with the survey, a victims’ registration and data bank was considered pertinent 
to the implementation. Such a registration exercise was carried out by NaCSA in 2008 
but this exercise was widely criticised by particularly the amputees association. It was 
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described as a non-participatory process and not sensitive to victims’ needs. The 
Chairperson for the amputees association for instance said they were not consulted or 
involved in identifying or sieving out fraud cases which meant that some individuals 
who made it to the amputees list were not genuine war victims. Another category that 
many felt could have been left out were victims of sexual based violence who might not 
have been as bold to come forward. As such a gender sensitive approach to registration 
needs to be done. A registration programme should be able to capture everyone as 
much as possible. 
 
9.5.5.2 Estimated budget and funding strategy 
 
The downside to the reparation programme in Sierra Leone was that there was no clear 
and steady funding source. The TRC did recommend possible sources of funding but 
these were not adequately pursued. The entire programme was therefore cash 
strapped. Based on the registration and established needs, it was proposed that the 
programme assesses how much money would be needed for the entire programme. 
Most important though is to explore how to get the money needed for the programme. 
Would it come direct from the government or through other fundraising activities? 
 
9.5.5.3 An implementation structure 
 
The respondents also argued that it was important to deliberate on what structure 
would be ideal for effectively implementing such a programme. Key issues identified 
by the respondents included for instance whether it would require regional or district 
offices or both? How many staff would be required? Estimated length of the 
programme? Differentiate between the one off benefits and benefits that would extend 
over a period of time. What sort of cooperation would exist between the reparation 
programme and routine state administration? What is the communication strategy for 
instance to the victims, public, government and other partners?  
 
According to NaCSA, the key is in ensuring sustainability of the programme and for this, 
one needs the full participation and commitment of all people that are involved in the 
implementation of the reparations programme. 
 
NaCSA stated that they continue to engage with the different line ministries to work 
towards mainstreaming the different services recommended by the commission into 
the main government programmes. According to NaCSA, they have had regular 
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meetings, although at the ministerial level, this was not confirmed and they have not 
yet achieved success in this strategy. 
 
NaCSA has continued to liaise with the previous funders, UNPBF and UN Trust Fund to 
end violence against women to encourage a continuation in providing funds. There is 
also a strategy of engaging in other specific oriented agencies to fund specific groups 
of victims similar to what the UN Trust Fund to end Violence against women did for the 
women victims of sexual violence. One such targeted organisation is UNICEF with the 
aim of ‘persuading’ them to fund services related to the children category of victims. 
 
Conclusion 
 
From the discussion with the respondents, there was a general consensus that the post-
conflict process in Sierra Leone has remained quite superficial. A lot of it has addressed 
the symptoms while the rot underneath continues to fester. The situation therefore is 
precarious and bound to spiral back into a conflict. Immediately after the war, there 
was the ‘forgive’ discourse and it was pointed out by some respondents, there is a false 
belief that everything is fine. However, the disparities that catalysed the war still 
continue to persist and there is a fear that something small could ignite a conflict 
because the root causes of the civil war are not being comprehensively addressed. 
 
In regard to reparation it seems to be a haphazard process with several hiccups along 
the way rather than a concerted effort at transforming the proposals into action. There 
is no direct commitment to implementing the recommendations but rather a strategy 
of merging them within the development agenda. This could work for the other 
recommendations but with the reparations, there is no clear distinction of which 
aspects would comprise reparation such as in the disability act or the policy on 
pregnant, lactating mothers and children under five. 
 
Despite all the frustrations arising out of the little to non-implementation of the 
reparation recommendations of the TRC, there is still a strong belief in the necessity of 
the TRC in the context of post war Sierra Leone. The TRC was significant in giving an 
avenue to acknowledge victims much in a similar way as the DDR was to the 
perpetrators. These two mechanisms are often seen as two sides of the same coin with 
expressions such as “the perpetrators had the DDR and the victims have the TRC.” The 
failure of the TRC was that it did not materialise into providing tangible benefits for the 
victims like the DDR provided to the perpetrators.  
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A lot of compromises had to be made while designing and implementing the 
recommendations. Working with limited funds, often attached with stringent 
conditions on their use meant that they could not provide the whole range of services 
and benefits as recommended by the commission but had to adapt the 
recommendations in what they refer to as interim measures. There were significant 
attempts to link the activities that were being carried out to the original 
recommendations in the TRC. 
 
The sample of respondents from the one category of beneficiaries I interviewed 
expressed their frustration at the delay in implementation. However, similar feelings 
of frustration over the limited reach of the truth commission outcomes could also be 
perceived from the general population.  
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CHAPTER 10. A GENERAL NOTE ON THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
10.0 Introduction 
 
In chapter 9 and 10, the context in which the TRC and reparation programmes in Ghana 
and Sierra Leone operated was presented. This followed a field study in the two 
countries where interviews were conducted with different actors. Both Ghana and 
Sierra Leone share a similar path in efforts to confront past atrocities and facilitate 
reconciliation. The Sierra Leone TRC and Ghana NRC took place during roughly the 
same period, 2002 – 2004 in Sierra Leone and 2003 – 2004 in Ghana and both were 
presented as being victim driven. However, beyond embracing the same mechanism, 
the context and course that each country took remained specific to each case. This 
chapter will highlight the salient issues in both cases. 
 
10.1 A tale of contrasts 
 
Despite having opted for a similar mechanism for dealing with the past, the contrasts 
in the two cases could already be observed on arrival at the respective airports. 
 
At Lungi International Airport, Sierra Leone on the morning of January 4, 2011, I got 
my first experience of what I later learnt was the “survival” life in Sierra Leone. What I 
had initially viewed as friendly welcome greetings were actually attention grabbing 
tactics to offer the most ridiculous services like pushing the baggage trolley for an 
obligatory generous tip. On the speedboat ride to Freetown, I expressed my shock at 
the aggression and the generic response was that the war had made everyone a 
‘survivor’. They had to find whatever means they can to earn a living because there is 
not much to go around although the government is doing its best to rebuild the country. 
The second time round in October 21, 2012, I was better prepared for the hassle of 
getting to the capital. In Freetown, there is a constant reminder of the depths the 
country descended to during the decade long conflict. The bustle of the city life is 
interpreted as a sign of the peace that allows the citizens to eke out a living; the 
mentally ill wandering about are said to be perpetrators who could not cope from the 
trauma of the war and snapped. There is also the issue of the very visible amputees, 
mostly begging, that are a reminder that war victims’ concerns still remain 
unaddressed.  
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Accra, on the contrary is a picture of calm, progress and stability. The streets are litter 
free, there is organised infrastructure and a number of memorials and sculptures 
scattered about. Underneath all this however is a dark past. For much of its history, it 
has experienced a number of military regimes, coups and unconstitutional rule. As I 
was to learn, many of the locals are suspicious of foreigners, particularly those asking 
questions considered to be political such as the experience of the truth commission. I 
experienced a constant need to reaffirm my neutrality and to establish proof of my 
status as a researcher. On the whole however, there is also a general sense of having 
moved on and a concealed amusement as to why someone would be interested in a 
mechanism that had ended. 
  
Beyond these physical differences, the context in which the TRC and reparations 
programmes took place evolved in fundamentally different ways. As seen in the 
previous chapters, the reasons that motivated the adoption of the truth commission 
tool, the role of the different actors, the framing of the reparations and the government 
response to the proposals remains unique to each case.  
 
10.2 Salient issues observed from the two cases 
 
From both the literature review and field work, it was apparent that in both cases, there 
was a significant difference between what the truth commissions had proposed in their 
recommendations on reparations and what actually happened. Moreover, neither case 
has benefitted from a detailed study of the implementation frameworks and statuses. 
In Sierra Leone, the ICTJ carried out an assessment of NaCSA activities after one year, 
following the release of funding from the peace building fund. This study focused on 
how NaCSA implemented the activities for which the Peacebuilding Fund had been 
awarded (Suma & Correa, 2009). A second study was carried out by the Amputees and 
War Wounded Association (Conteh & Berghs, 2014). Its focus was narrow and limited 
to the consequences of the non-implementation of the reparation on the lives of the 
amputee and other war wounded victims.  
 
In Ghana, there has not been any study on the implementation of the commission’s 
recommendations. An opinion survey was conducted following the end of the 
commission by CDD, however this focused on the perspectives of the victims on the 
work of the commission and on its recommendations. 
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Chapters 8 and 9 fill this gap by presenting an empirical overview of the context in 
which the truth commissions and reparations were carried out in Ghana and Sierra 
Leone. In the ensuing discussion, I highlight the salient issues observed in the cases 
using the proposed integrated approach to studying implementation (chapter 7); these 
are categorised as: Pre-truth commission; Framing of reparations; Content of the 
reparation proposal; Frameworks for following up and implementation and, Post truth 
commission processes.  
 
10.2.1 Pre-truth commissions 
 
Ideally, this section would benefit more from a study that could have been carried out 
in the context in which it is happening, that is, before the truth commissions have been 
set up. In both Ghana and Sierra Leone, many of the individuals and organisations that 
had been involved with the process of setting up the commission had either moved on 
or did not exist anymore. It therefore misses out on the passion and drive that 
motivated the selection of the truth commission mechanism. It is also during this 
period that a systematic study into the position of the government could be carried out 
given that truth commission rely heavily on government support for their existence.  
 
In both cases, the majority of the respondents answered that they perceived the truth 
commission as a necessary tool in their given context in response to the question on 
whether the TRC was necessary. For the case of Sierra Leone, the civil war and its 
devastating consequences on various institutions, property and lives coupled with the 
negotiated Lomé agreement that prioritised the ex-combatants stimulated the need for 
a victim oriented mechanism. The only point of concern raised by some of the 
respondents was that there was a limited attempt to incorporate local community 
based conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanism into the process, an oversight 
that limited its local impact. 
 
In Ghana’s experience, there were more divergent views as to the necessity of the 
commission. The proponents cited the legacy of human rights violations by various 
state apparatuses and institutions as well as the indemnity clauses that restricted 
mechanisms for redress. The dissenters on the other hand argued that much as the 
violations occurred, it could not be considered as wide scale. The number of victims 
was also not overwhelming and as such, existing mechanisms could be amended to 
accommodate the process. From the discussions however, the basis for their 
disagreement seemed to stem from the political nature of the truth commission 
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process. They did not agree with how it was owned by one political group and 
perceived it as being used to achieve political aims.  
 
It is also important to note that in Ghana, a period of ten years had elapsed after the 
transition from military rule and it was actively working towards instilling good 
governance and democratic institutions and practices. Ghana was also already engaged 
in rectifying some of the wrongs, notably restitution measures consisting mainly of 
property returns to the legitimate owners. The assumption held by some of the 
respondents was therefore that the people had moved on. This was also evident in my 
interactions while in the field where a number of individuals were not conversant with 
the NRC process that had taken place.  
 
Despite the disparity in how the truth commission was viewed, the two cases adopted 
a long term approach of tracing the roots of the violations to historical events and not 
view them as isolated events. The respondents in both cases emphasised that 
structural arrangements that facilitated the violations would need to be understood as 
well as outputs that would address these structural violations. 
 
In terms of the existing agencies that drove the agenda of the truth commission, both 
cases experienced vibrant civil society presence and advocacy. What varies from the 
discussion is the role that they played in setting the agenda of the commission. From 
the discussions, ICTJ played a significant role in organising the process in both 
countries. A noticeable difference in the two cases however that was whereas in Ghana, 
local civil society felt that they had played an active role in that they owned the process 
and pushed it forward include in the drafting of the NRC Act.  
 
My impression from the Sierra Leonean experience however, was that the civil society 
felt a bit side-lined in the peace negotiations and designing of the TRC Act as they had 
to operate in what had already been decided upon. Nonetheless, they still expressed 
that they were still instrumental in the direction that the negotiations took, specifically 
in incorporating victims’ issues into the agenda. 
 
In Ghana, I found that during the interviews, a number of the respondents talked about 
the mandate of the NRC and its focus on reparations. Through their advocacy, civil 
society ensured that reparation was an important component of the transitional 
process. In Sierra Leone, there was hardly any reference to the TRC Act during the 
discussions, except for one respondent, a former staff of the TRC who wanted to clarify 
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on the approach that the TRC tool regarding reparations. He explained that despite the 
TCRC Act not mentioning reparations, they interpreted phrases such as “responding to 
the needs of victims” to mean reparation measures. 
 
10.2.2 Framing of reparations  
 
There was no significant difference in opinion between the responses from the field 
and the literature regarding the factors that influenced the framing of the reparations. 
The former TRC staff reiterated what was already in the report concerning victims’ 
needs and drawing on human rights principles to influence the reparations agenda.  
 
In Ghana, the emphasis was on the outreach programmes explaining the meaning of 
reparations and how they would be symbolic and token to acknowledge the suffering 
of victims. The Sierra Leone case on the other hand emphasised the socio-economic 
situation and the framing of reparations to improve access to services and better the 
lives of the most vulnerable in a manner that would not exacerbate divisions in the 
community.  
 
Both cases also emphasised the framing of reparations in a context which would make 
them more attractive to implement by the responsible government. Much of these 
views on how to frame reparations were also expressed by the civil society.  
 
My perception is that this approach to the way reparations are understood and framed 
was largely influenced by the interactions with the advocates of the transitional justice 
paradigm. Both civil society members and staff of the truth commissions pointed out 
how they had participated in a number of conferences, workshops and trainings as well 
as interacted with members from other commissioners that had already taken place, 
notably South Africa.  
 
10.2.3 Content of the reparation  
 
From interviews, it showed that both the former truth commission staff and civil 
society were knowledgeable about the context of the reparation proposals and in 
general agreed with the format of the reparations that had been proposed. This was 
not a surprising finding given that both the parties had been instrumental in 
determining the final output.  
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Among the victims however, in Ghana, the emphasis seemed to be on the monetary 
compensation. Their views regarding the reparation programme was contextualised 
through the monetary payments by observing that either it was enough or not enough.  
 
Additionally, from the description of the outreach activities, much as the issue of 
reparations as tokens of recognition was emphasised, the highlight still remained on 
getting the victims to accept the monetary compensation as a token. I also suspect that 
the victims’ focus on the monetary payments was because this component of 
reparation programme had already been carried out and was therefore more 
publicised. 
 
Among the victims in Sierra Leone, there was a general awareness of the different 
forms of reparation. I generally inquired what they knew about the reparation 
recommendations and they were aware of the list of benefits and the categories of 
victims to benefit from the specific reparations. My interpretation from this could be 
that the category of victims that I focused on, that is the amputees and other war 
wounded, were one of the most visible and have had more interaction with civil society 
groups and are therefore able to pick up on the these issues as well. Secondly, this 
knowledge of the content of the reparation programme could also be attributed to the 
outreach programmes that popularised the recommendations. The AWWA had also 
recently upped their game to become more involved in advocating for the reparations 
and so they had to be aware of what the reparation programme entails making the 
members more aware of the programmes. 
 
As with the framing of reparations around victims needs and in a manner that would 
make them more acceptable to the government, the content of the proposals reflected 
the efforts of the commissions in attempting to make the proposals as reasonable as 
possible to the government and not particularly strain the budget.  
 
In both cases, the former truth commission staff pointed out that they did not anticipate 
that government would not implement the recommendations. In Ghana’s case, the 
commission even estimated how much a reparations programme for the monetary 
compensation would cost while in Sierra Leon, the emphasis on building on existing 
programmes was drawn through consultation with the programmes already in place. I 
was however taken aback by the fact that the ministries I visited in Freetown were 
unaware of the content of the reparation or the specific aspects their ministry was 
concerned with.  
 331 
 
10.2.4 Frameworks for following up and implementation 
 
The Ghana NRC and Sierra Leone truth commissions differ in their approach to 
recommending an implementation framework. The NRC did not consider it its mandate 
to propose an implementation framework but rather only make recommendations to 
the president and in this aspect consider their mandate fulfilled. As pointed out in the 
previous section, they emphasised that they did not foresee any reason why 
government would not take up the issue of implementation.  
 
Other respondents, particularly civil society were more doubtful of such a framework 
without a monitoring component. One of the respondents for instance questioned how 
such a system would work when there is no institution or body to monitor and remind 
the government of their responsibilities. He attributed the slow progress in 
implementation to the absence of frameworks for following up the recommendations. 
A number of the respondents however argued that instead of focusing on the existence 
or not of frameworks, the focus should rather be on the achievements and in the case 
of Ghana, it could consider the payment of the monetary compensation as a success. 
 
Ghana’s open framework proved to be advantageous as they did not experience the 
bureaucratic hurdles while setting up a follow up and implementations committee and 
according to one of the members, it was not a complicated process. 
 
On the contrary, discussions in Sierra Leone indicate that setting up the 
implementation framework was and is still a complicated process involving legislative 
decisions. The TRC justification of affiliating reparation into existing programmes was 
to ensure they are easily incorporated and it was assumed that it would be less costly 
than attempting to set up new bodies. However, as seen from how long it took before 
NaCSA and HRCSL were approved and the on-going negotiations between NaCSA and 
the various ministries to include the reparation aspect, it seems to be more complex 
than they had assumed.  
 
10.2.5 Post-Truth commissions 
 
Both Ghana and Sierra Leone went through a similar trajectory where there was initial 
interest and participation in the post-truth commission phase especially from civil 
332 
society. However, seven to eight years later, it was challenging to find any CSOs or 
individuals working on promoting reparations.  
 
In both cases, the respondents implied that the diminished interest in post-truth 
commission phase was related to the changing priorities of donors and governments. 
Many of these CSOs are dependent on external funds and are therefore prone to 
adjusting their focal areas to match the donors. 
 
However, the issue of changing priorities also needs to be placed in context. My 
observation from the discussions in Ghana was that it was not so much the changing of 
funding priorities that changed the focus of civil society away from the issue of 
reparations but more the idea that reparations had already been implemented. The 
respondents agreed that it was not yet a complete process as a number of the activities 
had not been carried out, notably the symbolic reparations, however, the monetary 
payment had been awarded. Moreover, the change in government with the party that 
had initially been anti NRC taking over power, it was perceived that it was unlikely that 
the NRC issues would feature in the agenda. 
 
The context in Sierra Leone appeared much more complex. Whereas all respondents 
expressed their disappointment at the fact that the comprehensive reparation 
programme had not been implemented, I did not receive an adequate response as to 
why reparation then was not a key point for advocacy. The amputees and other war 
wounded claimed that they were not considered a priority because they were not a 
threat to the government. Many of their members are not influential, are uneducated 
and unlikely to cause any chaos. One respondent from civil society backed up this claim 
by arguing that the threat of victims upsetting the status quo is unlikely and as such 
they are not taken seriously. The victims are few in numbers, and not organised as a 
group. In Free town where I was based, the only visible victims group was the AWWA 
where the chairperson estimated their total number countrywide to be around 1,000. 
He still had to carry out a detailed census to verify the exact number. 
 
From the highlights presented in the above synthesis of the empirical findings, it 
reinforces the idea that an empirical study of the cases and processes of 
implementation gives better context to the process. Through observation and 
interviews, the researcher is able to understand the how or why certain decisions are 
made or took the course that they did. 
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Conclusion 
 
Whereas the findings in the empirical research are not fundamentally different from 
the secondary data that was reviewed, the responses from the interviews and personal 
observation gave more context to the process and filled in some gaps, for instance in 
explaining why and how certain decisions were arrived at. For both cases, it was 
particularly useful in the analysis of the post-truth commission phase. The analysis 
detailed the step by step processes that were undertaken following the release of the 
commission reports and kick-starting the implementation of reparation exercises.  
 
The detailed analysis also reinforces the hypothesis that studying implementation 
cannot be carried out in isolation of the socio-economic, political or cultural influences 
occurring pre, during and post-TRCs.  
 
In this chapter and chapter 7, I structured the discussion using the proposed 
framework for studying the implementation of truth commission recommendations by 
applying it to the Ghanaian and Sierra Leonean cases. By using two contrasting cases, 
it underscores the generalisability and applicability of the framework in that the same 
variables I identified can be applied in any other context in order to understand how 
and why a particular case follows a specific trajectory. 
 
As pointed out in chapter 3, there has been an absence of implementation studies for 
post-truth commissions focusing on what happens to their recommendations. The few 
studies that have been carried out have not been based on any particular framework. 
Given this gap in implementation research, in the next section, I analyse how the 
variables identified in the proposed framework for studying the implementation of 
truth commission recommendations on reparation measure up to the general 
understanding of implementation research. 
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PART V: TOWARDS A STUDY OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
 
“People now appear to think that implementation should be easy; they are 
therefore upset when expected events do not occur or turn out badly. We would 
consider our effort a success if more people began with the understanding that 
implementation, under the best of circumstances is exceedingly difficult. They 
would therefore be pleasantly surprised when a few good things really 
happened” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, xx-xxi). 
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CHAPTER 11:  UNDERSTANDING IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH 
 
11.0 Introduction  
 
In 1973, Pressman and Wildavsky published a book which has been hailed as a 
pioneering exposition on implementation studies (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). In a 
preface to the third edition, they note that implementations tend to be more complex 
than imagined and, “many policies based on apparently sound ideas have encountered 
difficulties in practical application” (p. iv). In the book, they analyse the 1966 Economic 
Development Administrative (EDA) programme in Oakland where they emphasise 
closing the gap between policy design and implementation. Policy design and 
implementation should not be viewed as isolated components of a process but rather 
mutually dependent and strengthening the other (p. 143). They argue that more 
thought should be put into the actual implementation as well as taking the time to 
reflect upon the difficulties of implementation while designing the programme. In their 
assessment of EDA they hypothesise how the programme could have been better 
implemented. This study was pivotal in bringing the complexities of implementation to 
the forefront and precipitated scholarship on implementation research leading to the 
development of definitions, theories, variables and linkages with other disciplines, 
among others. This chapter will focus on briefly highlighting these developments in 
implementation research. 
 
11.1 Defining implementation 
 
What does implementation mean? At what point can we determine when 
implementation starts or ends? What variables are used to indicate and measure 
implementation? Can it even still be referred to as implementation or implementation 
studies when what is taking place is contrary to the stated objectives? These, among 
other questions, determine that it is imperative to get a clear understanding what 
exactly constitutes implementation and the study of implementation.  
 
In a 1987 publication, Lester, Bowman, Goggin, & O’Toole (1987) pointed out that there 
is no precise specification or definition of implementation. As a consequence of the 
definitional issues, there is no consensus as to what exactly comprises implementation 
and therefore no measures, antecedents and consequences of implementation had 
been fully developed. They however point out that a distinction needs to be made 
between the characteristics of the implementation process and the outcome of policy 
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implementation which would clarify the specific activities that can be referred to as 
implementation with the aim of establishing with certainty when or not 
implementation has occurred. 
 
Despite the assertion on the complexity in defining implementation, some scholars 
have nevertheless identified some definitions. Hill & Hupe (2009) for instance refer to 
implementation as “turning intentions legitimately decided upon into achievements” 
p. 117) with the actual process starting from an initial policy decision. According to 
them, implementation can be viewed as a ‘focus’ and as a ‘locus’. As a focus, it refers to 
a range of activities that deal with implementation, and as a locus it concerns the 
interaction of implementing agencies (p. 30). The conceptualisation of implementation 
here is the existence of goals or objectives and activities carried towards fulfilling the 
said objectives.  
 
In their earlier publications, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980, p. 540, 1983, pp. 20-21) 
frame it as the processes of “carrying out of a basic policy decision”. They however 
focus on the policy decision originating from a statute, important executive order or 
court decision. The general characteristics they describe take three forms, identify the 
problem to be addressed, stipulate the objectives to be pursued and structure the 
implementation process. They also point out that implementation by its very nature is 
dynamic and prone to factors such as changes in socio-economic conditions and public 
opinion. The context within which implementation is presented here is putting into 
action a set of government programmes. As pointed out by (Lester et al., 1987, p. 201), 
a key issue in early implementation research focused on government sponsored 
programmes and whether they had achieved their objectives.  
 
Moving away from implementation consisting of objectives and results of the 
objectives, Lester, et al. (1987) argue that implementation needs to be conceptualised 
into three aspects – a process, an output and an outcome. As a process, this refers to the 
timely and satisfactory performance of the necessary tasks. This would answer the 
question of whether what was being set out to achieve by the means of the policy was 
achieved in a timely and satisfactory manner. There is however no clarification by the 
authors on what “timely” and “satisfactory” implies. Implementation as outputs refers 
to the extent to which programme goals have been satisfied. Again, the concept of 
‘satisfaction’ and which variables or measurements would be drawn to determine that 
it fulfils the satisfaction criteria are not addressed in the article. Thirdly, 
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implementation can be looked at as an outcome. That is, whether there is any level of 
measurable change as a result of the policy or programme.  
 
From the above definitions, the starting point for studying implementation seems to be 
after the setting of the goals and there is no reference to the processes that influenced 
how the policy goals are identified and set out. This is not in tandem with how 
reparation goals are determined in a truth commission setting as seen from both the 
literature and empirical study where various factors determine the content and 
framework of both the truth commission bodies and their proposals. 
 
A closer approach however is provided by O’Toole (1986) who states that when we 
talk about implementation, we need to define what aspects we are interested in. He 
identifies two categories of implementation researchers; the restrictive group whose 
focus is on those charged with handling a policy, and the unrestrictive group who focus 
on the entire process from initial statement of policy to policy impact. The second 
approach presents a large scope of study while the first approach limits itself by for 
instance excluding some stakeholders like the actors not officially designated and the 
likelihood of the expected effect of the policy in the real world. In a later publication, 
O’Toole (2000), identifies policy implementation as the range of activities that occur 
between the framing of a policy decision and its “ultimate impact in the world of action” 
(p.266). In the analysis of implementation, he emphasises on distinguishing between 
the actual implementation and impact on the policy, which some have referred to as 
impact studies (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).  
 
Thus, implementation research “concerns the development of systematic knowledge 
regarding what emerges, or is induced, as actors deal with a policy problem (O’Toole, 
2000, p. 266). In a 2004 publication, O’Toole reiterates Lester, Bowman, Goggin, & 
O’Toole’s assertion that there is still a lack of theoretical consensus on policy 
implementation debates. Various theories and variables abound to explain 
implementation results and yet there is a gap between scholars and practitioners 
(O’Toole, 2004).  
 
Similarly, Van Meter & Van Horn (1975) capture the unpredictable and nonlinear 
characteristics of implementation. They view it as “actions by public and private 
individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in 
prior policy decisions. This includes both one-time efforts to transform decisions into 
operational terms, as well as continuing efforts to achieve the large and small changes 
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mandated by policy decisions” (p. 447). When talking about implementation, the first 
requirement is the existence of the particulars, whether goals, objectives or 
recommendation that need to be effected are in place. These are the impetus for the 
implementation and it is when these have been established or identified that the 
implementation phase starts (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975).  
 
Although Van Meter & Van Horn also focus on the policy objectives as their starting 
point, they add in the component of the influence of different actors in the 
implementation process and not just the specific groups mandated with the 
implementation.  
 
In this maze of debates, whereas there may not be a consensus on the exact definition 
of implementation, the general interpretation is of transforming goals into action. 
There is however some disparity on which stage the focus of implementation research 
should consider. Schneider (1982, p. 716) and some of the scholars discussed above 
for instance consider implementation as processes from policy adoption to 
routinisation of operations, activities or tasks governed by the policy. In Schenider’s 
description there are definite start and end times for implementation. Some definitions 
however are broader such as O’Toole (1986, 2000) and consider the elements that 
informed the policy and the impact of a policy on an existing situation as well.  
 
In this dissertation, I lean towards the broader conceptualisation of implementation 
when applied to the implementation process of truth commission recommendations.  
This is because various factors contribute to the design of the recommendations and 
as such, these factors can play a critical role on the policy outcome. This reiterates the 
findings from the literature analysis and perspective of respondents from Ghana and 
Sierra Leone in the empirical study who argued that in order to better understand the 
implementation of the reparations, it was important to factor in the debates, activities 
and the entire context that prevailed before, during and after the drafting of these 
recommendations. A study of implementation needs to critically assess the 
circumstances occurring in the context of the design, defining goals as well as the 
output. As such implementation research consists of understanding the processes that 
led to the formation of the objectives or recommendations and the transformation of 
the objectives into action.   
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11.2  Development of implementation studies 
 
The development of the field of implementation has been classified into generations. 
These have been grouped into first, second and third generation categories (Barrett, 
2004; deLeon & deLeon, 2002; O’Toole, 2000; Pülz & Treib, 2007; Sabatier, 1986; 
Schofield, 2001; Winter, 2006).  
  
In the first generation, scholars differentiate between the top-down and bottom-up 
models. Both models are purported to maximise the probability of implementation 
success. Essentially, the difference between the two models is that the “top-downers” 
start from a policy decision reached at the top of the political system and work their 
way down to the implementers. The central focus of the top-down approach is on the 
central control of the process and the “hierarchical execution of centrally-defined 
policy intentions (Pülz & Treib, 2007, p. 89). Thus, under this model, there are policy 
goals on the one hand and the implementation of these goals on the other with a linear 
relationship. To bridge these components, it requires the establishment of adequate 
bureaucratic procedures. The authors identify three variables pertinent to this process 
– sufficient resources, system of clear responsibilities and hierarchical control to 
supervise the actions of implementers (p. 91). To this end, implementation therefore 
implies “an interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve the 
said goals” (p. 91).  
 
The bottom-up theorists start out with the identification of the actors involved in 
concrete policy delivery at the bottom, then move upwards and sideways. This 
upwards and sideways component, according to (Pülzl & Treib, 2007, p. 93) is in order 
to identify the networks of implementing actors and their problem-solving strategies.  
 
Studies that fall into first generation, such as that of Pressman and Wildavsky focused 
on analysing specific cases of implementation projects and identifying variables that 
explain the success or failure of these implementations. These first generation studies 
were critical in bringing to the forefront the complexities of policy implementation 
although a major critique of this category is the assumption of a linear implementation 
framework from the top to the intended beneficiaries (deLeon & deLeon, 2002).  
 
The second generation studies tended towards theorising on how to successfully 
implement a policy proposal. The top-down theorists in this generation focused more 
on the “institutional, command and control” factors in policy implementation. In this 
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manner, they were quite similar to the first generation linear interpretation of 
implementation. Parallel to the top-down approach was the bottom-up theorists who 
held the assumption that implementation is non-linear and dynamic and consists of a 
number of stakeholders or middlemen facilitating or frustrating the process. The 
attention of this group was on what they refer to as the “street level bureaucrats”. 
These theorists lay emphasis on the view that those affected by the policies needed to 
be actively involved in planning and execution and argued for implementation 
concerns to be incorporated into policy formulation (deLeon & deLeon, 2002).  
 
Elmore (1979) in an earlier publication also discusses this concept in which he talks 
about ‘forward mapping’ and ‘backward mapping’ approaches to implementation 
analysis. Forward mapping is similar to the top bottom approach in that the analysis 
starts from the policy statement and traces the various stages through to the 
actualisation of the policy. This may include the initial policy, the administrative and 
structural measures and the observable effect of the initial policy on the target 
population. The forward mapping essentially has three steps; the objective, the specific 
set of steps for achieving the objective and the outcomes for measuring success or 
failure. Elmore however points out that the principal weakness of this approach is that 
it views implementation as a process in which the policy makers at the top “control the 
organizational, political, and technological processes that affect implementation” (p. 
603). 
 
The backward mapping takes on a reverse structure beginning with “a statement of the 
specific behaviour at the lowest level of the implementation process that generates the 
need for a policy. Only after that behaviour is described does the analysis presume to 
state an objective; the objective is first stated as a set of organizational operations and 
then as a set of effects, or outcomes, that will result from these operations” (p. 604).  In 
prescribing a policy, the policy makers would identify a need, target, structure of 
implementing agencies considering their abilities and resources. They then finally 
prescribe a policy that meets the criteria and resources can be directed at those 
organisational units most likely to succeed. With the backward mapping in mind, 
Elmore argues for a more extensive implementation analysis that goes beyond the rigid 
top-bottom hierarchies but that puts into consideration among others delivery level 
decisions which determine the effects of a policy such as accessibility, availability and 
willingness. These usually are decisions which “cannot be standardised, managed or 
controlled using conventional administrative tools “(p. 614-615). This arguments puts 
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to the fore the role of street-level bureaucrats who usually are the interface between 
the beneficiaries, policy makers and the policy itself. 
 
The debate about the direction, whether top-bottom, bottom-up or backward and 
forward mapping however no longer carries much impetus as there is consensus 
between the various authors about the importance of various variables within the 
implementation framework irrespective of whether they are at the top, centre or 
bottom (O’Toole, 2000; Pülz & Treib, 2007). These studies have generally been referred 
to as third generation studies (Goggin, Bowman, Lester, & O’Toole, 1990; O’Toole, 
2004). These studies focused on implementation research being more scientific, “They 
sought to explain why behaviour varies across time, across policies, and across units of 
government and by predicting the type of implementation behaviour that is likely to 
occur in the future” (deLeon & deLeon, 2002, p. 471; Pülz & Treib, 2007).  
 
As pointed out by O’Toole (2004, P. 322), implementations can sometimes tend to be 
complicated. He states that, “Implementation settings in the real world typically face 
considerable uncertainty and complexity, particularly in networked contexts and 
especially at the initial states of implementation, when routines for interaction are not 
yet in place, modes of coordination and many aspects of implementation action are 
under negotiation, and considerable learning must take place.”  
 
Such a perception is useful in connecting the differences between first generation, 
second generation and third generation or between top-down and bottom-up which 
have been likened to two sides of the same coin (O’Toole, 2000). As such, the decision 
on whether to use top-down or bottom-up should be determined by the context of the 
policy design and implementation, and employ a strategy of comparative advantage. 
For instance where there is no authoritative top or effective central regulatory regimes 
and there exists only a “skeleton secretariat”, implementation could benefit from 
bottom-up analysts who could “indicate ways of mobilizing stakeholders outside the 
official apparatus to lend legitimacy and catalyse effective collaboration.” Conversely, 
a bureaucratic top-down approach could suffice where there is uniform action, stable 
circumstances and possibility for sanctions for noncompliance (deLeon & deLeon, 
2002, p. 318).  
 
Furthermore, in implementation, there are multiple channels of influence and 
perspectives that could determine the actions of the various participants or 
stakeholders along the line as well as the final output. deLeon & deLeon (2002) have 
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suggested what they refer to as a “democratic approach to policy implementation” 
(p.483) which encompasses a more vibrant participation and inclusion in the policy 
formulation before it is adopted. 
 
11.3 Variables for measuring implementation in implementation research 
 
The increasing interest in implementation research through the 1970s and 1980s saw 
the production of a number of variables to explain implementation (O’Toole, 2000). 
With all the number of variables floating around, it becomes difficult to determine 
which ones are crucial and relevant towards implementation or which set would work 
better in studying implementation (Pülzl & Treib, 2007; O’Toole, 2000). In fact Meier, 
as quoted in O’Toole (2004, p.315; 2000:268) has suggested that any new additions of 
variables should be backed by the removal of two existing variables to reduce the 
congestion and duplication of variables. Despite the large number of variables, there 
appear to be more similarities among them than differences with simply different areas 
of emphasis. As such, the following section briefly explains three frameworks from Van 
Meter and Van Horn (1975), Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980) and Mazmanian and 
Sabatier (1989).  
 
Van Meter & Van Horn (1975) create a model to explain programme performance or 
“the degree to which anticipated services are actually delivered” (p. 449). The 
conceptual framework seeks to examine “factors that contribute to the realisation or 
nonrealisation of policy objectives” (p. 448).  They agree that implementation studies 
are complex with a number of methodological difficulties such as defining actors, 
boundaries and variables. Implementation analysis also requires long term study of 
multiple actors which can be strenuous in terms of time and resources. This often puts 
off scholars from embarking on it.  
 
Van Meter & Van Horn propose six variables that affect the implementation process: 
(1) Policy standards and objectives: These define the goals of the policy. Some of these 
have measurable and visible outcomes for instance the number of jobs or construction 
of specific projects while some cannot be easily quantified. The policy documents 
themselves may contain criteria for evaluation or these criteria may have to be 
determined by a researcher. 
(2) Policy resources: The assumption is that once a policy is decided upon, the 
resources to transform it into action are made available. The availability of resources 
and other incentives is critical to whether or not implementation takes place.  
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(3) Inter-organisational communication and enforcement activities: This concerns the 
question to what extent a programme’s standards and objectives are understood by 
the implementers. 
(4) The characteristic of implementing agencies: What are the “formal structural 
features of organisations and the informal attributes of their personnel?” (p. 471). The 
relationship of the organisation to other stakeholders may affect the implementation 
process. 
(5) Economic, social and political conditions: What are the influences of these aspects 
on the implementation process and outcomes and on the performance of the 
implementing agencies? 
(6) The disposition of the implementers: What is the perception of the implementers 
towards the policy? How much do they understand the policy or their role and what is 
their view of it “(acceptance, neutrality, rejection) and the intensity of that response?” 
(p. 472).  
 
This model was however not empirically tested by the authors. The proposed variables 
nevertheless appear relevant in explaining why implementation happens the way it 
does but also as specific variable that can be used to enhance the implementation 
process. 
 
In 1980, Mazmanian and Sabatier proposed a framework which they hailed as 
“generally more comprehensive and specific in its identification of variables, 
particularly with respect to the manner in which statutory characteristics affect 
subsequent events” (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, p. 538). In this framework, they aim 
to “capture the dynamic nature of implementation” by illustrating the effect of the 
interactions between the “socio-economic conditions, public opinion, and other 
factors” on the implementation process. In total, they identify 17 variables clustered 
into three groups: 
(1) Tractability of the problem being addressed by the statute: The authors argue that 
the level of difficulty presented by a problem is a determinant of how it will be dealt 
with. In general some problems are much easier to deal with while some complex social 
problems present greater challenges.   
(2) The ability of the statute to favourably structure the implementation process: The 
basis of the policy to be implemented is the statute and the assumption is that the 
statute is comprised of clear and consistent objectives and a sound theory of behaviour 
change in order to effect change. 
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(3) The non-statutory variables affecting implementation: The authors characterise 
these as the “non-legal variables affecting the policy outputs of implementing agencies” 
(p. 549). They point to variables such as mass media and public support which can 
facilitate or hinder the development of a programme.  
 
These variables generally seek to explain why implementation has occurred or not and 
the premise of this framework is that these variables affect the ability to perform and 
achieve the objectives of the policy. One of the strengths captured in their analysis is 
the emphasis on the interaction between the statutory and political variables in the 
implementation process, an element that is not only limited to decisions with a legal 
backing. 
 
The limitation of the Sabatier-Mazmanian framework however, is that it leans strongly 
on statutory policies which they refer to as “traditional regulatory policies in which 
government agencies seek to alter the behaviour of private target groups” (p. 539). 
Their emphasis on the capacity “of a statute to structure the implementation process” 
(p. 540) leaves out processes that are not backed by a statute. This model is also framed 
in the context of aiming to regulate the behaviour private target groups by imposing a 
combination of obligations and, or conditions such as legal directives or requirements 
for disbursement of funds (p. 539). It would therefore be more useful before and during 
policy implementation rather than post implementation. 
 
In 1989, Mazmanian and Sabatier revisited and reiterated the arguments they had 
earlier raised. They argue that implementation analysis is caught between two 
extremes; the practitioners who seek more practical answers to the question of 
implementation such as what needs to be included or excluded for a programme to 
work and what can they do to get the programme moving. The social scientists on the 
other hand are more theoretical and seek to explain the implementation process 
through a myriad of social, economic and political circumstances. An implementation 
framework needs to be able to synthesise these two sides (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 
1989). In addition to the earlier implementation framework, they stress six conditions 
that they consider most necessary for effective implementation. These are both a 
checklist for programme effectiveness and tasks to ensure implementation success. 
(1) The statute contains clear and consistent policy directives. 
(2) Statute incorporates a sound theory identifying the factors affecting programme 
goals and gives implementing officials sufficient jurisdiction to attain those objectives. 
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(3) The statute structures implementation to maximise the probability of compliance 
from implementing officials and target groups 
(4)Top implementing officials are strongly committed to attainment of statutory 
objectives and have the skills necessary to ensure achievement of the goals. 
(5) The program is actively supported by organised constituency groups and few key 
sovereigns (legislative or executive) throughout the implementation process. 
(6) Changing socio-economic conditions over time does not weaken the statute’s causal 
theory or political support or the priority of statutory objectives. 
 
As in the previous frameworks, there is still a strong emphasis on the legal structure as 
being pertinent to the evolution of the implementation process. Whereas these 
variables and discussions are useful to understanding policy implementation, 
recommendations by a non-statutory institution such as a truth commission present a 
different context. In the discussions above, there is a strong emphasis on the statutory 
component of a policy which in effect gives validity to its enforceability. 
Recommendations that truth commissions make on the other hand do not have such 
power. They are simply proposals left to the discretion of the sitting government and 
other institutions and there is no legal mechanism to ensure enforceability.  
 
Moreover, they also emphasise the need for the availability of resources and other 
incentives to carry out the implementation. These models are presented with a basic 
assumption that there is a legal and institutional framework in which they will operate 
and therefore approach implementation studies from the perspective that the 
proposed variables will ease the process of implementation. Recommendations from 
truth commissions however do not have this luxury. Most times, by the time the 
proposals are made, there is no confirmation or estimate of funds yet to come and 
neither are the institutions for carrying out the implementation in existence. The 
recommendations are made in the hope that they will get picked up and followed 
through or that they remain interesting enough to the different stakeholders such that 
they are sustained through to the implementation.   
 
Despite the uncertainty of the recommendations of truth commission 
recommendations, the above variables can still be relevant to understanding the 
process, particularly before the design and during the implementation. As with the 
approaches discussed in chapter 3 for how the post truth commission 
recommendations have been approached within TJ, these variables are limited to 
addressing specific setbacks in the design and implementation. In this study, I however 
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argue that it is critical to understand the context in the post implementation phase, 
notably the socio-economic and political structures as these could have drastically 
changed which would as well impact on the implementation. 
 
11.4 Application of implementation Research to Truth Commission 
recommendations  
 
According to (O’Toole, 2004), the target of implementation studies is the implementers 
principally or ‘implementation manager.’ Much of the literature has therefore focused 
on theorising implementation such as defining what implementation is and generating 
theories and variables that can be used to explain whether or not implementation has 
or is taking place. Some of the studies also focus on the variables that influence the 
process of implementation and typically measure the success and impact of 
programmes or the implementation factors that may play a part in the success or 
failure of programmes. As put by Van Meter & Van Horn (1975, p.448), the “study of 
implementation examines those factors that contribute to the realisation or non-
realisation of policy objectives.” However, it is critical to acknowledge the dynamic 
situations that are presented in different contexts which necessitate context specific 
responses (O’Toole, 2004, p. 216). ‘Specific elements cannot be put into place in a 
mechanical fashion’ (Palumbo, Maynard-Moody & Wright, 1984, p. 72) as factors that 
worked towards the implementation success in one locale cannot necessarily be 
generalised to other locales. Decades of research on implementation have served to 
confirm that implementation is complex.  
 
Implementation research has also expanded and is being applied in other fields other 
than public policy. Damschroder, Peikes, & Peterson (2013, p.1) have for instance 
applied it in the field of public health. They have interpreted implementation research 
as studies focusing on “how programs are implemented, translated, replicated and 
disseminated in “real-world” settings. It expands the focus of traditional research from 
discovering what works to also discovering how the implementation works in specific 
contexts.” In this context, implementation research is used to enhance the multifaceted 
nature of implementation including the operationalisation, characteristics of the 
setting and other factors as well as the interactions between these components. 
 
Still in the field of public health, Peters, Adam, Alonge, Agyepong, & Tran (2013) have 
argued that despite the confusion about its terminology and scope, implementation is 
nevertheless a growing field that places emphasis on the “scientific inquiry into 
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questions concerning implementation – the act of carrying an intention into effect” (p. 
1). It is also essential for these authors that researchers need to understand what, why 
and how policies, programmes or practices work in “real world” settings. The 
significance of implementation research can be noted in the publication of a practical 
guide for implementation research in health (Peters, Tran, & Adam, 2013). This guide 
which has been designed within the context of health interventions is quite useful in 
connecting theory and practice of implementation as it is common that what has been 
visualised often falls short in reality, and this is not only limited to health interventions.   
 
Pülz & Treib, (2007) similarly point out that the study of implementation processes has 
been limited to within nation states. Following this argument, they explore 
implementation research at the international level within the context of the domestic 
implementation of the European Union legislations. This discussion further reinforces 
the complexity of implementation more so at the international levels where the actors 
have to contend with policy, administrative, structural and cultural differences 
between the top and bottom. These dilemmas raise the question of the general 
applicability of the implementation models out of the context in which they have been 
developed. 
 
Werner (2004) however simplifies the understanding of implementation research and 
frames it in a manner that can be applied in different contexts and fields. He describes 
implementation research as a “general term for research that focuses on ‘what is 
happening?’ in the design, implementation, administration, operation, services and 
outcome of social programmes” (p. 1). According to him, the objective of 
implementation research is three fold: document, assess and explain programme 
experiences. It therefore describes what is happening, assesses if this is what was 
expected or desired and thirdly attempts to explain why what is happening is the way 
it is. Whereas describing the programmes is pretty much straightforward, Werner 
(2004) distinguishes between assessment and explanation as such. When engaged in 
‘assessing’ a programme, we judge “whether or not the programme or policy is 
operating according to some model, norm or standard” (p. 8). In this way, we look at 
the program objectives or goals and whether these are being fulfilled or not. In 
‘explaining,’ we endeavour to generate hypotheses about why the policy or programme 
is operating as it is.  
 
This discourse in how implementation has been carried out in other fields is useful in 
the manner that it takes a concept that has been predominantly entrenched in one field 
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and adapts it to suit interventions within another. It is this approach that is used in this 
dissertation. It utilises the understanding and concepts developed within 
implementation research to support the model developed for studying implementation 
of truth commission recommendations within the transitional justice framework 
where despite the recognition and interest in implementation of TJ mechanisms using 
standardised and scientific criteria it still remains an unexplored area. 
 
11.4.1 What aspects to study in implementation 
 
In implementation research, some authors have argued that a critical issue to consider 
while studying implementation is if there is an existing programme (Schneider, 1982). 
Existence is determined by whether the “elements for carrying out the policy directives 
are present and functioning” such as people, resources and organisations (p. 718).  
 
However, basing whether or not to study implementation on the existence of such 
elements would potentially exclude cases where there was an initial intention to define 
goals but implementation did not take off, a scenario that sometimes happens in the 
context of truth commission’s recommendations. A study of implementation therefore 
needs to move beyond the implementing agency or the output and seek to construct an 
account of the whole implementation account and establish connections in how each 
stage influences the others. 
 
In general, there are usually three broad areas of focus in the implementation process 
(figure 3); the policy formulation, which involves setting the agenda, the policy 
implementation, which is the transformation of the objectives into action, and the 
policy evaluation which assesses the impact of the policies (Blankenburg, 1985). As 
shown in the figure, these are not entirely isolated parts but are comprised of a series 
of connections constantly restructuring the output of the other blocks. UNDP (2009) in 
its handbook emphasises these linkages by stressing that an effective implementation 
and monitoring process requires a good programme and project design while the 
monitoring and evaluation will feed into the formulation and implementation. All of 
these processes of planning, monitoring and evaluation enhance the establishment of 
clear links between past, present and future initiatives. 
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Figure 3: The implementation Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blankenburg (1985) 
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(2007) elaborate in their interpretive approach to policy implementation where they 
argue that these “prior debates and policy meanings have an impact on policy 
execution … implementing actors are also confronted with multiple policy meanings as 
policy formation frequently involves the accommodation of contradicting interest” (p. 
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This position is particularly relevant for recommendations resulting from truth 
commissions because truth commissions themselves are an output of various levels of 
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and compromises on among others, necessity and feasibility and continuous 
negotiations to transform these recommendations into actions. The dynamics that go 
into the formulation of the recommendations are likely to impact the implementation 
and outputs. 
 
Reflecting on the observations both in the literature analysis and in the field, there 
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such seek to fulfil the needs experienced in each country which makes it difficult to 
generalise.  
 
Furthermore, in the frameworks discussed in public policy, the context of many of the 
cases is significantly different. These are mainly statutory decisions or government 
policies which means that there is an implicit statutory interest. In these cases as well, 
there is an assigned pool of resources geared towards its implementation. The same 
cannot be said of recommendations originating from truth commissions. Whereas the 
creation of a truth commission requires official acknowledgement and is empowered 
by the state (Hayner, 2011), the same cannot be said of their recommendations and 
therefore cannot be held to the same standards as statutory decisions.  
 
It is these considerations that influenced the proposal of a framework that could be 
specific to cases of studying the implementation of the truth commission 
recommendations on reparation. It draws on the implementation process in figure 3 
and proposes five key areas of focus in studying implementation that cover the scope 
of the implementation process following truth commissions. These include: The 
context through which the mechanism came into existence (pre-truth commission); the 
formulation of recommendations (framing of reparation), the content of the reparation 
proposals, the frameworks for following up and implementing and the evaluation of 
the results (post-truth commissions).  
 
11.4.2 Linking implementation research to the cases of Ghana and Sierra Leone 
 
While unpacking the top-down, bottom-up and third generation approaches for 
studying implementation above, it was challenging to attempt to fit the cases within a 
specific model. The Ghana case could have benefitted from a top-down study because 
of an apparent hierarchical administration of the implementation. In this instance, a 
decision was made at the top to establish a reparations committee specifying the 
functions and in which government office it is to be located. The funds were provided 
and the decision on how the funds are to be utilised was also determined at the centre. 
Using this approach however would not result in a nuanced view of the implementation 
process. Despite the appearances of bureaucratic procedures, it appeared to be 
directed by one individual, who needless to say got the specified job done. However, it 
was also necessary to reach out to various networks in order to understand why and 
how the implementation process is the way it is since this information proved to be 
difficult to obtain from the one individual.  
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The Sierra Leone case seems to be more complicated to fit into either of the models. 
Whereas the recommendations originate from the top, that is the truth commission, a 
more interactive process to determine the contents of the recommendation took place 
hence the identification of a need preceded the final recommendations. The 
implementation, like in the case of Ghana also bears a semblance to the top-down 
approach. The decision to establish a reparations unit and its functions was a central 
decision however, the decision on funds was more complex and beyond both the 
government and the implementing agency. The Peacebuilding Fund that had the 
authority to specify how the funds should be disbursed devolved this responsibility to 
another organisation, IOM. Similar to Ghana, in order to understand the 
implementation process, the proposed framework for studying implementation calls 
for the study on the various networks and actors and not just the implementing unit. 
 
 The reconciliatory approach of the different models proves to be rewarding for the 
study of the recommendations of truth commissions. In studying Ghana and Sierra 
Leone cases, there seems not to be a linear path to implementation. There is a lot of 
backwards, forwards and sideward movements. The various decisions are determined 
and influenced by a number of stakeholders (such as civil society or the public) and 
other variables (such as resources or politics). Each case would therefore need to take 
into account the specific context and realities prevalent in each situation and move 
away from trying to fit it into a particular model. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a general analysis on implementation literature and sought to 
understand what implementation means. It discussed different variables that have 
been proposed to study implementation however the starting point for these analyses 
are statutory documents and decisions, a critical difference in comparison to the 
recommendations of truth commission which rarely have any legal backing. In a 
number of cases however, the implementing agencies of the truth commission 
recommendations are drawn from the public service and as such are guided by the 
regulations of the public service commission.  
 
The discussion also shows how complex implementation is and highlights the different 
variables proposed for measuring implementation though these have focused on 
identifying features that would enhance the success of implementation. Much as the 
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variables can also be useful in understanding the status of the implementation they do 
not fully capture the complexities that are presented in programmes for which there is 
no statutory obligations such as recommendations of truth commissions. However, the 
ideas drawn from the implementation literature have been useful in supporting the 
proposed framework for studying the implementation of truth commission 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 12: FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING IMPLEMENTATION 
FOLLOWING TRUTH COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
12.0 Introduction 
 
The preceding discussion shows how complex implementation and implementation 
research can be. Between the framing of the policy and the realisation of the objectives, 
various levels of negotiation, interaction between actors and systems, re-framing of 
definitions and expectations take place. Implementation is far from a linear process 
and oftentimes, the policy designers are different and so far removed from the actual 
implementers. Moreover, the process itself constantly changing and programmes need 
to be reshaped and redefined (Pülzl & Treib, 2007).  
 
Based on the discussion in the previous chapters, this chapter analyses the proposed 
framework for studying the implementation of truth commission recommendations on 
reparation. It emphasises that for a comprehensive study, the scope for what is to be 
considered under ‘studying implementation’ needs to be broadened. This means that 
an analysis should go beyond the actual reparation proposals and activities that have 
or have not taken place to include the processes that determined the set-up of the truth 
commission mechanism through to the analysis of why the intended or unintended 
output is the way it is. As such, the purpose is not to propose variables that would 
contribute to the success or failure of implementation of reparations or on whether or 
not programmes have been implemented but rather to suggest parameters that could 
be applied to study the implementation processes. This would contribute to 
standardising implementation research for reparation programmes following truth 
commissions. On the other hand though, the variables could prove useful to both the 
designers and implementers of reparation programmes as key issues that could be 
taken into account during the design and implementation process. 
 
This chapter therefore focuses on developing further the key variables relevant for 
studying the implementation of reparations. 
 
12.1 Key variables for studying the implementation of reparation following truth 
commissions 
 
The discussion in the previous chapter was relevant for understanding what 
implementation and implementation research is and how it has been studied. I 
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however find that the approach it utilises does not give a comprehensive 
understanding of post-truth commission implementation of recommendations. It 
defines implementation as what is happening between the policy formulations to the 
policy output and as such implementation research focuses on this narrow scope. The 
starting point for most implementation research is the defined policy objectives or 
goals while the end point is the actual implementation or non-implementation viewed 
as the existence or non-existence of the stated gaols. There is little discussion on the 
dynamics that went into the production of the objectives or after the implementation. 
The variables that are proposed in implementation research are therefore limited to 
understanding the processes that take place within this limited scope.  
 
The proposed framework for studying the implementation of the recommendations on 
reparation however has five levels of analysis (figure 4):  (1) Pre-truth commission, (2) 
Framing of reparations, (3) Content of the reparation proposal (4) Frameworks for 
following up and implementation (5) Post truth commission  
 
Figure 4: A Framework for studying the implementation of reparation 
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The factors that necessitated the setting up of the truth commission can have an impact 
on the question of reparations as well as how the different stakeholders potentially 
respond to it. The proposed approach for studying post truth commission 
recommendations therefore goes a step back from the proposed reparations to seek 
and understand the different dynamics prior to setting up of the commission.  
 
Using three variables; motivations for setting up a commission, the agency for setting 
up the reparations component on the agenda and the mandate of truth commissions, 
this level analyses the context in which a truth commission was set up and evaluates 
factors such as the debates surrounding the establishment of the commission and 
whether or not reparations featured in these debates, the perceptions of different 
actors, the reparation needs and the ideas behind these needs and the different 
agencies that participated in this discourse. 
 
12.1.1.1 Motivation 
The motivation variable seeks to answer the question of why a truth commission was 
established in a particular case (7.1.1). The assumption being that the primary 
objectives for setting up a truth commission set the stage for how the subsequent 
actions and responses will follow.  
 
From both the literature analysis and empirical study of Ghana and Sierra Leone, 
whereas both cases instituted the same mechanism, the reasons why it was selected 
vary. Ghana adopted it as a response to the indemnity clauses that had been enacted to 
protect the perpetrators of human rights violations during the military and 
unconstitutional regimes. That however does not entirely explain the timing since it 
took place at least a decade after its transition. The emergence of a pro-truth 
commission ruling party gave the impetus for its actual establishment. This political 
undertone pretty much summed up the entire process including perceptions towards 
it and how much it could achieve. Since the change in political party in 2009, there has 
not been significant progress nor expectations for the implementation of the rest of the 
reparation proposals unless as one respondent during the field work remarked, the 
NPP wins the election, then perhaps they might be interested in reviving what they had 
started. 
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The political undertones in Sierra Leone’s case are not so obvious. However the stated 
objective was that the truth commission was viewed as a victim oriented approach to 
bring about reconciliation and healing. From the interviews, it was described as a 
victims’ version of the DDR. This was because of the over emphasis on the combatants 
during the peace process. This is evident in the limited mention it got in the peace 
negotiation documents although a number of the respondents also pointed out that the 
victims were not the priority during the peace negotiations. It was the combatants and 
ex-combatants who posed a real security threat. This refrain about victims not being a 
priority in the peace process continued to be a significant perception in the truth 
commission process and stretching into the responses to the recommendations for 
reparations. Although there were mentions of politically motivated peddling, these 
were not substantiated enough to establish causality between the outcomes and 
political influence.  
 
12.1.1.2 Agency 
 
In considering the variable of agency, it hypothesises the connection between the key 
actors that pushed for the setting up of the commission and thereafter, the inclusion of 
reparations on the agenda and the support towards ensuring that implementation is 
carried out (7.1.2). Was it local, international or a mixture? Often, the influence of the 
agency in ensuring a sustainable process where the set goals are realised is linked to 
their motivations for getting involved in the truth commission process in the first place.  
 
From various TJ experiences, civil society, both local and international have often taken 
the lead role in advocating for truth commission processes. In cases where robust 
implementation of the reparations have taken place such as in Argentina and Chile, 
many of these organisations were locally driven with a stake in the process, mostly 
because they were composed or facilitated by the victims.  
 
In Ghana’s case, much as the lead civil society groups advocating for a truth commission 
were local, they did not emerge in the context of truth seeking. The lead organisation, 
CDD’s core programmes were in the promotion of democracy and good governance. 
With the withdrawal of the ICTJ, it reverted back to its core programme areas and at 
the time of the field work, it was not as an organisation in following up the rest of the 
reparation proposals. 
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The sitting government was also a strong agent in supporting the establishment of the 
truth commission. After all, they had used the idea of a national reconciliation 
commission as a campaign manifesto. Having won the elections, the NPP facilitated the 
process in terms of funding and political support in setting it up. 
 
Similarly, in Sierra Leone, civil society emerged in the context of post conflict 
reconstruction, addressing a broad range of issues mainly in facilitating a peaceful end 
to the conflict and in social service delivery. This was not only specific to victims. The 
victims in the interviews mentioned the large numbers of NGOs that worked with them 
while they were in the amputee camps however these also provided basic services. 
During the peace negotiations, particularly the Lomé agreement, civil society was also 
included however as pointed out by some of the respondents, this was mainly an 
observation role. As such, despite their presence, the truth commission was co-opted 
into their programmes rather than the drive for their existence. Likewise, much as the 
truth commission in Sierra Leone was considered a critical element of the peace and 
reconciliation process, it did not emerge as a principle element of the agents but rather 
as a subset of the bigger peace and reconciliation programme. As described by one of 
respondents, the events that followed after the Lomé agreement created the 
impression that the TRC and victims issues was not considered “premium.” It is these 
responses that were carried on into the post-truth commission implementation phase 
where while everyone acknowledges the importance of victim issues, there is no one 
taking specific responsibility to ensure that they are met. 
 
12.1.1.3 Mandate 
 
The third variable of the mandate analyses how the issue of reparations is addressed 
in the terms of reference of the commission (7.1.3). How is the issue of reparation 
framed? The motivations for establishing a truth commissions and the interactions and 
discourse between the different actors or agents can play a role in how the issue of 
reparations is defined. Where the references to reparations are vague, then the 
mandate will likely reflect a vague approach however, more defined conversations on 
reparations prior to the mandate and likely to result in more specific references. 
 
In both the literature and empirical study, there was little information into the 
processes of how the mandate was drawn up. However, between the two cases of 
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Ghana and Sierra Leone, there were more structured and persistent effort from the 
CSOs in Ghana concerning the drafting of the NRC mandate, including the content.  
 
As has already been discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, Ghana’s reference to 
reparations in the NRC mandate was more specific and direct while the Sierra Leone 
TRC Act did not specifically mention reparations but made references which were 
subsequently interpreted as reparations by the commission. In the interviews in Sierra 
Leone, there were hardly any references made to the TRC mandate while the 
discussions in Ghana, particularly with the CSO members invariably pointed out that 
proposals for reparations were contained in the NRC which were then further 
elaborated on in the NRC. 
 
The motivation, agency and mandate generally set the tone for the commission’s 
experience and the outcomes in terms of implementation. The debates and decisions 
in this context influence the shape the implementation will later take in terms of the 
processes, structures and relationships. An analysis of these dynamics can be of value 
in unpacking subsequent decisions and responses in designing of proposals and their 
implementation.  
 
12.1.2 Framing of reparations 
 
In the second level of analysis, a study of the implementation on reparation would 
consider how reparations are framed. It addresses two variables; how reparations 
were interpreted and defined by the commission and the context that influenced the 
shape of the reparations recommendations. This level of analysis draws attention to 
the reasons behind the framing of the reparations recommendations. From this study, 
the general idea behind how reparations are framed is to make them as easy as possible 
to potentially be implemented. 
 
12.1.2.1 Interpretation of reparations 
 
In the first aspect of how reparations were interpreted and defined by the commission, 
already in 2.2.3, it was pointed out that reparations can be defined in either a broad or 
narrow sense framework. The broad definition encompasses all efforts aimed at 
repairing harm which may include both direct and reparative benefits. This has been 
nicely packaged in the UN Basic principles and guidelines and comprise of restitution, 
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compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition (United 
Nations, 2006a). A narrow approach consists of specific measures or programmes to 
directly benefit the victims (de Greiff, 2006b). 
 
From the analysis of the commission reports of Ghana and Sierra Leone, both 
approached reparations from a narrow perspective. They interpreted it as specific 
programmes to acknowledge, recognise and repair harm directed at a specific group 
that suffered violations. The Sierra Leone TRC however acknowledges the broadness 
of reparation programmes as discussed in the UN Basic principles and guidelines and 
draws attention to its other recommendations which have the potential of providing 
reparative benefits to both the specific victims and the general population who it also 
considers victims (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone, vol. II, 2004, p. 
242). The range of victims in Sierra Leone however necessitated tact in breaking down 
who would and who would not be eligible without eliciting divisions. Ghana on the 
other hand had a clearer victim categorisation, mostly based on self-identification as a 
victim. 
 
The same ideas were also expressed during the interviews. The difference arose 
between the respondents from mainly civil society organisations and former staff of 
the commissions and victims. In both Ghana and Sierra Leone, the former group of 
respondents had a more textbook definition of reparation and this, I would argue had 
more to do with their interactions with advocates of the transitional justice paradigm 
such as international organisations and former staff of other TRCs, particularly the 
South African TRC. The victim groups in both case viewed reparations as specific 
benefits they are to get because of the harm they suffered. It is worth noting that in 
Sierra Leone, I interviewed two categories of victims who bear physical reminders of 
their suffering which has limited their earning capacity. I also encountered a limited 
number of victims in Ghana who were primarily not satisfied with the benefits they had 
received and therefore their views on reparation might be based on their personal 
experiences and not necessarily reflect the other categories of victim not captured in 
this study. 
 
In both cases, the justification for taking a narrow approach in defining reparations 
was to propose programmes that could be easily implemented. By keeping the 
programmes straightforward and specific, they would not require enormous resources 
or changes to existing structures during implementation.  
 
362 
12.1.2.2  Context  
 
The second variable of the analysis considers the context that influenced the forms of 
reparations proposed by the commission. It analyses the existing socio-economic, 
political and cultural conditions that influenced the eventual forms of reparations 
recommended by the commission.  
 
From both the literature analysis and empirical study, despite a similar approach to the 
reparation programmes in both Ghana and Sierra Leone based on recognising and 
acknowledging the victims and the harms, the context that determined which aspects 
to include in the reparation programme was different.  
 
From the NRC report, Ghana’s approach focused on the individual victims who 
petitioned. The petitioners and commission specified explicit harms and computed the 
exact cost estimates for the atrocities. A significant portion of the report, specifically, 
in volume 2, chapters 5-9 contains brief summaries of the victims’ petitions and 
decision of the commission. The context in which the Ghana NRC’s recommendations 
on reparation was framed was to identify specific individuals whose rights had been 
violated and provide acknowledgement and recognition through the commission 
process and reparation programme. According to one of the members of the 
Reparation Committee, the individualised approach to reparation is something the 
Reparation Committee followed up on. They used the list that the commission had 
come up with and travelled around the country to pay according to what had been 
proposed by the commission. As pointed out earlier (7.3), and reiterated by a member 
of the Reparations Committee, the commission had already laid the ground work by 
emphasising that the amounts awarded were more symbolic and a token to 
acknowledge the harm. According to the Committee, the majority of the recipients were 
grateful and accepting of the payments.  
 
In Sierra Leone, much of the discussion from the empirical study strongly reflected the 
views already contained in the commission report. According to one of the former TRC 
staff, it was critical to not exacerbate divisions within the communities. The situation 
was still extremely fragile, more so, the circumstances for which the reparation 
programme would be relevant were widespread, that is, everyone suffered harm or 
loss as a result of the conflict but more importantly, they were in the same situation in 
terms of the living conditions as a result of the widespread poverty and inadequate 
 363 
services. Much as the commission focused on individual victims, these were framed as 
being representative of the general scope of victims.  
 
Furthermore, given that the country was emerging from a devastating war, the 
commission was aware of the various demands placed upon the government in the 
reconstruction efforts. It is because of this context that the commission sought to frame 
reparations as complementary programmes to existing efforts. More so, the specific 
reparation programmes were structured as opportunities to bring the most 
disadvantaged or vulnerable as a result of the war to an equal footing to the rest of the 
community by prioritising their needs. 
 
At the level of framing of reparations, a study of the implementation of the 
recommendations on reparation seeks to understand the commission’s interpretation 
of reparations and the context that determined the form that the reparations take. 
From the empirical research, it was particularly interesting to compare whether the 
views concerning definition and context of reparation by the commission was shared 
by the rest of the population, and in both cases, there appeared to be agreement with 
the views of the commission towards reparation. These shared views however failed 
to be adequately translated into tangible implementations, particularly in the case of 
Sierra Leone. 
 
12.1.3 Content of the reparation proposal  
 
This level of analysis in studying implementation examines the substance of the 
reparation proposal. Already in 3.2 and 3.3, I argued that a number of scholars have 
proposed sets of criteria that would facilitate the designing of reparations with a view 
to enhance their implementation. From the discussion, de Greiff (2006, pp. 5–13) offers 
a more comprehensive framework consisting of seven variables that could act as key 
pointers in designing a comprehensive reparations programme. Below is a summary 
of how the cases considered these variables while designing the reparation 
programme. 
 
12.1.3.1 Scope 
 
In determining the beneficiaries for the reparation programme, both the commissions 
in Ghana and Sierra Leone identified specific individuals based on specific criteria. In 
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Ghana, in order to access the benefits, victims needed to self-identify by coming forth 
to give their testimonies. Additionally, the harms for which they could receive 
reparation needed to be included in the categories identified by the commission 
(National Reconciliation Commission, 2004, vol. 1, pp. 175–180). 
 
In Sierra Leone, the commission distinguished between general and specific victims. 
The specific victims were determined based on their level of vulnerability. The 
commission identified five categories: amputees, other war wounded, children, 
victims of sexual violence and war widows. This categorisation was also influenced by 
the government ability to bankroll a reparation programme which necessitated 
limiting victims to benefit from the specific reparation programme. 
 
12.1.3.2 Completeness 
 
In completeness, the programme designers consider how to ensure that the 
programmes reach the intended beneficiaries.  
de Greiff (2006) identifies two criteria to determine completeness; evidentiary bar 
and structural issues influencing accessibility (p. 6). In both Ghana and Sierra Leone, 
the commissions relied on the testimonies of the victims. The commissions then 
verified the stories. From the discussions with the former NRC staff, it was much more 
difficult to determine some cases than others, particularly where the evidence was 
difficult to establish. This was more so in Ghana where the violations occurred several 
years back. 
 
In terms of the structural procedures for accessing the reparations, both the 
commissions and the established reparation programmes emphasised the need for 
easily accessible benefits. A vibrant outreach programme was employed to raise 
awareness of the commission and the benefits. 
 
In Sierra Leone, the programme was decentralised through the NaCSA structure to the 
district level. It also offered the possibility of new victims coming forward after the 
truth commission and registration processes.  
 
In Ghana, this aspect was not discussed in the commission. Instead, a robust outreach 
programme was utilised to raise awareness. A more centralised system was however 
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carried out with the Reparations Committee travelling to the different locations to pay 
out the monetary benefits. 
 
12.1.3.3 Comprehensiveness  
 
This feature considers whether a programme includes the complete range of 
violations or victims. In both cases, the commissions distinguished between the 
general violations and victims and the specific violations and victims eligible for 
reparations. Both identified these features from the testimonies received. In order to 
ensure comprehensiveness, both commissions proposed both symbolic measures and 
material benefits. In addition to the specific reparations, both commissions further 
proposed far-reaching changes to the socio-political and economic structures. These 
could be interpreted to bring about reparative benefits to the entire society. 
 
12.1.3.4 Complexity 
 
This relates to the different efforts identified by the commission to offer redress. In 
both the Ghana and Sierra Leone cases, the commissions demonstrated their creativity 
in attempting to reach as many victims as possible and offer a wide variety of 
measures. They propose both symbolic and material benefits including monetary 
awards and property returns. Aspects of service delivery are also included, more so 
for the case of Sierra Leone. 
 
12.1.3.5 Coherence 
 
This variable is concerned with how the different measures support each other to 
maximise their value to the victims. de Greiff (2006) distinguishes between internal 
coherence or how the measures complement each other and external coherence which 
is concerned with the relationship between the reparation programme and other TJ 
mechanisms. For internal coherence, the commissions in Sierra Leone and Ghana 
propose broad based programmes that include the different categories of violations 
and victims. This included both the monetary and non-monetary aspects. 
 
In terms of external coherence, both reparation programmes emerge from the 
respective truth commissions thereby linking truth telling to reparations.  
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12.1.3.6 Finality 
 
On whether or not there is a possibility of pursuing other means for civil redress after 
receiving the reparation benefits, both commissions in Sierra Leone and Ghana in their 
reports did not address this topic. This however brings into play the context in which 
the commissions were established. In both cases, there were already limited options 
for civil redress, notably the amnesty process in Sierra Leone and indemnity clauses 
in Ghana. In Ghana however, during the interviews one of the victims stated that in 
consultation with his lawyer, he planned to open a case in order to have his pensions 
which he had been excluded from receiving paid. He intended to use the findings from 
the NRC concerning his case as evidence. He had been unlawfully detained, tortured, 
dismissed from the military and exiled and the NRC ruled that what he had suffered 
was unlawful. 
 
In Sierra Leone, I did not encounter any victims with the intention of opening up a case 
but the reparation programme was still incomplete. 
 
12.1.3.7 Munificence  
 
According to de Greiff (2006), determining the worth of the reparations and its 
significance to victims is difficult to measure. However, following his categorisation of 
the worth of the reparations in monetary terms or the dollar value, Ghana and Sierra 
Leone lie on the lower side of the spectrum. Sierra Leone focused on the non-monetary 
aspects of reparations and only provided the option of monetary benefits in form of 
pensions to amputees, victims of sexual violence and other war wounded with 50% or 
more reduction in earning capacity. It did not specify the upper limit but capped it at 
not lower than 60,000 Sierra Leonean Leones per month.  
 
In Ghana, in addition to other forms of reparation, it recommended monetary 
compensation of between one million to thirty million Ghanaian Cedis.  
 
Both commissions therefore focused on emphasising the significance of the 
commission and reparation programme in recognising and acknowledging the victims 
and facilitating reconciliation over the monetary awards. 
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From the analysis of the recommendations in the commissions’ report in the cases of 
Sierra Leone and Ghana, it appeared that they were structured to reflect the above 
points. In unpacking the proposals on reparation while linking them to the taxonomy, 
a number of the respondents, particularly the elite in civil society, academia and the 
former truth commission staff, expressed views that showed an awareness that the 
reparation programme needs to be comprehensive and holistic. They further agreed 
that the proposed reparation programmes as they are in the respective reports meet 
this goal.  
 
Going by the report and the discussions regarding the reparation proposals, it would 
therefore be logical to assume that the recommendations are implemented, which 
however is not the case, particularly in Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, as discussed in 
9.4.5, alternative measures were implemented as opposed to what was proposed in the 
commission report whereas Ghana mainly focused on one aspect of the reparation 
programme (8.4.4). 
 
12.1.4 Frameworks for following up and implementation 
 
At this level, a study of implementation examines the options availed by the 
commission to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations. Two variables 
have been identified; a structure to guide the implementation and, the opportunities for 
funding the programme.  
 
12.1.4.1 Structure 
 
In terms of follow up and implementation structures, the two cases in this study took 
different approaches. The Ghana commission did not propose any implementation 
structure. The reason behind this, as explained by one of the former NRC staff was that 
the aspect of proposing an implementation structure did not fall within their mandate. 
They were tasked with making recommendations regarding reparation, among others 
and submitting the report to the president, which they successfully carried out.  
 
The Sierra Leone commission in contrast outlined a detailed structure including 
specific parties responsible for each aspect (figure 2). Not surprisingly, the reason 
behind this was to ease the process of implementation. With the foundation already 
laid out, all that had to be done was to set the process in motion. However, based on 
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the discussions while in the field, it appears that the commission underestimated a 
number of issues such as the bureaucracy and legality involved in setting up the 
different units proposed in their structure and more specifically, the enthusiasm of the 
government and other actors in responding to the recommendations. As stated by one 
of the former staff of the TRC, they had no reason to doubt the government’s 
compliance to implement the recommendations because it had shown support and 
commitment to the commission.  
 
Going by the two cases in the study, it is therefore not obvious that one approach 
automatically leads to a specific result. For instance, in Ghana’s case, without a 
proposed structure, there is a more positive outcome in terms of implementation 
whereas in Sierra Leone, the outcome is less impressive and a number of the relevant 
structures have not been utilised in the implementation process.  
 
Considering Ghana and Sierra Leone, it is also important to point out the size of the 
proposals. The number of beneficiaries in Ghana and the breadth of the reparation 
programme was not extensive. It consisted of symbolic measures, monetary 
compensation and a limited education and health service benefits as well as property 
restitution, community reparation and pensions scheme. The most detailed of these 
were the symbolic measures and monetary compensation. From the discussions with 
the former NRC staff, the monetary compensation was the one that required most input 
in terms of staff and resources in order for it to be carried out. Additionally, emphasis 
in Ghana was placed on the symbolic value of the NRC process and reparation 
programme in which the highlight was on acknowledging the systematic violation of 
human rights and the individuals who had experienced these violations. I found that 
individuals were more keen on discussing reconciliation, at the individual and national 
level and whether the whole process contributed to reconciliation, rather than 
dissecting it up to look at specific measures. The actual beneficiaries were keener on 
focusing their discussion on the specific benefits. 
 
In contrast, Sierra Leone’s reparation programme was quite extensive in terms of 
beneficiaries and benefits (6.7) consisting of service benefits in health, education, 
pensions, housing, skills training and microfinance, symbolic and community 
reparations. It involved incorporating these services into already existing government 
programmes thereby involving the different line ministries as proposed by the 
commission. From the discussions, what stands out is that the commission perhaps 
overlooked the administrative and legal processes of incorporating the reparation 
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aspect into normal service delivery. Some of the respondents pointed out that these 
processes such as changing the structures of existing ministries to include reparation 
would need legislative approval before being carried out. In spite of a detailed 
structure, the process therefore stalled due to the legality of setting it up as evidenced 
by the setting up of the reparations unit in NaCSA and the Human Rights Commission, 
key bodies relevant to the implementation programme which was not immediate. 
 
Going by the cases of Sierra Leone and Ghana, whether or not a structure exists does 
not necessarily indicate that the recommendations will be implemented.  
 
12.1.4.2 Opportunities for funding 
 
Considering the opportunities for funding, in both Sierra Leone and Ghana, the Acts 
establishing the commissions made mention of a reparations fund wherein the 
commissions took it upon themselves to propose funding sources for the funds. 
 
Drawing upon Segovia’s (2006a) discussion on financing reparation programmes, 
whereas the commissions did make suggestions on how to finance the respective 
reparations fund, the implementation of these suggestions is weak as there was no 
detailed structure of how this could be followed through to ensure that the funds 
materialise. For instance, they propose that contributions could be got from 
perpetrators but neither commission enlisted an extensive perpetrator participation 
nor proposed mechanisms of how to make perpetrators accountable and therefore be 
compelled to contribute. The Ghana commission proposed for funds to be sourced from 
sale of reconciliation memorabilia however these memorabilia were not produced, 
including the report which would have been a source of funds for the reparation fund. 
Sierra Leone commission proposed for instance a peace tax and revenue from mineral 
resources, among others but there are no details of how these can be implemented to 
generate the required funds.  
 
In both cases, there is a general silence on how to ensure that the funds for 
implementation are sourced either locally or internationally but rather an assumption 
that they will somehow be available. The emphasis on voluntariness and willingness to 
commit by the government and international donors did not materialise post truth 
commission. In Ghana however, one of the respondents mentioned that the 
commission estimated the amount which would be required for the reparation 
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programme which was communicated to the government thus enabling the 
government to plan adequately although I could not verify this statement or amount 
from either the report or further interviews. Such an estimate was not determined for 
the Sierra Leone programme despite the scale of the proposal. In any case, the fact that 
there was an estimate for how much the monetary compensation would cost for the 
Ghana case was linked to the quick implementation in Ghana. 
 
Both Sierra Leone and Ghana highlighted a number of avenues that could be used to 
finance the reparation programme. In both cases however, these were vague 
suggestions without any enforceability mechanism. There was an emphasis on 
voluntariness and an implied sense of government and donors’ willingness to fund the 
programmes, an assumption which might did not necessarily hold. 
 
12.1.5 Post truth commission 
 
This level of analysis in general examines the processes that take place in the 
implementation of the recommendation after the end of the commission. It is at this 
point that the focus of conventional implementation studies lies as they seek to explain 
what has happened and for some studies why it has happened in such a manner. It 
consists of three variables; Responses of the different actors, an implementation matrix 
and explanation of the implementation status. 
 
12.1.5.1 Responses of the actors 
 
In examining the responses of the different actors, a study of implementation considers 
the reactions of the different stakeholders to the report as well as to the 
recommendations. These stakeholders might include, the government who is often the 
main recipient of the report, civil society organisations, international partners and 
donors, victims, general society, the TRC members and other transitional justice 
mechanisms, among others. The reaction of key stakeholders can be indicative of the 
way the implementation is carried out. 
 
A key indicator of government response in the cases of Ghana and Sierra Leone was the 
release of the government White Paper responding to the report of the commission. In 
Ghana, the White Paper was released six months after the submission of the report. As 
discussed in 5.6.1, the tone of the White Paper was positive and the government 
 371 
communicated its acceptance of the findings and recommendations and its 
commitment towards implementation. This positive response was reflected in an 
extensive portion of the recommendations on reparation being implemented and a 
continuation in following up other aspects, notably the property restitutions. In Sierra 
Leone, the White Paper was released eight months after the submission, following 
persistent pressure from civil society groups and growing discontent among the 
general population over fears that the contents of the report were being doctored. 
Regarding reparations, it expressed a noncommittal stance and a vague 
implementation strategy where it already cites impediments to the implementation 
such as resources (6.9.1). In Sierra Leone’s case, the government did not commence a 
reparation programme citing resource constraints until 2009 when funds were availed 
by the UNPBF. Resource limitations continue to be a refrain in the Sierra Leone 
reparation conundrum. 
 
In both cases, civil society activism is credited for pressurising the government to 
respond regarding the publication of the White Paper and public release of the reports 
because they kept up the momentum. They further popularised the work of the 
commissions as well as the findings through wide dissemination of the publically 
available excerpts but also by keeping the conversation going in the media. 
 
From the two cases, the role of other stakeholders was not apparent. A significant 
difference though was that in Ghana which was predominantly a domestic initiative, 
the role or presence of international actors was hardly discussed except in the context 
of support by international organisations notably ICTJ and members of other TRCs. In 
Sierra Leone, the international presence was mostly criticised for abandoning the 
process after the submission of the report. 
 
Stakeholder response immediately following the submission of the report can 
therefore be one of the determinants to understanding the implementation process.  
 
12.1.5.2 Implementation matrix  
 
The implementation matrix variable consists of analysing the output from the 
implementation process by comparing it to the initial stated goals. It basically seeks 
answers to the question of what has been carried out or not since the submission of the 
recommendations and provides a detailed picture of the status of the implementation.  
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An analysis of the post-truth commission processes has been presented in 5.6.2 and 
8.4.4 for Ghana and 6.9.2 and 9.4.5 for Sierra Leone. In both cases, it shows mixed 
results with either a number of the reparation components not implemented as in 
Ghana or an alternative strategy mirroring the actual programme being carried out as 
in Sierra Leone.  
 
A breakdown of what has already been carried out can also be indicative of what is 
likely to be carried out and the perception of the beneficiaries. In Ghana for instance, it 
was indicated from the interviews with the Reparations Committee that the process of 
monetary compensation had been completed and basically closed. It would be unlikely 
that new cases would be taken up and neither would it be likely that other aspects of 
the reparation programme would be implemented considering the circumstances such 
as the change in government. In Sierra Leone, at the time of the field work, the NaCSA 
staff and victims were still hopeful that resources would be obtained and an agreement 
would be reached with the various government departments to launch a 
comprehensive programme like it was intended. Further communication with key 
respondents however revealed that the estimated costs was not realised and it is 
unlikely that a comprehensive programme would materialise in the near future.  
 
12.1.5.3 Explanation of the implementation status 
 
The variable explanation of the implementation status attempts to unravel the reasons 
as to why the implementation process is as it appears to be. It further explores the 
factors that either facilitated or hindered the realisation of the goals. 
 
In conventional implementation studies, a number of variables have been proposed to 
explain implementation. These variables and the approach was relevant in providing a 
basis for which aspects to seek out while unpacking the implementation process. 
However, given the context of reparation proposals and the uniqueness of each 
programme in terms of how specific it is to a particular case, it was challenging to 
generalise the variables. More so, as seen in the literature, many of these variables are 
fluid and as such there is no specific set used to describe implementation as they vary 
from author to author and from field to field. 
 
The approach in this study was therefore to explain the status in each country 
independent of what is happening in the other country. This approach was also 
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precipitated due to the fact that there was no shared knowledge between the two cases. 
I often inquired into the thoughts of the respondents over the truth commission and 
reparation process in either Sierra Leone or Ghana, depending on which country I was 
in and besides a few generalised feedbacks, neither group was keenly following what 
was going on in the other country. 
 
From the implementation matrix, I established that the implementation was not 
carried out like it had been envisioned in both countries. I therefore sought out why 
this was so. Each case had context specific reasons. In Ghana for instance, the issue of 
politics stood out 8.5). The partisan approach to the truth commission and reparations 
was considered to have had a negative effect on the outcomes. Regarding the 
implementation, the general perception was that as long as the current political party 
remains in power, it was unlikely that any steps will be taken to complete the 
reparation programme considering that the previous political party was instrumental 
to setting up the process. It is from this perspective that a number of the respondents 
were vocal about not politicising issues of the truth commission and reconciliation 
processes if more wholesome outcomes are to be experienced. Furthermore, a 
common proposal regarding truth commissions and their recommendations was to 
enshrine legal safeguards to ensure that irrespective of which party comes into power, 
they are legally bound to implement the recommendations.  
 
Sierra Leone presented a more nuanced and complex explanations for the status of the 
implementation (9.5.3 and 9.5.4). The most obvious explanation provided for the delay 
in implementation was the issue of resources to run the programme. Whereas the 
resource issue cannot be underestimated, the responses yielded varied layers to 
understanding the implementation process. A number of respondents, particularly the 
amputees and war wounded group, argued that implementation has been ignored 
because victims are not a priority. Whereas the lack of resources is valid, other 
comprehensive programmes have been carried out such as the DDR, the special court 
as well as development oriented programmes targeting specific groups such as 
children under five years and lactating mothers. The subject of sustainability was also 
equally relevant to the Sierra Leonean case. A number of the respondents expressed 
the view that they had been abandoned by the international community, which 
happened to be the key funders of the commission and they were as well expected to 
continue with the process post truth commission. This point was further linked to the 
different stakeholders, particularly the government and civil society organisations 
which were perceived as not having an interest in reparations thereby contributing to 
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the reduced interest of the international community. Some of the respondents 
nevertheless argued that given that these stakeholders are reliant on the international 
funds, they are hardly in a position to make demands but rather are compelled to 
conform to the programmes determined by the international bodies. 
 
From the responses, whereas there are some recurring themes such as politics and 
resources, the context in which they are manifested tended to be unique to each case. 
This level of the model strongly justifies the inclusion of an empirical component in the 
study of the implementation of reparation as it provides a unique perspective to the 
whole reparation process.  
 
The model proposed above for studying the implementation of reparations following 
truth commissions emphasises a broad outlook beyond the recommendations 
themselves but rather at linkages between the different phases in the pre, during and 
post truth commission as these have a significant influence in the implementation 
process.   
 
Analysing the processes that occur before the commission is established, gives an 
understanding of how and why the reparations recommendations are outlined the way 
they are. It can also explain the responses of the different stakeholders for instance if 
reparations did not appear to be a priority or well defined, it can hardly be expected 
that they will be a priority in the post truth commission phase. Although the literature 
I examined in implementation studies does not emphasise this aspect of what happens 
before the stated objectives, Elmore (1979) touches upon it in his discussion on the 
“backward mapping” of implementation studies in which the reasons for which a policy 
is required need to first be clearly understood and outlined before the objectives are 
defined. This approach focuses on clearly specifying the basic components of a policy 
such as the need for the policy, targets, structure of implementing agencies, abilities 
and resources and then proposing a policy that meets the criteria. 
 
Similarly, the model explores the phase during the proceedings of the commission. It 
analyses how the discourse on reparation is confronted and later framed with a focus 
on how this could have impacted the implementation of the recommendations. 
 
Conventional implementation studies places emphasis on the post policy phase which 
examines how the implementation has been carried out. Likewise, a post TRC phase 
analyses what the intended goals were and how these have or have not been achieved. 
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Additionally, it engages the different stakeholders to understand the dynamics of the 
implementation and its outcome. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter draws on the existing literature and the experience from the field to 
propose a framework that can be useful to studying the implementation of the 
recommendations on reparation. It proposes five levels of analysis: (1) Pre-truth 
commission, (2) Framing of reparations, (3) Content of the reparation proposal (4) 
Frameworks for following up and implementation (5) Post truth commission. Such a 
broad focus takes into account the complexities that reparation programmes 
encounter which in many cases do not just occur while effecting the recommendations 
but a combination of issues that occur before and during the period in which the 
recommendations are made. 
 
In reference to the Ghana and Sierra Leone cases, I highlight the complexities of 
studying post-truth commission implementation of reparation programmes. In 
Ghana’s case, some aspect of the programme, notably monetary and property 
restitution were implemented while in Sierra Leone, an alternative version was 
implemented. This therefore creates uncertainty on what labels to attribute to the 
progress considering the understanding of implementation from implementation 
studies. This therefore reinforces the approach of studying reparation programmes in 
totality and attempting to understand the motivations behind the different processes. 
 
The purpose of the framework is not to propose elements that would contribute to the 
success or failure of implementation of reparations or on whether or not programmes 
have been implemented but rather to proposition parameters that could be applied to 
study the implementation processes. This would contribute to standardising 
implementation research for reparation programmes following truth commissions. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION  
 
Transitional Justice (TJ) has grown in both theory and practice. It has become a 
buzzword in situations where there have been gross violations of human rights 
(Krueger, 2016; Nauenberg, 2015). Much of the focus has however been limited to the 
developments before and during the TJ processes. The amputee victims in Freetown 
for instance recalled that there was a time when everyone wanted to be associated with 
them while they were at the Murray Town camp. They had their pictures taken and 
stories recorded and there was a continuous hive of activity around them. Presently, 
they could only identify one group, Norwegian Friends of Sierra Leone (SLV), a 
Norwegian NGO that has worked with them in improving their livelihoods. 
 
The shift in the attitudes regarding TJ processes is particularly detrimental to the post-
TJ structures which require a sustained long term response. This study sought to 
contribute to the post-TJ discourse by studying the follow up frameworks for truth 
commission recommendations after the end of the commission proceedings. The 
central question of the thesis was “what happens to the recommendations on 
reparations made by truth commissions after the completion of the commission?” Two 
groups of sub-questions were further raised. The first group dealt with understanding 
how truth commissions have approached the issue of reparations and these included 
the following:  
(1) To what extent did the question of reparation feature in the discussions on TJ 
measures?  
(2) What do truth commissions mean when they refer to reparations? 
(3) What are the determinants for the inclusion or non-inclusion of follow up 
frameworks in the recommendations? 
(4) To what degree have proposals on reparation been implemented? 
 
The second group of sub-questions was concerned with how other fields, notably 
criminology and implementation studies have approached truth, reparations and 
implementation. In the first instance, I explore how criminology has interacted with TJ 
and the understanding of truth, truth commissions and reparation. In general there is 
limited crossovers between the two fields despite strong claims on how the two can be 
beneficial to each other’s growth. Secondly, owing to the limited focus of TJ on 
implementation, a second field I look into is implementation studies where I 
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investigate how implementation studies could contribute to the study of 
implementation in TJ. This section included the following sub-questions: 
(5) How can the understanding of truth and reparations in criminology be applied to 
truth commissions and reparation programmes? 
(6) How can implementation studies contribute to the study of implementation in 
transitional justice? 
 
The context in which the central question was set stems from the concerns about the 
lack of follow up of the recommendations made by truth commissions despite 
compelling arguments about the need to transform the proposals into tangible actions 
(Hayner, 1996a; Hayner, 1996b, Hayner, 2011; González & Varney, 2013; González, 
2013; United Nations, 2006b; United Nations, 2013; UN Commission on Human Rights, 
2005). Moreover, there is no established framework that can be used to systematically 
study the truth commission recommendations and the responses towards them. The 
goal of the study therefore was to propose a framework that could be used for studying 
the implementation of truth commission recommendations on reparations. 
 
The strategy undertaken in this thesis was to first of all identify how the question of 
implementation of the truth commission recommendations is addressed in the context 
of TJ. My findings show that insufficient attention has been paid to this issue. In cases 
where studies have attempted to link truth commissions and reparations, the bulk of 
the discussion is focused on either the design aspects of how to make reparations more 
meaningful to the beneficiaries or features that facilitate the implementation. These 
insights are however not enough to explain both the status of the implementation and 
justify why and how the implementation turned out the way it did. An analysis of 
recommendations on reparations shows that truth commissions do in fact take the 
design aspects of the reparations seriously and strive to recommend as comprehensive 
and meaningful proposals as possible. 
 
The analysis of implementation therefore needs to evolve beyond the post-truth 
commission phase and include the processes before and after the establishment of the 
commission. 
 
A qualitative approach was selected for the study which involved a literature analysis 
and fieldwork in two cases studies, Ghana and Sierra Leone. Two field visits were 
carried out in each of the cases in 2011 and 2012 where purposely selected 
respondents were interviewed. The objective of the field visits was to complement the 
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literature findings. In both cases, the issue of implementation of the truth commission 
recommendations on reparations was not popular. In Ghana, the process was low key 
following the payments of compensation to victims and concentrated in the offices of 
the Reparations Committee at the Attorney General’s office consisting of skeletal staff. 
Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the programme was in limbo constrained by operational 
challenges. 
 
In the subsequent sections, I highlight the salient findings with an emphasis on how 
they contribute to answering the research questions. This is followed by the concluding 
remarks and recommendations for both policy and academic work. 
 
The research question and sub-questions 
 
The central question in this study was “what happens to the recommendations on 
reparations made by truth commissions after the completion of the commission?”  
 
In general, after the end of a truth commission, there is not a lot of effort that goes into 
following up and implementing their recommendations, particularly on reparation for 
victims (Aciru, 2017a; Hayner, 2011; Laplante & Theidon, 2007; Parmentier & Aciru, 
2016; United Nations, 2013). Likewise, there is limited examination, both scholarly and 
non-scholarly on issues of implementation. The case studies highlighted in this 
research reinforce this assertion by showing how interest in post-truth commission 
processes was significantly lower after the end of the commission. In Accra, I did not 
identify any civil society organisation focusing on the implementation of the NRCs 
recommendations while in Sierra Leone, a handful of organisations with an interest in 
the post-truth commission were identified. The follow-up however was not being 
carried out in a comprehensive fashion as these organisations cherry-picked specific 
issues to work on. In both cases as well, a number of recommendations on reparations 
have not been implemented. 
 
A key observation in studying the follow-up and implementation of the 
recommendations of truth commissions is that the post-truth commission processes 
need not be looked at in isolation but should be contextualised through a long term 
approach that considers how the different stages impact on the decisions and actors in 
the process. Based on this, below is an examination of the sub-questions. 
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(1) To what extent did the question of reparation feature in the discussions on TJ 
measures?  
 
This question reflected upon the context in which truth commissions are established 
and how the discussions on the inclusion of reparation are framed. As discussed in 
3.3.4, the rationale for the selection of the truth commission mechanism and the 
purpose for which it is established does have repercussions on the discussions 
surrounding reparation. In my analysis, I considered the driving force behind the 
establishment of the truth commission and extent to which reparations featured. The 
two cases discussed in this thesis as well as other illustrative cases highlight this 
assumption and show that where the discussion on reparation features from early on 
in the process during the set-up, there is a higher likelihood of sustaining it until 
implementation.  
 
In Ghana, civil society action played a significant role in shaping the NRC. It emerged as 
a result of the unavailability of other mechanisms with which to address the past 
human rights violations and a key component to addressing the past harms was 
reparation. This aspect is reflected in the NRC act (2000) which among others called 
on the commission to make recommendations for redress of wrongs. A receptive 
government further ensured the availability of resources to establish the NRC and 
facilitate the reparations programme.  
 
In contrast, in Sierra Leone, civil society played a more supportive role during the 
discussions that established the commission. As one civil society respondent pointed 
out, they worked within an established framework that had already been determined 
during the 1999 Lomé peace agreement and the 2000 TRC Act. The priority in 1999 
during the signing of the peace agreement was to bring about peace and get the warring 
parties to ceasefire. Despite the commission being framed around victims, reparations 
did not feature in either the agreement or the TRC Act but was rather introduced by 
the commission and included in its report. My hypothesis is that the late introduction 
hindered the mobilisation of support for reparation. 
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(2) What do truth commissions mean when they refer to reparations? 
 
This question is aimed at getting a better understanding of what truth commissions 
mean by reparations. Depending on the context in which it is used, reparations is 
conceptualised in different ways.  
 
In the first place, I examined the general understanding of reparations within 
transitional justice. Transitional Justice provides a nuanced discussion of reparation 
which comprises of both the broad and narrow definitions. The broad definition 
consists of all measures aimed at repairing harm and offers both direct and reparative 
benefits (de Greiff, 2006; Roht-Arriaza, 2004). The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines 
have identified five measures comprising of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-recurrence (UN General Assembly, 2006). A narrow 
definition on the other hand consists of specific measures to provide direct benefit the 
victims (de Greiff, 2006). 
 
I further examined reparations in the context of criminology and found that in 
mainstream criminology, reparations is conceptualised from a narrow perspective 
consisting mainly of compensation and restitution. However, a more restorative justice 
approach offers a broader conceptualisation of reparations. 
 
Drawing on these discussions, the truth commissions in Ghana and Sierra Leone 
incorporated a narrow approach to reparations with a focus on programmes directed 
at benefiting specific individuals. The programmes in each commission were however 
tailored to meet the broad range of requirements from the different categories of 
victims.  
 
In Sierra Leone, the beneficiaries for the specific reparations were identified based on 
their level of vulnerability and this comprised of five categories: amputees, other war 
wounded, victims of sexual violence, children and war widows. The specific packages 
were determined after considering the victims needs vis-à-vis the socio-economic 
context. The focus was therefore on symbolic measures and facilitating access to social 
services. 
 
In Ghana, the beneficiaries of the reparations were those who identified as victims 
during the collection of testimonies and suffered any of the violations identified by the 
commission (National Reconciliation Commission, 2004, pp. 175–180). In determining 
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what packages to recommend, the commission considered the potential cost of the 
reparation programme and emphasised token value of measures. It focused on 
reparation as a recognition and acknowledgment of the harm suffered by the victims. 
The Ghana commission proposed a combination of one-off monetary payments, 
symbolic measures, social services and community reparations. 
 
Following the discussion in 12.1.3 about the content of reparation programmes in 
relation to de Greiff’s (2006) taxonomy of reparation efforts, Ghana and Sierra Leone 
appeared to have designed a comprehensive programme well aware of the challenges 
of reparation programmes. 
 
(3) What are the determinants for the inclusion or non-inclusion of follow up 
frameworks in the recommendations? 
 
This question addresses the inclusion or exclusion of frameworks for following up and 
implementing the recommendations on reparation. In some cases, commissions 
recommend follow up and implementation frameworks and in some cases, they do not. 
I identified two factors that explain whether the commission recommends a 
framework or not. First, the mandate of a commission may require that it proposes an 
implementation framework. Very few countries have done this such as Kenya and Peru 
where the establishing Act obligated the commissions to make recommendations for 
an implementation framework. In the second case, it is out of the deliberation of the 
respective commissions to elaborate an implementation framework. In most cases 
however, the recommendations are directed at the government or any other institution 
that are typically in charge of establishing a follow-up and implementation framework. 
 
Drawing on the case studies, I examined what the specific frameworks were included 
for following up. In both the establishing Acts, neither required the commissions to 
propose a follow up and implementation framework. However Sierra Leone elaborated 
a follow-up framework while Ghana did not. Although it was not clear why the Sierra 
Leone commission took this route, they proposed a detailed follow-up and 
implementation framework as discussed in 6.3.4 and 6.3.4.2. 
 
The key issue in this part was whether the frameworks provided an advantage or 
disadvantage to implementation. The answer to this was not specific as there was 
mixed results regarding implementation although Ghana, without a proposed 
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implementation framework registered a more positive outcome regarding 
implementation. This result alone is however not enough to establish causality 
between proposal of frameworks and implementation. 
 
 
(4) To what degree have proposals on reparation been implemented? 
 
This part of the study focused on developing an implementation matrix for the 
recommendations on reparations. It compared the proposals outlined in the reparation 
recommendation and the actual outcomes that have taken place. In general, the 
implementation of recommendations on reparations can take any of three forms, 
robust implementations, implementing some of the recommendations or 
implementing none of the recommendations as discussed in 3.1. 
 
For the selected cases, there were a mixed results regarding the implementation. In 
Ghana, a Reparations Committee was established and funded by the government which 
was tasked with implementing the recommendations on reparation (8.4). They carried 
out the monetary compensation however the other recommendations on reparations 
are still pending. 
 
In Sierra Leone, the structure for following up and implementing the recommendations 
on reparation was successfully set up. This comprised of specific units in NaCSA and 
Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone. However, when it came to the actual 
implementation, it carried out what I refer to as an alternative strategy to align the 
reparation activities with the proposed recommendations.  
 
The above discussion aimed at exploring how truth commissions have approached the 
recommendations on reparation in the context of transitional justice. The second 
aspect to the study was to examine how other fields, notably criminology and 
implementation studies have addressed these issues. The salient features are 
addressed in the ensuing section.  
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(5) How can the understanding of truth and reparations in criminology be applied 
to truth commissions and reparation programmes? 
 
From the analysis on the linkage between criminology and TJ, two issues stand out. 
First, mainstream criminology approaches truth and reparations from the classical 
understanding of how crime and justice is supposed to work in a context in which such 
systems are actually in existence and operational. Transitional societies emerging from 
a conflict or authoritarian regime however present a much more complex set of 
challenges that often requires thinking and working outside the box. TJ as a field has 
stepped outside the box and adapted and developed mechanisms and processes, many 
of which more traditional fields might find wanting but can be applied in specific 
contexts.  
 
Second, a significant amount of literature emphasises the marginalization of 
international crimes from mainstream criminology. Given the scale and enormity of 
these crimes, some scholars have questioned as to why the field that specializes in 
understanding crime has kept international crimes under the radar. A number of 
scholars have attributed this to factors such as the rigid definition of crime as well as 
the methodological and theoretical challenges which mainstream criminology has been 
rather reluctant to approach Bijleveld (2008). 
 
Nevertheless, this gap is slowly being bridged. A number of publications on 
international crimes have been published in criminology specific journals and books.  
Additionally, more scholars of international crimes and TJ are broaching the subject 
and vice versa.  
 
Much of the emphasis on linking criminology and TJ has focused on how international 
crimes and TJ can benefit from criminology. This could be both in theory and in practice 
for instance through applying criminological theories and methods to analyse 
international crimes and the TJ mechanisms. Existing TJ programmes can also be 
studied as has been done in this study thereby contributing to the development of new 
frameworks of analysis. 
 
With specific reference to truth seeking and reparations, I however argue that 
criminology could greatly benefit from TJ. These are two of the key mechanisms that TJ 
scholars and practitioners have been preoccupied with and as such have developed a 
detailed body of theory and practice. In reparation for instance, much of the literature 
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in criminology approaches it from a narrow scope of known victim and perpetrator, 
limited range of the types of reparation and a restricted procedure for obtaining or 
awarding reparation. TJ on the other hand seems to have covered various angles 
including instances where the perpetrator or direct victims are unknown or where it 
involves groups or perpetrators and victims. The same can be said of truth seeking 
where TJ particularly through the practice of truth commissions portray the nuances 
that accompany truth seeking. This is an aspect that has not been fully explored in 
mainstream criminology where truth is portrayed as a commodity to facilitate the 
judicial process although to a lesser extent, particularly in RJ and victimology, the value 
of truth has been explored.  
 
Several scholars have argued that there is a positive link between TJ and Criminology. 
I concur with them in terms of how both fields can mutually contribute to the others 
growth and possibly develop a spin off field of Criminology of international crimes. 
Considering that I approach criminology from a TJ perspective, I view it as a field that 
has dealt within the comfortable zone. Comfortable in the sense that it approaches 
crime within the conventional parameters of crime. Whereas it deals with the concepts 
underpinning this study i.e. truth and reparations, much of it is based in this context 
with individualised approaches. In this regard I find Criminology would have a lot to 
learn from TJ particularly in the way it deals with the grey areas of crime for instance 
normally conforming individuals becoming perpetrators, the unknown victims and 
perpetrators and dealing with large scale crimes among others. 
 
(6) How can implementation research contribute to the study of implementation in 
transitional justice? 
 
Implementation research involves identifying and examining the factors that have 
contributed to the realisation or non-realisation of policy objectives. This is however a 
complex process particularly where multiple variables are involved.  
 
From the analysis of the TJ literature on post-truth commissions and empirical study 
in Ghana and Sierra Leone, a key finding is that there is neither a specific approach to 
implementation nor systematic methodology for studying the implementation of the 
recommendations. Implementation is context specific and dependent on the socio-
political and economic dynamics in a particular case.  
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Sierra Leone’s case appears to have had a clear and workable framework and as a 
researcher, I was excited with such a framework because it would provide a step by 
step guide thereby identifying the bottlenecks at each level. This was however not the 
case because on the ground, all of the implementation rotated around one institution, 
NaCSA rather than a decentralised scheme with each ministry playing its role.  
 
Ghana’s case was not entirely different in the sense that the implementation was 
centralised within one body. The advantage it enjoyed was that it received the 
adequate funding to carry out the process. However, it restricted its activities to only 
the monetary aspects.  
 
Fundamental to reparations being actually implemented is the attitude of the sitting 
regime and political coalitions towards reparations. This explains why there has been 
relative success in some cases which might not be considered economically strong. The 
victims in Ghana and Sierra Leone definitely know that if the government and 
international community wanted to get the reparation programme moving, it would 
have already been rolling. The common explanation for the non-implementation, 
particularly in Sierra Leone was the lack of resources to finance the programme as well 
as the detailed structure of the services oriented benefits that necessitated institutional 
changes to be carried out. Such arguments have however been referred to as a tactic of 
the government to complicate the issue by employing “a new technical language of 
procedures and prerogatives … to explain why policies cannot be implemented.” 
(Colvin, 2006:201). This perspective was prevalent in view of ongoing government 
projects. 
 
One of the more striking issues in the study was the position of the victims and their 
role in the whole transitional process. It is impossible to talk about the implementation 
without factoring in the victims. Ideally, a research on implementation would have 
inquired about and assessed the impact of the reparations in the victims’ wellbeing and 
whether the intentions have been fulfilled. But it took a different turn, particularly in 
Sierra Leone where victims were still waiting for what had been promised to be 
delivered.  
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The proposed framework for studying implementation: An integrated approach 
 
This study highlighted the lack of a framework within TJ for studying the 
implementation of truth commission recommendations. It argues that despite a 
number of studies into the post-truth commission developments, there has not been a 
systematic methodology advanced to study how the recommendations have been 
followed up and implemented. The approaches to analysing the recommendations 
have been disjointed. Some of the studies have been limited to the design aspects 
where they propose variables that could be relevant to establishing a robust 
reparations programme whereas others have looked into elements that could facilitate 
or frustrate the programme.  
 
Following the literature analysis and the experiences derived from the field, this study 
proposes a framework that could be used to study the implementation of the 
recommendations of truth commissions. I refer to it as an integrated approach which 
views implementation as part of a long term process rather than an isolated activity 
emerging after the end of the commission. It holds that implementation is affected both 
by the prevailing circumstances as well as the dynamics that existed before and during 
the truth commission. 
 
The framework therefore proposes five key levels of analysis of truth commission 
recommendations on reparations: (1) Pre-truth commission, (2) Framing of 
reparations, (3) Content of the reparation proposal (4) Frameworks for following up 
and implementation (5) Post-truth commission.  
 
This broad focus gives the opportunity to study the complexities of why the 
implementation in a specific case is taking a certain direction. It not only asks what is 
happening with the implementation but looks into why it is happening the way it is. 
 
Final remarks 
 
The central question posed seemed innocuous. “What happens to the recommendations 
on reparations made by truth commissions after the completion of the commission?” It 
however ended up showing the complexities involved following the end of the truth 
commission. The basic assumption following the establishment of a truth commission 
is that its recommendations will be fully or for the most part be implemented. There is 
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significant attention and resources poured into the truth commission process but this 
is usually lacking in the post-truth commission phase as can be seen in the 
implementation stage. Classic implementation studies show that studying 
implementation involves assessing the output against the policy objectives and in this 
way, implementation is deemed a success or failure. It is however difficult to label the 
implementation process following truth commissions in these terms as the results 
show more nuances. Can the Sierra Leone reparation programme be labelled a failure 
for the alternative programmes it implemented that deviated from the original 
proposals or Ghana’s a success for following up on the monetary compensations? 
Studying truth commission recommendations therefore needs to move beyond the 
superficial labels and address the complex details involved in the establishment, during 
the proceedings and after the end of the commissions in order to place implementation 
into the right context.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study examined the linkages between truth commissions and the 
recommendations they make on reparations for victims. It explored issues of 
compliance and/or noncompliance to the recommendations, the follow-up and 
implementation mechanisms and the interactions between the different actors. Based 
on the findings and conclusions, the following recommendations are suggested. These 
recommendations are considered relevant for academics, policy makers and 
practitioners. 
 
Applying the proposed framework 
 
The framework proposed in this study was developed after identifying the gaps in TJ 
and implementation studies literature following both the literature review and field 
work. From the literature, I established that a number of the cases focused on the 
design aspect rather than actual implementation while those that focused on analysing 
specific cases concentrated on identifying key areas that could impact implementation. 
An examination of the selected cases also found missing gaps which necessitated going 
to the field. The framework was therefore developed after identifying the limitations 
encountered both in the literature analysis and the field work. I drew upon literature 
from implementation studies to ascertain if the proposed framework is comprehensive 
in scope. An empirical application of the proposed framework for studying truth 
commissions would therefore be relevant. Additionally, this study was based on only 
two cases. It would therefore be beneficial to test its applicability to other cases as well. 
 
Post-truth commission focus 
 
In researching post-truth commissions, it is striking that there is very limited 
information regarding how their recommendation have been addressed. Almost 
everything suddenly stops with the report. A number of studies have rightly dealt with 
issues concerning the operations of the truth commission as well as how they deal with 
concepts such as truth and reconciliation, among others and how they contribute to 
goals such as good governance and democratisation. This proposal therefore calls on 
more scholarly and practitioner focus on post-truth commission processes concerning 
reparation. This could be facilitated by directing funds and grants for research to 
institutions to specialise on following up the processes set up by the commissions.  
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Longitudinal studies of truth commissions 
 
This study occurred a number of years after the truth commissions in the selected cases 
had already taken place. I noticed a lot of apathy towards issues concerning truth 
commissions because it was considered to have been a completed process. I therefore 
missed out on the raw experiences that determined the direction of the commissions. 
Where applicable, a longitudinal study of a truth commission would be relevant thus 
providing a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the mechanism and 
the implementation of the recommendations. Such studies would ideally take into 
account the before, during and after processes.  
 
Empowering local ownership 
 
In both Sierra Leone and Ghana, there was a visibly low level of participation of victims 
and civil society organsiations in advocating for the implementation of the 
recommendations. The beneficiaries did not seem to be in a position to mount a 
consistent and strong advocacy network to put pressure to implement. Additionally, it 
also seemed that the rest of society had moved on. This proposal therefore addresses 
the operational factors and calls on a long term approach to the mechanism of truth 
commissions. This could be achieved by recognising and encouraging local capacity, 
ownership and direction of the process. Truth commissions need to be locally driven 
in a bottom-up process with the local actors actively defining the process.  
 
Victim-centred implementation process 
 
From the study, my impression was that the implementers have approached 
implementation from a bureaucratic top-down process. In Ghana, the truth 
commission report and list of victims was the yardstick for determining the reparation 
benefits. The victims who felt dissatisfied with either the benefits or the process were 
faced with a cumbersome petition process. In Sierra Leone, the implementation 
process largely excluded the victims in the decision-making processes. This created 
mistrust and suspicion towards NaCSA and the government. This implementation 
approach in both cases does not appear to consider the nuanced dimensions of victims 
needs resulting in dissatisfaction in the overall process. I would therefore recommend 
that the implementation process should as much as possible be victim centred. Such an 
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approach would also consider the needs of the victims that fell outside the scope of 
those identified by the commission for specific reparation. This is particularly relevant 
in the context of Sierra Leone where the beneficiaries of the specific reparations were 
determined by the commission rather than the individual self-identifying as a victim. 
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